Speech by Federal President Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier at the anniversary event "75 Years of the Reestablishment of the Federal Foreign Office" on March 24, 2026, in Berlin:

Germany Frank-Walter Steinmeier · Federal President of Germany

24 March 2026 · Anniversary event "75 Years of the Reestablishment of the Federal Foreign Office" · General Assembly hall, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, Germany

Context
Steinmeier addressed the Federal Foreign Office anniversary celebration in Berlin on March 24, 2026, marking 75 years since the institution's reestablishment.
Main themes
75th anniversary of the Federal Foreign Office, German diplomacy and foreign service, post-war German history and reconciliation, current global crises and international order, role of diplomats in an age of disruption, artificial intelligence and diplomacy, German foreign policy identity, next generation of diplomats, raw power politics and international law, European security
Duration
~29 min
82nd percentile
Words
3,519
82nd percentile
Sentences
164
84th percentile
Readability
50
62nd percentile
Grade
11.6
39th percentile
Syntax
3.09
59th percentile
Vocabulary
2.06
20th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 78%76%
  • Ceremonial 11%10%
  • Institutional 6%6%
  • Economic 3%2%
  • Social 3%2%
  • Technological 1%1%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

164 sentences in 51 paragraphs

A familiar sight, this General Assembly hall. Its name alone marks a claim, an ambition level for the exciting, always challenging, sometimes overwhelming service in this office: to have the whole world in view. That is your job!

I am very grateful to you, Mr. Wadephul, for the invitation. It is a reflection of our friendly cooperation. And it gives me the opportunity to congratulate this venerable house on its anniversary and to express my gratitude and respect to the staff. So: many thanks and heartfelt congratulations on your 75th!

The history of the Federal Foreign Office is your history, the history of the people who represent our country in the world and who, over 75 years, have built trust in our country through their work and just as much through their personality, their humanity, their integrity. This new trust, after the total political and moral disarray of Nazi Germany, was and remains the foundation for the success story of the Federal Republic.

I myself have – as a minister here in this house, but also in the Chancellery, in the German Bundestag, and now for almost ten years as Federal President – come to know and appreciate whole generations of female and male diplomats, of staff from all career paths. Not a few are among my closest companions and friends.

Dear staff, I know that for all of you, the Foreign Service is more than just a job. The Foreign Service is a life decision, a life model – often a beautiful and exciting one for you and your families, often not an easy one, but in any case, one that is of paramount importance and remains so for our country.

The history of the Federal Foreign Office has been made by you, by people. And the future of the Federal Foreign Office will also be written by people. Artificial intelligence may be useful – in managing speaking notes, for example, their multitude, some say overabundance, to which, of course, the demands of the Federal President contribute – I confess my share of the blame.

But especially in this present, in this breathless, highly dangerous moment, amidst political and technological constant disruption, we need you, we need wise female and male diplomats with judgment, communication skills, and integrity. And even if some currently consider diplomacy to be weak and unimportant: In this time of crises and conflicts, we need more diplomacy, not less!

How wonderful that at this birthday celebration, the next generation of female and male diplomats plays a leading role. Dear candidates: I have the utmost respect for your career choice. I am pleased that you, especially in this global situation, in this moment that is anything but easy, say: Yes to working for our country, Yes to the Foreign Service!

As for myself – if you allow me a brief historical detour – my decision for a very political life dates back about 35 years. Until 1989, I could well imagine remaining in academia. In the autumn of 1989, I was just in the final chapter of my doctoral thesis when the wall fell. A time full of possibilities, full of hope lay ahead of us. The German success story after the war – new beginnings, economic miracle, reconciliation, European integration, and finally reunification – all of this seemed, back then, in the early 1990s, to radiate almost linearly into the world and into the future: more peace, more freedom, more democracy. We, I myself, perhaps some of the older colleagues here in the hall, wanted to be part of this development. We wanted to build this world, which should become a little better day by day, without naivety and with much energy, taking with it a piece of the experience of the German stroke of luck.

The contrast to today could hardly be greater. Confidence has become an extremely scarce commodity, especially here in the heart of Europe. The world around us seems to become a little more dangerous, brutal, and at least irrational every day. And to the same extent that the international order, for which we stand, disintegrates day by day, we, Germany, seem to be pushed further to the margins of global affairs. To put it bluntly: the greater our horror at the course of world politics, the greater our inability to change anything about it. "Will the Foreign Service still be needed in the future?" is the guiding question over the discussion in the second part of this event – a bold, an honest question for an anniversary celebration, but one that, simply because it is asked, is concerning.

Ivan Krastev recently made the observation that Germany's current difficulties are paradoxically not a result of failure, but of the success of the politics of our post-war history. Precisely because the lessons of the Second World War are forever etched in our minds, precisely because war in Europe seemed unthinkable – it is precisely for this reason that we Germans find it difficult when raw power politics returns, when international law is disregarded, and for many, historical memory apparently does not even reach back to Iraq, Libya, or Afghanistan.

In short: German foreign policy is facing a fundamental reorientation. The world in our minds must be re-mapped.

At this moment of historical challenge, you, dear staff here in the hall and the many at the foreign missions, are serving our country. The circumstances are, of course, completely different from those in 1951 or during the Cold War, but the strategic challenge may not be smaller than for those who, 75 years ago, paved the way for a new, peaceful, trust-building foreign policy of the Federal Republic.

Why do I speak of such a fundamental change?

Four constants have shaped the decades of initially West German foreign policy since the re-establishment of the office – first:

the division of Germany and its overcoming;

second:

the Western alignment;

third:

European integration; and fourth:

the relationship and dialogue with the East of our continent.

A sober look at the situation in 2026 reveals that three of these four constants, at least for the foreseeable future, have been swept away – which makes the one remaining constant, namely the unity of Europe, all the more significant.

Let me briefly outline the strategic picture: The long-unresolved German question, which occupied us in both Germanys for decades, has been legally answered since 1990. And it has also enriched this office with great colleagues from East Germany. Of course: The internal unity of our country remains a major societal task, but it is – fortunately – no longer a task for foreign policy.

The fundamental constants of West and East, the relationship with Washington and Moscow, have preoccupied all federal governments of the past decades, but are particularly associated with two names, two chancellors: with Konrad Adenauer and his clear positioning of the young Federal Republic in the Western alliance and Willy Brandt with the so-called new Eastern policy he initiated at that time. Both of these constants are experiencing an unprecedented break in our present.

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has fundamentally broken with all principles of the European security order. The effort to design a "common house of Europe" with Russia after the fall of the Iron Curtain has occupied this office and generations of politicians, including myself, for decades. Precisely because we Germans had experienced that the politics of small steps, the politics of dialogue and strength, of deterrence and détente, can be successful – from the beginnings of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe over 50 years ago to the joy of reunification and the eastward expansion of Europe – precisely for this reason, we held on to this effort for a long time – today we know: too long. The Russian tanks before Kyiv have laid all this effort to waste and brought a terrible war to Ukraine. And I believe that even after the war, it will not be about peace with this Russia, but about the calculability of the conflict. In short: Europe must today organize its security against Russia, not with Russia.

The break in the transatlantic relationship since the beginning of President Trump's second term is no less profound. I therefore speak of a "double epochal break" in our time – not because what is happening in Moscow and Washington is the same or comparable, but because both are of strategically overturning significance for our foreign policy.

Just as I believe that there will be no going back in the relationship with Russia before February 24, 2022, I believe that there will be no going back in the transatlantic relationship before January 20, 2025. The rupture is too deep and the lost trust in American great power politics – not only among alliance partners but worldwide. Even a future US government will no longer simply be able to resume the role of the "friendly hegemon" and guarantor of a liberal international order, one that has also brought us democracy.

Germany has painfully experienced in the case of Russia how excessive dependencies make us vulnerable. We had to free ourselves, practically overnight, at great cost from energy relationships with Russia, which we had entered into and deepened over decades, since the first natural gas pipeline deal in 1970, based on mutual rationality and valid contracts.

We must also free ourselves from dependencies in the transatlantic relationship that make us vulnerable. This primarily concerns security and technology. Achieving European sovereignty in defense and technology is not a task for this afternoon, but a generational project. However, the magnitude of the task must no longer be a reason for delay, neither for us nor for our European partners.

The German Bundeswehr must become the backbone of conventional defense in Europe. For this, the federal governments have made necessary decisions since February 24, 2022. And for this, our Bundeswehr needs not only the support of politics but of the entire society. This means: sufficient financial resources, modern equipment, more personnel. If voluntariness is not enough, then we need a return to conscription – I believe, in the best form of a social service time for all, some serving in the Bundeswehr, others in social institutions.

In the technological field, the dependency on the USA is even greater. Therefore, we must not simply accept it. We know that superiority not only means foreign policy power but also the power to influence our domestic politics through digital platforms and social media. The American government has made it clear to us in Munich a year ago that it is determined to weaken liberal united Europe. Perhaps the current conflict between Anthropic and the Pentagon could be a wake-up call, perhaps even an opportunity for Europe. The technological location Europe has talent, has markets, has opportunities, but also ethical standards. And we should build on this quadriga.

Back to the fundamental constants of our foreign policy. I mentioned Adenauer and the Western alignment. What does Western alignment mean today? This is one of the difficult questions of our time to which this house must provide answers.

For 75 years, we have had a close partnership, but time and again also differences with the Americans, even major differences like those over the Iraq War. But we could always say: There is a common foundation on which we can rely, on which we can resolve our differences, to which we can return. Today, that is not the case. The West remains, I insist, a valuable normative ideal. But the West as a political reality does not currently exist.

Therefore, foreign policy realism in this time means: Let us not deceive ourselves! That is what Mark Carney meant in Davos when he quoted Václav Havel's "shield in the shop window."

Realism means: Yes, we must be pragmatic in dealing with this US administration and focus on our core interests. But realism also means: Let us not contort ourselves! The current American government has a different worldview than we do – one that does not take established rules, partnership, and built trust into account. We cannot change that. We must deal with it. But we have no reason to align ourselves with this worldview.

Great powers may survive in a world without rules, perhaps even profit in the short term. That does not apply to us. And it does not apply to the overwhelming majority of states either. That should be the bridge we need right now! That connects us with so many others, especially the rising middle powers around the world.

Since the beginning of my term as Federal President, I have sought contact with these middle powers, states that do not make headlines every day but have much to offer us strategically – and I am quite sure: we have much to offer them as well.

Thanks to the great support and collaboration with you at the Foreign Office and at the embassies, I have been able to travel many, many times in the ASEAN region, in the Gulf States and Turkey, in Kenya, South Africa, Chile, and Brazil. Just last week, I was again in Mexico and some of its neighbors to strengthen our partnership with a world region that is not just the backyard of a great power.

All these middle powers seek contact with us, for they too want, just like us, to reduce dependencies and broaden partnerships. These states certainly do not share all our views and interests, but they share with us a central goal: The world of tomorrow should be more than a duel between the USA and China. But precisely for this reason, these countries are also paying close attention to what contribution we make to stabilizing international rules, to an order that serves all and not just a few.

That is why I am convinced: Our foreign policy must be pragmatic and effective – and where it is not, it must become so. But that does not mean neglecting international law. Our foreign policy will not be more convincing by not calling a violation of international law a violation of international law. We have already had to deal with this in the Gaza War. We must also address it in the Iran War. For this war is, in my view, unlawful under international law – there is little doubt about that. That the justification of an imminent attack on the USA does not hold up seems to be recognized even in parts of the American services. This war is also a politically disastrous mistake and – what frustrates me the most – a truly avoidable, unnecessary war if its goal was to stop Iran on the path to the atomic bomb. The nuclear agreement had already brought us so much further. We have never been as far from Iran acquiring nuclear weapons as we were after the agreement was concluded on July 14, 2015, in which many in this house participated with great effort and for many years. It was the American Secretary of State who said at the signing: "Let us not underestimate the historical significance of this moment: With this agreement, we prevent a war that we Americans would have had to fight against Iran." In the second year of his first term, President Trump withdrew from the agreement, and in his second term, the war is being waged.

International law is not an old glove that we should shed when others do. On the contrary: It is vital for all those who cannot count themselves among the great powers. Even if it is disregarded or violated by some: International law as a framework of order, a rulebook, and a source of legitimacy has lost none of its significance – neither for Germany nor for Europe. In a world without law and rules, this Europe would be lost. For the European Union is itself built on law and rules. It would collapse in on itself if we made the worldview of raw power our own.

Thus, the circle of the four historical constants, with which I began, closes. Three of them have been swept away, but this one remains all the more urgent: European unity, a united and strong Europe, which is no longer just a mandate of our past, but the geopolitical imperative of this time.

The President of the Commission recently wrote in a letter to the members of the European External Action Service: Europe should be a great power. A big word! I am not concerned with whether that is realistic. Rather, I am concerned with the question: What kind of power does Europe want to be?

Europe cannot be powerful if we adapt to the zeitgeist of ruthlessness. We can only do that by standing against this zeitgeist! We must become militarily stronger, much stronger. But that alone will not be enough. We must strengthen what has made us strong. A united Europe has prosperity, peace, freedom, and cultural radiance because we show consideration, because consideration is part of the DNA in Europe: consideration for one another, for opposing interests and their reconciliation, for law and rules, for history and national identities. Let us preserve this European reflex. And who should do that if not you here in this house?

I have just turned 70 and can report: Age has few, but certainly some advantages – for example, that one becomes a bit more relaxed in the face of short-winded political and media trends. In the time since 1998, during which I have been able to accompany and later shape foreign policy, the commentary on our foreign policy has experienced astonishing swings. I remember times when diplomacy with difficult countries was considered indecent, times when everything military was regarded as suspicious or misguided – times when every screw on the armored vehicle had to be explicitly justified in the arms export report and still faced relentless criticism. In 2014, when I supported the NATO two percent target in Wales, public support in my home country was limited. Germany wanted to be a peace power without military strength, but with clever diplomacy to shape the world.

Today, the pendulum has swung in the other direction: references to international law are deemed naive, diplomacy ineffective, foreign cultural policy dispensable, and only military strength matters. I sometimes rub my eyes when I read media comments that dismiss classical diplomacy as the lame arm of a bold, military strength-based foreign and security policy.

It is time for us to develop a mature attitude towards the relationship between military strength and diplomatic wisdom, one that is taken for granted in other countries: that military strength cannot do without diplomatic wisdom.

Dear members of the Foreign Service, I want to encourage you all the more today: Do not lose your compass! You know that German foreign policy will always need four pillars: military strength to be taken seriously; wise diplomacy to devise solutions and forge alliances; also soft power – culture, economy, science – as an attraction for the world out there; and international order as a framework and direction.

I ask you: Do not lose this compass when the political world map is being redrawn today. Be a Foreign Service without arrogance, but with self-confidence! You have so much reason for it, so many role models in 75 years of service history: The first ones who brought this office, with its heavy, also personal burden, onto a new democratic path; also the first women like Ellinor von Puttkamer, who managed to break through a system that was thoroughly male-dominated; the witnesses of world history like those in 1989, who, under the balcony in Prague, which Genscher spoke of, provided thousands of Germans from the GDR on the embassy grounds for weeks; or their colleagues from East and West, who a summer later solidified the happiness of German unity in the Two-plus-Four Treaty during long nights of negotiations; the crisis managers at war and conflict posts around the world, from the convoys in Bosnia in the 1990s to the traumatic moments at Kabul airport and, unfortunately, also currently again in Ukraine and the Middle East; and of course, time and again, the many capable individuals like those in 2020, who at the beginning of the Corona pandemic brought a quarter of a million Germans from all over the world back home, but for that hardly came home themselves for weeks.

I thank you and all those who serve the Foreign Service with so much passion and dedication!

No one knows what the world of tomorrow will look like – not even I. I only know: There is no going back to the 1990s, but equally no going back to the 19th century. Germany will not be at the core of world-historical events, but we will also not be inevitably pushed to the margins. There are simply no historical blueprints for the geopolitical moment we are in. What an exciting moment to be part of the Foreign Service! A service that has so often reinvented itself can and will do so again. Do it well! And trust your compass!