Speech by the President of the Nation, Javier Milei, at the Llao Llao Forum.

Argentina Javier Milei · President of Argentina

19 April 2024 · Llao Llao Forum

Context
Milei addressed the Llao Llao Forum on April 19, 2024, outlining the severe economic crisis inherited by his administration and the reforms undertaken to avert hyperinflation.
Main themes
Economic inheritance and crisis, fiscal deficit reduction, hyperinflation prevention, monetary policy, twin deficits, currency and exchange rate, economic reform agenda, central banking theory, political criticism of sound policy
Duration
~69 min
97th percentile
Words
8,260
97th percentile
Sentences
404
97th percentile
Readability
65
94th percentile
Grade
9.3
13th percentile
Syntax
2.91
36th percentile
Vocabulary
2.03
14th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 70%68%
  • Institutional 16%16%
  • Ceremonial 6%6%
  • Social 4%4%
  • Geopolitical 2%2%
  • Technological 1%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

404 sentences in 18 paragraphs

Good morning. So much applause makes me doubt the so-called type 2 error. Well, the talk I am going to give today is about the inheritance, what we did, and most importantly: how we see it looking to the future and what the possibilities are from this perspective. The first thing to understand is the disaster we inherited, or rather, to give you an idea. When an economy has twin deficits of four percentage points of GDP, that is a yellow alert; eight is a red alert, and that means... you are going to get hit hard. Well, we inherited twin deficits of 17 percentage points of GDP. So you can get an idea of the size of the challenge we faced. Those twin deficits had a consolidated fiscal deficit of 15 percentage points of GDP, where five corresponded to the national treasury and 10 to the Central Bank, where, as if that were not enough, the position of the LELIQs, which could be for 30, 60, 90, 120, 150, and 180 days, had all been converted to one-day repos. This means that at the moment we took office, the monetary base could have been quadrupled in one day. I say this to give you a sense of the magnitude of the difficulties we encountered. At the same time, in terms of price dynamics, with a controlled exchange rate and such a large gap, the flip side is that there exists what is technically called money overhang. The magnitude of the money overhang at that time was basically similar to what we had before the Rodrigazo of 1975, which implied that when the country ran out of reserves and had to forcibly devalue, the inflation rate sextupled, in fact, it went from 30 to 180 percent. We had a similar experience in 1959 of similar magnitude, which also implied a sextuplication of the inflation rate: at that time it went from 20 to 120. Therefore, if we had an inflation rate that was basically traveling at 200%, that implied that the inflation rate could reach levels of 1200%; moreover, if we considered that we could be tripling the base, let’s say increasing the base three times, that implied bringing inflation to 3600 percent annually. And if on the other hand we consider that the previous government issued 13 percentage points of GDP directly and indirectly with a base that is now at 2.6, it implied multiplying by 5. That is to say, we were putting four times four times more monetary base; that is, we would be talking about an inflation rate on the order of 15000 percent.

This may seem exaggerated, but doing the math from the monetary side, the reality is that during the first week of December, prices were already rising at 1% daily; that annualized is 3700 percent annually. When you consider how it was in the first two weeks of December, the acceleration was so great that prices were already rising at 7500 percent annually. And this may seem like an exaggeration, and in fact, many accuse us of having been exaggerated, when you take the case of wholesale inflation in December, it was 54%. That annualized gives 17,000. That is to say, we were indeed on the path to hyperinflation; the only thing that hyperinflation required to materialize was monetary validation.

There is a very funny anecdote in a wonderful book called The Central Bank: Theory and Practice, by an economist named Alan Blinder, who was one of the first academics to reach the monetary policy committee of the Federal Reserve, who also taught at Princeton alongside Bernanke, and he tells something that is very interesting: let’s suppose we have the perfect central banker, then the perfect central banker, let’s suppose, controlled the interest rate - I say it’s not the instrument I like, but the book is made with that example - and then this central banker is so brilliant that not only does he know how to move the rate, but he also perfectly hits the lags. So when he sees that the inflation rate is about to accelerate, he starts to raise the rate and manages to keep inflation at the target; when he sees that the economy is slowing down and the inflation rate goes below, he modifies it and again keeps inflation at the target. It’s interesting because at the limit this could imply that he moves the interest rate as if it were an electrocardiogram of someone who is well or someone who is running if that were the case and keeps the inflation rate constant. The guy is perfect. Now notice that when he is raising the interest rate, there will be a lot of people criticizing him because they say ‘where are you seeing inflation and you are going to put us into a recession’; and when he lowers it, they say ‘you are going to be encouraging inflation’. That is to say, the guy does a perfect job and what is going to happen to him: he will be criticized all the time. Welcome to the world of politics. Fortunately, my work studying the Torah alongside my dear rabbi Axel Wahnish, who we now have the fortune of having as ambassador in Israel, one of the things he told me was that already having left Egypt, every time Moses got up late, they criticized him for being lazy; if he got up early, they said he was fighting with his wife, and if he got up on time, it was because he had nothing to do. That is to say, no matter what they do, they will criticize us anyway. That is quite reassuring when starting the management, because if they criticized Moses, then they can say anything about me and I have more than earned it. But it is good to know because now there are many who say: ‘there has never been hyperinflation’. Now I will describe it, but we have made an adjustment of 13 percentage points of GDP, the largest in the history of humanity. But well, that’s life. The other part was the exchange rate imbalance: the relationship between the parallel and the official was three to one. Therefore, the situation was quite complicated. Here there is something interesting, that I will preemptively address the criticisms we receive, ‘that the exchange rate needs to be raised’, all that kind of stuff. I remember that we were at the Libertador hotel, I was with Toto’s team and the market consensus was that we had to take the exchange rate to 600. In fact, I wanted to take it to a level that adjusted for country risk would be equal to the parallel. That has a technical justification to try to eliminate excess demand. And that the impact on activity be as little as possible. It amuses me because those same people who complain that now the exchange rate is lagging said it had to be 600 and the inflation hypothesis they had is much higher than what we are experiencing. Their model doesn’t add up, guys. What I say is: watch out for those economists, because their model doesn’t add up. They told me the exchange rate had to be 600, that we were crazy to set it at 800, and the inflation hypothesis they had was higher than what we are having in reality. I say their model doesn’t add up, I just mention it.

Then we had a minor problem called net international reserves, we were down 11.5 billion dollars. We also had another unreported problem, which we all knew existed, called the Sira, which was actually 60 billion dollars, but when we asked for it to be reported and for them to come forward, evidently there was a part that knew they were doing illicit things. And 45 billion were reported. Another problem we had was that we had maturities in foreign currency of 25 billion dollars, concentrated mainly in multilaterals, and we had the agreement with the International Monetary Fund fallen through, so we had a huge problem with those 25 billion dollars. And the truth is that as if all this were not enough, we had maturities in pesos equivalent to 90 billion dollars. So, if you consider the imbalance we had in the monetary sphere, it was worse than that before the Rodrigazo; a balance sheet situation of the Central Bank much worse than what we had before the hyperinflation of 89; and that we also had social indicators worse than those we had in 2001, we were truly facing the mother of all evils because we had all the worst crises all together. Is this something to cry about? Look, the truth is no; because the only way a libertarian liberal government could emerge in a country that drags 100 years of socialism was in the midst of a disaster. The only way this could happen was this, it was a three-band carom and the forces of heaven allowed it. And as if all this were not enough, in reality, economic activity was falling and had a rebound. That’s the cap. In fact, I even have a version in Hebrew of the same. That’s funny about where it came from. I will tell you because it’s fun, so you can see how dynamic politics is. When Victoria and I took office as Deputies in December 21, a journalist from Diputados TV, whom I knew from América, a real rude guy, told me: ‘but you are two deputies, what can two deputies do in 257, you won’t be able to do anything’. And I replied with the first book of Maccabees 3:19 which says ‘victory in war does not depend on the number of soldiers but on the forces that come from heaven’. Maradona would have a phrase for that.

Naturally, in the face of this disaster we faced, we undoubtedly had to have a very tough and concrete stabilization program. This is funny because they spent the entire campaign saying that we had no plan, that we had no economic program, that we had nothing, we were told a lot of things. But in reality, the only ones who said what needed to be done were us. In fact, I even published a book called ‘The End of Inflation’, where if you read it, you will find that everything is told there. And I didn’t just say I was going to do it, I am doing it. That is even more fun.

So, the first question was shock or gradualism. The truth is that when you review Argentine history, all shock programs, except for that of 59, not only managed to lower inflation, but were also expansive. And all gradualist programs ended badly. The other thing is that to do gradualism you need time. Do you think I had time if I had the possibility of tripling the monetary base in one day… sorry, quadrupling the monetary base in one day? No, there was no time. But as if all this were not enough, if you want to do gradualism, it also requires that you have financing. And Argentina had no financing, as the agreement with the International Monetary Fund had fallen through. In that sense, the truth is that there was no other alternative but shock. Moreover, I believe that the only way out is shock. That also has an explanation. So based on this, we implemented a very, very tough stabilization program. I say aside from the number of things that many economists say ‘no, that this is a transition, that later the program is missing’. Look: if the wholesale inflation in December was 54%, it has been decreasing every month, the previous month was 10 and the last was 5; if the wholesale inflation that was at levels of 45 we managed to pin down at 25 and then it was 20, 13, 10 and now we are on our way to a single digit, in terms of core for sure. They should be more respectful, clearly there is a stabilization plan to lower the inflation rate. That they don’t see it is not my fault. A stabilization program essentially has three elements: it has a fiscal policy, we even named that fiscal policy, it’s called chainsaw and blender, so it has a chainsaw and it has a blender. In fact, many of those who criticize us for the quality of the adjustment, it amuses me because they said that making an adjustment of more than one percentage point of GDP was impossible. And we aimed for a zero deficit in 2024. And we did it with such conviction that obviously it had a blender and it had a chainsaw. And then we believed we would be able to achieve it in the first quarter and we achieved it in the first month, that is, in January we had zero financial deficit. In fact, they criticized us and said that in February the primary deficit would explode. Again, zero deficit. And I will let you know that on the 22nd we will be doing a national broadcast, where we will also be announcing the fiscal numbers and I inform you that the first quarter of the year ended with a positive financial result. So to all those analysts who say that the deficit is going to explode on us and all that, I dedicate the applause you just gave or again the phrase from Maradona.

The other element is the issue of monetary policy. Basically, the Central Bank is bankrupt. So, the question is how to resolve the bankruptcy of the Central Bank. This is the key. The bankruptcy of a Central Bank is resolved by liquidating its liabilities; that is, with the size of the Argentine problem, it implied a stratospheric price level until they liquidated enough liabilities so that the net worth was at least zero. Are we clear so far? If this is the case, it means that given that price level, to resolve the cleaning up of the Central Bank is in the stratosphere, given today's prices, the line that connects those two price levels gives the implicit inflation rate. Therefore, it was essential to clean up the Central Bank. Why? So that the stratospheric price level that left the Central Bank's net worth null would decrease, and as that price level decreased, the expected inflation rate would also have to decrease. Naturally, we also started a process of cleaning up the Central Bank. There we also encountered some criticisms; I even have the WhatsApp messages and the reports from the consulting firms, saying that the real interest rate had to be brought to positive territory. If we had done that, instead of decompressing the balance sheet of the Central Bank as we have done so far, I can tell you that so far this year we would have already put four more monetary bases into remunerated instruments. So what would we be discussing now? No, this is unsustainable; we would be talking about the ball of Leliqs or the ball of repos, or I don’t know what, a snowball that would ruin us in hyperinflation. Now all of them are hiding; no one is saying anything. That is to say, they must be afraid of Maradona's phrase. But, put another way, the important thing is that the flip side of that fiscal deficit of 10 points of GDP has already been brought down to four. That is, not only have we made a fiscal adjustment of seven points of GDP in the treasury, which is why we have now started to relax allocations, and so now there is more chainsaw and much less blender; I say, for those who are so worried about the quality of the adjustment, as if a permanent blender is not a chainsaw, right? But well, that is another detail. The important thing is that we have made successive cuts in interest rates, and what did everyone expect every time we lowered the rate? That the exchange rate would rise and that we would lose reserves. Well, we have accumulated more than 12 billion dollars in reserves, we have come out of the territory of negative net reserves, and in the meantime, we have paid a lot of things. Therefore, what we have done in monetary and exchange matters is also a success. Now the discussion is, ‘no, well, but the dollar rate is enormous.’ And so if I had set it in positive real terms, it would have been even bigger. So they should more or less agree on what they want to say about the interest rate, because we have always been clear that it was an arbitrage problem with the dollar rates. That is, not to look like a caveman at the real interest rate in a closed economy.

And obviously, we made adjustments to the exchange rate. If you remember, when we were campaigning, they said that with us the exchange rate would be at 6,000 or 10,000. I think they saved you a little bit. So what do we have in terms of results? Not only have we achieved zero deficit, but we have gone a bit beyond: instead of making a five-point GDP adjustment, we made one of seven. You can see that in a work done by Nadin Argañaraz, which he actually circulated on Twitter, and we also reduced the quasi-fiscal deficit by six points. So we made a 13-point GDP adjustment, that is, we just made the largest fiscal adjustment in the history of humanity, because we also did it in three months. This is important, but that is precisely what allowed us to avoid hyperinflation. Furthermore, one of the characteristics of the zero deficit issue, which is very important, is the following: when you have zero financial deficit, it means that debt does not rise; if debt does not rise, the debt-to-GDP ratio does not rise, therefore, you are on a sustainable path. That is, you become solvent; and if you become solvent, the price of bonds has to rise, and in fact, from 18 dollars when we took office, they are now close to 60, and the country risk that was at 2900 is now at 1200. And if we manage to lower the country risk by another 200 basis points, we can already enter the debt markets. This adjustment was so strong and so positive in the way we did it, that when we went to negotiate it with the Fund, while all analysts said that our program was inconsistent and that a Fund review with programs that had failed like the Argentine case takes about three months, we got the agreement in a weekend. You can imagine what the phrase is.

And, obviously, this is translating into a decrease in the inflation rate, because as I told you, the wholesale inflation, which is the one that is anticipated, was at 54%, that is, the equivalent of 17,000 percent annually, and today it is at 5. Moreover, the International Monetary Fund itself, which had inflation expectations for this year for Argentina around 250% annually, has lowered it to 150. Lowering it to 150 means that, from today onwards, it expects that on average inflation will be five and a half. But since the process is not linear, it means that we are heading towards a low single digit by December. That is, we are achieving it. Naturally, there are a lot of criticisms; what happens is that the criticisms, to me, seem to be made understanding the model that one has in mind. For example, I don’t know when they say ‘integral program,’ then they say ‘sectoral policies’ within the program within the program. Look, I am not Leontief; I am not going to make you a five-year plan. I don’t believe in that. I don’t believe in a dirigiste economy. I am a libertarian liberal; I am going to take care of stabilizing the macro, you have to take care of the micro, what do I have to be doing with the micro? Enough with the stupidities we have been doing for 100 years, where we make any macro disaster and then politicians come in choosing the winners. Which is also a huge source of corruption. Therefore, what is the rule of a liberal in this? Don't pick the winners. I am going to take care of stabilizing the economy, lowering inflation, generating the conditions for the economy to grow again; the rest is all up to you. That is, the one who explains this best is Claudio Zuchovicki, who has a fabulous example: Is Milei going to take care of inflation? Yes. Is he going to take care of the fiscal deficit? Yes. Is he going to take care of the exchange issue? Yes. Is he going to take care of cleaning up the balance sheet of the Central Bank? Yes. Is he going to take care of his pizzeria business? No. You have two pizzerias, one is doing well, the other is doing poorly. You have the same international context, you have the same macro: I am not going to take care of the pizzeria; that is a micro problem, you have to solve that. What do I have to be doing getting involved in each of your businesses? You can't be so fatally arrogant.

The other is the income policy, but what is the income policy? Touching the price of such and such, the price of such and such, the interest rate, wages… Hey, hello, I am a libertarian liberal; I believe in the price system. I understand that I can have a transitory problem because I am going through a hyper-socialist economy, I have 100 years of socialism, and so we are making a pro-market reform. There are a lot of initial imbalances, plus the additional problem that we have to avoid a hyper, so we are correcting relative prices in a context of high inflation and with some foundational problems and with some problems of violating private property before, so it may be that at some point there are some corrections via competition defense. Everyone will understand what I am talking about. But except for such specific things that are typical of the transition, those things will never exist again. But first, you have to stabilize the economy and make it clear the respect for private property. And not that someone using state resources takes positions and generates a dominant position based on state fraud and then generates political movements by touching a demographic segment where there is a large proportion of voters. Welcome to the world of politics; it is the garbage I am describing to you.

We already talked about the interest rate issue. We also talked about the sustainability of the adjustment; there is more chainsaw left, less blender. The best example is what we are doing in terms of pensions: if we had left things as they were, retirees would have lost two points of GDP; with what we are doing, they will only lose half a point. That is, we are returning one and a half points to them. And naturally, the discussion of the exchange rate. The discussion of the exchange rate is quite ridiculous: ‘no, because the exchange rate has to go up.’ Why? If today there is no gap, why do I have to be touching the exchange rate? Because I don’t like the market exchange rate? The first thing you have to understand is that that analysis of the real exchange rate - I will say it in Latin, I would say Professor De Pablo - is nonsense. Because they take a series of the real exchange rate. The question is, what is the reference year? Someone explain to me why they take a certain reference year on which to calculate the average. Explain that. No, they don’t explain that. Not only that, when you look, there are moments when the real exchange rate is very depreciated and there are moments when it is very appreciated. Therefore, let’s say, something that has that level of volatility, calculating the average I would say is another stupidity the size of a house. But as if all that were not enough, at the moment you don’t know, calculate an average, and at some point the exchange rate is going to pass through there, take that year. Could you say that in that year you can replicate the supply and demand conditions of all past, present, and future goods that affected the determination of that set of relative prices in Argentina and in the world, all simultaneously and as if in the meantime the composition of the supply of goods had not even changed? Do you realize the nonsense of doing that? As Professor De Pablo says: that is arithmetic, that is not economics. So when they come, they talk about the real exchange rate, this and that, do you realize the arrogance that implies? Because it implies knowing the vector of relative prices, but not only now of Argentina but also of the whole world. And then you should know the preferences, the technology, and the endowments, not only present but also future, not only of Argentina but also of the whole world. Do you realize? And to take a policy action and for that to work, you should be omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent: that is, you should be God. Why the hell do you think Hayek named that book The Fatal Conceit? Because it is a little pretentious, right? Well, the one who raises their hand like that thinks they are in that condition. One of these days they will tell you to bring them a coffee. But well, you already know who I am talking about; these are things that happen.

So, this is everything related to the stabilization part. Now, obviously, it is not all stabilization; at some point, we have to start growing. To start growing, structural reforms play an important role. But there is one very important thing, which is to understand the nature of structural reforms. Toto explained this masterfully when he gave the first speech about the characteristics of the program. In that speech, he explained it perfectly, and if you look at the entire regulatory framework and the restrictions and all the mess we have, and the legal framework, they are consequences of addressing the effects and not the causes. That is to say, the cause of the problem is always the same: if you take the last 123 years of Argentine history, Argentina has had a fiscal deficit for 113 of those years. Argentina has had 22 crises from 1901 to today, 20 of which have a fiscal origin. They either have a high fiscal deficit or an extraordinarily high one. Therefore, the central problem is the fiscal deficit. So, for example, you have a fiscal deficit, you finance it with monetary issuance. So what happens is that at some point it deteriorates… I mean, all of that affects the exchange rate, so they try to anchor it with the exchange rate. When you do that, what happens? You lose reserves. Then the currency penal law appears so that you cannot buy dollars. Instead of fixing the cause, which is the fiscal deficit, since politicians do not want to touch their own, it was made very clear yesterday that theirs is off-limits, Macri would say: ‘mine is fine,’ yesterday was a clear example, ‘mine is fine’… fortunately, Argentines are reacting. So, in that context, you find yourselves in that situation. Or, for example, you finance the deficit with monetary issuance, you generate debt, sorry, monetary issuance, then inflation starts to rise. What do you do? Price controls, for example, the gondola law. Now, what happens when you control prices? Shortages appear. So how does politics respond? With the law of shortages. That is to say, the dollars leave, so they impose capital controls, and then the one who flees is a criminal. The one who flees is a hero; the one who flees is a hero, they managed to escape the clutches of the state. You laugh, but I see it that way. What would you recommend to your client? I put on my economist's suit: buy dollars. That later counts as flight. And the truth is, if you buy them on the black market, even better, because then you don’t have to pay a bunch of stupid taxes that exist, all to finance those who raise their hands and those who do it out of greed, to finance those useless people. The saying goes that a thief who robs another thief has 100 years of forgiveness; I say with what Argentine politicians have stolen, we have eternity won.

The reality is that when you look at our economic program, which has the fiscal leg, the monetary leg, and the exchange rate leg, where there is a nominal anchor, it is not that there is no nominal anchor. That is another stupidity they said: ‘no, there is no nominal anchor here.’ Look, since we arrived, the monetary base has practically not changed, and we bought, we issued a lot to buy the 12 billion dollars; they left us a little gift called some puts at the Central Bank that triggers endogenous issuance, there were the remunerated liabilities. And how do we compensate? We compensate with BOPREAL and we compensate with fiscal results. And that makes the monetary base not change. Today we have null net international reserves and the same monetary base. That is the anchor; the anchor is the amount of money. Moreover, if you look, they always label the Fund as very aggressive regarding the speed at which inflation can decrease; they recognized that we are bringing it down faster. Moreover, some criticisms seem quite funny to me between the exchange rate and inflation because during the convertibility, which took 20 months to stabilize the inflation rate to make a serious country in terms of inflation, with a fixed exchange rate, today the inflation rate is decreasing much faster than during convertibility. And that has an explanation because during convertibility, you had endogenous money. Endogenous money associated with the increase in the demand for money. When you wanted to demand pesos, what did you do? You delivered dollars, and the Central Bank gave you pesos. So the increase in the demand for money had as a counterpart what? An increase in the supply of money. And that makes it so that you kept the money market in equilibrium all the time, and the only thing left was the readjustment of relative prices due to the two previous hyperinflationary messes, Alfonsín's hyper and Menem's hyper. So when all those relative price problems were finally corrected, inflation disappeared because you maintained equilibrium in the monetary market. We also maintain equilibrium in the monetary market, but without issuing, so all increases in the demand for pesos go against what? Against a decline in the goods market, therefore, the level at which the inflation rate decreases is much faster: there is the explanation; it wasn’t that difficult. The only thing is to put a little thought into it.

To face this, we sent the most ambitious reform program in Argentine history. We sent a thousand reforms in two instruments: one-third in the DNU, two-thirds in the Ley Bases. The DNU is still in place. But what is the characteristic of these instruments? It has three elements: the first is that unlike all the DNUs that have existed in Argentina, where all advanced on individual freedoms, on private property, this is the first time that it returns freedoms, that is, it returns freedom to citizens, it makes a furious respect for private property, it promotes more competitive market structures. That does have a huge defect, both the DNU and the Ley Bases, a tremendous defect: it goes against the politicians' scams. This was clearly seen when they overturned it in the Senate. Obviously, the biggest champions of the scams, what are they going to say? ‘No, the decree is unconstitutional.’ Fortunately, the Court, after some things, now seems to have found its way, it has reoriented itself, and now it has ruled in two cases in favor of the DNU. It is still not enough, but it is a good start. As for the Ley Bases, it also has the same concepts, but there were things that could not come out by decree; they had to go through Congress due to the type of things it implied. So when we sat down with the governors at Casa Rosada, one of the things I proposed to the governors was to fix their fiscal problem. And that was in Chapter 4 of the Ley Bases. Now, what happens? The governors, instead of understanding that as an act of goodwill, understood it as a sign of weakness. In that case, they started to make a mess in fiscal matters. So what happened? We removed Chapter 4 from the Ley Bases. How did the red circle, which is becoming more and more analog, read it? ‘This is a defeat for Milei.’ Toto came out and explained: ‘Well, if you don’t want to leave Chapter 4 as it was and make a fiscal mess like the one you are making so that we get hit in six months, we are lifting Chapter 4. But if we lift Chapter 4, you are going to end up making a fiscal adjustment bigger than the one you are willing to make. Now the Ley Bases has returned; guess what it has. The same Chapter 4. Who won? Be careful with these guys, who are very analog, who seem not to understand how politics works.

Not only that, but then the rest of the Ley Bases passed, it was approved. And then they started to dismantle it. How interesting because the trust funds had been around for more than 20 years; they just found out that they existed. We had all the champions of republicanism, of anti-corruption, and everything, but nothing ever happened with that; it was discovered now. Like all the things we are discovering all the time from the Ministry of Human Capital, where, for example, we have found that half of those who received funds for the soup kitchens did not exist; they were ghost kitchens; or kitchens that claimed to serve 500 people, but in reality served 50; or those who requested food bags and did not want to leave a record of the IDs of those who received those bags; or not only that but also when they received the bags, they quoted an extra Premium quality, and when you put the noodles in, they fell apart the moment you threw them in the water. Look at all the things we have found. Or the popcorn vendor who called me ‘Holy Week, it falls between March and April.’ Of course, because he was waiting for the cause of the smocks to come in for his wife between March and April. Interesting everything we are finding and how they abuse the most vulnerable for this. Moreover, look at one of the great triumphs we had; the first thing we received was a criticism. I remember that everyone was kicking up a fuss about the issue of poverty managers. One of the wonderful things that Minister Pettovello did, we being aware that the most complicated part was going to be in the first part of the year when the fiscal adjustment was fully operational, because we were going to be generating savings without a counterpart of investment, and that was going to cause economic activity, employment, real wages to fall, and there would be more poor and more indigent people because making the economy honest is not free; 20 years of populism is not free. Towards the end of Menem's government, the average salary was 1800 dollars; if you adjust it to today, it is 3000 dollars; when we took office, it was at 300, meaning that 90% of income in dollars had been lost. It is not that the rates are high and all those things: the problem is that we are so miserable, so poor that we cannot even pay the subsidized ones. The problem is not a problem of how much the rate is; the problem is how populists destroyed our income. They spent their time boasting about Keynesianism, saying we have to consume, we have to consume. Of course, consuming means saving less; if they save less, they invest less; if they invest less, the per capita capital stock does not increase, productivity does not increase, wages do not increase… Welcome: we are poor. So it is not free; it is not free. Twenty-some years of populism is not free.

There they began to destroy the Bases Law and, well, we brought it down. How did the analogs of the red circle understand it? 'Another defeat for Milei.' And they still do not understand the principle of revelation; they have all been exposed. That is to say, if I am a champion of not touching, for example, the salaries, we have frozen salaries since January by my order. What happened yesterday, is it a defeat for Milei? It is a tremendous victory; we are going to crush them in 2025. People are unmasking these criminals, who only care about being in politics to steal. It is fantastic; it is a wonderful moment of revelation that we are living: all the scams are coming to light, all the filth of politics is coming to light; that is to say, we are leaving them all exposed, in 2025 we are going to crush them directly. And now I enter the last part of what this presentation will be. The reforms we proposed in DNU plus Bases implied that in terms of economic freedom we would jump 90 places. That is to say, we would be like Germany. In 20 years we would resemble Germany, but since politics does not want to stop stealing, it attacks the DNU, it attacks the Bases Law, it takes pieces away, for what? So that they do not touch their businesses. I have news for you: the reforms that we cannot implement now, we will implement starting December 11, 2025. And in addition to those, I have 3,000 more. I am not going to make Argentina resemble Germany, because Germany has a GDP per capita of 50,000 dollars; I do not want to aim for small things, I want to resemble Ireland. I want to aim for a GDP per capita that is 50% larger than that of the United States: that is the revolution we are proposing, a true revolution of freedom. And in that sense, there are some things that seem interesting to them, because it is true that in the midst of the adjustment we are making, 75% of Argentines understand that we are worse off, they clearly understand that we are worse off. But what is the most wonderful thing? That when we took office, only 20% of Argentines believed that in a year we would be better; that rose in January to 30; in March it was already at 40, and today we are at 50. Today half of Argentines perceive that in a year we will be much better. And that is not minor. In addition, 70% of Argentines are convinced that we will exterminate inflation, only that there are 50 points who believe we will do it in a year and 20 points who believe we will do it in two. Moreover, if today were the runoff, despite what some may think, we would win by a larger margin: we would win 58 to 42, we would win by 16. But not only that, because when you go to that voting of the 58, what is more interesting is that 48 points would be in the first round. We would win in the first round because the one with the most voting intention after us is Cristina Fernández de Kirchner with 20. And it is not true that of those 10 incremental points between the first round and the runoff we would get zero, therefore, we would be above 50 points. What does this mean? That without a doubt starting December 11 we will make all the pending reforms plus the 3,000 we have on file, plus all the others we are designing and that we will also implement. We are going to make Argentina a true liberal Argentina that is a power and that is great again in 35 years.

And finally, the question is how. It seems almost fundamentalist the idea that only if I say we are increasing in economic freedom will it happen. You may hold me in high regard, but believing me that much could even be dangerous. So the point is how the whole process works. The first part is rebound; the first part is rebound. In fact, notice that more and more analysts are seeing a V. That V had already appeared in an indicator that seemed strange, that for February the seasonally adjusted from Orlando Ferreres had given positive. But clearly, it is an indicator that has a lot of instability at the tip. So you have to take that with a lot of caution. Not only that, now the leading index from Di Tella that anticipates the evolution of activity has come out, and it gave positive. When you look at mining, it is going up; when you look at oil and gas, it is going up; when you look at agriculture, it is going up. That is to say, we have more and more signs that this is rebounding and rising. Not only that, but you also have some additional issues, and it is that where the strongest declines were noted, the cuts are occurring in a violent V. Examples CAME, sales… it had a strong rebound. Not only that, but the brutal drop in country risk; when you look empirically, every time country risk collapses, activity rebounds strongly. But not only that, there is another fundamental element, and it is that even if we did none of the structural reforms, the decapitalization of the economy is due to a whole set of negative structural reforms that have caused one to eat up capital. The Argentine economy is very decapitalized. Why is it decapitalized? So that the marginal product value of capital - I mean the firm's IRR - is above the WACC, so that they do not destroy value. So in that context, what you have is that by changing the rules of the game, what happens now? The rate is misaligned with the opportunity cost of capital. Why do you think stocks are soaring? Precisely because of that, because they are seeing it from abroad. So in that 20 years of destroying capital, enormous productivity, enormous real returns against collapsing interest rates, you have a chance to make money like crazy, even without structural reforms; that is to say, without making reforms we can grow for an interesting period of time, not at the rates I would like, but we can rebound strongly now and grow strongly at the start. So we will reach 2025 with very strong expansion rates composed of rebound and growth due to decapitalization and falling inflation rates. Get ready because we are going to crush it. And then we will have the composition of the chambers that we need to make the reforms that Argentina needs to be great again. But that is not all. If you notice, when all this is over, the fiscal adjustment will be consolidated at 15 points of GDP; that is to say, there will be 15 points of GDP that the government was taking to finance parasitic activities, and that now this savings will be transformed into productive investment. And that will inject into the economy at least between 4 and 5 additional points of growth. So we are preparing to generate a true… I would not say economic miracle, because all we are doing is what the books say should be done. But we have our heads so deformed after 100 years of brainwashing in public education, whether state-managed or privately managed, we have so much socialism in our blood, that when one sees it this way it seems like a miracle. In reality, all we are doing is applying the manual.

Therefore, the growth prospects going forward are wonderful. Because even if we do not have all the majorities to make all the reforms we want, only for a large part of the reforms, when they start to see the liberal libertarian wave that is coming, they will adjust. And that will allow the reforms to come out much easier than one sees now. But this is only part of the story. What I just told you is the entire macro configuration that makes Argentina an excellent business case. I will put it in these terms: if I buy long-duration assets in Argentina with falling interest rates, I make a lot of money, right? Imagine if they are also real, so they did not adjust, so you have a lot to gain, with which there is an opportunity to enter into infrastructure businesses and a lot of things to make a lot of money. Not only that, it is also important that you are aware that our lines of economic analysis have three blocks: there is a first block that is the conjuncture. There you will find Toto, you will find Pablo Quirno, you will find Santiago Bausili: they are the ones who deal with the macro, with the conjuncture. Then there is the second line of analysis - this is not a matter of order, it is a matter of exposure - which is the issue of regulatory reforms, structural reforms, the freedom agenda: there you have two giants, you have Federico Sturzenegger and Dr. Rodríguez Chirillo, who are the ones who designed the structural reforms to free us from all this socialist misery that we have been carrying for 100 years. And then there is the third group, which I have the privilege of having here, the dear Demian Reidel, who is the one in charge of thinking about the economy of the future. And where, with the advice he develops, he analyzes and studies policies so that Argentina becomes a leading country, a first-world country, where we are at the forefront of technological progress. We are doing everything; we are leaving it all. But I want to now close with something very important for you to be clear that I can leave everything ready, but the final decision is yours. Those who have the power to transform Argentina are you, not a politician. All I have to do is clear the way for you, make your life easier; but the true creators of wealth are you, those who will change the future of the country are you, those who will make a better Argentina are you, those who will lift us up are you, you are the entrepreneurs, the businesspeople, not the politicians. Politicians do not create value; they destroy it, and what I am doing is returning freedom to you. I told you in the elections: what do the rest of the politicians ask for? The vote to give them the power to transform their lives. And I told you: I ask for your vote to be able to return your freedom to you so that you are the true architects of your future. So you have to take responsibility for being the heroes of this story. I will clear the way for you; as Argentina begins to grow, I will put a foot on public spending, so that it is diluted in terms of GDP and start returning your tax money. That is to say, from now on there will also be a lot of tax cuts, and it will also generate a virtuous feedback. So I will tell you this to give you an idea. Today is a very special day; today is the birthday of the rebe, and we are also entering Passover: where the exit from Egypt is remembered. But this is very interesting, because after the 10 plagues that fell upon Egypt and everything that happened, Moses leads the people to the Red Sea and they ask him to open it. Moses strikes the staff and they say 'open it.' And he tells them 'go for it.' 'No, no, open it and we will enter.' And he tells them 'you have to have faith; you have to go for it, you have to enter and cross.' And the water did not open, and on the other side were the Egyptians, that is, slavery, who were coming to take them away. And there, when the heir prince jumps in and believes and trusts, the waters open, and there the final liberation occurs. What does that mean? Guys, at some point you are going to have to put your balls on the line, you are going to have to invest, you are going to have to take a risk so that the waters open and we are free. Long live freedom, damn it!