Words of the President of the Nation Javier Milei at the 60th Idea Colloquium 2024, Mar del Plata.

Argentina Javier Milei · President of Argentina

18 October 2024 · 60th Idea Colloquium 2024 · Mar del Plata

Context
Milei addressed the 60th IDEA Colloquium in Mar del Plata on October 18, 2024, presenting Argentina as a business and investment case highlighting economic reforms.
Main themes
Argentina as investment case, economic crisis and stabilization, inflation reduction, fiscal adjustment, monetary policy, structural reform, business environment, historical economic context, Milei administration achievements, poverty reduction
Duration
~72 min
97th percentile
Words
8,688
97th percentile
Sentences
342
96th percentile
Readability
56
79th percentile
Grade
11.5
39th percentile
Syntax
3.21
74th percentile
Vocabulary
2.00
11th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 73%70%
  • Institutional 9%9%
  • Social 9%9%
  • Ceremonial 5%5%
  • Technological 2%2%
  • Geopolitical 2%1%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

342 sentences in 47 paragraphs

Good afternoon everyone. First of all, I would like to thank the authorities of the IDEA Colloquium for the mistake of inviting me. I would also like to congratulate you on the choice of the name of this Colloquium, the motivation behind it, where the reference of: “If not now, when” is taken— I don’t know if you know this or not— from the book of Pirkei Avot, 1:14, which refers to Hillel, and says: “He used to say that if I am not for myself, who is for me? And if I am only for myself, what am I? And if not now, when?” What I am going to do now is basically present Argentina as a business case. Why now, and I will basically make a first part, where I will explain why this time is different, and then I will directly present Argentina as an investment case.

Basically, one should ask why this time will be different; in fact, the book by Reinhart and Rogoff is precisely a narrative of how many times it has been said that this time will be different, and it always ended the same way. In the Argentine case, it always ended badly. So it is a bit more challenging to explain why this time it will be different. But it is also true that at some point there may be a change in trend, a structural change, and a change that initiates a new era. In fact, the Generation of '37 was precisely working to make this time different, and they certainly succeeded because when in 1860 the Constitution of Alberdi was put into action, going from being a country of barbarians; in 35 years we became the world's leading power. So the central idea of this presentation is to show you why that is feasible and why this time it can indeed be different.

Naturally, to explain why this time is different, we cannot overlook the initial conditions we faced, because the way we resolved this also contributes to the argument that this time will be different. Basically, when we took office, we were facing what was potentially the worst crisis in Argentine history, which combined the worst elements of the three largest crises in Argentine history. We had a monetary imbalance or monetary overhang that was double what we had during the Rodrigazo. Consider that at that time, when the Central Bank ran out of dollars and had no choice but to open and devalue, the inflation rate multiplied by six; if it was double—imagine—we were traveling at 200% and we were going to 1200 as a base, and if it was double, to 2400.

On the other hand, when one looks at the situation of the Central Bank—in terms of interest-bearing liabilities, regarding the monetary base—the situation was much worse than what the Central Bank had at the beginning of '89—prior to Alfonsín's hyperinflation—which ended at 5000%, and at the same time, social indicators were worse than those we had before the collapse of convertibility. Therefore, it is clear that the situation was extremely complex and that any mistake could have triggered a crisis of proportions that are very difficult to imagine, but in light of what each of these crises were, it is not hard to imagine that at least poverty would have doubled. Therefore, we would have been at levels of at least 90% or a little more, and with surely half of the population in extreme poverty. The basic symptom of all this was reflected in what the inflation rate was. There is always a discussion about whether it is valid or not to be making annualizations. From my point of view, it is valid because it is at the rate that prices were moving, and there were elements that allowed for a monetary validation that effectively validated them in practice.

Moreover, the day we took over the administration, in that opening speech—I explained how the calculation was made. So, and I actually did that from a monetary perspective because, in fact, I did not yet have the data, for example, of what the wholesale price index was, for December, for example. In that sense—in the first week of December—the prices were moving at 1% daily, which is 3,700 percent annually. When you looked at the second week, there had been an acceleration and prices started moving at the rate of 7,500; and when you take the wholesale inflation, and I always tend to work with wholesale inflation because it is usually a leading indicator, that is, it tends to precede what happens with retail inflation, and that month it was 54%. That—in annualized terms—is 17,000%. Therefore, there is no doubt that if this had exploded, we would be talking about an absolutely different situation. So the first thing we clearly had to do was to end inflation; here, without a doubt, it is always key to have a good diagnosis, and fortunately, thanks to that enormous team I have, led by “Toto” Caputo, we were able to deliver a precise blow from the very first moment. And we started from the hypothesis that inflation is—always and everywhere—a monetary phenomenon, generated by an excess supply of money, whether because demand falls; because supply rises, or because both happen, which leads to a loss of purchasing power of money and consequently, all prices expressed in monetary units rise.

Note that in the very definition I use about the origin of inflation and how I view inflation, I do not define it as the generalized rise in prices, but as the loss of purchasing power of money. That is to say, I do not have that bad habit, of many politicians, who believe it is the fault of businessmen who set high prices. I still remember my predecessor in office, who said that inflation is produced by devils, and the forces of heaven killed them all.

That very definition of generalized price increases is what allows some night owl to believe that this can be fixed with price controls, when that has never worked in the history of humanity, and if there is a place where it has never worked, it is in Argentina. So the point was to trace the origins of monetary issuance, and here it was interesting because another thing that exploded, to the eyes of anyone looking at the Argentine case, were the twin deficits. Think that when a country has 4% of GDP in twin deficits, it is a yellow alert; 8 is a red alert because it is on its way to getting hit; we had 17; more or less to have a sense of the magnitude of the challenge. Now, of those 17; 15 were in the public sector; 5 in the Treasury and 10 in the Central Bank. So basically, the idea was to tackle the problem of the public sector and tackle the problem of the Central Bank. And in that context, we developed the zero deficit program.

I remember that when we were campaigning, with a chainsaw, many took it as a joke; they also said it was impossible. And, moreover, if one looked at Argentine history, it seemed quite complicated because—in the last 123 years—Argentina had a deficit in 113; the 10 years it did not have a deficit were because it was in default. And, moreover, when one took the number of crises—using the methodology of Ana María Cerro and Osvaldo Meloni—Argentina, from 1901 to today, had 23 crises, where 21 have a fiscal origin and where they separate between high fiscal deficit and fiscal mismanagement, directly.

There are a lot of other things that contribute to the legacy, and I do not want to overload too much because I have said it in other places and I want to leave myself more time to discuss the Argentine case, but that which seemed virtually impossible, that it could not be adjusted more than 1 point per year, that we would never achieve it… we achieved it in the first month of management. That is to say, in the first month of management, we achieved what had never been achieved in 123 years in the Argentine economy.

Naturally, in the face of this achievement, obviously when it was achieved in the first month, which by the way we were also surprised, don’t think… I believe in the chainsaw, but “Toto” did it better. That’s when they started to question, and instead of recognizing that the econochantas mandrils were wrong, they started with “no, it has a lot of blender and little scissors” and all those little things from these kids who are surely not heirs of Adam Smith. I am, they are not. But, having said that—beyond the parish jokes—basically, the first thing we did was reduce the number of ministries—from 18 to 9—today we already have 8 ministries. In addition, public works were completely eliminated. They said it was impossible to touch public works, of course, because that’s where politicians steal, and we—as we are willing to have a Government of honest people— the first thing we cut was public works.

Another thing they said was impossible to touch because it was a big scam among politicians was the discretionary transfers to the provinces. In general, what was done was to make those transfers to those provinces with the most opaque accounting possible, precisely so that in that way they could steal. Naturally, discretionary transfers to the provinces… out. Another thing they said could not be done was to touch public employees. Not only did we lay off almost 50,000 public employees, but also, every time a contract falls— in most cases—it is not renewed. Therefore, we also reduced the number of public employees.

Then there is a very interesting part that happened in a Cabinet meeting. We were gathered and—in the middle of the meeting—“Toto” had to leave for a meeting outside Casa Rosada. And so, he got up and I stayed with the rest of the ministers, and once he left, I asked each of the ministers and—explicitly—I told them that I wanted them to also cut 10% more from each of the expenses of each of the ministries. The most surprising thing is that the following week each of the ministers brought me a program for reducing and streamlining spending, cutting public spending by 10%. That indeed shows commitment to management.

In addition, another thing we did that also seemed impossible was the elimination of intermediaries, that is, to remove the managers of poverty from the middle. This was one of the battles—probably one of the toughest we had to fight—this was a battle that was designed with the Minister of Human Capital, Sandra Pettovello; the Minister of Security, Dr. Bullrich, and Dr. Ferraro, who is Guillermo Ferraro, who was in Infrastructure, where—basically—what was proposed, because that was what appeared in the headline and the reason why Minister Pettovello was criticized so much, was that the counterpart of the plan was eliminated. So they came out to criticize us saying that now we wanted to give plans without counterpart and that what we were doing was promoting laziness, that is, as if we were even worse than the populists who had left. And that is not understanding what was happening with that.

We were clear, first of all, that due to the type of adjustment we were making, it was very likely that the strongest impact would be felt during the first quarter. Therefore, it was also important to do it during vacations, so that people would not find out so much—so to speak—about what was happening. On the other hand, we had to ensure that the most vulnerable sectors did not feel the force of the adjustment. So it was very important to provide them with support, but the problem was that there was no money, so where were we going to get the resources? It is true that we also aimed for an adjustment of 5 and overreacted and made an adjustment of 7 and then we were able to restore other items. But here it was key, that it was also what fueled and fed the blockades, which said it was impossible to end them, and that thanks to this measure and the Anti-Blockade Protocol of that wonderful minister, who I have to say is Dr. Bullrich, today we live in an Argentina that has no blockades, something that also seemed impossible, and that we achieved from the first day of management.

In that context, something happened that everyone believed that since the beneficiaries of the plans received a card, that prevented there from being intermediaries, and in reality, that did not prevent there from being intermediaries because—basically—while they collected with a card, at the moment they had to leave the proof that they had provided the service, at that moment, they were charged the toll and that was when they took half of the plan. So suddenly they had two plans and one plan they had to leave to the picket hordes so that they could continue collecting the plan. And how was the provision? Carrying the coupons they were given—in the marches—to prove that they had been in the marches. So one of the things we did was eliminate the obligation of that provision. So what happened? People were not obliged to go to account for having done something and, therefore, without us turning a single peso more, their income doubled in the midst of the adjustment. But at the same time, that took resources away from the picketers, from the managers of poverty. That is why it was so important to have the Anti-Blockade Protocol ready quickly and that is why it was very important what happened in the first battle we were going to have.

And in that context, the transportation system - instead of using it for negative campaigning - as Massa did throughout the campaign, saying all kinds of aberrations that are - to this day - I have to keep explaining are lies, such as, for example, that I am going to charge tuition at universities or that I want to close them because I want to privatize them. That is to say, they used, they use all that negative campaign so that they are not audited. So, the question I would ask you is: are you in favor of the crooks and that they are not audited and that they use the universities to steal with politics? Because that is the question. Universities will not be privatized; they will continue to be public and free of charge. The only thing we want to do is audit them, and yet, I have to keep responding to this.

And - in that context - a line of complaints was established so that they would not be extorted. And, obviously, we deployed 18,000 troops to the streets, since Belliboni threatened with a demonstration of 50,000 and internally said it would be 100,000, thus presenting himself as a mega-success. And the demonstration ended up being 3,000 people, and - from that day on - the blockades in Argentina came to an end. Indeed, that was a good move as well. Because you have three types of wars: you have stock against stock wars, the one who runs out first loses; you have flow against flow wars, which never end; or you have flow against stock wars. The foolishness of Argentine politics, in this regard, was that - it was giving flow to the enemy all the time, and this design between Dr. Pettovello, Dr. Bullrich, and Dr. Ferraro turned it into a flow against stock war, and we had the flow and they had the stock. They were going to make a strong bet and then the different marches would deflate. And, indeed, that is what we did, but - in the meantime - we had to endure the criticism that we were promoting laziness. So when you go through the Capital and can transit comfortably, say: “sorry, Milei.”

Naturally, in this, there was also a dilution of salaries in the public sector, and obviously, that also impacted pensions, pensions that - today - are above 10% over inflation and above what they were in November. And not only that, but also - in dollars - they tripled. That - basically - was the “Chainsaw” program, something that had never been done, and we tackled a lot of sacred cows, because we got involved with public works, with transfers, we got involved with everything, we got involved with the managers of poverty. Therefore, it is not that it was impossible: it just took the courage to do it, and we had it. On the other hand, that only fixed a third of the problem. We still had the problem of the Central Bank, what was the quasi-fiscal deficit, which involved endogenous money issuance and, therefore, if we wanted to cut inflation, we had to end the quasi-fiscal.

There, it was also very important to start showing - systematically - fiscal balance and that it was something that had come to stay and that it was not something transitory. Because there is something very important here: if I go to zero deficit, the increase in debt is null. Therefore, the debt-to-GDP ratio is not increasing, and if the debt-to-GDP ratio is not increasing, consequently, one is solvent intertemporally, and sooner or later, the Country Risk will collapse, and we received it close to 3000 and - today - it is fighting to break 1000. So it seems that we are also doing well there. And it is not that it is decreasing due to a type 2 error; I mean, I think that achieving it based on having fiscal solvency is an achievement and very far from lamenting. That is why for someone who reads the ink, it burned their brain.

So, in that cleaning of the Central Bank, we had to face the issue of remunerated liabilities; moreover, what were the Leliqs, which were instruments for 30, 60, 90, 180, 270 days, the previous government had passed everything to 1 day. So that - if the crisis exploded - the amount of money could multiply by five in one day; obviously, that would have implied a brutal inflationary explosion and, by the end of the year, we would no longer be in power and they would return to government, but with all the dirty work done. We did not give them the pleasure; they are still eating popcorn, they must be that fat.

Moreover, with all that was taken from the lab coats, surely, they will be able to stay nice and round. So, there we also fought a very important battle at the beginning because what did a large part of the profession suggest to us? And it was that we should raise the interest rate, that we should take it to positive territory, the real interest rate, and the reality is that if we had done that, today, we would be discussing a liability/monetary relationship against the base of more than 10 times and we would be discussing carry trade and we would be discussing when we would be about to blow up and we would be discussing that inflation does not go down because the expectation of issuance - since those remunerated liabilities are future issuance - consequently, it would never go down. Which would have been a huge mistake. There is, obviously, a whole discussion about whether to use the interest rate or not. I mentioned that in the last meeting of the Central Bank. But what we decided was to arbitrate the rate in dollars, given the jump in the exchange rate, which was nothing more and nothing less than a clarification because it amuses me the intellectual dishonesty of some saying, “no, Milei came and devalued,” as if the gap did not exist and as if the Central Bank was about to burst with reserves. I mean, there are truly people who I don’t know if they don’t listen to themselves, don’t read what they write, one cannot be so intellectually dishonest.

But by arbitrating the rate - in dollars - and in a stabilization process, and with a price clarification, it was obvious that the interest rate in pesos, even being negative in real terms, could be arbitrated with the dollar rate. And that at the same time allowed us to continue diluting the remunerated liabilities, and in the meantime, we continued consolidating fiscal balance. And when the solidity of fiscal balance was already clear, there began a huge task by the Secretary of Finance, Pablo Quirno, in conjunction with the Central Bank, where they began to remove the remunerated liabilities from the balance sheet of the Central Bank and it started to go where it should have always gone, which was to the Treasury; because, fundamentally, those remunerated liabilities arose from having generated fiscal deficit, having financed it with monetary issuance and that through another window taking it out by paying rates. So that the fiscal problem turned it into a future inflation problem and that, which is also interesting because no one said how to solve it, when one... the answers when I raised this were absolutely ridiculous and no one knew how to solve it; well, we solved it in six months and in the seventh month, the quasi-fiscal deficit ended; something that seemed impossible, we also made possible.

After we managed to close the tap on the remunerated liabilities, we moved to a scheme of zero excess money supply. I remember that I presented that at the Stock Exchange and explained that only then we would buy dollars, that is, that the only source of issuance that would remain was the purchase of dollars. And one of the things we realized is that we were wrong with that scheme. If you take the traditional books of international monetary economics, you will find that when someone goes and sells dollars, or in other words, buys pesos from the Central Bank, that has money demand and does not generate inflation. That is true in a world where there are no capital controls. When you have capital controls, you go and buy pesos not because you want to, but because you are obliged, and - therefore - the differential between what you would want to have and what you are actually buying is what generates pressure on the price level. And in the face of a speculative attack, where the dollar was trading at $1500 and they anticipated that, the following week, it would go to $2000 and so on, we decided to change the monetary scheme and go - directly - to zero issuance.

It seems that also worked and something happened that never happened in Argentina, and that is that the dollar from 1,500 fell to 1,100; so, that which also seems impossible, we also made possible. So the result of all this is that wholesale inflation, which was at 54%, that is, annualized at 17,000; yesterday the last data on retail inflation was released, and basically, the inflation for September was 2%, that is, from having inflation at 17,000 we brought it down to 28%, and do not doubt that we will continue to lower it.

Moreover, it is also very interesting how this was achieved because this also makes this time different. Because we did not do it having a prior hyperinflation that implied a deep dilution of financial assets, so that stabilization was quick. We also achieved it without an expropriation, that is, we did not resort to the violence of a Bonex Plan, nor to a compulsive renegotiation or a default or any equivalent; that is why when they said: “when do you finish cleaning the remunerated?” and I don’t know, the answer is: “I am not a dirigiste, I am a liberal,” and this is a market process and we will finish cleaning them as the market allows us to pass them to another instrument. Therefore, this is also a novelty for what is the Argentine economy, that we did it without expropriating and without default.

Another important characteristic is that we are doing all this without controlling prices, which also makes a big difference. On the other hand, we also did it without fixing the exchange rate, because if one fixes the exchange rate this happens faster. And as if all this were not enough, we did it in a recomposition of relative prices; the previous government had left prices very lagged and we are recomposing them and - today - prices cover more than 80% of costs. Therefore, this is indeed a truly different way of lowering inflation compared to how it was done in previous programs in the Argentine case. And as if all this were not enough, one could say: “but what happened, in terms of activity?” Look at the most similar program, in terms of adjustment, that was done in Argentina, much smaller than this, but of significant magnitude, was what happened with Duhalde in 2002. That year, GDP fell by 10.9% and in the second quarter, which is when the adjustment fully entered, the economy fell by 16%. Moreover, days ago, Deputy Minister Daza mentioned that all experiences of strong adjustments, not like the one we did, but of significant adjustments, in each of those cases GDP had fallen - at least - 10%.

I tell you that if we take the last data from the seasonally adjusted EMAE, and we compare it with November/December, the drop is - barely - 0.6%. If you want to look at it in Industry, with the last data it is already at the same levels as November. That is to say, there was a negative impact in the first quarter, and it has already begun to reverse. Therefore, in addition, the economic program was so well designed that it also implied not having to suffer strongly, in terms of activity and - today - the utilization of installed capacity is already above what we had last year. But it was not all stabilization, that is, not only was a stabilization program made, but also a set of structural reforms were made, and between the DNU - 70/23 - and the Bases Law, a reform was made 8 times larger than the one Menem made, but with the situation that the reform that Menem made was the largest in Argentine history. Therefore, I want you to have historical awareness that we are living in a government that made the largest structural reform in Argentine history; that is indeed different as well.

And what does that imply? It implies that we are going to jump 90 places in terms of economic freedom and those countries that are freer are 12 times richer than the repressed; they have 25 times fewer poor in the standard format and 50 times fewer in the extreme format, and that we are walking towards institutions that today could be compared with those of: Germany, France, Italy, any of the countries in Europe. Therefore, in fact, in the sessions, Juan Pablo Nicolini presented a work on, for example, maintaining fiscal balance, with that we would have the potential to double GDP - in 10 years - that is, a growth rate of GDP per capita of 7%. And as if all this were not enough, I have a luxury of a minister, who is “The Colossus” Federico Sturzenegger, who deregulates something every day. That is, there is no day that Federico does not make my day happy when I read his Twitter account. Thank you, Federico.

And now is when I am going to start selling you the Argentine case, because once I talk about the RIGI, I will present Argentina as if it were a business. I took an active role in the format of the RIGI, so if you don’t like the RIGI later, you can blame me all you want because I was deeply involved and got my hands in there, so all the fingers are marked, you will see all the dirty fingers, I have it all. So now I am going to tell you what I got involved in, so if that is what you are ranting against, know that it is my fault. One of the things we explicitly included in the RIGI was the respect for the financial economic equation of the business. That is, the financial economic equation of the business is the account you use when calculating the value of a company. That is, if you had a regulated company, for example, and basically what is done to a regulated company is that its quasi-rent is nullified, it implies that it will have a return similar to the opportunity cost, which in a regulated company is also regulated, to put it in some way. And in that sense, for example, in the case of a regulated company, you look for a price path to be zero. So, you can rewrite it in terms of the necessary income to cover the cost of operation and maintenance; the fiscal cost and the return on capital. That is, there are different ways to describe that same equation. But the most interesting thing about that equation is that it has an element that allows quantifying the effects of the atrocities that the State can cause: whether it raises taxes, whether it modifies or creates new taxes, or whether it modifies the rules of the game, in the case of a regulatory company it is easier because it would be a modification in the regulation, but – suppose – that you are a company that rents offices and a Government comes and imposes a Rental Law, which was impossible to touch; we did it on the first day and it is working.

So, the fact of incorporating the financial economic equation of a business means that every time the State or a Government wants to implement fiscal policy, harming the private sector, the cost of the account will be much greater than the positive that it can generate. Therefore, we are tying the hands and feet of future politicians, us too, but we do not want to do that kind of thing. Look at this, we are going to a zero deficit and zero issuance scheme in an election year, can you tell me what politician in the world has done that in the history of humanity? because from my point of view it has never happened.

At the same time, another thing we included in the RIGI, in the original version, was the choice of three courts. So, you could choose one of those three courts. In those three courts, the modification that I thought of making is that one chooses a court, but if over time they are not happy with that court, they can change it. That is, they have flexibility, that – if a court – does not respond, they can switch to another court. That is, the joke of politicians expropriating wealth creators is going to end. It is going to end because if a court does not respond, they will go to another. But that was not enough for me, I wanted a little more, I was quite insatiable that day, it seems. Maybe because I come from the private sector. And another thing I thought of was to add a local court. Because when you look at the experience of other cases, international courts always took a lot of time, and instead, with local courts, it flows much faster. Now, that local court is obliged to take the results generated by the Competition Defense and Competition Defense will have a special unit for RIGI. And those who follow the RIGI contracts, the RIGI situations, will have to know about micro, they will have to know about macro, they will have to know about loan economics, they will have to know about law, they will have to know also about finance and, very especially, about business evaluation and economic regulation. And they will have to, now there will be income exams everywhere, but that exam will be designed by some notables and me. I mean, I am not the notable one. The notables are Federico Sturzenegger, Toco Caputo, Santiago Bausili, and I will throw in some additional mischief. So, it will be a unit aimed at protecting investors, so they will always be able to opt for the local court under these characteristics.

Why do I say this? Because now getting into Argentina, properly speaking. If you wanted to evaluate a project, you will be looking at the cash flow. Now, cash flow, wonderful. But you can have a phenomenal business, but if later the State or a government comes and expropriates you, the mechanism does not work. That is, it is very important, probably one of the most important institutions along with respect for life and freedom, is property rights. Not for nothing, in the sessions of this year, we said it was life, liberty, and property. And here private property will be respected. It will be respected to the letter, because that is what will allow savers to save and they will be defended. In fact, the way we dismantled the situation of the Central Bank was by respecting property rights. And that also implies that we will not encroach on the results of the investment. For us, the one who makes money is not a villain. For us, the one who makes money is a social benefactor. That is, he is a hero. That is, he is someone who is fixing your life, because you can only be successful by serving others with better quality goods or better prices. Therefore, far from pursuing him, we will celebrate him, we will applaud him.

And in that situation where we respect savings, respect investment, respect property rights, that is what will lead to a process of capital accumulation in per capita terms that will raise the productivity of Argentines and make us all richer. Therefore, that is clearly non-negotiable, like none of the basic parts of my program, as you may have already seen. Because when I said that if the fiscal degenerates did things that harmed fiscal balance, they said to you “he won’t dare.” Come on, tell me if I didn’t dare.

But, aside from that, another thing I want to mention is, well, then you will choose a sector; you can imagine that I, being liberal, am not going to get involved in promoting something in particular, I: “Don’t pick the winners.” This is very interesting because, on many occasions, some night owl says: “oh, but he doesn’t have a program, he doesn’t have a stabilization program,” and what miraculously brought inflation down from 54 to 2? Which, by the way, was also induced inflation, right? I mean, wait until we get there and achieve it in consumer and we will see what happens with the exchange rate afterwards, you already know, obviously, that you know. But, having said this, from our perspective, a stabilization program has three legs: a fiscal policy, a monetary policy, and an exchange rate policy. In fiscal terms, zero deficit; in monetary terms, zero issuance and currency competition, which is already happening. So that those who have great fears about exchange rate appreciation do not worry, we are allowing the supply and demand for dollars to be mapped voluntarily by individuals, therefore, they will not have an abrupt drop in the exchange rate that is so rapid that it does not allow them to adjust in the real sector and end up bankrupt; it is contemplated, but do not be afraid. Now you can make transactions in dollars and in any other currency. So cheer up, that is not a problem and/or stop being scared by economists who seem to have died with the dinosaurs and resurrected and maintain the same habits as the dinosaurs.

Aside from that, aside from that, it is clear that in Argentina there are sectors that are very interesting, which I also suggest you include when you do the analysis of the real exchange rate. I mean, the issue of real exchange rate analysis is quite debatable, but I find it more questionable when they cut the series. Why do they cut the series in 2002 or 2003? Why don’t they cut it in 1991? Ah, no, because then it will give very low, so they cannot come with “no, there is a real exchange rate problem.” That is, the problem that implies when they choose the date is not a minor issue. But even so, I warn you: with everything that is happening in energy matters, with everything that has to do with OIL & GAS, it is most likely that Argentina will go, without a doubt, to a much more appreciated currency level. That is, why? Because there are enormous opportunities in OIL & GAS issues that, clearly, respecting property rights will bring investments, and in fact, the RIGI already has announcements for more than 50 billion dollars in investments and many companies are already investing. Moreover, many of the companies are already placing debt below 8% in dollars, and even Pampa did it at 5.75, so get ready because a tremendous wave of dollars is coming from that place.

Obviously, with the presence of the RIGI, investments in mining, the most emblematic would be copper and lithium, will also be making a great contribution. Without a doubt, our agriculture, as long as we can grow and lower taxes, we will go against the withholdings. And that, in addition, will allow the sector, agriculture, to expand more strongly. Therefore, agriculture and livestock have a lot to contribute here. And, obviously, in an economy that generates all this, it generates a lot of opportunities in terms of services. I mean, it is more in an economy that for so long has been consuming capital, the marginal productivity of capital is high. That which we see in microeconomics that seems like an abstraction, do you know what it means? that the heartbeat of the asset is enormous, that is, the heartbeat of the cash flow of the firm is enormous. Therefore, also, if we work hard to lower the cost of capital, investments should flow very strongly.

And then, another thing we are working on intensively and very especially with Dr. Reidel, is on the topic of Artificial Intelligence. From our point of view, Artificial Intelligence is like a sort of Industrial Revolution, but reloading. When you look at the statistics of GDP per capita growth over the period from year zero of the Christian era until now, that series is often described as a hockey stick. It is a series that is practically constant for 1800 years and then it hits a strong acceleration as a consequence of the impacts of the Industrial Revolution. Well, Artificial Intelligence is going to make that process seem like child’s play because it is going to be much deeper, and for Artificial Intelligence to develop, you need to have cheap energy in cold places with large expanses of land. Argentina. Therefore, also… But I only say this for the sake of merely stating sectors that do have enormous potential, which I am not going to explain to you because you are in the trenches and know much better than I do, and it would be a fatal type of arrogance to believe that I can tell you something about your business, you who are on the front lines. But just to mention them as cases of things that can happen and that, in fact, are happening.

And then there are the impacts of the macro on cash flow, and there we have elements that pertain to the short term and the long term. In the short term, it has to do with the cyclical recovery; at the beginning of the presentation, I talked about the utilization of installed capacity, how it has been rising, and basically what is pushing it is the recovery of real wages, for 5 consecutive months real wages in Argentina have been rising and pensions are also rising in real terms. You also have to add to that the reversal of the stock cycle, that is, when we were at the end of the previous Government, as a way to protect themselves, companies overstocked. And in that sense, in the first part of the year, they liquidated the stocks and that deepened the decline of the first quarter; and now there is a recomposition of stocks and that is what is making the factors of cyclical recovery push positively.

Obviously, there is everything related to long-term growth, and there, everything related to structural reforms and what is being done in terms of regulation. Given that our goal is to become the freest country in the world, that also implies a significant drop in transaction costs. At the same time, there is a strong increase in savings. The fact that we have removed the state from the equation and achieved a fiscal savings of 15 percentage points of GDP means that the resources that were taken by the public sector will now be available in the private sector. It is no coincidence that in December we were discussing hyperinflation, and today we are discussing 30-year mortgages, or how a company was able to issue debt in the local market at 5.75%. Not only that, but the elimination of inflation reduces price distortion. Inflation has a harmful effect, which is that the price system is a mechanism for transmitting information, coordination, and adjustment. If you basically have inflation, what happens is that it flows with noise. So, I can be explaining here, being very good at explaining, and you can be very intellectually gifted people and understand without any problem what I am saying, but imagine that from now on, noise starts to emerge and more and more noise. I keep explaining well, you continue to be very intelligent people, but the noise prevents us from communicating. That is what inflation does to the price system, and when it does that, a lot of transactions are lost, and there is a loss of efficiency in the allocation of resources. Well, our zero issuance program ensures that the Central Bank will never bother you again.

And why do I say this? Because as endogenous dollarization progresses and you start to make transactions in dollars freely, there will come a time when the dollar operations will be very large and the peso operations will be very small. And when that situation arises, we will be in a position to close the Central Bank and ensure that politicians can never again deceive you with the inflation tax. On the other hand, I am already close to finishing, I warn you, another thing that is very important in a business is growth. And growth, when you take empirical evidence, in economic growth there is a phenomenon called convergence, which is the situation in which a lagging country catches up with the larger countries. That in Argentina could turn into a power in 35 or 40 years, but a real power. Not, let's say, mid-table. Power, power. Let's see, when I talk, for example, my model resembles Ireland. Ireland, from being the most miserable country in Europe in 40 years, today has a per capita income 50% higher than that of the United States. That is the world I like. For Argentina to be the country with the greatest economic freedom in the world. That will make us prosperous.

So, there is a situation that is this convergence. And, in reality, when one looks at the literature of the Austrians, it is very interesting because Hayek spoke of the market as a process of discovery. So, as you discover things, you grow. Now, what is interesting? Why can those who come from behind grow faster? Because the rest of the things have already been discovered by others. All they have to do is copy it. That is to say, many of the businesses are already invented. There is no need to reinvent the wheel, just bring them. Nothing more. That facilitates growth in convergence. And obviously, we are generating the conditions from what we propose from artificial intelligence and from what we propose as a mechanism in terms of institutions to promote a free economy and for people to carry out their projects. And that is where Schumpeter and creative destruction take their place, which is what will make us grow when we are at the forefront. But we have 30, 40 years to copy beautifully and advance strongly.

Therefore, it is not that difficult. And finally, the issue of the discount rate. As I said, fiscal solvency implies a drop in Argentine risk, and that basically allows the interest rate to fall. In fact, one of the things we were doing with Federico when we were discussing the issue of universities is that aside from the negative signal that it implied to yield on fiscal numbers, and that at the same time it meant being subdued by the corrupt, because the problem is that they do not want to be audited, so we were not willing to either yield… or to submit to the corrupt and we were not willing to give up the fiscal numbers, but we said, "Well, let's do the math on what happens if one takes this increase." And what one saw was that when that increase was given in the end… there is a very interesting book called History of the Fifth Floor and it shows how after the original stabilization of the Austral, Sourrouille starts to..., at the behest of Alfonsín, give a quarter of a point to each one, to you I give 0.25, to you I give 0.15. He gave everyone everything. The fiscal deficit returned and ended in hyperinflation.

So, what we did was the exercise of: "Well, let's see the incremental effect of the money that goes to the universities. And we go back to being the disreputable ones from before," that is, we return to a world of 3,000 basis points of country risk. By the way, the disreputable ones who had the country risk at 3,000 took a lot of resources from the universities, and then they are the ones who say they are going to defend them. It is interesting, I mean, there are those hypocrites and there are the direct thieves, those who directly steal from the universities. So, we did the math, and in one exercise we hold on and cling to our fiscal policy, paying all the political costs. That makes GDP remain at 600 billion dollars. If we yield and go back to the usual ways, it goes to 400 billion dollars. This is interesting because, when we take in terms of resources for the universities in dollars, they remain constant. That is to say, all that increase, but in a more sordid macroeconomy, the resources end up being constant. But what is the problem with a more sordid macro? First, that GDP per capita in dollars is lower. The important thing about the drop in GDP per capita in dollars is that it has two components: there is a component of a drop in activity, which is one-third, but the remaining two-thirds is due to the jump in the real exchange rate. And that implies an increase in the number of poor and indigent people. Therefore, as a business, it was not only terrible because GDP per capita was smaller, but it also implied a multiplication and increase in the number of poor and indigent people.

So, when the math is so clear, the other thing that should be clear to you is that these people are not defending either the university or the interests of Argentines. That what they only want is to defend their thefts and end up running over a government that forces them to work, that forces them to work decently and stop stealing with politics. The other argument - and this is the penultimate one, so I am already finishing, I warn you - is the reduction of macro volatility. That reduction in volatility is an element that adds value. If you want the sharp ratio is rising. Obviously, in the perspective of real options, you could say that I have less volatility, so those options could be worth less. Well, all that macro volatility that we are removing, put all the volatility of the business, which is so that you create wealth and that it is not because there is a group of arrogant politicians ruining everyone's life. So I leave that volatility in your hands.

Therefore, given that the flow of funds is rising, either because we respect property rights, because we will not allow them to be expropriated, because there are basically business opportunities, because there is growth and because, at the same time, the discount rate is falling, if I put myself as a portfolio manager, I would say: "long duration in Argentina," that is, Argentina is an asset to buy, to be long. And what can be done to be long? Make real investments. Therefore, Argentina is an excellent business case. Now, I do want to return to the original phrase from Pirkei Avot, which used to say: "If I am not for myself, who will be for me?" That is, if I do not take care of myself, who will take care of me? More liberal impossible. You are responsible for your own destiny, you are the architects of your own future. If you do not take care of yourselves, who will do it? The State? No, because the State can only do harm, the State produces nothing. When the State gives something, it is because it previously stole it from someone. That is why we have implemented the most liberal policy in all of Argentine history. We have reduced the weight of the State on the private sector by about 13 percentage points of GDP, because we have made the largest adjustment in history, we have removed the State by more than six percentage points of GDP. If we only take into account the Treasury, never have so many freedoms been returned in such a short time.

Therefore, I mean..., if you are not for yourselves, if you do not take care of yourselves, who will take care of you? Moreover, and even if you take care of yourselves —you take care of yourselves— the question is what am I, what are you. You are entrepreneurs, you are the ones who create wealth, you are the social benefactors, you are the ones who have the key to make Argentina great again, you are the great responsible ones, you are the ones who can change this reality, we are only giving you a level playing field, a playing field in which you can play. We are giving you the rules of the game, we are giving you the framework, but the creation of wealth will depend on you. That is to say, you are the ones who will lift Argentina, you are the ones who will make Argentina great again.

And so, the final question is: And if not now, when? It is now. It is now because this has never happened in Argentine history. But for this to endure, it requires being successful. And this will be successful when there is growth. And growth will occur when you decide to take on your role as entrepreneurs and go out and win the market. And that is what will bring prosperity to all of us. So, may God bless the Argentines, may the strength of heaven be with us, and long live freedom, damn it.