His Excellency the President of the Republic, Gabriel Boric Font, participates in the launch of the Institutional Memory of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022 - 2026.

Chile Gabriel Boric · President of Chile

26 February 2026 · Launch of the Institutional Memory of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022-2026

Context
Boric addressed the launch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Institutional Memory 2022–2026 in Santiago on February 26, 2026, reflecting on Chile's foreign policy legacy.
Main themes
Chilean foreign policy legacy, institutional memory of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic continuity across administrations, international trade and economic relations, Chile's reintegration into the world, global crises and Chilean responses, multilateralism and state policy, acknowledgment of diplomatic staff and leadership
Duration
~44 min
92nd percentile
Words
5,301
92nd percentile
Sentences
238
92nd percentile
Readability
36
26th percentile
Grade
13.8
65th percentile
Syntax
3.10
61st percentile
Vocabulary
2.27
67th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 59%57%
  • Ceremonial 13%12%
  • Economic 9%9%
  • Environmental 8%8%
  • Institutional 7%7%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 5%

238 sentences in 90 paragraphs

Good morning to everyone present.

I greatly appreciate the words of our Foreign Minister, Alberto van Klaveren, and in that regard, I want to thank the team that has accompanied me during these four years at the Foreign Ministry. I remember Antonia Urrejola, as former Foreign Minister, Ximena Fuentes, and José Miguel Ahumada, as former Undersecretaries.

Today, I want to acknowledge Claudia Sanhueza, our Undersecretary for International Economic Relations; Gloria de la Fuente, our Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs; and Alberto van Klaveren, our Foreign Minister, who together have formed a tremendous team.

I want to focus today on Alberto, whose experience has been fundamental in advancing the foreign policy of the State of Chile during these turbulent times. His advice, his ability to weigh different elements in tense moments have been a guide for me, and I truly value that he has been willing to collaborate and lead the Foreign Ministry.

I also take this opportunity to greet everyone who works at the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry is a world unto itself and has all that that implies. But what we can be proud of is that the Chilean Foreign Ministry is a tremendous, highly professional institution. In Latin America – and I imagine in other parts of the world – Itamaraty is often spoken of as a sort of example. I am sure that our Foreign Ministry is up to the task and that all its officials, its staff, its career workers have a professionalism, but above all a commitment to Chile that is unwavering, and for that, I am deeply grateful.

I would also like to mention Carolina Valdivia, who was Undersecretary under former President Piñera – who passed away at the young age of 46 – and who was fundamental in the dispute we had with Bolivia regarding the Silala River. We were with her when the resolution was given, and through the memory of Carolina, I also want to acknowledge all the participants and everyone who was part of – we are joined here by Issa Kort – previous administrations in the Foreign Ministry because, as we said from the beginning, this is a State policy, and we always learn and continue what those who came before us did.

That said, we are talking about certainties in a time of transition. It is beautiful to see the mountains in the background because the mountains are this natural monument that gives us certainty of being in Chile. When one arrives in Chile, the first thing one does is look for the mountains to know that we are here. Chile is here, and I think it is a very precise title to account for what Chile has sought and offered in the international context not only during my term but throughout the last decades.

Because these have always been challenging times. In the last 36 years, former President Aylwin took office as the first government of democracy, just four months after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Former President Aylwin had the tremendous task that was not obvious, not easy, and he carried it out with great, great dignity and great effectiveness alongside his Foreign Minister at the time, to reintegrate Chile into the world. Chile was isolated during the dictatorship, completely isolated from the world, and former President Aylwin had that task and fulfilled it with flying colors and success.

During the early 90s, the order born from World War II was subjected to strong tensions, and we witnessed the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the wars in former Yugoslavia, the Gulf conflict, the brutal genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda. And amid all those turbulences, former President Frei had the lucidity not only to reintegrate Chile into the international scene but to diversify our trade relations and insert Chile into the world from a perspective that we are grateful for today.

I always remember – I was a child at that time – the magazine Topaze, which showed former President Frei, linking him to an airplane and saying that former President Frei traveled a lot. And it was said as if it were a criticism. Today, we appreciate those trips of former President Frei because they were tremendously important for Chile.

Then came the attack on the Twin Towers, the invasion of Afghanistan, and there was former President Lagos who, while consolidating what had been sown, managed to reap what former President Frei had planted in terms of international economic matters with the FTAs, while also impeccably defending the dignity of Chile by saying no to the war in Iraq, with Chile being part of the UN Security Council. At the very moment when the FTA with the United States was being negotiated, at the very moment.

The subprime crisis, the various social movements, the Arab Spring, the global COVID-19 pandemic, so many things that former President Bachelet and former President Piñera had to face during their two terms.

I think of former President Bachelet, who also took up something that former President Lagos had already begun to warn about, taking up the fight against the climate crisis as a banner. Today, Chile is one of the pioneering countries, for example, in ocean protection. And there, former President Bachelet was fundamental, fundamental. To this day, that is recognized.

Former President Piñera had to deal with nothing less than the pandemic, which required global coordination. That was done at the height of the circumstances and allowed us, in Chile, within the crisis that it meant and all the losses we suffered like all countries in the world, to manage that crisis in the best way possible.

But also, note that former President Piñera was the president who recognized Palestine as a sovereign state and opened a diplomatic office of Chile in Palestine in 2011.

Both former President Bachelet and former President Piñera had to deal with legal disputes that required the best of our Foreign Ministry, our lawyers, and national unity, both with Peru and Bolivia, achieving results – at least from my perspective – that were successful and always privileged peace as a method of conflict resolution.

So, I mention all this that was not initially in my speech because it shows that international policy must have continuity, and those of us who have the honor of exercising it for the duration of our mandate must take into account, respect, and learn from what has been done before us. I believe, and this will be judged by history, that we have fulfilled that mandate.

Navigating in a climate of transition and uncertainty seems to be the hallmark of the times. But, although everything we think is solid today seems to dissolve into thin air, from Chile, we say calmly that there is a principle that does not admit fluctuations. Our foreign policy and trade policy decisions are made with a State perspective.

And that has different orders. There are orders in terms of negotiations, in the relationship with the private world, in dealing with different world leaders, in our participation in multilateral organizations, but also in symbolic issues that allow me to pause on one of them.

In January, if I remember correctly, 2024, President Javier Milei took office in Argentina. And a debate arose in Chile about whether I would go or not to the change of command in Argentina. This was debated in light of the evident political differences we have with President Milei. However, I had no doubt, and the Foreign Minister certainly did not either. Because if there is one thing we are clear about, it is that we, who occupy these positions today, are passing birds. We said it explicitly, presidents come and go, institutions and peoples remain. And there we were, as it should be, at the change of command in Argentina, reflecting in that small gesture the character of Chile's international State policy. We are always respectful of the law and international law and think of the good of our homeland and its people.

That said, I would like to situate ourselves in the cycle that calls us and an inevitable question arises, what world is it that we have to govern? Understanding the historical time is part of political responsibility because governing is not just about executing. Governing is knowing how to read the environment in which policies are adopted.

As the Foreign Minister said, who manages to synthesize it very clearly, pragmatic policy based on principles. Politics is always situated. And where do we find ourselves today? Perhaps beyond the contingencies and disputes, the place where we are in the world and which represents the most important crisis that our generation is experiencing has to do with what we have done and what we are doing with our planet, the climate crisis.

Chile has been profoundly responsible in this because we are a medium-sized country. And I convey, we no longer need to say that we are a small country. We are a medium-sized country in the international concert. We contribute, fortunately, very little to the carbon emissions that contribute to the climate crisis. However, we are among the countries that fulfill our commitments made at the Paris Summit.

For example, the inventory carried out at the Ministry of the Environment every year, compliance with mitigation policies, the commitment to be a carbon-neutral country by 2050, the entire process of energy transition, the incorporation of non-conventional renewable energies is also part of our international policy because we know that we live in this world and we must take care of this world, and sometimes that seems to be forgotten.

That is a central element of the world we live in. In fact, one of the first treaties that our Government ratified was the Escazú Agreement, just months after taking office.

Now, we know that we are living in an interregnum that seems – and it is paradoxical for the word – not to be temporary but structural. It is a profound transition of the international system. The rules that organize the world since the end of the Cold War no longer coincide with the real distribution of power in the world.

Just as the Peace of Westphalia once determined how international relations would be in the West, World War II established a framework of relatively coherent norms and rules that coexisted alongside a hegemony, that of the United States, which was capable of sustaining this order by providing the rest of the world with a relative financial stability, general respect for agreements with exceptions, for example, the war in Iraq, with active participation in multilateral organizations and with a very significant contribution to their financing.

Today, as the Prime Minister of Canada, Mark Carney, very lucidly stated, that commitment has broken, and we must not only lament the spilled milk but assume that that commitment no longer exists. Because the power that guaranteed these goods has reduced its willingness to assume that role universally and predictably, while parallelly other powers have accumulated economic, technological, and military capabilities, without fully accepting the inherited rules. This mismatch causes friction, competition, confusion, and uncertainty.

Therefore, the growing and evident paralysis of the UN Security Council in the face of major conflicts is not only a problem of institutional design, it is that, but it is not only that, but it is the visible reflection of a redistribution of power that can no longer translate into consensus. Consensus that we believed to be perennial is now fragile.

But if we pay attention to the details, we will see that we are not facing the collapse of the order, but rather its forced renegotiation, and that renegotiation will likely extend for decades. Because power does not cease to exist; it fills itself in different ways, and the question is how it is being filled today.

That is why it is important to know how to situate Chile in this complex unfolding, and that knowledge begins geographically and strategically in our neighborhood. Chile is proudly Latin American and in South America, first of all, in Latin America, with the Caribbean, our foreign policy does not unfold first in the world and then think of the region in a residual manner. It does so in parallel in our neighborhood, on the continent, in the Global South, and in the international system as a whole.

You saw that a few months ago I went, for example, to the change of command in Bolivia, which might have seemed difficult at other times. Just yesterday, I spoke on the phone about various issues with President Rodrigo Paz. We are embedded in our region, and we must have relationships. Look at when there were fires in Argentine Patagonia, Chile went to offer help. When we had our fires, Argentina came to help us. There, political differences are set aside because we are one continent, one region.

What happens in Peru, Brazil, Argentina, or Bolivia is not peripheral data. It is a constitutive part of our own strategic horizon. Chile is a global country, but it is first and foremost a South American country, and strategically it is from there that we must situate our reflection.

At the same time, we must understand the nature of power in today's world, because power has ceased to be linear and is no longer exclusively territorial. Military supremacy does not necessarily guarantee technological leadership. Industrial strength does not imply financial hegemony. Digital influence does not ensure political legitimacy. We live in a world where various layers of power overlap with one another. Energy, data, trade, technology, security, and respect intersect and intertwine. International politics, then, is no longer a board where pieces move in a predictable manner, but has transformed into a complex network of interdependencies.

For a medium and open country like Chile, this demands a very sophisticated perspective. It is not enough to measure the size of our economy or military power. We must observe technological dependencies, energy vulnerabilities, control of critical resources, and institutional resilience to make the most of the spaces where we can participate with voice, resources, influence, and recognition. Each country has different visions, and each expresses them in different ways. It is not about making a judgment; that will correspond in other spaces, but look at the political situation in Peru, for example, regarding the succession of presidents they have had in recent years.

Chile is not a military power, nor is it a global financial center. Our economy is dynamic and open, but it does not solely determine the course of regional or global trade. However, that does not make us irrelevant. In almost all global comparative indices—Gross Domestic Product, population, territory, foreign trade, human development—Chile is categorized as a medium-sized country, not a small one.

We are an integrated economy, a strategic supplier of critical minerals, a stable democracy in a complex region, and an actor with a recognized multilateral vocation. And it is precisely because of this intermediate condition that our influence does not come from imposition, but from articulation.

For Chile, this ongoing search for a place in the world translates into the ability to advance on three strategic axes. First, strengthen our autonomy by integrating value into our economy. Second, create diverse and adaptable coalitions. And third, maintain our reputation as a stable, reliable country that is consistent with its principles.

In these years of government, we have strengthened ties with India, with whom we are close, I hope, in a difficult negotiation, but making progress towards a Free Trade Agreement.

We signed the modernization of the Agreement with the European Union, strengthening our capacity to absorb technology while providing access to critical minerals. Note that while Mercosur, fortunately, finally signed the agreement between Mercosur and the European Union after much effort, we signed the AMA, which is the update of the treaty we signed 20 years ago with the European Union, where we included, for example, in the aspect of critical minerals that the exchange of critical minerals should be with the commitment to add value to production in Chile. And we discussed this directly with Ursula von der Leyen at one of the summits we attended.

We participated in the Belt and Road Initiative led by China. We also participated in the Oval Office of the White House in the Alliance for Economic Prosperity in the Americas. We participated and were invited to the 19th G20 meeting and the 17th BRICS meeting.

We have maintained a sober and stable relationship with the United States, especially during the three years we shared with the Biden administration. Even during President Trump's administration, our Foreign Ministry negotiated professionally to avoid being significantly affected by the new tariff policy, especially regarding our main export products.

We promote the development of our own capacities to contribute to the energy transition in the world and strengthen our industries through initiatives such as the National Lithium Strategy, the National Green Hydrogen Strategy, and the Continuous Shipbuilding Plan.

We have invested in science, international technological cooperation with many countries, but I particularly mention Chile's entry into CERN, the world's leading particle physics laboratory.

Thus, dear friends, we advance in autonomy that is not ideological neutrality, but the power to make decisions with full independence from external pressures, whether from states or companies that want to make decisions for us. It involves diversifying trade partners, reducing vulnerabilities, maintaining institutional stability, and developing our own technological capacities.

Allow me to also briefly refer to the current situation. Because in this scenario, towards the end of 2025, a reference to the Monroe Doctrine reappeared in the United States' security strategy, that idea from the 19th century, according to which the Western Hemisphere, and particularly the American continent, constituted a sphere of preferred influence for the United States. As some high-ranking officials of the U.S. government have even pointed out in official statements, the "backyard."

In its contemporary version, it has come to be called the Donroe Doctrine, due to the addendum made by the current president. It particularly assumes that Latin America must align with the national security and development criteria determined by Washington and limit ties considered uncomfortable or competitive, under penalty of punishments or consequences for the peoples or elected leaders who do not follow this path.

In practice, this logic is already being translated in several countries in Latin America, where economic, technological, or security cooperation with the United States is conditioned on a subordinate position to this worldview.

This can be expressed in trade incentives subject to political cooperation, in pressures to adopt platforms or technological standards defined unilaterally, or in expectations of security support conditioned on certain geopolitical priorities.

The consequences of this have been manifested in Chile in recent days with the sanctions imposed on officials of our government for merely processing an investment project, reviewing whether it complies with the standards required by Chilean law.

This—obviously—also has implications for Chile and for the rest of the countries in the region, as these dynamics reduce the autonomous space of medium-sized countries to develop and diversify relations with extra-regional actors, especially with countries like China.

Now, this is not exclusively a phenomenon of the United States towards America. Let us see what Russia has done, for example, or what it has tried to do for a long time with the countries of Eastern Europe, regarding the sovereign will of countries to join or not join NATO. It is exactly the same logic. And it is a logic that, at least—from my perspective—as Head of State, we cannot accept.

Our country recognizes and respects the historical relevance of the United States in the region, with its critical aspects, of course, such as its intervention in the coup d'état of 1973. But today, Chile and I, as President of the Republic, but as Head of State—and I have no doubt that this is shared or I hope it will be shared by the majority of political sectors—value having a solid and respectful relationship with the United States of America.

However, we must pragmatically assume that there will be greater pressure for alignment under specific U.S. priorities, while the influence of other global actors in Latin America will continue to be a structural reality.

Chile's task is not simply to deny that tension, but to manage it in the best interest of our homeland, to position itself as an autonomous interlocutor, to articulate principles and concrete work in the region, to defend our strategic autonomy, and to maintain an open insertion without renouncing either the relationship with the United States or the strategic diversification with other partners like China, the European Union, or India.

In the face of any logic of unilateral primacy, the most effective response is functional regional coordination. An example of this is working for a more integrated South America in infrastructure, technology, energy, and risk management, which acts as a strategic buffer. Coordination reduces asymmetries, generates economies of scale, expands margins of maneuver, and strengthens our capacity for collective decision-making.

Because strengthening Chile's autonomy is about expanding our options, not limiting them. It is not about withdrawing from the world or acting in solitude. In a fragmented system, a second line of strategic action for medium-sized countries must be the development of capacities to build flexible cooperation architectures, coalitions that articulate in response to concrete challenges, human security, energy transition, technological regulation, mediation in conflicts, regional integration.

These coalitions do not imply permanent alignments or rigid blocks, nor do they necessarily require sharing each of the policies of the partners we have in these coalitions. They also do not replace the multilateral system, which Chile remains deeply committed to, but rather complement it. They allow progress when universal consensus is difficult and, at the same time, can become platforms of stability in an uncertain environment. I think, for example, of the Pacific Alliance, the CPTPP, the Brasilia Consensus, among many other instances that embody these characteristics.

The United Nations remains the only universal space, and its current weakness does not make it dispensable. It is urgent to reform and strengthen it, with the leadership of backed figures who have a track record and experience. That is why we have decided—not now, not yesterday, but in September 2025—and I want to make this very clear in light of certain controversies that have arisen lately: September 2025—before the presidential election in Chile, to present the candidacy of former President Bachelet as Secretary-General of the United Nations. I believe this should be a source of pride for all of Chile.

Moreover, we have done this together with the two main powers in our region, Mexico and Brazil. We recently spoke with Lula about how we would continue with this campaign, and he told us about the effort he had made to also present former President Bachelet's candidacy to the President of South Korea. You saw that recently as well.

This is and must be a state candidacy that makes all Chileans proud.

Just as with the UN, the response of medium and small countries to the threat looming over global representation bodies such as the World Trade Organization or the World Health Organization or UNDP, ECLAC, should not be retreat or the proliferation of alternative forums and initiatives raised unilaterally only with those who think like oneself.

Defending, strengthening, and modernizing existing institutions in the current context is a strategy for stability and preservation of the International Rule of Law. Hence, the importance of the Global South for the formation of these coalitions. India, for example, is a central actor in technology and industry, and our visit to India yielded very positive results for the country. Brazil influences the climate and regional agenda; that is why they were the last organizers of the COP. The United Arab Emirates mediates in global conflicts and are also partners of Chile; we were there. South Africa articulates multilateral positions and defends human dignity, as they have done in the case of the Palestinian genocide, to which South Africa's coordination also adhered in the United Nations. Peru is also relevant in minerals and has a strong cultural and historical heritage projection.

And if the Global South wants to become a political project with real impact, it cannot aspire to replace one hegemony with another. It must seek interdependencies that are more balanced. Not enemies, not adversaries, but collaborators, since in the end, the world is one.

This is expressed in diversified and non-exclusive trade, in investment in technological development, in consistent defense of international law, in energy transition with clear and equitable rules, in forming more coalitions and coordination spaces among Global South actors. This is not an identity gesture. It is a strategy for stability.

In this logic, South America occupies a priority place—from our perspective. In a fragmented international context, our region has the opportunity to build coalitions in concrete areas, physical integration such as the Bioceanic Corridor, which we have decisively advanced with Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina, and the northern regions of our country.

Digital cooperation and technological interoperability, such as what we have achieved with LATAM-GPT, which we proudly launched a couple of weeks ago here in our homeland.

Coordination in the face of wildfires and natural disasters. How joyful we were to see volunteers arrive from Mexico, Argentina, even Canada when we needed their help.

Energy transition and protection of critical infrastructures.

Antarctic Policy. Chile is an Antarctic country and is no longer just the gateway, as is traditionally said, because Antarctica is here. In Puerto Williams, the southernmost city in the world, we have a Subantarctic Center of excellence that is researching and generating knowledge.

We have built in Chile, our Navy at ASMAR, the first icebreaker in South America, the icebreaker Viel, which completed its first research mission in Antarctica during these months.

We have strengthened our bases; now the Ministry of Public Works is remodeling the runway at Teniente Marsh. We went with the Secretary-General of the UN, prior to the penultimate COP, to Antarctica, to send a message to the world from Antarctica.

And, together with the Chilean Air Force, we reached the South Pole, the only place in the world from which everything, in any direction, is north.

Finally, as a third element, I want to refer to the international reputation that our country has built since the return to democracy, thanks to those who preceded us. And that is why it was important to mention former presidents Aylwin, Frei, Lagos, Bachelet, and Piñera – in their two terms – and all those who accompanied them in the Foreign Ministry and in their work.

Coherence in actions, credibility in what we say, and predictability become strategic assets to continue being a country with a reputation and, therefore, respected. I have seen this, and I say it genuinely, in each of the forums I have attended internationally.

Chile has maintained its reputation by always defending international law, maintaining clear positions in the defense of human rights, relating with sobriety, collaboration, and dignity with all the great powers, and diversifying ties without abrupt breaks.

Allow me to bring up three of the major crises we have faced during our term and what our position has been as a State regarding them.

Venezuela, the Venezuelan tragedy that has experienced the largest exodus after Syria. After Syria, which had a war lasting more than a decade. More than 8 million Venezuelans migrating throughout the continent due to a cruel dictatorship. There were always those who urged us to lower the tone or who asked us not to be so emphatic, “because it is supposed that they defend some flags that we also do.” No, gentlemen.

Regarding respect for human rights, Chile has only one standard. Therefore, it does not matter if it is in El Salvador, if it is in Venezuela, or if it is in Nicaragua. Our condemnation of human rights violations is always the same, regardless of the color of who the perpetrator is.

In Ukraine, today, not long ago, four years have passed since Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Some called on us to act pragmatically, “why should we get involved in this conflict that is so far away?” “No, what happens is that Zelensky is this or that or has such ideas.” “No, it’s that they are the heirs of the Soviet Union.” None of that influenced our decision to condemn without nuance the violation of a country's territorial integrity by another, to demand respect for international law, because ultimately that is what also protects a medium-sized country like ours. Chile condemns Russia's aggression and invasion of Ukraine.

And the massacre in Gaza. There are also those who told us that we had to choose one side or the other. That legitimate defense was or what was happening in Gaza was an inevitable consequence of Hamas's terrorist actions. We said at the UN that we are not available to choose between barbarities. We condemn Hamas's terrorism, demand the release of hostages, and condemn the genocide that the Israeli government is carrying out in Gaza, which has not ended and which we have seen how in the West Bank today continues to displace and occupy territory. We maintained a firm position, despite pressure from both sides, that it was not enough, that it was too much.

But, you know? I had the peace of mind that as we have acted with a single standard in the different conflicts we have faced in international matters, we had the legitimacy to uphold our position. That we will never accept under any circumstances the massacre of a people, the murder of children, women, and innocent men. Whoever perpetrates it.

When sanctions, economic pressures, or technological restrictions replace negotiation, the system fragments. Also, allow me to quote the Canadian Prime Minister when he said that when a power leads each country to negotiate one-on-one, evidently the great power will always come out ahead. This is like collective bargaining. If at the end of the day the employer in their position of power demands from a worker, it is different than if they talk to the union.

That is why it is important to unite. Not only against the current power, but to unite in general and have clear rules. Respect international law, if international law is not an abstraction. It must be enforced.

Forced obedience generates resistance, and countries seek alternatives, create parallel mechanisms, and diversify ties. But we are realistic and know that coercion and threats can impose discipline in the short term. But in the long run, they erode global stability and, above all, trust in those who carry them out.

That is why in this new scenario legitimacy becomes a central strategic resource because reputation, respect is also power, and I assure you that Chile has power.

Dear friends, we cannot choose the historical moment we live in, but we can choose how to act in it. Chile has decided to act with strategic seriousness in the face of uncertainty. Instead of lowering our voice out of fear, we have strengthened it with coherence and responsibility. Chile is and can continue to be a respected actor that acts with clarity and conviction, without subordinating itself to anyone.

This is the challenge of the time to come. Prudence without renouncing ambition, coalitions without losing autonomy, principles without falling into maximalism. Maintaining a commitment to human dignity is not a symbolic gesture; it is the ethical basis that gives meaning not only to our international insertion but to the very act of being in politics.

That is the place that Chile has occupied these four years, and it is the commitment that leaves our Government, this period of Government for the future.

Thank you very much.