Open Class of the President of the Nation, Javier Milei, at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, in California, United States.

Argentina Javier Milei · President of Argentina

29 May 2024 · Open Class of the President of the Nation · Hoover Institution, Stanford University

Context
Milei delivered a lecture at Stanford University's Hoover Institution on May 29, 2024, presenting economic ideas from his book on capitalism, socialism, and the neoclassical trap.
Main themes
Market failure and neoclassical trap, capitalism vs. socialism, state intervention and economic growth, price system and property rights, Mises and economic calculation, Hayek's road to serfdom, incentive incompatibility under socialism, discovery process and innovation, regulation stifling growth, Milton Friedman's market philosophy
Duration
~66 min
96th percentile
Words
7,861
96th percentile
Sentences
315
96th percentile
Readability
56
79th percentile
Grade
11.6
40th percentile
Syntax
3.16
67th percentile
Vocabulary
1.96
7th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 77%76%
  • Social 7%7%
  • Institutional 7%7%
  • Ceremonial 4%4%
  • Technological 3%3%
  • Geopolitical 1%1%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

315 sentences in 67 paragraphs

Good day, thank you very much for allowing me the honor of being here with you and for being able to convey some of the ideas that are very important regarding the government we are leading in Argentina. Naturally, I never stop being an economist, and there are issues that become super important, especially regarding decision-making. In today's talk, I want to focus on one of the topics I develop in my recent book titled: "Capitalism, Socialism, and the Neoclassical Trap." Basically, I want to address what is technically referred to as a market failure, which is defined as non-convexity, that is, when there are concentrated market structures and how regulation ends up stifling innovation and economic growth.

In that sense, the talk will be structured in five parts: the first thing I will do is present the logic of the conceptual structure of what I will be presenting, which are the force elements behind the argumentation. Obviously, once I do this, I will begin to elaborate on where I believe the neoclassical structure has a problem, a failure, an error, and that this leads to state intervention, which ultimately kills economic growth.

Basically, the first element of the conceptual structure is an idea from Mises, who pointed out that there were only two polar economic systems: on one side, free enterprise capitalism, and on the other extreme, real socialism. This idea, combined with a very famous work by Hayek, which is the book: "The Road to Serfdom," pointed out that every time there was state intervention, the outcome ended up being worse than what was originally there. There is a phrase from Milton Friedman, who spent a lot of time here at the Hoover Institution, which said that, in general, "the correction of a market failure by the state ends up being worse than what we originally had." Basically, what Hayek pointed out in "The Road to Serfdom" is that every time there was an intervention, the result was worse, and that motivated politicians to new interventions, which generated not only a worse functioning system but also implied an increasing weight of the state, and that dynamic ultimately led to socialism and, therefore, to misery.

Therefore, it is important to know what the logics and dynamics are that also lead to this. The first point regarding the impossibility of socialism was already raised in 1922 by Mises in his book: "Socialism," and what he said is that socialism was unviable because it could not perform economic calculation, that is, concretely, if what you are doing in a transaction is exchanging property rights, and that generates a historical record called prices, which functions as a signaling transmission mechanism where agents coordinate: some will be buyers; others will be sellers, and that in the face of divergences, there will be adjustments, that is, the price system is a mechanism for transmitting information, coordination, and adjustment.

Thus, the central event is triggered by the exchange of property rights. Therefore, when the state appears and intervenes, what it is doing is interfering with property rights. And by interfering with property rights, the signal begins to have noise, and the more intervention there is, the more the property right is violated, the worse the signal that is transmitted becomes, and ultimately, in real socialism and without private property, there is no price system, and therefore the system collapses. That is why, in all places where socialism has been applied, it has been a failure economically, socially, and culturally, and moreover, as it exacerbates violence, politicians have ended up killing 150 million human beings.

The other issue that is also very important and falls within these problems generated by the presence of socialism and state intervention is that, in addition, an incompatibility of incentives is generated because if you are going to be making money and you strive to make money—as Milton Friedman said, the social responsibility of the businessman is to make money, because if he does, he is a hero—because basically what he is doing is generating better quality goods at a better price.

Therefore, he is a creator of welfare. And if you intervene and with the argument of income distribution and inequality and that kind of issues, with which socialism attacks, the counterpart is: why should I exert myself if they are going to take the fruit of my labor? And if I cannot appropriate the fruit of my labor—then—it makes no sense to work. In fact, the presence of socialism aborts the processes of discovery. And that is not a minor issue; in fact, Hayek pointed out that "the market is a process of discovery." Hayek framed this in terms of the discussion on income distribution, saying that there was no such thing as a pie, but that pie was a pie that was being created, that was being discovered, as the market process took place. But this is very important because state interference ultimately breaks the discovery process, which is basically innovation.

Let’s suppose two individuals who are not connected, and one generates a product and has a waste. In fact, that waste he would want to get rid of, he would even be willing to pay for someone to take that waste away, and it happens that on the other side, there may be another individual for whom that waste could serve as an input and would be willing to pay for it. But then a third individual appears who discovers a business opportunity, which is to buy from the first and sell to the second, and he does this because he will make a profit, and if that profit is actually solving the problem for two individuals, which is wonderful.

Remember that the first was willing to pay as long as someone took it away; and the second was desperate to get it to be able to carry out his project. So, this third individual—obviously—is going to do well because he is solving a problem. And if the state appears regulating him, what will happen is that it will interfere in that process, it will abort it, and if the state advances too much, it will abort it directly. Therefore, we will all live much worse; probably the most emblematic case was during the pandemic with masks. If they had allowed the market forces to operate freely, there would have been many more masks, much more quickly, and much cheaper. And the fact that the state intervened only created a big problem.

Naturally, in less intervened economies, it caused damage; in super intervened economies—like Argentina—it caused our country to have 130,000 deaths from COVID, when if we had done things like a less mediocre country, we would have had 30,000 deaths.

That is to say, the state’s presence, state intervention cost us Argentines one hundred thousand lives in one year. That is to say, state intervention ultimately ends up being a murderous intervention, either directly or indirectly. And this is important because this combination of the market as a discovery process, plus Locke's principle of appropriation, which states that "he who discovers it keeps it," is the basis of the thought of Israel Kirzner on these issues, where he shows the market as a discovery process, and if you intervene for whatever reason, generally for distributive reasons, you will cause harm. I present it to you in another case and I won’t delve further into this, but let’s suppose I have a general equilibrium system that is initially in equilibrium, and suddenly a problem appears, such as a pandemic, and then you have a drastic change in demand. That drastic change in demand will mean that some products will be in high demand, and their price—naturally in the short term—will be very high. Just that price signal is what will attract resources from places where resources should not be and direct them to where people are asking for resources. If you, in the name of discussing income distribution, profits, inequality, and so on, start to intervene in that market, the only thing you will have is that the market that needed to be destroyed is destroyed, but the market that needs to prosper does not prosper, and therefore, in the end, we are all much worse off.

Therefore, one of the things that is very important to clarify is that state intervention is always bad because it is based on force. And nothing based on force can be good. In fact, liberalism is built on respect for the right to life, liberty, and property, and always as a starting point and basis the principle of non-aggression. And if there is a large and institutionalized aggressor, it is the state. Therefore, the action of the state always produces harm, and the more state there is, the worse we fare.

In this logic, then, where intervention generates harm, this is tremendous because the neoclassical analytical instrument— even with people who consider themselves libertarian—could end up being functional to socialism if it embraces the models and takes into account what is referred to as market failures, since the definition of market failure supposedly enables intervention. There I want to make some reflections because one of the things that one notices when working in the business world is that one uses models.

Why? Because reality is complex, so they are used to simplify, to better understand what one is doing, to focus on the things that are truly important, but when the model does not map with reality, one discards the model. That is, one does not get angry with reality. If you get angry with reality in a company and cling to the model, you will lose your jobs because you will be losing a lot of money. So, the first thing one learns when in the trenches is to understand that if the model does not map with reality… the model goes. However, in the neoclassical world, when reality does not map with the model, we call it a market failure.

That is to say, I would tell you that we are afflicted with fatal arrogance. And I include myself, because I have taught Microeconomics for 25 years of my life and have read countless Microeconomics books, read many models and papers that came out new, but everything changed the day I read Murray Newton Rothbard in a work called: "Monopoly and Competition," and that day my life changed. But what I want to say is that enabling that concept of market failure and intervention favors socialism. That is, we end up being functional to socialism. In fact, within the strategy of socialism of the 21st century, and the way to advance over economies, where Latin America is a great example, 21st-century socialism has been very successful in Latin America. It has had a lot of presidents. And in Argentina, it had four Kirchnerist terms; in Uruguay, it had Pepe Mujica, it had Tabaré Vázquez; in Chile, it had Lago, Bachelet (twice), Boric; now, in Paraguay, they had Lugo; in Brazil, they had two governments of Lula, one of Dilma Rousseff, then Lula again; they have Petro in Colombia; they have Castillo, who was in Peru; López Obrador in Mexico, and I believe I am not forgetting anyone, and then—in Spain—they have Pedro Sánchez, who is something like a Kirchnerist and I would no longer say he has good manners because he does not have them. So, what do we do?

One of the things I will do is detect these problems, propose some solutions, but—naturally—I warn you that this is part of my next work, which I am writing with Dr. Demian Reidel, with whom I also have the privilege of being accompanied and who is one of my chief advisors, but I will be giving some clues about where I believe the solution lies. So the first thing is to define what a market is. I think that is fundamental. And sometimes I have the feeling that many economists do not know how to define what a market is. In fact, some reflections that are made confirm to me that they do not know what the market is.

And for me, the market, again, is my definition, that is, what I think is—absolutely—up for discussion, I have no problem with that, and it is that the market is a process of social cooperation, where property rights are exchanged voluntarily. That is, you exchange property rights with another individual, with another agent, voluntarily. And if you do it voluntarily, there can be no error by definition; you are doing it voluntarily. That does not mean that suppose I go and buy a pair of shoes. And the pair of shoes I thought would give me a certain performance and I do not like it. Well, I made a mistake. But I fix it, but there was no failure in that decision; that is, at that moment when I made the decision, it was what I wanted to do, and I did it voluntarily.

No one forced me to make that transaction. And the only agent within the economy that makes those forced transactions is the State. Therefore, the only one who can generate failures within the economy is the State. Not the market. Because in fact, the market is us. If when they talk about the market, we are the market, we are the market. And so, why do we have to endure someone - fatally arrogant - coming to say that I am making the wrong decision, if they don’t even know what I am doing, or why I am doing it? I mean, surely, if I were to go see the Los Angeles Lakers, surely, a fan of the Boston Celtics would say that I am wrong. On what grounds, if I like the Los Angeles Lakers, I saw Magic Johnson play? What were they going to explain to me, that I am wrong? I like the yellow and purple colors – besides – purple is the color of Libertad Avanza, so I like it even more. This is very interesting; this happens to me regularly in public discussion; a problem arises and some statist tells me: “there is the world of Milei generating these problems.” So I say: okay, let’s see if the world of Milei generates these problems, I mean, apart from how powerful I am generating problems myself. So, nothing, I say because there are things that come to my mind that I obviously cannot tell because I have a restriction that I am still the head of state. So when you hear or see me doing something like a silence, I ask you to please understand me.

So one of the things I say is if you believe there is a market failure in a certain market, the first test I propose is to check if there is no State intervention because it may be that what you are perceiving as a market failure is actually the damage caused by State action, and if you were to remove the State from the equation, we would surely be better off. So, the first point is go and check if the State is involved. Now, if you went, checked, and the State is not involved, I suggest you go and analyze it again because it is wrong. I mean, obviously, I say, I am a libertarian liberal. Nothing, what I am going to provide is the foundation for why I say what I say.

So, well, the question is, what motivated all of this for me. One of the things that happened to me in Economics, from doing so much microeconomics and general equilibrium, was that when all the modern literature on economic growth appeared, I found it very friendly, now, it was very easy for me to the point that I started studying economic growth and ended up specializing in issues of economic growth with and without money. Something that is also motivated by the fact that the most important economist in Argentine history, Miguel Sidrauski, was a specialist in economic growth with money, so I already had a certain attraction to that and the micro foundations had been very useful to me, and having taught mathematical economics also helped me. So I started working on these topics.

At one point, I was invited to give a talk at the World Economic Forum, not the last one I did that caused such a scandal, when I was a calmer person. I was invited to talk about demographics and growth, and when I start looking at this, I come across the works of Angus Madison and I find something that all of you know, I will describe it anyway, but surely all of you know it, which is what is called the hockey stick. That is, that series presented by Madison with two thousand years of history, that is, from the year zero of the Christian era until the year 2000, and we find that GDP per capita was practically constant for 1800 years, that there was only a 40% increase in GDP per capita in the sixteenth century, that is, after the discovery of America, and that the truth is that it was an absolutely monotonous series, a series that if one separated back in 1800 and had to choose between staying with Smith or Malthus, it seemed most reasonable to stay with Malthus.

However, after the industrial revolution, GDP per capita rose nearly tenfold, and this occurred in a context where the population multiplied at least sevenfold.

So, faced with that situation, what one sees is that we are in the presence of increasing returns. We have more people entering the market and yet productivity rises, if GDP per capita was rising, that is, what Malthus predicted was not happening. The presence of increasing returns, that is, in the terminology of market failure called “non-convexities” or if you want to put it another way, in which there are concentrated market structures, the problem is that if you frame it in microeconomic terms, that is a supposed market failure, or to put it another way, monopolies are bad.

So, if monopolies are bad or concentrated market structures are bad, how can we say it is bad if when in 1800 more than ninety-five percent of the population lived below the extreme poverty line and by the year 2000 that number had fallen to less than ten percent? That is, how something that generated so much well-being or that generated so much well-being from the perspective of microeconomics was wrong.

There are several answers; the easiest, simplest, most obvious answer one could find in a very nice book, a small book, a book of popularization. In fact, in the latest edition in Spanish, it has a preface of mine and my conflict with the book when I met it. It must be for that reason that I dedicated myself to politics because I love conflict.

But aside from the humor, there is a book by Henry Hazlitt called “Economics in One Lesson” and he starts and says, “Well, what is the lesson of economics?” He distinguishes between the bad economist and the good economist, saying that the bad economist is the one who focuses only on one market in a single period of time. While the good economist not only looks at one market but looks at all the others and not only considers the consequences of what happens today but also considers the implications for the future. That is, he is talking about an economist; the bad economist is an economist who only does partial equilibrium and of a single period, and the good economist does intertemporal general equilibrium, that would be the definition.

But I say aside from this, the most important thing is how do we trace the problem? Where is the problem? So now I am going to spoil the answer and then I will give the explanations. From my point of view, the origin of the problem lies in the interpretation of the invisible hand, of the idea of the invisible hand under the logic of Pareto, which makes the invisible hand incompatible with the idea of the pin factory, that is, increasing returns, and when one advances in the formal structuring of the analysis of efficiency, yes? Choosing certain mathematical constructions makes the invisible hand come into dispute with the pin factory.

This has clear analytical consequences, and from that construction, when we introduce normative issues into the analysis of equilibrium, is where this conflict between reality and the model we call market failures begins to appear. When the problem of non-convexities arises, it has to do with concentrated market structures, with monopolies. We can have the case of public goods.

There is something very funny about public goods; we usually discuss public goods in terms of rivalry in consumption and exclusion. When one looks at, for example, the emblematic case that was used to describe a case where rivalry in consumption and exclusion did not occur, it was the issue of lighthouses.

In one of those meetings that Milton Friedman and other economists had in Chicago, there was a lawyer who obviously was not contaminated with all the neoclassical tools that we base economists are contaminated with, so he found very amusing solutions, saying that the emblematic case was the failures, this lawyer who later won the Nobel Prize in Economics and lived to be one hundred and four years old, if I’m not mistaken, named Ronald Coase, what did he do? He went and analyzed all the failures of the nineteenth century, an emblematic case of market failure, and it was the case of public goods, and there it required State intervention and whatever. Well, guess what he discovered: they were all private.

That is, that economists do not know how to describe the problem well, the problem is not in reality, it is that we have tools that are wrong. This is a topic, the public goods one, I will do it now, and I think when I tell you this, you will think it is a joke. But believe me, in real life it is not, and much less in Argentina. It may be that I am affected by the case, but let’s suppose you have two communities separated by a river and discover that if you build a bridge, you could trade with the other community, you are expanding the market, therefore, you will have greater division of labor, greater productivity, greater well-being.

Excuse me, do you have a Boca jersey there? Good, that is populism. No, but that was when I was a goalkeeper, it doesn’t count, but doubly populist.

Well, they discover that it would be good to build a bridge; what happens? If it were only a problem for the private sector, do you know what they do? They agree and gather and build the bridge, they find a way. The problem is when the State is involved, then the State goes, taxes everyone, and builds the bridge. But then there are a lot of people who live off the State. So, what do they do? They start looking, they create the Ministry of the Bridge and start looking for where to build bridges. There comes a time when they have built all the bridges that could be built, so they create the Ministry of Water to put water in order to then build a bridge. You laugh, I ask you to check the organizational chart of the public function. Fortunately, here I have with me this formidable, wonderful professional, who is my Minister of Economy, Luis Caputo, who is the one carrying out the chainsaw, and from that, we are getting rid of a lot of things.

I want to tell you that I am very happy when you applaud my Minister of Economy because he is not only making the largest adjustment in Argentine history, but it is the largest in the history of humanity, in depth and in amount of time. When one adds what we are doing in the Treasury and in the Central Bank, in fact, we have adjusted more than thirteen points of GDP. That, if you had proposed it at another time, they would have crucified both of us in the middle of 9 de Julio, which is where there is an obelisk, a tall and big thing there. I raise him in the presentations and they applaud him, it is a change of era. People are waking up, they are waking up to the ideas of freedom, and the man who is carrying it out is the dear Luis Caputo, who is here present, thank you.

Obviously, there is another type of supposed market failure that we could analyze, externalities. You take the case of externalities; externalities in consumption are to avoid that point, so that there is no problem of circularity in resolving the equilibrium of the general problem. But do you believe that people are so stupid that they will not be able to decide? There will come a time when they will starve, so they will decide in some way not to die. That is, then I do not need someone to intervene to solve the consumption externality because in the end, someone will solve it. The cases of externality in production, how many times have you seen in textbooks the case of the company that pollutes the sea or the water? In reality, it is a problem of property definition; in fact, one of the brilliant things that Coase also solved was the issue of resolving these problems by assigning property rights.

Another issue is that of asymmetric information, where it is obviously clear that it is better not to have the State involved because we can solve that problem better being in the trenches than someone who is going to look at it from Everest. The other thing that is also extremely arrogant is the issue of coordination failure as a consequence of a prisoner’s dilemma problem. If you noticed, there is a strong assumption in the prisoner’s dilemma: the prisoners cannot interact.

You realize that such a simple assumption has a gross level of institutional violence, and so, as I grab and introduce that gross level of institutional violence, now I need a violent organism to solve the coordination problem as if the agents were idiots, and the agents are not idiots, they are intelligent. The problem is that there are a lot of tyrants involved in the middle called the State who live off our money and that is why they generate these problems, for what? To live off that and not for us to be better off.

That is to say, they create their own demand, why? Because they have the coercive power of the State in the middle. In other words, the person in the State looks at what they can regulate; one of the things that will happen with regulators, and this is important for you to keep in mind, is that, since they are in that office and need to justify why they are warming the chair, they create regulations to justify their existence and ruin our lives. This is not minor because it has direct implications on how this negatively impacts innovation, for example. Well, they regulate because they don’t know, they regulate because they have to warm the chair, they regulate for whatever reason, and they are ruining our lives.

I’ll tell you more, when you have monopolies—and this is important because we already know that growth will have to be explained in terms of increasing returns—when you start to regulate and look at any model of regulation, one of the things that happens is that when you regulate, given the regulatory framework that implies the competitive model, you regulate those monopolies to resemble the competitive model as much as possible, and if they don’t achieve that, well, let it look like the second-best solution, which is Ramsey.

In that context, that regulation will eliminate the quasi-rent, and if you eliminate the quasi-rent, you are eliminating the incentives to innovate, and if you regulate by assimilating competitive firms and take away the quasi-rent, what you are doing is killing innovation and therefore killing economic growth. Therefore, when you start to regulate, what will be the downside? It will be that you will not grow. What is the region of the world that grows the least? By far, Europe. And why? Because they are overloaded with regulation; they became so fanatical about creating a model that resembles the competitive model that they killed increasing returns. In other words, they killed the quasi-rents; by killing the quasi-rents, they have no incentives to invest. If they don’t invest, there is no innovation, therefore they are left without economic growth. So let’s not allow these fatally arrogant people to destroy our lives with regulations; let’s move towards a much freer society, and if the problem is economic theory, trying to see where the error in economic theory lies, let the world resemble an economic theory that has errors that came from a world that had no growth.

Edwards’ box can be very entertaining when there is no growth in a static economy, just like Malthus, just like increasing marginal returns, but that is not the real world. What do I do? Do I stick with the model or do I stick with reality? Since reality makes me uncomfortable, I stick with the model and say that the problem is reality. Let’s not fall into that madness because in that madness we will destroy our lives.

Well, what do we do now? Where do we go? One of the things I did was say, I’m not going to recount the whole history because I don’t have the time, and well, having studied the history of economic thought has some advantages, like knowing where to make the cut, right? I said: “Let’s go to Adam Smith, let’s set Adam Smith as our starting point.” Although, surely you are aware that I am a libertarian liberal, I adhere to the Austrian school of economics, that philosophically I am an anarcho-capitalist, and that in real life I am a minarchist. Unlike my colleagues, I do not have a negative view of Adam Smith; in fact, I think Adam Smith is a sort of total genius. For me, Adam Smith is to economics what Gauss was to mathematics. That is to say, someone who was 200 years ahead of his time and was the one who saw it. We, as we have a very particular way of doing politics, traditional analysts question us, and we mock that and tell them: “They don’t see it.” Well, Adam Smith saw it. In that sense, basically, from my interpretation of Adam Smith, the wonderful thing about Adam Smith is that he had an implicit model of economic growth.

Adam Smith’s model in "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations," for friends "The Wealth of Nations," has a model of economic growth. In fact, the idea of the pin factory is the idea of increasing returns because he said, if I have one person making pins, one person alone, even if they were very good, what could they produce? Twenty units and no more than that. Now, what he said is that when he divided the work into fifteen distinct activities, the per capita production of pins jumped to five thousand. That is to say, you had increased the workforce by fifteen times, in terms of personnel, and production had gone from twenty to five thousand per capita.

Then he says something that is very interesting and that in light of what is being woven and carved regarding interpretations of the future, especially the wonder that involves artificial intelligence, which is the exacerbation of increasing returns, especially for those dystopian equilibria. I would tell you, don’t be so afraid of dystopian equilibria because the idea of the pin factory and increasing returns and the division of labor has a limit. And what is the limit? The size of the market.

I am not going to take fifteen employees to the pin factory, and then I would have fifty thousand, seventy-five thousand pins to sell. If I can’t sell them, I am not going to go to that level of division of labor. I will go to the level that the market can support. Don’t think of the process only from the supply side; think that demand is also there. Let’s not fall back into the problems we fell into in the past with the hatred of machines, that is, with the Luddites.

Because, let’s see, the day Edison invented the light bulb, of course, candle manufacturers were very angry. They were very angry, and the reality is that what Edison did was wonderful, right? Because that allowed me to have a better quality good, at a better price, reached more people, also generated more jobs, and I saved money and could spend it on other goods. That is to say, a machine for generating well-being. That is to say, those who generate technological progress are machines for generating well-being. But they can never go beyond the limit of the market, unless there is innovation that makes us all richer, that makes us all better off.

So, let’s not be afraid. Let’s not ask for regulations because we don’t understand what it’s about. Let’s try to understand what it’s about and not to regulate. That is to say, freedom can never be bad; what is bad is not being free. Innovation is never bad; ultimately, we can discuss the values on which innovation is built, and if we build it on the values of libertarianism, I say, who could be against the unrestricted respect for the life project of others or in defense of the right to life, liberty, property based on the principle of non-aggression? What is the problem with this? Who is against this? Only you could be successful serving others with better quality, at a better price. But there is a limit: the limit is the size of the market. Don’t be afraid; don’t regulate technological progress; this will have as a counterpart the demand.

Or do you think you are going to generate technological progress for things that do not exist? How are you going to do such madness and sink a lot of money into that? If in reality that money comes from human beings, are you going to throw money just to throw money? I don’t know any entrepreneurs who dedicate themselves to burning money for sport.

The other interesting thing about Adam Smith’s work is that it contemplated learning in practice, that is, the model of work; it also contemplated technological progress. Because basically what Adam Smith said was that a person in their work, every time they did it more often, did it better each time. That is to say, that at some point they found ways to produce the same thing but using less labor and reached a discrete jump. That discrete jump we call technological progress.

That is to say, Adam Smith not only contemplated increasing returns; he had the problem of the division of labor well defined, but he also had a growth model that contemplated technological progress. All in the year 1776, given that it also took him ten years to write the book. If that is not being advanced, I don’t know what being advanced is. And the other interesting thing was free markets and minimal State intervention. And the corollary of that is the invisible hand. That each one, guided by their own interest, leads to general well-being.

In the monetary realm, Adam Smith had a gold standard model. Now, once we have Adam Smith’s work, it is clear that today it is easy, already knowing the results, we know that Adam Smith was right. But at that time, it was not so evident. Standing in 1776, it was not so evident. And that is why you have in the year 1801, if I’m not mistaken, but around there appeared Malthus’ work and the idea of diminishing marginal returns. It did not seem crazy in light of what had been, for example, the previous eighteen hundred years. And also, before the year zero, it did not differ much from what it was after until 1800, and that made sense because it said that when someone arrived, they occupied the best plot of land, and when the second arrived, they occupied a lesser one, and so on.

So, marginal productivity was decreasing, right? This made real wages lower and that, later, interacted with the passion for the sexes, led to the iron law of wages, and derived in a lot of aberrant relationships that we are not going to discuss now, but aberrant relationships that had been coming for many years. It is not the axis of the discussion at this moment to go there. That idea was continued by Ricardo, by Stuart Mill, until it reached Marx. The reality is that at that moment is when neoclassical theory appears, surpassing the classics, with the subjective theory of value. That is when Menger appears on one side and Léon Walras; I mention them because it is important since at some point economic theory will have to go back in part of history, after Keynes, and that gave a relevant basis from where they will draw.

In that sense, when we are entering the twentieth century, it becomes evident that Malthus’ analysis was wrong, that what Adam Smith had proposed was right, that there was the problem of increasing returns, and that if one wanted to explain economic growth with constant returns to scale and with neoclassical tools, in that format it did not work, much less with diminishing marginal returns.

The first two who saw this were Alfred Marshall and Allyn Young, and they began to see how they could incorporate the issue of increasing returns into the structure of the models to explain economic growth. This debate was so important and so intense that it is when the discussion about monopoly begins, and you will find there the theory of monopoly, like that of Joan Robinson or very interesting models like that of Chamberlin with monopolistic competition. That is to say, there was a whole climate of the time to try to see where the problem of increasing returns was and how to incorporate them into what we would now call macroeconomic analysis or economic growth to explain economic growth; there was a concrete problem. But Keynes appeared, and the problem with the appearance of Keynes is that all the analytical framework that existed before was destroyed. That is to say, the "General Theory" is a masterpiece, but a masterpiece of evil, of terror. I don’t want to start talking about Keynes because if I do, it will take me seven hours, and I have a lot of meetings that I won’t reach.

How did pre-Keynesian macroeconomic analysis work? I mean, it wasn’t called macroeconomics, but it doesn’t matter; we can think of it that way today. They were what were called intertemporal models, where the interaction between saving and investment determined the interest rate, what is called the Wicksellian interest rate, that is, the interest rate as a mechanism of intertemporal coordination that is nothing more than the relative price of present goods with respect to future goods, and in the money market, the price level was determined. So, it was a model of intertemporal characteristics where in the goods market relative prices were determined, and in intertemporal terms, saving and investment determined the interest rate, and that had to have all relative prices aligned in terms of goods so that everything coincided that they had the same interest rate so that there was no intertemporal arbitrage.

What Keynes did there was break everything; the first thing he did was create a consumption function depending on income, which in terms of those who understand general equilibrium is an aberration; general equilibrium functions do not contemplate quantities; they contemplate all prices; in fact, a general equilibrium model is determined by preferences, endowments, and technology, and if you take out the excess demand functions, they depend on prices, not income; income appears there; income is derived from selling my endowments and from the share I have in profits; with prices, all the information is there.

But since Keynes was not an economist and had only taken a course with Marshall, who was the champion of partial equilibrium, he thought to include income in the consumption function and broke the intertemporal nature of consumption. Therefore, saving became a residue after investment. The "General Theory" is interesting because it has a beautiful chapter describing how investment criteria work, and in another chapter, it states that basically "animal spirits" determine investment. I have coarser versions, but I cannot say them as a head of state.

In the goods market, instead of determining the interest rate, it determines income, and with that income, it determines the demand for labor, which, in the face of a labor supply, determines the wage. This has several problems because it lacks the determination of the price level and the interest rate. It decides to determine the interest rate in the money market, which is madness because the interest rate exists not because money exists, but because time exists. Moreover, how can there be an interest rate in a single-period model? It makes no sense; the interest rate is essentially an intertemporal issue. Therefore, obviously, it had no theory of capital or anything like that. What did it do? Well, it determined that the price level of the economy was a mark-up over wages, that is, another aberration. It destroyed the entire theory of value. Obviously, such a monster could not function, and then, when it became clear that Keynesian theory was not working, it manifested itself with the acceleration of inflation.

What happened then? The multiplier implied a violation of the budget constraint. They said, "Hey, we went too far; let's return to the basics." But since the Austrian school had been defeated in that historical context, they decided to return to Walras's line and leveraged the work of Abraham Wald, a young mathematician who in the 1920s demonstrated the existence of equilibrium without having fixed-point theorems, a true genius, and with the arrival of Brouwer's fixed-point theorems in 1956 and Kakutani's in 1957, the first for functions and the second for correspondences, we began to work on the analysis of general equilibrium.

In general equilibrium, we basically study whether equilibrium exists, whether it is unique, and whether it is stable. The wonder of fixed-point theorems is that if we are working with sets that are closed, bounded, convex, and with continuous functions, we can apply Brouwer's theorem. Then equilibrium will exist, be unique, and be stable. In the case of correspondences, equilibrium will exist; we do not know if it is unique, but if we make some additional assumptions, either on the demand side or the supply side or both, we can ensure uniqueness and stability.

The problem arises when we want to incorporate Pareto optimality, that is, to add welfare properties to the equilibrium that we now know exists, is unique, and is stable. The idea is that if each person, guided by their own interest, let's say "maximizes their utility," leads to maximum general welfare, and we would need all agents to be maximizing. But when we frame it in terms of the consumer, there is no problem; the problem arises on the firm side.

One of the problems is that they cannot accept increasing returns because in that case, the production functions would be convex functions and they could not find a maximum unless they find it at a boundary, which would imply that they take over the entire economy. When they look and there are several firms, it means that it is not a problem. In an economy with a single agent, that happened in communism, and we already know it was a failure because it could not compute prices; therefore, it does not work.

So, it was decided to look the other way and leave it like that. In Varian's book, which is surely the best at the intermediate level, do you know how many times the word entrepreneur is mentioned in the book? None. And firm? Four times. Firm, yes. That is, do you think the role of the entrepreneur is only to solve a Lagrangian? The entrepreneur's job would be quite easy, and that was lost here, which prevents us from correctly capturing the problem of increasing returns.

That problem of wanting to do welfare analysis led to the use of poor mathematical constructions that leave us with constant returns to scale or decreasing marginal returns. If there is something that reality differs from the model, we call it market failures, and that enables intervention. When we enable intervention, the result is worse.

The more we advance with the issue of regulations, the more we will be killing increasing returns, the generation of benefits, and the incentives to innovate. If we kill the incentives to innovate, we will not grow anymore.

I suggest actively reading a work by Murray Newton Rothbard, the inventor of anarcho-capitalism, called "Monopoly and Competition," within the book "Man, Economy, and State." The third volume is called "Power and Market," but it is part of the same work where Rothbard becomes an anarcho-capitalist. This will open your eyes, and you will see that monopolies are not bad. If I have 10 companies and one creates a product, like a cell phone of better quality at a better price, the other nine go bankrupt. But that entrepreneur is a social benefactor because he is providing me with a better quality good at a better price, which allows me to consume other goods and save money; that is, he is making my life easier. It does not matter if he saves it or reinvests it in his company because that will generate better products and wages, save me more money, and do a bunch of other things; fantastic, what is the problem?

Look, this guy is so bad, so villainous that you know what he does? All the money he makes, he buries in the ground. Well, if he did that, he is taking money out of the economy, and therefore the price level is lower, and that is what we all want; therefore, by lowering prices, let us not be afraid, let us move forward, let us be optimistic. We do not know what the future will be like; the only thing we know is that it will be much better, and it will be much better if in the meantime we remove the State from all our lives. Thank you very much.