Words of the President of the Nation, Javier Milei, at the 10th Latam Economic Forum, in the Golden Mercantil Hall.

Argentina Javier Milei · President of Argentina

5 June 2024 · 10th Latam Economic Forum · Golden Mercantil Hall

Context
Milei addressed the 10th Latam Economic Forum in Buenos Aires on June 5, 2024, explaining his government's economic inheritance, reforms undertaken, and Argentina's development path.
Main themes
Economic inheritance and fiscal deficit, libertarian liberal governance, hyperinflation prevention, monetary imbalance, Argentina's path to development, twin deficits, Central Bank liabilities, debt management, IMF agreement, structural economic reform, political opposition, convergence to developed country status
Duration
~59 min
96th percentile
Words
7,091
96th percentile
Sentences
345
96th percentile
Readability
60
88th percentile
Grade
9.9
19th percentile
Syntax
3.10
60th percentile
Vocabulary
2.05
18th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 63%60%
  • Institutional 16%15%
  • Social 10%10%
  • Ceremonial 7%6%
  • Technological 4%4%
  • Geopolitical 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 5%

345 sentences in 35 paragraphs

Good afternoon. Well, first of all, thank you very much to everyone present. Professor Arriazu! I'm ready, I already won. Thank you, professor. First, I want to thank each one of you here for contributing to this enormous work carried out by the foundation and the huge, giant effort made by my dear friend Darío Epstein to move this forward.

And thank you all, because it is for a good cause, charity in the good sense, because it is voluntary and not by force. Basically, what I am going to try to explain is the inheritance we received, what we did, where we are going, and where we will go, despite politics. Yes, and I will leave some preliminary ideas on the discussion of convergence, that is, how Argentina can become a developed country.

Basically, we inherited a disaster, and we do not complain about that because for a libertarian liberal to become the first president in the history of humanity could not happen under normal conditions. So we were clear that if we arrived, it would be in a very complicated situation. At the same time, we were also clear, and we had maintained this during the campaign, that if the crisis exploded, it would be easier to resolve because reality would impose the adjustment on politics. And that the complicated case was if it did not explode, but we were also prepared to resolve the case in which it did not explode.

Indeed, that is what we had to do, and fortunately, we started working on solving Argentina's problems from day one. And that has avoided disaster. Specifically, we inherited, to put it simply, 17 points of twin deficits, in terms of GDP; more or less to have an order of magnitude: four is a yellow light; eight is red on the way to a punch, imagine 17. Of those 17, 15 were explained by the fiscal deficit, and the fiscal deficit came five from the Treasury and 10 from the Central Bank. But, in addition - as if that were not enough - within what was the fiscal deficit, those 10 points of GDP had the highest ratio of remunerated liabilities, in terms of monetary base, in history. We were still above levels that had been perceived in 1989, prior to Alfonsín's hyperinflation. But with an additional aggravating factor, which is that, in a gesture of responsibility, affection, and patriotism, the previous government had passed everything to one day. And the real bet of our predecessors was that we would come in, open everything cheerfully - from moment zero - and, in truth, they understood that we are libertarians. Now, what they believed was that we ate glass.

No, we do not eat glass. So, in that sense, their bet was that this would trigger a great run, that the amount of money would quadruple in very few days, that this would trigger hyperinflation and - in the middle of all that mega crisis - they would return to power, precisely in January, in a context where they would also generate looting, attacks on supermarkets, and all the stories we already know.

And this in a context where, in addition, we started from a monetary imbalance worse than what we had prior to the Rodrigazo and with social indicators worse than those we had in 2001. That is to say, a perfect combo for which the caste made us pay all the adjustment and then they would come back as saviors and do the great Kirchner: take everything from the fifth basement and show it as a wonderful work, which was nothing more than a rebound and helped by an international context rarely seen. But that was not the only problem we had, as we also had other problems like the SIRA debt, which was 50 billion dollars; we had the problem of trapped dividends. So, in addition, we had a problem that was not just the problems we had in the flows, we had phenomenal stock problems. And the way in which you solve stock problems, if you do not do it correctly and they turn into flows, automatically that jump can generate very complicated consequences in the macroeconomic dynamics. Especially if the dollar is a leading indicator of what can happen in terms of prices, consequently, the problem you are going to get into is much bigger still.

Why? Because a jump that could be of transitory characteristics makes your money demand fall and that can become unstable and turn into a permanent crisis. The other problem we had was that we received an internal debt, about to mature, equivalent to 90 billion dollars; we had external debt maturing for 25 billion dollars, but although most was with multilaterals, we had the problem that Argentina had fallen out of agreement with the International Monetary Fund. It was very interesting because, when they spoke and said that we had a program that was not consistent and a bunch of things they said, it was interesting because, in general, when you have such a characteristic that the program is fallen, at least you have to be discussing it for about three months, and - especially - if there is a new administration. And the interesting thing is that we resolved it in a weekend.

That means that we had not done things that badly. At the same time, we had a problem of international reserves; the net international reserves we inherited were around negative 11.5 billion dollars, with a gap of 200%. In addition, if you look at how economic activity was coming, economic activity - during the first part of the year - was falling and then picked up, based on how the previous government started to stimulate the economy, giving public spending and financing it with monetary issuance. To give you an idea, throughout the entire period of the government, 28 points of GDP were issued to finance the treasury, but of those 28, 13 took place in the election year. That is to say, they were leaving a huge bomb and it was better for it to explode on someone else and come back, but we did not give them that pleasure. The flip side of this was how inflation was coming. The first week of December, it was at a rate of 1% daily, which is something like 3700% annually. In the second week, it accelerated and reached levels of 7500% annually. We had done the calculations, in terms of monetary excesses and others, and we estimated that if we did not take urgent measures, inflation could reach levels of 15000% annually. This, which seemed like an exaggeration, is interesting to see that when you look at the month of December, wholesale inflation, which tends to lead retail inflation, was 54% monthly. 54% monthly means 17,000% annually. In reality, that could have happened if we had started to validate monetarily, which - obviously - we did not do, and the wholesale inflation for the month of April was 3.4%. That, annualized, gives us almost 50%. Yes, I understand that 50% is a horror, but we were coming from 17,000. And to have an idea of the magnitude of what was done, then from that, we designed a stabilization plan, a stabilization program. Basically, there are different ways to do it. Sometimes I find it hard to understand if things are done wrong, intentionally, or if they are done wrong, out of ignorance. That is to say, when an economic program is designed, whatever it is, you cannot demand that those who will carry it out be and think like you. You have to put yourself in the shoes of those who are doing it.

So, and it would seem ridiculous to me - if we are within a program of a liberal-libertarian - to start thinking in terms of what I am going to do sectorally, what I am going to do with this, how I am going to control prices, how I am going to manage the dynamics of relative prices. I am a libertarian liberal, I believe in freedom, so sometimes it is as if they ask for things that are not within the DNA of what one is going to do, because it is not the only way to do things. In our conception, an economic program has three central elements: what I can contribute from the macro, which is fiscal adjustment. Yes, that is, a fiscal policy, a monetary policy that basically consists of cleaning up the balance sheet of the Central Bank, and an exchange rate policy to clarify the disaster we had in the external sector.

After that, looking at, fiddling with, waking up relative prices and that there has to be a price-wage agreement is not in my conception. That of choosing winners is not in my conception and do not even think of asking me for it because you will not have it. I am a libertarian liberal. In that context, we had to attack the fiscal deficit and the first thing we did was clearly attack the fiscal deficit and we attacked it from two sides. Obviously, with a fiscal adjustment in the Treasury and attacking the balance sheet of the Central Bank. In fact, we had said it in the campaign itself. We talked about chainsaw and boy, was there a chainsaw. Now it happens that some said that it could not be adjusted more than 1 point of GDP. So, of course, when the adjustment phase started and ended up being equivalent to 7, then they started to question the quality of the adjustment. First point: of 123 years, we had 113 of deficits. So making the adjustment was not easy. Second point: Have you seen what the fiscal degenerates are like, in action last night? So look at what this fight is. But unlike others, with adjustments of half a point of GDP and ended up blowing up; we made the adjustment of 7 and we are here standing. And we will continue to fight. And every time the fiscal degenerates of politics want to break the fiscal balance, I tell you now, I said it before, I say it now, and I will repeat it until I am tired: I will veto everything, I do not care at all. So, when we advanced with this adjustment, the serial blunders began to question the quality of the adjustment. And then they said: "Too much blender and little scissors!". Well, Ecuador and scissors. 90% of the adjustment is chainsaw and only 10% of the adjustment, only if you look at the Treasury corresponds to the blender. Thus, among the things we did, which were also impossible until we did them, one of the things we did was say: "I don't know if you remember, it's my most well-known phrase internationally. I would like you to remember another, but this is the one that says: outside." And today they are campaigning - all over the world - with the outside. Well, the outside meant reducing the number of ministries by half and cutting the entire structure of the State in half. And that was not free because - obviously - we fired people. In terms of contracts, we will end up firing 75,000 people. We have already fired 25,000.

So, not only was the number of ministries reduced by half; we eliminated discretionary transfers to the provinces; we eliminated - outright - public works; we eliminated contracts. Not only that, but one of the things we knew was that the program was going to generate social tension and that it was also going to generate a drop in activity. When you make an adjustment, what it does is increase savings. So, if that increase in savings does not have a counterpart in investment, your employment activity, real wages will fall. So, while we were making the adjustment and we had announced that there would be a contraction of activity, which is what happened, during the first quarter of the year, what do we say if we decided to implement a strong social containment policy? So, we doubled the AUH; we doubled the Food Card; we increased school assistance; we multiplied almost five times the assistance for children's supplies, and we also provided financing to the middle class, which goes to private schools so that the children do not lose going to school, because, given the serious situation that families are living, if they also lose school and the children have to start changing schools and have to change classmates and all that generates a very big trauma. For this reason, we also attacked that, but we not only did that and we are seeing a huge task, which was done by Minister Pettovello, who has been so torpedoed in recent days. That is to say, let’s see, we just made a tremendous adjustment and we only have complaints, on the social front, from the managers of poverty.

That is to say, we have tired of hearing - in conferences - that we had to end the scams of intermediaries, that we had to end corruption in social programs, that we had to get out of assistentialism so that those who had the misfortune of falling into those unfortunate situations could move forward with dignity.

We are doing it now, what did you think it was free? It is obvious that all the crooks, who lost their scams would be angry, which is what they are seeing and they are operating against her and, therefore, against the government everywhere. Look at the wonderful thing that Minister Pettovello did, along with Minister Bullrich, whom I thank for being present here. And at that moment, the Minister of Infrastructure, Guillermo Ferraro.

One of the things that Minister Pettovello discovers, and realizes, is that while the people receiving the plans have cards, one believes that the problem there has been solved, so, well, they received cards, of course. But they had to go and verify that they were working, and who did that? The poverty managers, and that was where they paid the right of pernada. It was there that they lost half of the plan, and with that, they also extorted people to go to the marches; that is to say, we provided money so that people could have social support; the poverty managers took it and enslaved people, using them to march against those who work, horrific. So, at that moment, what does Minister Pettovello discover? At that moment, she was heavily criticized. She says: "Since we knew that the first quarter was going to be very tough. During the first quarter, what we say is that they have to stop giving the work certificate. Of course, why is that important? Because with the same money, people received double the amount. And who do you think lost out because of that? The poverty managers. So, who was the first to complain? Belliboni. So, the first thing Belliboni did was organize a march, and in that march, he said that 50,000 would go, because he actually believed that 100,000 would go. And there we also had to overcome a huge test, which was not to let them win in the streets. And, with Minister Bullrich, the Security Protocol was prepared; from the Ministry of Human Capital, it was said that those who cut would not be paid.

In addition, a phone number was provided so that people would not be extorted, a reporting line was set up. The boss arrived: "Hello, boss." So, in that context, it was interesting because 3,000 people ended up going to the march. The reporting line exploded, and today we have a lot of cases initiated against these people who extorted the most vulnerable. And within all these things, we found out that - in addition - they had trust funds; they had a lot of things and where several strata of society are involved, many. And so that also explains why there is so much torpedoing.

Because it is not only the poverty managers; there are business tycoons involved, and there are other types of people whom one would imagine to be more spiritual and not involved in these kinds of things, and they are all torpedoing because their scam has ended. So, that is why what is happening is happening, but didn’t we want to end corruption? Never has so much been done, in six months, as what we are doing and in many much longer periods of time. That is to say, we are not only putting the economy in order, we are not only putting security issues in order, but we are also ending corruption, and that is why politics is on fire.

But it didn’t stop there, because the other thing we had to do was to clean up the Central Bank, basically. There, a lot of things had to be done. The first thing that had to be done was to clarify the exchange market. I remember that, at that time, they told us that the exchange rate had to be set at 600. Again, the option to liberalize was not in the plans because with the stock problems we had, it was the path to hyperinflation. But beyond that, we asked: "How do we fix this then?" The consensus of many economists was: "No, set it at 600." In fact, we made this decision in the place where I had been living for about three months, at the Hotel Libertador. With "Toto's" team, since we were going to impose the Country Tax, the idea was that the exchange rate should be aligned. Our idea was for the exchange rate to be aligned with the market, why? Because in that way we would reduce excess demand in the Foreign Exchange Market, and by shrinking excess demand in the Foreign Exchange Market, we would reduce excess supply in the goods market, in the labor market, and therefore, the adjustment would be less painful.

In that context, a devaluation was made, a currency jump, and from there, a policy of devaluations was set so that the exchange rate would follow a certain path. In that context, they also predicted all the calamities and disasters imaginable, none of which came true. And, moreover, many of those who said that the exchange rate had to be at 600 and made a much higher inflation path than observed are now in line with what they say there is a currency problem that now, obviously, is a different discussion due to all the noise that politics has introduced. But then, and all those who want to see that discussion can listen to Dr. Arriazu or can see my presentations? Yes, but beyond that, in the meantime, we bought 17.5 billion dollars.

And we continue to buy dollars every day. Not only that, but we also started a process of cleaning up the Central Bank. We inherited a quasi-fiscal deficit of 10 points of GDP; today it represents 1 point of GDP. And that was achieved for two reasons: one is that what was sought to be arbitrated was the dollar rate and not the peso rate. So, in that context, having made a devaluation jump, if we had followed the current of what many economists said that the real interest rate had to be positive and that argument, today, we would have a problem, we would have remunerated liabilities of 8 times the monetary base. So, we would be talking about carry trade, about when hyperinflation explodes, and all that kind of stuff. So, by setting the interest rate, arbitrated with dollars, but in terms of real pesos negative, that is what allowed us to gradually liquidate that position of remunerated liabilities.

And as the fiscal adjustment progressed; in fact, in January, we already had a financial surplus, that is to say, not primary, financial. And the zero deficit policy continues, and the numbers for May are already known to be very good. And when the first semester ends, and obviously, in June, due to the issue of bonus payments and so on, it is deficit. But when you take the 6 months together, there will be a surplus. That is, because everything we have added so far more than exceeds what we will have as a deficit in June, with which we will have - a first semester - with a positive primary and financial result, something that they said was impossible. Impossible, nothing. And while we were consolidating the fiscal position, the Secretary of Finance, Pablo Kirno, what did he do? He was building a peso curve, and while he was building the peso curve, he started to remove debt that was in the Central Bank, and he started to transfer it to the Treasury. So, today, the ratio of remunerated liabilities to the monetary base is 1.2 times, almost a third of the problem we inherited. This is not minor because the remunerated liabilities were future monetary issuance, which were a future problem in inflationary terms. And this is not a minor point because today we have a monetary base of 15 trillion, and that means that we have remunerated liabilities of 18 trillion. And now I’m going to give you another excellent piece of news: of those 18 trillion, 12 trillion are in the hands of the public sector, so we only need to clean up, just 6 trillion. That is, we are close to solving the problem of remunerated liabilities.

And not only that, of those 12 trillion that the public sector has; 7 are in Banco Nación, and the holdings of the Ministry of Economy in Banco Nación are 3.5 trillion. So, you are going to say: and what remains? Well, look, part of it is held by Banco Provincia, that is true, that is not close to our control, in fact, it is in the hands of a political enemy who also fills the media with ads to dirty us and to cover up the mistakes they make. But what is interesting? As it has so many fiscal problems, it has the bank completely saturated, so it does not have many possibilities to do things because it needs to meet the minimum cash position, so it cannot do much. Therefore, if you look, we are solving the problem of remunerated liabilities. Not only that, but also, once we finish with this, we will go for the problem of the puts, which we have on track.

The puts are a mess that the previous government made, with the endorsement of the International Monetary Fund to finance the deficit in a covert way that did not violate the targets. And the banks, instead of financing the Treasury, preferred to put it within the Central Bank. And we are working to solve that problem. When we solve that problem… goodbye restrictions. Therefore, it is true that politics meddles; that politics dirties; that politics, clearly, a large part of politicians do not want to fix this. When you look at the Bases Law, plus the DNU, there is - basically - a matter of restoring freedom to citizens, there is a matter of making markets more pro-competition, not pro-business, but pro-competition, and there is a third element which is to end the scams. I believe that this third point strongly explains this, in fact, among the things and privileges that we wanted to end with politics, something that I will advance anyway, eh, because I don’t care at all. Yesterday, the fiscal degenerates, one of the things they did boasting of being a caste, and that they like to be a caste, and that they think they are better than the rest of the people, while to approve a law that benefits all Argentines, except for the crooks, they have it there detained and parked for 6 months.

Yes, they are very quick to raise their salaries, raising their salaries by 80% well behind the backs of the people. While I tell you that - in the Executive - the salaries are the same as when we took office. But not only that, but also, obviously, they are looking to break the fiscal balance. Look, Bukele when he took office, you know what? He had no deputies, nothing. He had no legislators, nothing. Do you know how he governed? By vetoing everything. All the things that the fiscal degenerates did, he vetoed them all, which is what I am going to do, I am going to veto everything. But then, yesterday, a deputy started defending privileged pensions. Something to which I said, we are going to renounce. And, in addition, as it is an acquired right, it is not that I am going to be touching those who are behind, but that, in reality, it only affects, from my person forward. And why is this important? Look, I can be in office for 4 years or I can be in office for 8 years, if everything goes very well, but, you know what? After that, what do I do once I finish with this? I will have to go out to work. So, it is interesting, because as I have to go back out to work, I have to actively take care of doing things that are right. Because if not, the day after, I am left without a job and I starve.

Because, imagine, what conferences am I going to sell the day after, if I was a disaster as president? Therefore, eliminating the privileged pension is a very important incentive to do things right. So, it is not a minor issue. But of course, after 100 years of decay, they believe that doing things wrong is normal. And so they do anything, total they have insurance. What insurance? The insurance for the caste has ended. If they do wrong, after doing things disastrously wrong, let them starve for being worthless. On the other hand, some say: "No, he doesn’t have a long-term program." I ask you a question: And what do you think the Bases Law and the DNU were? Look, the largest structural reform in Argentine history was made by Menem. The Bases Law - as it is today - is five times larger than Menem's structural reform. If that is not a long-term plan, what are you talking about? And, in addition, there is the DNU. When you take the DNU and the Bases Law, they are a thousand structural reforms. How many will remain? 800. Okay, let’s pass 800. You know what? After this, I will go for the 200 that were pending from this. And, in addition, I have 3,000 more.

And why is this? Look, when you look at the indices of economic freedom, those countries that are freer grow more than double those that are repressed. The per capita GDP is 12 times larger. Not only that, but they also have 25 times fewer poor people in the standard format, 50 times fewer in the extreme format. Moreover, people in the worst decile of the free country live better than 90% of the people in the repressed country. They have several times more income than the average. The business is freedom. And, for example, with phase 1 of structural reforms, it implies a jump in economic freedom of 90 places. That is to say, resembling countries like Germany, France, Italy. But nothing, as you will see, are not all the reforms we are aiming for. In fact, we have always mentioned, as a witness case, what could be, the case of Ireland, from being the most miserable country in Europe, today has a per capita GDP 50% higher than that of the United States, or countries like Switzerland, or countries like Luxembourg, whichever you want, are among the freest. And the reality is that as we have 3,000 more structural reforms pending, once all this passes, it is not that we are going to become as free as those countries, but we are going to be the freest country on the planet. Therefore, our goal is to become the most prosperous country on planet Earth.

It seems that, for Argentine politics, it is a business to create poor people, and now we see that what they are dedicated to is exploiting them and making profits. Today I had a conversation with a friend while having breakfast, and the topic was causality. That is to say, my hypothesis was that assistance is generated, for whatever reason, because they embrace wrong economic ideas, and from there they take a noble cause, which is to provide that assistance, and then they turn it into a bunch of kiosks. So, of course, when you start to touch the kiosks, you are accused of being inhumane, insensitive, and all those things, when in reality what you are doing is putting an end to the kiosks. So, one would have to ask whether they are in favor of those criminals stealing by taking the bread out of people's mouths. But they always shift the goalposts, and obviously, the guidelines play a fundamental role, which we have cut because if there is truly freedom, how can you be financing yourself with a compulsive source of income? It is a contradiction in terms. Well, it seems that… when they talk about freedom and all those things, it is always as long as it doesn’t touch their pockets; also known as the most sensitive organ of the human being. And my friend's hypothesis was a bit more brutal, which was that, in reality, they come to do business and invent all that kind of stuff to make profits. The truth is that politics is so dirty that I don’t know which of the hypotheses can truly be correct, but the fact is that it is dirty, and we are sweeping that away.

And I want to leave one last reflection to - at least - leave good prospects for the future, and it is related to growth and convergence. Convergence is the process by which a developing country becomes a developed country. Clearly, we should be looking for ways to do that, that is, how to generate a process of sustained growth to catch up with one of those countries we admire. And there are some things that I think are important to keep in mind. One is when you look at the empirical evidence of growth. You go to any growth book or some advanced macro book, and you will find data from Angus Maddison, may he rest in peace, that goes from year zero to the year 2000 of the Christian era and is called…, look at GDP per capita, and it is called: "The hockey stick." When you look at that, basically what you observe is that GDP per capita was - for 1800 years - practically constant.

In reality, it only had a jump of 40% in the 16th century. Therefore, if you took the growth rate of GDP per capita during that process, it was 0.02%, that is, it took approximately 3500 years to double GDP per capita. However, after the Industrial Revolution, the following two centuries were truly impressive, and a situation was generated where GDP per capita almost multiplied by 10, with an increasing acceleration. In the 19th century, the growth rate of GDP per capita was 0.66%; the first part of the 20th century was 1.2%, and in the second part, it was 2.1%, and moreover, if you correct for underestimation of national accounts, it could be that the growth was even a point higher in the second half of the 20th century. That is to say, what is seen is an acceleration of growth. And if you also consider the population, given the population that existed around the year 1800, and the one that existed at the end of the 20th century, to maintain the analysis of that series, more or less the population multiplied by 8 or 7, if you want, by eight, but… So when you look at that, it has a counterpart in economics called increasing returns. And there is a whole issue because increasing returns, the counterpart of that is, if you want to call it technically, convexities; if you want to use friendlier language, it is called concentrated structures; the most polar case is that of monopolies. And this is not a minor issue because, according to conventional economic theory, monopolies are bad and must be regulated.

And that is quite conflictive because, how can it be that for micro it is bad and, in the meantime, the extreme population of 95% of the population lived on less than a dollar a day, and that number, when in the series we are looking at, had dropped to less than 15%? So, how can it be that something that was so good for humanity, microeconomics treats it as something bad? That has several problems. Microeconomics has problems, not the series. What happens is that it is reasonable that if you, the model does not map with reality, break the model and make another one. Economists, I don’t know, something strange got into our heads, like I don’t have the data, I don’t know, but we have this madness that when reality does not map with the model, we call it market failure.

For those who take decisions seriously, they know that this is a serious problem. So, in reality, that analysis is wrong. Basically because the only monopoly that is bad is the monopoly that is determined by the force of the State. In fact, the original definition of monopoly is from Lord Cooke, which is the one Adam Smith took, and which states that a monopoly is basically a situation in which the monarch, the feudal lord, the prince, whoever you can think of, set what could be bought or not of a certain product. So, someone was being given a monopoly. Obviously, that was against the people and in favor of the businessman and the monarch. But if there is no violent event, it is not a problem. In fact, let’s suppose I have a situation where I have ten companies selling cell phones, and one appears and sells me a cell phone at a lower price and of better quality. Obviously, the remaining 9 will go bankrupt. And what do I care? If I now have a better quality product at a better price. Not only that, many are concerned about that. There is a very basic book in economics that is very nice, called "Economics in One Lesson," by Henry Hazlitt, which says what the difference is between the good economist and the bad economist. It is that the bad economist only looks at one sector and does not look at the consequences in other sectors, and less the consequences, in the future. That is to say, the good economist not only looks at that sector, but also looks at the other sectors and not only contemplates the present, but also contemplates the implications for the future. That is to say, it is the difference between making partial equilibrium, of a single period, against making general equilibrium, intertemporal. So, when you start to remove those spider webs that are in people's heads, things change substantially. Therefore, the first thing to understand is that monopolies are not bad. In fact, I would say that monopolies can be wonderful if they are the result of having only one left. And if you don’t like that there is only one, don’t get angry with the one that is there, get angry with those who are not there, not with the one that is. Because the one that is there is solving problems for people. Unless it is arranged by the government, which is another problem, but the problem there is not that there is only one businessman, but that the problem is that the State is there.

And why is that important? Because the counterpart of increasing returns is what generates economic growth. And when governments start to regulate monopolies, one of the things they do is kill the quasi-rent. When they kill the quasi-rent, they kill the incentive for innovation, and when they kill the incentive for innovation, they kill economic growth. And convergence, which, in the growth literature, is a problem of a mathematical nature, I would say, has to do with the shape of the production function. And there is no more explanation than that problem. So there is no explanation of why it converges, no. You have the model and then it has to do with the curvatures of the curve, and that’s how it will be. It’s all mathematical pyrotechnics; I’m being quite elegant today. At another time, I would say other things, but I will try to maintain decorum, not because of the investiture, but because I have a giant here. So, I will try to behave better.

So, I say, but that is mathematical pyrotechnics. It is interesting, for example, to see Musk as a Hayekian issue or combined with Israel Kirzner, where Hayek sees the market as a process of discovery. And that…, Israel Kirzner looks at the market as a process that mixes the discovery process, but with Locke's principle of appropriation. Because the truth is that if you are going to discover something, but you cannot appropriate it, why would you want to discover it? So, that combination makes that discovery process generate economic growth. That is to say, why? Because they start to solve problems. Moreover, look, there is one thing… when we had the first meeting with Elon Musk and my sister read it right away. Elon Musk, do you know why he is wonderful and why he is doing well and deserves to do well? He told me: "I get up every day thinking about what problem I can solve for people." It is genius; it is genius because basically if he solves problems for people, he will get his products sold. Consequently, if he does it well, he makes a lot of money. Bravo, that is to say, a hero, a social benefactor, that is to say, I think that politics will have to spend 50 years explaining the mind of that man, and today I am (inaudible), I am optimistic.

Or would it be easier for you to understand if a bill were offered to you, but since we are not willing to play in that league, it doesn’t happen. But aside from that, what is interesting about all this? It is that when one is in a developing country, there are a lot of opportunities that have already been discovered, discovered in other places. Therefore, what one should do is copy it. And if one copies, they will grow very strongly. And with the advancement of information, that copying is faster. So, for example, look, the first country to double GDP per capita was the United Kingdom, in a process that lasted 58 years, starting in 1780. And that implied that GDP per capita grew at 1.2%. The second to achieve it, starting in 1839, which took 47 years, was the United States. That implied a growth rate of 1.5% per capita. The third to achieve it was Japan, in 34 years, starting in 1885, and that implied a per capita growth rate of 2.1%. Another case is Italy, which did it in 21 years, starting in 1890, and implied a growth rate of 3.3%. Spain, in 1950, did it in 18 years, with a rate of 4%. South Korea, since 1978, took 9 years, with a rate of 7.8%. Or China, which started in 1987, and did it in 7 years, with growth rates of 10%. That is to say, notice that as we move forward in time, the processes of convergence happen faster because the discovery process is valuable at the frontier, but in the transition, what needs to be done is to have good institutions so that we can copy and grow, and that is by gaining economic freedom. And why am I particularly interested in the case of artificial intelligence? Because artificial intelligence is like the new Industrial Revolution. And what was the Industrial Revolution in history? That is why I talked about the hockey stick; it implied a dramatic increase in the growth rate. So, what does artificial intelligence generate? It generates an exacerbation of increasing returns; that exacerbation of increasing returns implies acceleration in the growth rate, and the way to achieve that acceleration of growth is not to kill it with economic regulation. What is the area that grows the least on the planet, despite having a pole of artificial intelligence? Europe, because it is full of regulations. When you start to think like macroeconomists and want to make the monopoly resemble a competitive company, you are destroying the quasi-rents, you are destroying the extraordinary profits, you are destroying the incentives for innovation, you are killing economic growth.

What is the problem in the other pole, which is the United States? Well, because it is also running and they are fearful and afraid of issues related to artificial intelligence. That is to say, every so often, the Luddites reappear, that is to say, those who hate machines, and, in reality, what is the other pole? China, but we don’t know what they are doing. So, we are offering that Argentina be this fourth pole of artificial intelligence in the world. And why? Because we have large expanses of land, cold climate where all this is very important, the possibility of having a lot of cheap energy, which is very important, for what? So that intelligent algorithms can learn. And that generates a lot of heat, so that is why it is so important to have a cold area, extensive land, and cheap energy. But, in addition, we also have what? Human capital.

And if we, then, generate the correct institutions, whether it is the DNU, whether it is Bases. That is to say, phase 1 of structural reforms. Or everything that remains pending to make us the freest country on planet Earth, it will imply that we will have the conditions so that, in a period of at most 40 years, we can become the world's leading power again. Thank you very much.