Speech by Federal President Horst Köhler at the festive event "Frankfurt – Weimar – Bonn – Berlin, Germany's Path to Democracy" on the 160th anniversary of the first German constitution on the 27th ...

Germany Horst Köhler · President of Germany

29 March 2009 · Festive event "Frankfurt – Weimar – Bonn – Berlin, Germany's Path to Democracy" on the 160th anniversary of the first German constitution · Paulskirche, Frankfurt, Germany

Context
Köhler addressed a festive event at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt on 29 March 2009, marking the 160th anniversary of the first German constitution.
Main themes
1848 revolution and German democracy, Paulskirche constitution, heritage of liberal democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, political participation, social justice, German national identity, pre-revolutionary censorship and repression, European Spring of Nations, industrialization and social change, path from 1848 to 1949 and 1989
Duration
~36 min
88th percentile
Words
4,292
88th percentile
Sentences
180
86th percentile
Readability
31
19th percentile
Grade
14.7
74th percentile
Syntax
3.09
59th percentile
Vocabulary
2.29
71st percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 43%43%
  • Social 22%22%
  • Geopolitical 16%16%
  • Economic 10%9%
  • Ceremonial 8%8%
  • Technological 1%1%
  • Environmental 1%1%
  • Not in focus 1%

180 sentences in 38 paragraphs

"1848 – Heritage and Obligation"

I am pleased to celebrate this occasion. It reminds us how deeply our liberal democracy is rooted in German history. Since 1848, the demand for equal political participation, for fundamental rights, and for the rule of law in Germany has never fallen silent, until all of this was achieved in 1949 and 1989. Since the "Constitution of the German Empire" was adopted here in the Paulskirche and came into force the following day, political power in Germany could no longer rely solely on traditions and privileges – from then on, it had to justify itself constitutionally and in general elections. With the Paulskirche Constitution, the Germans also made their own valuable contribution to the history of freedom in the 19th century. Even though the ideas of 1848 were unfortunately only fully realized and permanently implemented in our country after the Second World War – they are at the core of our democratic tradition and our self-understanding as a nation-state. Therefore, reflecting on what was achieved back then also encourages us to examine the current state of our democratic order and the challenges it faces today.

The revolution of 1848 has its prehistory, it has its own history, and it has itself become the prehistory for the hundred years between 1849 and 1949.

The prehistory of the revolution includes the promise made by the German princes after the victory over Napoleon to allow constitutions and organized participation of citizens in their states. Many of them broke this promise or delayed its fulfillment and even reversed it. Instead, for decades, freedom of expression was stifled, the press was censored, and any critical sentiment was spied on, intimidated, and punished. Tens of thousands of people were imprisoned or driven into exile. It was no comfort that almost everywhere in Europe a similar graveyard silence prevailed.

But the citizens could not be silenced or kept in a state of immaturity for long. Their awakening took shape in many ways, especially through a reading revolution (Thomas Nipperdey). Book production skyrocketed, and the Germans became a nation of newspaper readers. The news press, accelerated by the newly established telegraph lines, created a new sense of time and life, less leisurely, with a broader horizon and a greater sense of change. The new means of transport, the railway, also brought states and regions closer together. The increasingly dense rail network created new hubs for goods, information, and opinions and forced new corporate forms like the joint-stock company for the necessary large investments.

At the same time, social problems intensified. Germany was still on the eve of the industrial revolution, but the population was growing rapidly, and decent work was lacking; the superior competition of the British textile industry plunged weavers and related professions into misery; the exploitation of women and children as the cheapest labor drove down men's wages; and many farmers, especially in Prussia, had been reduced to agricultural laborers for noble landowners or were struggling with poor harvests, especially in the years leading up to the revolution. Thus, there was unfreedom, rapid technical and economic change, and mass misery, and people no longer blamed God or nature for all of this, but rather the prevailing social conditions and especially the princes and their entourage in the military and administration.

In response, they countered the demand for participation and social justice with narrow-minded class arrogance, military violence, and the command that subjects should not "apply the standard of their limited insight" to the actions of the authorities.

Into this powder keg fell the spark of the February Revolution in Paris. It triggered a chain of revolutions in the European capitals. Europe experienced the warmest March in a long time climatically and a true "Springtime of Nations" politically. There were even a series of major European peace congresses. At one of them, Victor Hugo coined the phrase "United States of Europe" in 1849. For a brief moment in history, this vision seemed to come within reach for many. We have become more timid about it today.

Germany experienced the March days as a festival of freedom. Political clubs and parties formed everywhere in the blink of an eye; the streets and squares belonged to citizens' assemblies and public speakers; and city councils and state parliaments were inundated with petitions for the long-awaited political reorganization. Across all social strata, people took a stand for the revolution and demanded freedom, participation, and social justice. This was accompanied by bloody struggles time and again. On a revolutionary flyer here in Frankfurt, it was stated in March '48 that it was printed "at your own risk and self-help." But only a minority took the path to "self-help." The vast majority relied on good arguments and legality.

The heart of this trust in legality and good arguments beat in the Paulskirche. The German National Assembly created a constitutional work under the most difficult external and internal political conditions that was among the most modern of its time. Many of its fundamental decisions were later taken up by the Parliamentary Council for the Basic Law 100 years later.

The Paulskirche has faced various accusations since then: that it was a world-removed and doctrinaire parliament of professors and that it misunderstood political priorities when it first adopted "the fundamental rights of the German people" and only a quarter of a year later the Imperial Constitution.

As for the alleged world-removed nature: On the contrary, many members of the Paulskirche, and even more so of its Constitutional Committee, were particularly experienced in administration and justice. In addition, the best minds from science and business were involved, and it is reported that at least one-fifth of the deputies had worked their way up from relatively humble backgrounds – which does not sound like world-removed. Regarding the alleged doctrinarism: The negotiation protocols and the compromises reached speak a decidedly different language. And the partial pre-announcement of the fundamental rights even before the Imperial Constitution had its good reason: The National Assembly thus established a binding standard of fundamental rights for all German individual states, which decisively advanced nationwide democratization. From this, the conviction can also be inferred that the enforcement of freedom would also bring unity.

The fundamental rights of the Paulskirche Constitution are rightly considered its most important contribution to German constitutional development. They were intended to bind simple legislation and tendentially also the administration and the courts, and they were to be enforceable through legal action – all of this is familiar to us today, and the fundamental rights action provided for in the Paulskirche Constitution to the Imperial Court can be interpreted as a kind of precursor to today's constitutional complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court.

The founding fathers consciously spoke of fundamental rights instead of civil or human rights. They wanted to avoid echoes of foreign constitutional terms because they sought a solution that was as appropriate as possible to German conditions. Therefore, in the section on fundamental rights, they linked very different things: personal freedoms such as freedom of expression and assembly, political and social participation rights such as equal citizenship, equal access to public office, and the right to education, political fundamental decisions such as the abolition of the nobility with its privileges, and institutional guarantees such as freedom of the press and local self-government. All fundamental rights combined and a groundbreaking democratic electoral law for the time were intended to orient the interests and powers of the "fellow citizens" towards the common good and to allow them all to benefit from it. It was less about the defense against the state than about its common construction, about the participation of all in it, and about its constitutional moderation. The individual citizen was understood as an individual and at the same time as a member of numerous life circles. In these, he should live his freedom, and from the good and active cooperation of all these life circles and the interplay of fundamental rights exercise, one expected the purification of egoisms and group interests and, as a result, the promotion of the common good. This may seem idealistic in retrospect, but we continue to struggle for a reasonable balance between individual interests and the common good and will always do so.

For this rather cooperative and state-oriented understanding of fundamental rights, local communities in municipalities and cities naturally had special significance. At that time, they were mostly still small and manageable, people knew each other, and were mutually dependent in many ways. The Paulskirche Constitution granted municipalities self-government as a space for their independent contribution to state building. The German Association of Cities published the study "Hostility to Cities in German History" in its series in 2003 – the Paulskirche Constitution is noted in it as a shining exception.

It is fascinating how strongly the deputies relied on education and equal access to educational opportunities for the construction of the state. "Constitution and law are empty words for a people without education," it was stated as justification. The Frankfurt Imperial Constitution mandated a comprehensive public school system and made the teachers employed therein civil servants – until then, many elementary school teachers had to make a living through side jobs as sextons, gardeners, or small traders. Attendance at elementary schools and lower vocational schools was to be free of charge, and gifted children from poor families were to be granted free instruction even in higher schools. Incidentally, the entire education system from kindergarten to university was understood as an organic whole, and experimentation with different educational methods was to be allowed. This seems remarkably modern. The question is: Have we today realized everything that the Forty-Eighters aspired to, and is our education system developing in the right direction?

Education and science were to serve the political rise of Germany, and political education was to ensure the good governance of the country: Press censorship was categorically abolished because a free press was understood as essential for political freedom. Not only that: All concessions and special burdens on printed materials were also prohibited to prevent the daily press from being "in the hands of the rich" and to facilitate the supply of rural areas and ordinary people with affordable newspapers and books. It was about, as it was stated in the discussions, "promoting the intellectual and political education (...) and freedom of the people." With this, the Paulskirche also demonstrated foresight.

The National Assembly did not only address social justice with school freedom. The most significant step was the abolition of oppressive noble privileges. The feudal hunting privilege on foreign land alone endangered the livelihoods of farmers through enormous crop damage. The indivisibility of large land ownership was considered one of the main causes of rural pauperism and was abolished – the rural proletariat should finally be able to acquire property through diligence and frugality. And the burdens and obligations attached to land, such as the so-called "tithe," were definitively abolished against compensation to the mostly noble beneficiaries. The tax and judicial privileges of the nobility were also abolished.

Furthermore, the Paulskirche had already engaged in intensive debates regarding labor protection and competition law, social fundamental rights, and a state economic and employment policy in connection with the regulations on occupational freedom and tax justice. This was also groundbreaking, and during the discussion of a legal trade regulation, a draft was even developed from within the parliament that contained an early model for operational co-determination, which was soon successfully practiced in the textile industry – unfortunately without making a lasting impact. These beginnings of our social federal state and the social market economy also deserve to be remembered and honored.

However, the Paulskirche Constitution was also a child of its time. For example, it knew nothing of the political equality of women. It also did not provide for a parliamentary democracy, meaning the dependence of the government on election or confirmation by parliament. Instead, the head of state, the emperor, was to appoint the government and could dissolve parliament at any time, while parliament could not overthrow the government but only had legislative powers and the budgetary right.

The Frankfurt Constitution was also an expression of a comprehensive compromise among the major political movements of the time in the country. It certainly reflected the will of the people. Three-quarters of the German states recognized it, and it is the only German constitution for which broad segments of the population fought for its validity. This struggle against Vienna and Berlin was hopeless from the very beginning. Nevertheless, the question remains: What development might Germany have taken under the Paulskirche Constitution?

We only know the path Germany took without it, how the failure of the revolution became the prehistory of the following hundred years. This can only be sketched out here, but it must be shown. Indeed, the Paulskirche Constitution was not forgotten; it was defended in some German states even after the explicit repeal of fundamental rights by the German Confederation, for example, by continuing to pursue its goals at the state legislative level. Many who participated in the deliberations of the Paulskirche later took on political responsibility again and carried on its ideas. But that was only a faint reflection. For the reaction once again massively suppressed freedom of opinion, press, and association, driving thousands into exile (Baden, Mecklenburg, and Württemberg are said to have lost five percent of their population at that time!), it introduced a three-class voting system instead of equal voting rights, it hindered modernization and liberalization in legislation with its preserved privileges, and it changed the recruitment of high state leadership personnel from noble privilege to party patronage and the new networking of old cliques.

The fundamental rights of the Frankfurt Constitution had no opportunity to permeate Germany with their immediate validity and to shape it in a free manner. Perhaps it would have become a different country? Instead, citizens were pushed out of politics. Bismarck borrowed heavily from the Paulskirche for the constitution of the North German Confederation and for the Imperial Constitution of 1871, but he weakened the democratic dimension and the rights of Parliament and strengthened princely sovereignty. "Must Americans" like Friedrich Hecker and Carl Schurz felt uncomfortable during later visits. Unity was merely the body, Hecker argued, but it still lacked its soul, freedom. And Schurz found that while unity had been achieved, freedom had been postponed. The victorious campaigns of 1864, 1866, and 1870/71 conferred a halo and complacency on the military and its leaders, which contributed massively to the militarization of society as a whole. And if in the Paulskirche foreign policy had been so nationalistic that Robert Blum warned that one could just as well "declare war on the whole world," then citizens and their representatives became even less accustomed to self-aware modesty after 1871. The German high festivals and household gods were now called Sedan Day and Fleet Program and Place in the Sun. The political parties in the Reichstag were denied the opportunity to exercise governmental responsibility. While the factions and parties that had begun to form in the Paulskirche still felt and heeded the salutary compulsion to compromise, the Reichstag parties cultivated their ideological principles and mutual prejudices more. The German Empire only became a parliamentary democracy towards the end of the First World War, and this proved to be a poisoned gift, as the old elites stepped down without taking responsibility for the catastrophe and subsequently accused the democratic parties and men like Ebert and Erzberger of treason. The Germans now had a democracy, but unlike in 1848, there was a lack of democrats, and in the Weimar Constitution, a powerful substitute monarch was created in the figure of the Reich President. Truly, the failure of the Paulskirche Constitution has cast a long shadow!

We should therefore appreciate all the more what has been achieved since 1949. In our free democracy and in the pervasive validity of fundamental rights that shape all areas of life, the central aspirations of 1848 have been realized. At the same time, our Basic Law gains a historical depth dimension through its reference to the Paulskirche Constitution, which is all the more impressive because we know that the constitution fathers of 1849 also connected to many free traditions and aspirations of German history. And it is also true: All of this was consciously or unconsciously chosen and desired by the people in the GDR when they paved the way for the unity of Germany in a peaceful revolution.

We should cultivate the memory of this prehistory of our freedom much more strongly. Why are there so few streets and squares named after the men of 1848, after Beseler and Gagern and Simson and Welcker, after Kinkel and Dahlmann and Unruh and Blum? When will the life of Carl Schurz be filmed, which was more exciting than many a novel? And when will someone distill a collection of sources from the writings, negotiation protocols, and pamphlets of that time that can stand alongside the American Federalist Papers and Antifederalist Papers?

We should also calmly try to view our constitutional reality through the eyes of the Forty-Eighters: What would they say about the state of municipalities and local self-government, about the quality of the press, radio, and television, and about the state of political education? Would they perhaps insist on much stronger separation of competencies when looking at the federal-state relationship? Would they remind us, in light of some blockages in the Bundesrat, that the Paulskirche Constitution granted representatives of the federal states a free mandate like that in the American Senate?

Engaging with the revolution of 160 years ago also sharpens our view of the challenges our democracy faces today. Back then, people were pushing for democratic participation. They expected a fundamental improvement in their living conditions from it. Today, political disinterest is growing in Germany, there is dissatisfaction with how slowly and opaquely our state functions, disappointment over how little immediate influence citizens and voters seem to have on it, and skepticism about whether state democracy can still cope with major, cross-border challenges or has long since relinquished control to inter- and supranational economic interests and large bureaucracies.

Yet we face similarly pressing tasks as those for which the call for democracy was raised back then: Back then, it was about enabling equal citizen rights against undeserved dominance, socially shaping the industrial revolution, and achieving state unity. Today, it is about completing European unification, triggering an ecological industrial revolution, and advocating for human dignity and against mass poverty worldwide. I am convinced: We will only succeed if we strengthen and invigorate the principle of democracy at all levels, in Germany, in the European Union, and in the global coexistence of nations.

Therefore, we should work even further in Germany on a reorganization of federal-state relations. The goal should be to create more democratic transparency and accountability. It is important that representatives of the people and citizens at the federal, state, and municipal levels know the costs of decisions as far in advance as possible. They should finance them from their own resources and not be able to pass them on to others. We should also discuss changes to the electoral law that give voters more influence over which candidates receive a mandate on the party lists – it does not always have to be those at the top. Therefore, we need democracy as a way of life in all areas of coexistence, we need many opportunities and offers in schools and society that invite young and old to share responsibility and maturity and accustom them to the taste of democratic self-determination. This way, an ethos grows that connects citizens and makes them willing to endure the efforts that democratic engagement and free voting processes inevitably entail.

We must do this for our democratic self-determination – and more. Let us consider the European Union: Germany, like all member states, has transferred a multitude of decision-making rights to it. Accordingly, the actions of the EU permeate and influence our daily lives – it concerns us all. We must therefore pay close attention to ensure that this action is democratically controlled and guided. Therefore, we Germans should not only closely follow the European policy-making of the Bundestag and the federal government, of state governments and state parliaments, but we also have a great interest in strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the European Parliament, in expanding its powers accordingly, and in ensuring that the significance of national parliaments is appropriately recognized at the European level. The Lisbon Treaty provides significant improvements in this regard. It would be an important step towards the necessary further democratization of the European Union.

The Federal Republic of Germany naturally advocates the principle of democracy in its foreign policy as well. However, in international relations, there has never been such an intense democratic dimension as that enshrined in our constitution and in European Union law; and a world state with world democracy and world government remains a utopia. Instead, the principles of state equality and state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs still largely prevail, which in turn stems from the respect that each nation determines its own fate, and we therefore cannot simply assume or impose the Western model of democracy as universally binding.

Against this backdrop, we will have to deal with unfinished and unsatisfactory situations for a long time to come. We will have to engage with governments that do not meet our democratic standards and can only be ignored at the price of worsening the situation of their peoples. We will have to deal with states that confidently reject the Western path as a misguided one and derive their legitimacy from sources other than democratic decisions. I fear we will witness nations that freely and democratically choose the enemies of freedom and democracy. And we will have to make progress in the interest of all peoples despite stark inequalities of power, influence, and democratic dignity.

Therefore, foreign policy is not a field for the impatient and the dogmatic. Those who want to make progress must work within and with the existing conditions and structures and need to have endurance. However, much good can already be achieved in the short and medium term.

The current global economic and financial crisis – as regrettable as it is and as angry as its causes make us – offers additional opportunities. It shows, on the one hand, how urgently the economic and financial markets need effective oversight and accountability. This oversight and accountability must itself be democratically legitimized, as it concerns res publica, public affairs that affect everyone. Only if parliaments and governments as democratic representatives establish the necessary oversight and accountability (which must also include significant sanctions) will they fulfill their political responsibility. If this succeeds worldwide, then the crisis will have served as an important example that globalization can be shaped in the interest of the global common good. On the other hand, the economic and financial crisis offers the opportunity to intelligently align the now necessary stimulus programs and subsequent investments with this global common good. If, for example, investments are made worldwide in better infrastructure, environmental protection, sustainable economic practices, and renewable energies, then this not only stimulates the economies today but also makes them more robust and environmentally friendly in the long term. We all depend on this, as the thoughtless continuation of the current economic model and lifestyle of industrialized nations is not sustainable in the long run.

We all, and especially democracies as the most sensible of all forms of government, must learn to think and act in such global contexts. The Earth urgently needs a development policy for the entire planet; and this is in the vital interest of all. A wise policy in and with the given circumstances will therefore also vigorously strengthen the United Nations. There, the Paulskirche stands for global tasks, and there, development policy for the entire planet has its natural and legitimate framework.

As constructive pillars of world politics, regional associations will become increasingly important. The success story of the European Union shows that it is possible to secure peace and freedom, gain weight in the world, and increase prosperity – by committing to cooperation in free self-determination and learning to redefine sovereignty. We Europeans should confidently bring this democratic experience into the work of establishing a new world order.

All of this requires a great deal of insight and even more tenacious work. It is crucially dependent on public opinion and the engagement of as many citizens as possible. When parliaments and governments feel supported, even pressured, by their citizens in contributing to global governance and the development of the Earth, they gain powers that only democratic legitimacy can confer. And when many people engage in cross-border initiatives and interest groups, it acts as an additional supporting pillar for international cooperation. Already today, institutions like Greenpeace, like the World Hunger Aid, and like Amnesty International contribute immensely to improving the living conditions of millions of people and to the enforcement of human rights. Civic engagement and the emerging international civil society cannot replace the actions of states and governments, especially because they are not a substitute for democratic self-determination. But they can complement and invigorate democratically legitimized actions, just as every democracy is strengthened and inspired by citizens who live out their rights to freedom both individually and collectively and enhance the common good. Globalization and democracy do not contradict each other; on the contrary: globalization expands the realm of action that requires democratic governance.

So let us get to work, in Germany, in Europe, and worldwide. Let us not forget: The legacy of the Paulskirche enriches us. It also obliges us.