Words of the President at the Monetary and Banking Days 2024 "Fiscal Deficits, Monetary Policy, and Inflation"

Argentina Javier Milei · President of Argentina

15 October 2024 · Monetary and Banking Days 2024

Context
Milei addressed the 2024 Monetary and Banking Days conference on October 15, 2024, presenting Argentina's economic inheritance, diagnosis, and stabilization policies implemented since taking office.
Main themes
Hyperinflation crisis inheritance, fiscal deficit and monetary imbalances, inflation stabilization policy, monetary base and interest-bearing liabilities, economic reform results, Argentine macroeconomic history, money overhang, central bank policy
Duration
~82 min
98th percentile
Words
9,874
98th percentile
Sentences
440
98th percentile
Readability
59
85th percentile
Grade
10.5
26th percentile
Syntax
3.15
67th percentile
Vocabulary
2.09
25th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 91%90%
  • Institutional 3%3%
  • Ceremonial 3%3%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Geopolitical 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

440 sentences in 61 paragraphs

Javier Milei: Well, good afternoon. First of all, thank you very much to Vladimir, thank you very much to Santiago for allowing me to be part of these sessions. Thank you very much to each one of you who are here and who are interested in this enormous work that the Central Bank is doing, along with that colossus we have as Minister of Economy, Toto Caputo, who textbooks will remember as the best Minister of Economy in Argentine history.

The presentation I am going to make consists of three parts. In the first part, I will be describing the inheritance that we received. In the second part, I will be discussing the diagnosis and the key, fundamental role that good economic theory has in precisely solving this type of problem. And in the last part of the presentation, I will be discussing the policies implemented and the results we are achieving, and what we are expecting moving forward.

In that sense, regarding the inheritance, one of the things that struck us, that was truly shocking, was what was happening with the inflation rate at the beginning of December. When we looked at the inflation of the first week, the daily inflation was at 1%; if you annualized that, it implied that inflation was traveling at 3700%. These numbers I will be giving may seem exaggerated, but when I give you the monetary imbalances that would have implied validating this… let’s say there would have been monetary validation that would have allowed this to spiral and continue forward. When you took the first two weeks of December, the rate was already at 1.2% daily, meaning it had accelerated. And that, in annualized terms, was 7700. On the other hand, you have a concrete figure for what the inflation in December was in retail prices, that is, in consumer prices, which was 25.5%. And that, in annualized terms, was close to (I don’t have the microphones calibrated well because I keep bumping into them, so I either choose the glasses or the microphones, so if you hear strange things it’s because I bumped into the microphones) it was an inflation that was traveling at 1500%. But if you take it in wholesale terms, that 54% annualized gives $17,000%. That is to say, we were on the brink of a macroeconomic collapse.

Moreover, it was not only what one was seeing as a symptom of this problem of the accelerating inflation rate, but there were also the initial imbalances, which could give the monetary validation that would validate inflation precisely. Basically, we were combining the imbalances of the three worst major crises in Argentine history: on one hand, we had a monetary surplus, the famous Manny overhang, which was double what we had before the Rodrigazo. In fact, we are publishing a note in The Economist, and the people from The Economist asked us for this estimate, and fortunately, Federico’s team took the luxury of re-estimating the money overhang, and it was indeed double what we had in 75, that is, in the period before the Rodrigazo.

Why is this important? Because the inflation before the Rodrigazo was 30%, and when the Rodrigazo exploded, it jumped to 180%; that is, the inflation rate multiplied by six. If we were coming in with an inflation rate of around 200%, clearly multiplying by six would imply jumping to levels of 1200%. But if the imbalance was double, it meant at least jumping to 2400%. On the other hand, we had an additional problem, which was the situation of the Central Bank in terms of interest-bearing liabilities. The ratio of interest-bearing liabilities to the monetary base was around four times. That is to say, that situation is even worse than what we had before the hyperinflation of '89, with levels of monetary base in terms of GDP similar to those of that time. Therefore, the fall in the demand for money would have strongly and very easily led us to hyperinflation levels. At the peak of hyperinflation, the monetary base in terms of GDP fell to 0.2%.

And in the hyperinflation of '89, we had an inflation rate of 5000%. This was further aggravated by the fact that we had a set of interest-bearing liabilities maturing in 30, 60, 90, up to 270 days. And the previous government intentionally, this was not casual, moved all those positions to one day; therefore, we had that bomb about to explode in one day. That is to say, we could quintuple the amount of money in one day. Basically, the previous government’s bet, that is, in reality, they did not believe that we were libertarian liberals; they actually considered that we were libertarian libertines. In fact, in the public debate, you will find quite a few libertines, who in the name of freedom, let’s say if we had done that, we would have generated the precipitating hyperinflation, Peronism would have taken all its forces to the streets, they would have looted supermarkets, that dynamic we already saw during 2001 or 2002 with the coup d'état that Alfonsín and Duhalde carried out against De la Rúa; a coup that ended and the looting stopped, let’s say when Duhalde came to power.

That was what they had planned, therefore, not only would we have generated hyperinflation, we would have taken the situation, if you look at the jumps in poverty both from 2001, 2002 and from '89, '90, the jump in poverty would have implied reaching levels of at least 90% poor and 50% indigent, a true calamity. And not only that damage, but also the populists would have finished off any glimmer of a liberal solution. Because what worries the political party the most, which is actually where everyone is, the entire political caste, which I say is the party of the state, is being in power. But if they also make someone else pay the cost, it’s a party for them. And that is what they were looking for, for everything to blow up very quickly and return to power by January, when all the imbalance was cleaned up, to load all this onto us, grab the cyclical recovery, and enter into an endless cycle of populism.

And there was also the aggravating factor that we had social indicators that were worse than those we had in 2001. At the same time, we had flow imbalances. The fiscal deficit, adding the Nation, that is, the Treasury and the Central Bank, reached 15 points of GDP: five were in the Treasury and 10 were generated in the Central Bank, which is the quasi-fiscal deficit. And, at times, the exchange rate gap was around 200%. That is why I find it amusing the comment from some analysts saying "Milei devalued." If the gap was 200% and the net international reserves were negative by almost 12 billion dollars, I did not devalue. I mean, the devaluation was already there; it was just a matter of being honest.

But we not only had the problem of these flow imbalances, we also had stock imbalances. As I mentioned, we had negative international reserves of about 12 billion dollars. We had debts in the Central Bank with, between the SIRA and the trapped dividends, about 50 billion dollars. We had debt in pesos maturing soon equivalent to 90 billion dollars. We had foreign currency debt maturing for 25 billion dollars, a large part of that debt was with the International Monetary Fund, but we had the program fallen. And this is interesting too because, in general, when one has a situation of recurrent defaults, restoring that situation with the Fund can take between 3 and 6 months. And the reality is that the economic program was so solid that, in one weekend, the International Monetary Fund gave us the opportunity to move forward. Obviously, they did it with reservations, reservations that many made about, for example, that it was impossible to achieve a zero deficit. We proposed to achieve a zero deficit in 2024, that is, when 2024 ended. I remember that many domestic economists said it was impossible to make an adjustment of more than one point of GDP, that it was madness, and all the epithets associated with that about my person and, above all, about the fact of going around with a chainsaw.

But we showed the Fund, we proved the consistency of our program, and the truth is that the goals were much more ambitious than those proposed by the International Monetary Fund, therefore, it came out very quickly. And the reality is that this, which seemed impossible to achieve over a year, we achieved in a month. That is to say, Argentina, which in the last 123 years had a deficit for 113 and the ten years it did not have one was because it was in default, in the first month of management achieved a zero deficit, a feat that we have not abandoned to this day and that we will not abandon this year. And the law we sent for the budget is based on a zero deficit for the first time in Argentine history. And we are going to comply with it rigorously and we will resist everything that needs to be resisted. Because when it was necessary to put what needed to be put on the table, betting on fiscal balance in the face of sensitive causes and where the populists wanted to break the balance in public accounts, we did what we had to do regardless of the impact that this could have on my image. Because I did not come here to say let’s take care of my image and do political life; I came to fix Argentina’s problems and I am willing to pay all the costs I have to pay. And if I have to veto retirees and I have to veto, let’s say, the fraudsters who defend their scams through the figure of universities, with great lies, I will do it, because my commitment to fiscal balance is unwavering and that is what I did.

Naturally, within all the stock problems we had, there was also the problem of the puts. You will remember what that part of the discussion was. Therefore, that was what we found ourselves with, and we were facing a catastrophe. A strong and rapid reaction was needed. Fortunately, we had been working on an economic program to have a very strong consistency relationship and, well, we are taming this wild bull. So, now the second part of this presentation has to do with the diagnosis, and here a very important role is played by what one believes in terms of economic theory and the consequences in terms of economic policy. I know that some parts are very basic for a large part of the eminences sitting here, and I apologize for having to share simple things in some areas, but there is also a broader audience and there are students, and I think it is worth refreshing some concepts or keeping them in mind. And some things should also be good for us to keep in mind, even being professionals and very prestigious, because it is the basis on which we think about this problem.

We are convinced of the monetary nature of inflation. That is to say, inflation, for us, is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon generated by an excess of money supply, either because the supply increases or because the demand falls, or because both things happen at the same time, and that generates a loss of purchasing power of money. As all prices are expressed in monetary units, they rise. That is our diagnosis. Now, that, in addition, given all this discussion, because, just as we are proposing this, there are other professionals who consider that inflation is multicausal and all that kind of thing. The truth is that these are hypotheses to which I do not adhere, but that is part of another discussion. I come to tell you how we see it, what we are doing, and then those who truly understand will end up writing history as it should be.

So the question is: well, where does this hypothesis come from? That is to say, how do we look at this problem? So, from my point of view, the first thing to do, because in fact it is not the same to define inflation as the generalized rise in prices regarding the loss of purchasing power of money. Because if the problem is the generalized rise in prices, the usual cavemen appear, who have been failing for more than 4000 years, trying to control prices. Aside from the fact that this is associated with a problem of value theory, believing that prices are a margin over costs, that is, a problem of objective value theory. A theory that was defeated, I say, already in 1871 with the appearance of Menger, let’s say when he wrote his principles of economics and politics and that he did so in parallel with William Stanley Jevons and Léon Walras. I wanted to mention Walras, can you imagine why?

Aside from that, one should think: what would the world be like without money? Well, the world without money is something we study; it is usually studied in the last part of the models in microeconomics courses, in the part on general equilibrium, which are the barter models. Now, the problem is that, in a barter economy, you encounter two major issues that are not minor. One is the problem of double coincidence, that is, you need to find someone who wants what you have to sell, at the same time that this person has what you want. That is a significant problem. But even if you found that counterpart, there is also a problem of indivisibility. That is to say, I like bread, I eat bread, and I meet a baker, but I am probably not willing to give a lecture for a kilogram of bread. And the amount of kilograms of bread that would imply a lecture of mine, at least now... and I hope to do things right so that I can live off this when my political career ends, given that I have renounced my privileged pension, the first in history.

We are convinced of the monetary nature of inflation. That is to say, inflation, for us, is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon generated by an excess supply of money, whether because the supply increases or because the demand falls, or because both things happen at the same time, and that generates a loss of purchasing power of money. Since all prices are expressed in monetary units, they rise. That is our diagnosis. Now, that, in addition, given all this discussion, because, just as we are proposing this, there are other professionals who consider that inflation is multicausal and all that kind of stuff. The truth is that these are hypotheses to which I do not adhere, but that is part of another discussion. I come to tell you how we see it, what we are doing, and then those who truly understand will end up writing history as it should be.

So the question is: well, where does this hypothesis come from? That is to say, how do we look at this problem? From my point of view, the first thing to do is to recognize that it is not the same to define inflation as the generalized rise in prices with respect to the loss of purchasing power of money. Because if the problem is the generalized rise in prices, the usual cavemen appear, who have been failing for more than 4,000 years, trying to control prices. Aside from the fact that this is associated with a problem of value theory, believing that prices are a margin over costs, that is, a problem of objective value theory. A theory that was defeated, I say, already in 1871 with the emergence of Menger, let’s say when he wrote his principles of economics and politics, and he did so in parallel with William Stanley Jevons and Léon Walras. I wanted to mention Walras; can you imagine why?

Aside from that, one should think: what would the world be like without money? Well, the world without money is something we study; it is usually studied in the last part of the models in microeconomics courses, in the part on general equilibrium, which are the barter models. Now, the problem is that, in a barter economy, you encounter two major issues that are not minor. One is the problem of double coincidence, that is, you need to find someone who wants what you have to sell, at the same time that this person has what you want. That is a significant problem. But even if you found that counterpart, there is also a problem of indivisibility. That is to say, I like bread, I eat bread, and I meet a baker, but I am probably not willing to give a lecture for a kilogram of bread. And the amount of kilograms of bread that would imply a lecture of mine, at least now... and I hope to do things right so that I can live off this when my political career ends, given that I have renounced my privileged pension, the first in history.

The truth is that I do not need that much bread. So, I say all this because, if one truly took it seriously, this would lead to a huge loss of transactions, and therefore, we would have a truly abrupt and violent drop in well-being. Therefore, look, you will not believe where I am going to get this reference, but this reference is from Joan Robinson. She said that when analyzing the issues of the neutrality of money, they were not well thought out, because it is not the same to have a barter economy as it is to have a monetary economy, and that is not a minor issue. Now, in the face of that situation, one has to understand how money appears. And, in reality, it is not that individuals started crying because they could not make transactions and were wandering through life. They tried to find a solution, and one of the things they discovered was that there were some goods that were exchanged more than others. So, one of the things they discovered is that if they went and bought that good that was exchanged more, it served them indirectly to buy what they really wanted. That is to say, in reality, money is a good of indirect exchange that is used to make transactions. For example, when man was nomadic, the most important thing, for a large part of human history, was eating. So, things related to food were important. Nomadic men would barter and had a "money," if you will, as a good of indirect exchange, and it was precisely livestock. They used livestock as a good of indirect exchange.

Now later man became sedentary, and one of the things he ate a lot was bread, and bread is made from wheat. So they started making transactions in wheat, not because they wanted to have wheat, not because they wanted to accumulate wheat, not because they desired to have a lot of wheat, but because they actually wanted to use it as a good of indirect exchange. In that sense, you have different currencies like wheat, like flax, like coffee, like tobacco. I always find a lecture by Milton Friedman very amusing where he talks about the hyperinflation in Germany and says, they used nails, and at one point he says they used cognac. And he says: it was the most liquid definition of money I found in my life. So, if you look at all these goods, they fulfilled two of the roles that money must fulfill, which are being a unit of account and being a generalized medium of payment. But the problem with these goods is that they are like ice cream, right? Not so violently, but they are like ice cream; they do not have a negative interest rate, that is, if you do not eat the ice cream now, it melts, so you are left with nothing. These goods also, either due to the passage of time or whatever, would lose value. And consequently, they did not serve as a store of value. And from that problem, metallic coins appear, whether gold, silver, or copper.

But more than that, and there you have the three functions of money. No, I am not going to go into the whole discussion of when paper money appears and all those things because I will get tedious. But what I am interested in noting in this, the most important thing from my point of view, is that the demand for money is a derived demand. That is to say, no one demands money for its own sake; no one is planning to take any peso, dollar, or whatever currency you can think of, to the wooden suit. No one is thinking about that. Moreover, in fact, inheritance is a miscalculation.

So, put another way, the demand for money is a derived demand; it is a mirror demand of what is happening on the real side. Now, notice that if I put it in these terms, the demand for money at any moment in time is a function of consumption. That is to say, there is no need to put income and the interest rate, which is an aberration, and I will explain that now too. Because if I put the entire consumption path, that will give me the demand for money at each time period, and I work in a general equilibrium model; at this moment I am working under normal conditions of pressure and temperature, to see, let’s say, how do they manage to kill an elephant? Little by little.

In that sense, if you look at a general equilibrium model, the excess demand functions depend, in the final instance, on what Robert Lucas Jr. -may he rest in peace- called deep parameters. That is to say, it depended on preferences, technology, and endowments. If you want, you can add as an additional element, honoring the recently known Nobel laureates, the property system to include institutions. That said, that vector is constant. And if that vector is constant, the consequence is that the consumption path is granite. That is, you take it, if you want, you solve it applying the principle to the maximum of Pontryagin, if you want to solve it. And you can do it in discrete or continuous, applying as you wish. Or you solve it with Bellman, or whatever you want. Or you do it with the Lagrange method, I don’t know, whatever you want. But that path is a rock. And, therefore, the demand for money is granite because it is a mirror of that. That is to say, you need it precisely to be able to make transactions. Therefore, under normal conditions, the demand for money should be something granite. Notice that, then, the classics were not so foolish when they developed the first rudimentary versions of the quantitative theory, where they said that the demand for money is a constant proportion of income. They were not so crazy. In fact, the problem is that this demand function for money is inconsistent with a general equilibrium model because prices in the general equilibrium model are homogeneous of degree zero, and this would be homogeneous of degree one. That raises some inconsistencies in the functioning of the system. But they were not so crazy or so foolish.

So under normal conditions of pressure and temperature, just as the consumption path is fixed, the demand for money, the real demand for money, must also be fixed; and that must be equal to the real balances, which is the nominal amount divided by the price level. Therefore, see that the price level is determined by the quotient between the money supply and the real demand for money. And where the only thing the Central Bank can do when it includes money is to determine the nominal scale of the economy. And there is also the issue of the nominal anchor, that is, the amount of money is what ultimately generates the idea of the nominal anchor, which is to determine the price level. And obviously, if the demand for money is given, if I increase the money supply, the consequence is that the purchasing power of the currency must fall. That is to say, prices rise, that is to say, this situation where inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon generated by an excess supply of money, whether because the supply increases or because the demand falls. In this case, the deep parameters did not change; they should not change, and consequently, that leads to a loss of purchasing power of money, and all that are monetary units rise. Basically, that is the central thesis and where it comes from.

Naturally, if one thinks in these terms, because I say to be thinking about this, let’s say we are not going to be doing seminars or anything like that. Especially, let’s say, because we can be doing all the nice calculations, and then there are the orcs. The orcs come and talk to you about the squaring of the circle, the virgin whore, and all those things.

So the consequence is: well, what do we think in terms of monetary policy? You have two ways to pose the problem: one, with exogenous money, and another, with endogenous money. One way to think about this problem with exogenous money involves fixing the amount of money; therefore, when you fix the amount of money, automatically what you are fixing, in some sense, is the price level. That is to say, it adjusts to the conditions of the general equilibrium system on the real side, and the price level is determined. Obviously, I am working with functions that are homogeneous of degree zero, not of degree one, that is, it is not strictly like the old quantitative theory. In that sense, what happens? If I fix the amount of money, the natural consequence is that if that vector of preferences, endowments, technology, and property allows for technological progress—let’s suppose that a technological progress could be described, again, exogenously; real life is more complicated—the consequence would be that you would have an economy that expands, that grows, and therefore, that economy would generate deflation.

That is to say, it would be an economy where, if the amount of money is constant and you have more and more transactions and more demand for money, the flip side of that, if M is fixed, you should have deflation. I warn you that the problem of deflation is a problem of modern literature. If you go to the literature prior to the 20th century, that is, in the 19th century and further back, this was not something that was discussed. There is a wonderful book on this by Philipp Bagus called Defending Deflation, and it was not a problem. It is a modern problem because we are used to living with inflation. Furthermore, those who claim that it is a problem are insulting the private sector. I am not to blame for a policymaker being so stupid that they do not understand that I can make contracts in real terms and neutralize them in terms of inflation. In fact, one of the things we did with the zero deficit was to ensure that fiscal policy moved in accordance with revenues and, therefore, in accordance with inflation and what happens with the level of activity. The other option is a monetary rule.

To set a way in which the amount of money grows so that there is no deflation, because, basically, in the previous case there will be deflation, given that the amount of money does not grow, and the economy grows. The deflation will be in line with that economic growth. The other option is to set a growth rate for the amount of money and, in contrast to what happens with the growth rate, that will end up determining the inflation rate. This, again, in terms of pressure and temperature. When we start to introduce things, it starts to move quite a bit more. But the interesting thing is that there you would have another pattern of movement. The reality is: who sets that rate and why? Again, we encounter the issue of fatal arrogance. The first question is: why is it bad to have deflation if deflation is a way of returning income to the rest of the population? Yes, obviously, against the State. That is very well.

Not only that, but also if I am going to set it, why am I going to set it? On what basis, why am I going to set it? Because the reality is that if I set the amount of money, then you tell me no, but I have some guys who are so brilliant that they are going to set the amount of money according to what people want. And if people can do it, why do I need a third party? Let people choose their own money and determine the amount of money based on what they want and that's it. So, if the Central Bank expands, it causes harm; if it contracts, it causes harm. And if it keeps the amount constant, it also causes harm; it always causes harm. The issue is how much harm it causes; the way it causes the least harm is if it does not move the amount of money, but that is part of another discussion.

That is one scheme of monetary policy; the other scheme of monetary policy is endogenous money models. Without a doubt, the most well-known, the most popular is the one in which the exchange rate is fixed. In what would be the terminology of Julio Hipólito Guillermo Olivera, in his works on On Passive Money—I believe the translation is on passive money—he talks about what is called the external standard, which is when you fix the exchange rate.

Now, when you go to the case of an open economy, again in a very simplified model, you have purchasing power parity, where local prices are equal to the exchange rate times international prices. Now, if I am fixing the exchange rate and I am a small economy, that means that local prices are determined for me. So if I have determined and if my relationship of the real amount of money—meaning M over P is equal to L, which is fixed—and now I have P from outside, then what is determined endogenously is M. That is, the amount of money within the economy is determined endogenously, based on what is happening in terms of inflation outside or what is happening with the demand for money. That is, if my demand for money increases, for example, I will end up expanding the amount of money.

This is not minor, because I could say that then the monetary base is equal to reserves plus domestic credit. And when I fix the exchange rate, then, if I increase domestic credit, I lose reserves. I mean, this may seem like a rather silly thing, but Kirchnerism did not learn it... As a consequence, later, when they start to lose reserves, they start to impose capital controls. But the important thing is to see that money is now determined endogenously, because given "P," which is given by the PPP, and given "L," which is given by the mirror demand associated with the intertemporal consumption path, that is where the amount of money comes out so that this can map. Naturally, there are other mechanisms to think about this problem; this is one of many. One is the commodity standard. Notice that the commodity standard, in some sense, has some resemblance to this, but the commodity standard has a subversion or a version also linked to what is called the "wage standard." I mention this case because there is often a lot of talk about models of distributive struggle. So, you now determine the price level as a markup over labor costs, net of productivity. In this way, you determine prices, and the amount of money should adjust to that. So, when distributive struggle appears, the problem lies in the fact that this distributive struggle manifests itself in, suddenly, a higher price level. And that higher price level requires monetary validation to not pay it in terms of activity. Basically, the problem with that model—which, suddenly, others do not necessarily have to have—is the fact that it has a problem of value theory. Because, again, I am saying that prices are a markup over costs. Or I can say that it is labor cost to present the distributive struggle.

The problem with that is that now I am working with an objective theory of value, and we already know that the objective theory of value was annihilated. Therefore, everything that has to do with... acts of brutality, like what the Soviet monstrosity did, which had people controlling prices, then believed that by adding the costs from there, they would determine the price level. So they were determining who the bad guys were... Do you remember the former president saying "there are devils"? Well, the forces of heaven killed them.

And then, thank you, Darío. The other model of endogenous money is what Olivera called the credit standard, which was the fact of fixing the interest rate. Basically, there is a problem there because now you are not determining the amount of money or the price level; that is, you have the problem of what is called the nominal anchor. That is, by not having M fixed, you cannot determine P. Consequently, the system is left adrift, and that is why inflation expectations are so important. Why? Because that allows you to link future prices with present prices, it allows you to determine P, and from there, determine M and from there, solve the model. The truth is that, to me, controlling the interest rate seems like an aberration. I remember, everyone knows of my admiration, affection, love, and all the definitions they may have, but since we are friends, I can tell the anecdote with Federico Sturzenegger when he decided to switch to inflation targeting. I asked him what he thought of Moreno, and he said "Caveman." Yes, if you want to whistle, whistle away, no problem. I mean, after all, he is constantly campaigning to have me removed. So, if you want to say whatever you want, I will not deny it.

That said, obviously, we all have a pretty bad opinion of Moreno, especially because he has a bad theory of value. He believes that prices are determined by costs. This is very important; one of the things that Menger raises in his Principles of Political Economy from 1871, and that later Von Wieser rewrites, is what is called the principle of imputation, where prices determine costs, and not costs that determine prices. It is so ridiculous to believe that costs determine prices that, if this were the case, there would be no bankruptcies. There would also be no sense in being efficient if, after all, I can pass on the cost. It is something that really makes no sense. But if you want, see all the discussion about the labor theory of value and the subjective theory of value, so I do not overwhelm you with this kind of thing.

And why is it aberrant to control the interest rate? Because controlling the interest rate is equivalent to the controls that Moreno did, but intertemporally as well. Because, in the end, what is the interest rate? The interest rate does not exist because money exists. This is a shot at Mr. John Maynard Keynes in the General Theory. In fact, the interest rate does not exist because money exists; the interest rate exists because time exists. The interest rate has to do with the intertemporal preference rate; I say it is a deep parameter as well, within preferences. Therefore, in reality, the interest rate is the relative price of future goods with respect to present goods. Or why do you think that when the interest rate rises, savings increase? Because what is saving? Saving is future consumption; so if I am raising the interest rate, the present price is rising; if the present price rises, I substitute present consumption for future consumption. That is why you see that when the interest rate rises, savings increase, but in reality... I mean, go... Intermediate microeconomics, the intertemporal chapter, and it shows you precisely this problem of relative prices, the interest rate. I mean, you do not have to be very sophisticated either.

Or solve the problem of dynamic optimization, and when you see the utility ratio and the interest rate, obviously the time preference rate appears; you will find that those same conditions are the same as if you had set prices. That said, then, it is an aberration to want to control the interest rate because it implies being so arrogant as to not only want to control present prices but also future ones. I mean, which makes it like being a Moreno reloaded. It is the incredible Hulk version of Moreno. Therefore, I am not in favor of controlling the interest rate. I mean, given that we have a Central Bank, for now, we will control the amount of money. It does not matter because, as Santiago and Vladimir are brilliant guys, they will find work elsewhere, but they will have done an enormous service to the country the day we leave this job and end this filthy ordeal called the Central Bank. It is like the frog and the scorpion: do not ask it to change. So, having said that, we had, given this theoretical discussion, to face the problem of stopping hyperinflation.

So, we had three factors for expanding the base. One is what is called by the public sector, which is financing the fiscal deficit; another is by the financial sector, and another is by the external sector. When we decided to have a zero deficit, basically it was a way to cut off monetary issuance to finance the treasury. If you take the Cerro-Meloni methodology, from 1901 to today, Argentina has had 23 crises, of which 21 have a fiscal origin, where the fiscal deficit can be large or extravagantly large. The extravagantly large cases are the case, for example, of the Rodrigazo, with 14 points of GDP in 1975; the exchange rate table in 1982, with 11 points of GDP; the hyperinflation of Alfonsín, with 8% in 1989; the convertibility in 2001, with 7. Well, we had, in the consolidated, 15. To have an order of magnitudes.

In that sense, it was essential to cut the fiscal deficit and, hence, the zero deficit, to end the issuance of a fiscal type. Now, in terms of quasi-fiscal, we had two sources, and we achieved that in the first month, closing the fiscal tap. We had to end the remunerated liabilities because the problem of the remunerated liabilities was a non-minor issue because what it generated for us was more quasi-fiscal deficit and increased future money supply. Because, in the end, all those remunerated liabilities were future issuance; therefore, they were future inflation. So, basically, we had to cut that way of spiraling and growing those remunerated liabilities, which were generating a fiscal deficit of 10 points of GDP, and made the economy truly shaky.

And here it is important to have this discussion because many economists suggested that this was stopped by raising the interest rate. And if we had raised the interest rate, today we would not be talking about how we stabilized, but we would have been talking in recent times about carry trade; we would have been talking about the relationship; today the remunerated liabilities would probably be ten to one with the monetary base; we would be discussing when hyperinflation would occur or when that title position would be expropriated. Therefore, if someone is in favor of the interest rate, I want to tell them that we dealt them a defeat, that we did it not using the interest rate as a mechanism. Because if we had used the interest rate, if we had done what the International Monetary Fund said and what many local economists said, today we would be in hyperinflation.

What we did was something different: basically, in the face of the exchange rate imbalance, we made a correction, where the exchange rate would approximate that of the market. Why is this very important? Because what it did was reduce the excess supply of money. How is the money overhang generated? The money overhang is generated because you have a fixed exchange rate, you are issuing money, you start to lose reserves, you impose controls, and that artificially increases the demand for money to collect inflation tax. Not only is it violent and a lie about inflation, which is an unlegislated tax, but they are also forcing you to demand more pesos by force to collect more inflation tax. A total immorality.

But aside from that, what is the most interesting thing about this situation? That if we had done what they said, we would first be in an inflationary nonsense, but not only that. By bringing the exchange rate closer to that of the market, when they corrected for the country tax, what we did was reduce the excess demand in the foreign exchange market, thus reducing the excess demand in the foreign exchange market. Therefore, we reduced the excess supply in the rest of the economy. Reducing the excess supply in the bond market meant that interest rates fell, and consequently, country risk fell. Reducing the excess supply in the goods market meant that the decline in activity was not as severe. And therefore, employment did not fall as much, and thus unemployment did not explode. That is why we made the largest fiscal adjustment in the history of humanity - if I take the Nation and the Central Bank - and yet there was no social problem. I mean, there is a part of the program that has to do with social policy made from Human Capital, but that would be an extra hour and I don't want to bother you with my presentation.

So, in that sense, see how interesting it is, because the other day Jose Luis Daza explained: the characteristic of this program is that while all other experiments of similar characteristics involved GDP declines of around 10%, if today you look at the July data of the seasonally adjusted EMAE compared to December, the decline is 0.6. If you look at industrial production, it is at the same levels as in November. If you look at what we did, for example, in 2002, GDP fell by 11, 10.9%, but in the second quarter, which is when the adjustment occurs, it fell by 16%. Look at how great the Minister of Economy I have is. But with the social consequences that that has. That is to say, having thought about that problem of where we placed the exchange rate, because we could not open under the logic of libertarianism, meant precisely looking for a market proxy that would minimize that excess demand.

At the same time, one of the things that happened is that I remember that when we achieved the surplus in January, they told us it was a coincidence, the second time it was a coincidence, well, there came a moment when they realized that the fiscal commitment was real. Think that, from having 18 ministries, we brought it down to 8; we made a lot of cuts to public employees; we completely eliminated public works, we completely eliminated discretionary transfers to provinces. And obviously, there were also items that had an adjustment mechanism that were diluted, but then they were recomposed (sic) and yet the fiscal numbers are here. So that allowed us to show that the zero deficit policy was working and that it was working seriously. And zero deficit means that I am not taking on new debt, that is, I can be rolling over the debt, but I am not taking on new debt. In fact, I tell you that in the last 40 years, only one government reduced debt in a market way, not compulsively, not with write-offs in renegotiations. We, 20 billion dollars.

And as this was happening, what does it mean? It means that you, the debt-to-GDP ratio is not increasing; therefore, it means that you are solvent intertemporally, consequently, that also explains the fall in country risk, today country risk ended at 1047, the lowest level in the last 5 years.

Moreover, when we were discussing the issue of universities, because more than anything for what it implies in terms of signaling the fiscal deficit, one of the things I did with Federico was, I asked him to estimate the impact of country risk on GDP in dollars and if we, let’s say, with this level of country risk are at a GDP of 600 trillion, no, that is, 600 billion dollars, if we go back to the old ways and with a country risk of 3000, let’s say, GDP goes to 400 billion dollars, which would mean losing a third of GDP or gaining, let’s say, having 50% more GDP compared to the case of 3000 basis points, that is, it is not a minor issue in terms of per capita GDP.

It is not a minor issue in terms of the discussion of universities, where at no time was public university questioned, at no time was the non-tuition questioned, because nothing is free, there is no such thing as a free lunch. But, what happens: if we went back to the old ways and went to 3000 of country risk, because we started to yield, I recommend the book "Stories from the Fifth Floor," as, let’s say, the Alfonsín government starts to yield to pressures and ends up in hyperinflation. So, in that context, we do not negotiate; moreover, if you go to the equilibrium where country risk goes to 3000, the amount of dollars that go to the university is the same but the difference is that I have a lower per capita GDP, a third lower.

And also, as that fall in GDP a third goes into activity, but two-thirds is due to a jump in the real exchange rate, that implies that it also increases the number of poor and indigent people. And we are not going to tolerate either that they break our arm regarding fiscal balance nor are we going to tolerate such damage to Argentines, I say for a group of criminals who do not want to be audited. Fortunately, today the ruling came out and we will be able to audit them, the crooks are in danger.

And as we advanced in fiscal balance, that is where this giant who is here, Dr. Pablo Quirno, came in and began to put the debt in the place it always had to be. That debt was national government debt, it was treasury debt. That is to say, what was happening was that fiscal deficit was generated, they sought some trick to issue money, that money would enter the street and then they wanted to sterilize it elsewhere by paying interest. But that problem that was in the quasi-fiscal deficit was actually not having clarified what was happening with the treasury accounts. And as we showed our commitment to fiscal balance, regardless of the fact that the devaluation jump implied that what we needed was to arbitrate the interest rate in dollars, that implied a negative real interest rate in pesos. Which also allowed us to dilute the remunerated liabilities and another part to take it to the treasury. And what no one was talking about and that everyone said was impossible to resolve, between this giant who is Santiago Bausili and Pablo Quirno, they fixed it in seven months, look if I am not going to be proud of my team.

Naturally, then came the discussion of the put, that discussion you know. At that moment we had moved on to discuss, it is a speech in which I am at the Buenos Aires stock exchange and I talk about zero excess supply. Basically, what I was saying there was, we will only issue for the external sector. Because if you look when we were talking about endogenous money, in the case of external standard you only increase the amount of money against the demand for money, that would be the argument. So, that money does not generate a loss of purchasing power of money, that is, it does not generate inflation. Now, we realized that we were wrong, the truth is that. Why? Because that is a free system, but this is not in the textbooks either, so that is to say. Therefore, that self-flagellating issue I have, my friend Alejandro Rozitchner, told me, "But is it in the textbooks?" No, "and then what are you lamenting?"

Well, but one has that perfectionism. And what we realized is that exporters selling dollars was not exactly wanting to demand pesos. Because, let’s say, in the traditional model you have a transaction in pesos that you want to make, you take your dollars, with those dollars you buy pesos and it is with those pesos that you make the transaction. So that demand for money is mapped against the transactional demand and that does not generate problems in terms of purchasing power of money. Now, what is the problem? The problem is that when I have capital controls and I am forcing them to liquidate dollars, I am buying pesos, but all those pesos I do not want and the consequence is that now there are indeed excess pesos and it generates inflation.

So, from that moment, we decided, in the face of a very complex situation and in which, let’s say, there was a whole idea that the exchange rate was going to $2000 that Monday, I remember that, with Toto we were traveling to what was my presentation in Sun Valley. And there, with Toto and Santiago via video call, we decided to change the monetary policy scheme and go directly to "zero issuance." We knew we were risking being attacked anyway, but we had the firm conviction that if we did not modify the amount of money, sooner or later we would win over the market. Today the exchange rate is at $1150, and it is full of economic monkeys.

So, the point is, what have we achieved? Well, what we have achieved is that wholesale inflation is at 2.1%, that is, we went from 17,000 to 28%. If you want, retail inflation, from 1500 we went to 30%. But the most interesting thing is that, by design of policy, there is a part of inflation that is induced inflation, which has to do with the agreed devaluation rate and international inflation. I will round it off at 2.5%, but it is already a little less today. So, if my last CPI data is 3.5%, it means that the true inflation of the program, the true monetary inflation that the program is generating, is one point. That is to say, if I removed the crawling peg, that 2.5 would automatically disappear, and therefore, I would only have one point of inflation left. This means that the inflation of the program today is traveling at 13% annually, so if you take it in terms of CPI or IPM, if you correct for the exchange rate guideline, you will see that we are talking about inflation levels that range between 13% and 25%.

And why is this important? Because this miracle in terms of lowering inflation was achieved without there being hyperinflation. In general, it is more: the two previous successful programs precisely had a strong inflationary process before, which implied a strong dilution of real balances and, consequently, there was not much more for the demand for money to fall and therefore, it was much easier to stabilize. We did it without expropriation, that is why it often amuses me when they told us: "No, well, what day are you going to do this thing?" I say, they do not understand, I am not a communist, I am not a dirigiste, I do not believe in fixing prices, fixing wages, fixing interest rates, sectoral policies. No, no, I am a liberal, and the only thing I can do as a liberal is that my economic program has a fiscal policy, zero deficit, a monetary policy, zero issuance, and an exchange rate that is still not free until I finish correcting the stock imbalances.

And this is also important. Furthermore, we do not control prices, we do not control the exchange rate, and we also made a recomposition of relative prices. Today, regulated prices already cover 80% of the cost, something that seems like a minor issue, but it is not. So, with all that, we managed to lower inflation and it is in a range, if you want, of 13% to 25%. So, how does this continue? I mean, when do I lift the controls? Well, look, the timing is God's. I do not know when the time is. But all these operations that we have been doing were done in the market, and being done in the market means that it will depend on the decision of the agents.

Now, the most interesting thing is that when the observed inflation tends to the induced inflation, what happens? Inflation disappears. And if inflation disappears, it means that the money overhang is disappearing. As the money overhang disappears, inflation will resemble induced inflation, the exchange rates converge, the inflation rate converges, and as I resolve the stock problem, when it becomes zero, the money overhang is eliminated. And when the money overhang is eliminated, there is no excess supply of pesos. And if there is no excess supply of pesos, I can lift the controls even when I do not have dollars, because I am going to a flexible exchange rate system.

Obviously, what will it depend on? I mean, on how the agents manage this dynamic until the program inflation disappears. That is to say, only the induced one remains. We lift the controls. Obviously, while that happens, we will finish resolving the stock problems, because that dynamic does not occur independently of what is happening with the rest of the stocks. And that day, we lift the controls. When? I do not know, but it will happen when all those conditions are met.

That said, the point is how this moves forward, because the question is, okay, we have set the broad monetary base and the observed monetary base, let's say the traditional one, the traditional format is growing. But what is it growing in accordance with? For example, how is the unwinding of Lebacs and the like taking place? Suppose you have a company and you see that demand is recovering, when you see that demand is recovering, what are you going to do? Are you going to lose market position or are you going to exit the money market? You are going to exit the money market, when you exit the money market, the bank has to give you the money. When it has to give you the money, it turns around and asks the State to pay the Lebac. So, there you have an endogenous expansion of the money supply. For what? To finance the movement of activity. In parallel, what is going to happen is that when the money overhang disappears, what is also going to disappear? The difference between the observed monetary base, the traditional one, and the broad one. From that moment on, the amount of money remains fixed.

So, the question is: "Well, okay, once we get to that, let's say, the money overhang is eliminated, the definitions of the base map, the exchange rates converge, the interest rates converge. So, now I open up, how does it continue?" Well, assuming that the economy is going to grow and I have serious arguments to believe that it is going to grow, I say, either due to the structural reforms that imply a jump in the indices of economic freedom of 90 positions. And today we have institutions that are starting to resemble, despite the fiscal degenerates, they are starting to resemble more those of Germany, France, Italy. Still, that does not satisfy me, I warn you, I want Argentina to be the freest country in the world. Therefore, that implies that GDP, I mean, in fact, I saw part of Juan Pablo Nicolini's presentation showing precisely the issue of growth. I mean, if I was not misinformed, GDP doubles in 10 years, which implies a per capita GDP growth rate of 7%.

That, let's say, on one side. On the other hand, guys, we have just saved and returned to the people 15 points of GDP. We temporarily took a little with the PAIS tax, but we have already returned it. And, moreover, we are removing it now in December, we are removing it definitively, the first time we said that a tax was raised temporarily, we fulfilled it and we removed it and now, at the end of the year, in addition, we eliminated it.

Furthermore, the continuous decrease in country risk will imply lower discount rates. I mean, look at how much Argentine financial assets have risen. Well, if you think in terms of Tobin's Q, the market value is much higher than the replacement value. A wave of investments is coming. And not to mention what has to do with the RIGI and that more than 50 billion dollars in investments have been announced. But not only that, but there are also factors that enhance short-term demand. Because notice that today the installed capacity data has already risen to 61.3%. That is to say, there is a recovery of demand. And that is because for 5 consecutive months real wages and pensions have been rising in real terms. And, in addition, the cycle of stocks had to be reversed, therefore, we have conjunctural elements, whether it is the recomposition of wages and pensions in real terms, as well as the reversal of the cycle of stocks, plus structural factors related to the RIGI, related to the increase in savings within the economy, with the decrease in country risk and structural reforms. Therefore, let's say, when we become aware of maintaining this course for 10, 20, 30 years ahead, we will be talking about the Argentine miracle.

Thank you very much.