Words of the President of the Nation, Javier Milei, at the 2024 Edition of EXPOFI, at La Rural, Palermo.

Argentina Javier Milei · President of Argentina

12 June 2024 · EXPOFI 2024 · La Rural, Palermo

Context
Milei addressed the 2024 EXPOFI business forum at La Rural, Palermo, reviewing six months of his administration's economic crisis response.
Main themes
Fiscal adjustment and deficit reduction, monetary imbalance and inflation crisis, inherited economic crisis, Central Bank liabilities, exchange rate and international reserves, external and internal debt, economic reform progress, price controls and deregulation, IMF agreement, hyperinflation risk, government's six-month review, libertarian economic policy
Duration
~57 min
95th percentile
Words
6,828
95th percentile
Sentences
304
95th percentile
Readability
59
86th percentile
Grade
10.4
25th percentile
Syntax
3.15
67th percentile
Vocabulary
2.09
26th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 72%70%
  • Institutional 14%14%
  • Social 8%8%
  • Ceremonial 5%5%
  • Geopolitical 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

304 sentences in 34 paragraphs

Good morning. Thank you very much, Esteban, for inviting me again. The last time I came as a candidate, fortunately we were successful and I returned as president. So I couldn't fail to keep my word, so here I am again. Thank you very much to everyone.

Since six months have passed since the government took office, I think it is appropriate to take a sort of review of what we received, what we did, and what we are aiming for. Specifically, when we came to power, we undoubtedly received what was the characterization of the most important crisis in Argentine history. We had a monetary imbalance that was at least twice that of the period before the Rodrigazo. This is interesting because when the Rodrigazo exploded, which was a crisis with similar characteristics - in monetary terms - to that of 1959, it involved a sixfold increase in the inflation rate. Therefore, at the rate that inflation was already coming in Argentina, above 200, it was going to put us at inflation rates - solely due to that effect - at levels of 1500. At the same time, we had an imbalance - in the Central Bank - that was worse than what we had in 1989, at the beginning of 1989, in the lead-up to Alfonsín's hyperinflation; with the aggravating factor that the previous government had not only left three times the ratio of remunerated liabilities over the base, aside from a series of contingent instruments, the famous Puts, which would have at least implied - in the span of a day - multiplying the amount of money by four or five times.

In fact, the great bet of the previous government was that we, assuming our libertarian profile, would want to free everything on the first day, which would clearly generate a monstrous hyperinflation given that social indicators were worse than those of 2001, which would have led to a brutal crisis and, by January, they would return to power with all the liquefaction and adjustment done the hard way. Faced with that situation, the flip side was that we had twin deficits equivalent to 17 points of GDP; all those who have studied early indicators of crises know that 4 points is a yellow alert; 8 is a red alert before taking a tremendous hit, so 17 was a rather intimidating number, to put it mildly. Of those 17 points, 15 points corresponded to the National State, where of those 15.5 were generated from the Treasury and 10 from the Central Bank.

And, at the same time, we had not only the problem of remunerated liabilities, in terms of monetary base, what I just mentioned, but we also had the problem of the SIRA, which was 50 billion dollars, and we also had trapped dividends. That is to say, we not only had a problem with flows, but we also had a brutal problem with stocks. This is not minor, because the materialization of the stock, from one day to the next, becomes an unsalvageable flow and the consequences that a movement of stocks of that nature could bring on the exchange rate could lead to an even deeper drop in the demand for money in a context where it was multiplying enormously, which would have forced us to face what was a true disaster.

But not only that, we also had financing problems because we had internal debt, in pesos, equivalent to 90 billion dollars; we had external debt maturing, equivalent to 25 billion dollars, where a large part was with multilateral organizations, but we had the agreement with the International Monetary Fund fallen through, and that was also interesting because when you have a situation of recurrent default and, aside from that recurrent default, one wants to renegotiate the targets, in that sense, generally, those reviews tend to take about three months. And in our case, it was reviewed and approved over a weekend. This is interesting because those who criticize - now - said at that time that the program was inconsistent, not only was it not inconsistent, but it has proven to be truly successful and we will go over that.

At the same time, the situation - in terms of financing - was quite complex, because in fact the country risk was around 2,900 basis points and, in addition, we had an external sector problem. Basically, the previous government left us with negative international reserves, equivalent to 11.5 billion dollars and a gap of 200%. On the other hand, in terms of activity, the beginning of 2023 had started with a decline, and towards the second half of the year, the government began to carry out a fiscal and monetary policy that was truly delirious. To give you an idea of the magnitude, the previous government issued to finance the deficit, 28 points of GDP. Of those 28 points, 13 were during the last year. That is to say, it was something truly insane, and that also shows the size of the bomb they left behind.

But all of this was happening in a context of price controls, meaning there was strong repression in the price system and all controls were set to expire in November, after the elections, and already in December, prices - in the first week of December - were growing at an annual rate of 3,700% and, in the second week, it accelerated to 7,500. The reality is that this was getting worse because in fact when one looks at wholesale inflation for the month of December, it is 54%. This is interesting to note because wholesale inflation always leads retail inflation, and a monthly inflation of 54% annualized gives 17,000, and the reality is that the figure for the month of April in wholesale was 3.4%, meaning that annualized it was 50%. So it is quite amusing that they say there is no economic program when inflation dropped from a rate of 17,000% annually to 50%, and it is quite. I know they are consultants who are paid, but it doesn't drop from nothing, it is not an act of magic to bring it down.

And that basically obeys a hard stabilization program that we carried out, and it is important to understand the logic of a stabilization plan. I understand that we have years and years of brutal interventionist brainwashing, and so we tend to think of stabilization programs as a matter of defining a lot of policy issues, and sectors, and all those things. But in reality, a stabilization program has three elements: it has a fiscal leg; it has a monetary leg and an external leg. In that sense, in terms of the fiscal leg, what we had to do was attack the deficit, knowing that the biggest problem was not in the Treasury, but that it was also in the Central Bank, which was double. And, in that sense, it took - at least in terms of discourse - the discussion between shock and gradualism, and the reality is that I have always been on the side of shock and I was hardly going to change, at the moment of being in charge of this ship.

And I didn't, and I have an explanation, because historically all shock programs in Argentina, except for the one in '59, have been successful and all gradualist programs have ended badly. So the first argument was empirical in nature. The second argument is that to do gradualism I need financing and the truth is that with the conditions Argentina had, there was no chance at all that I would have financing. Therefore, even if I had wanted to do something else, I couldn't have done it, but I still wasn't going to do it because I don't believe in gradualism. For me, gradualism is just a mechanism for the adjustment on the political criminals to be slower; choosing gradualism means choosing that the one who adjusts hard is the private sector and the political criminals continue to party, and when the moment comes when they really have to adjust, they also don't end up adjusting.

Therefore, there was no chance it could be any other way and in that sense we set the goal of zero deficit. It is also interesting because the zero deficit goal was for all of 2024 and the truth is that we approached the adjustment with so much courage, with so much strength, that we made a reduction of the ministries by half; we eliminated transfers to the provinces - we practically eliminated them completely - we eliminated public works; we also eliminated a lot of political contracts; we made a strong fiscal adjustment. We also - temporarily - imposed the PAIS Tax, which - if the Bases Law passes - we will lower to then eliminate it. And, in addition, we were clear that the adjustment was going to have a strong impact on the social front. That is to say, when you generate an increase in savings, as a result of the adjustment, the flip side is that in order for it not to be recessionary, you would have to have an increase in investment. The reality is that, with Argentina's reputation, it was hardly going to be possible to generate credibility overnight for investment to take off. Even so, we sent a program of structural reforms to Congress, which is the Bases Law, and we also sent a DNU, which they told us was unconstitutional and that Congress was operating, and the reality is that we see now, as they have been discussing the Bases Law for six months. Now it is interesting because that would have made the adjustment less painful, but politics doesn't care about that; what politics cares about the least is the people. What politics cares about is doing business with the people's money and that is what we came to change and that is what has them so violent. Because it is not that all these things we are achieving, we achieved them without politics accompanying us. That is to say, we achieved them, despite politics.

And, we were also told that it was impossible. There are some who are saying that there is no plan, that the worst has not passed and all that nonsense. It must be that the dye is burning their brains. It is interesting because that same person said that it was not possible to adjust more than 1 point of GDP. So, I would have liked to know how he was going to finance it and what he was going to do - within the Central Bank - because he had no plan for the Central Bank. That said, we believed we would achieve it in a year, and - incredibly - we achieved it in the first month. That is to say, by January we had achieved a financial surplus. So, what they started to criticize was that it was only something transitory that we had achieved in January.

And then, they started with that it was just a blender, a lot of blender and little scissors. The fact is that the scissors ended up being 90% of the adjustment and the blender only 10%. So they also lied there. I mean, how did something that they said was impossible to achieve happen, then they started questioning the quality of the adjustment, and the reality is that 90% is chainsaw and only 10% is blender. Not only that, but they also said that we wouldn't be able to sustain it and in February, again, we had a financial surplus, and that we wouldn't be able to sustain it in March, and in March we had a financial surplus again, and we had it again in April, and we had it again in May, and when you adjust for the seasonality of June, and you look at the first half of the year, we are going to end up with a substantial financial surplus. That is to say, the zero deficit is not negotiable in any way. That is to say, they are going to have to take me out dead from the Casa Rosada to break the fiscal deficit.

Not only that, but they also questioned us on the social issue and the reality is that - in terms of AUH - we are at the highest level of AUH in history. Moreover, we also significantly multiplied the issue of the Alimentar Card; the 1000 Days plan. And, in addition, we provided school assistance, not only in terms of supplies - which was a very successful program, due to the number of people it reached - but also for those middle-class families who had problems covering the fee, we also provided financing for that. That is not a minor issue because in the face of the problem that the drop in income posed for families, the fact of having to change schools for the kids, and the shock on the kids is so strong that we thought we had to provide assistance. But as if all this were not enough, systematically the assistance only covered 68% of the basket and today it covers 120%. So the assistance is working.

But, in addition, there was a very important element, as it was repeatedly said that we had to put an end to the managers of poverty, to the intermediaries. And the first strong move we made, shortly after starting the government, was a move between the Ministry of Human Capital, the Ministry of Security, and the Ministry of Infrastructure. The first idea was from Minister Pettovello, who basically decided to interrupt what was the accountability of what had been worked on, meaning that when you receive a social program, you have to then account for having worked. At that moment, Minister Pettovello was very harshly punished for doing that, but that was fundamental to put an end to the managers of poverty.

That was the part they were not seeing, why? Because while people receive - directly - their income on a card, when they had to go validate that they had been working, that’s where they stole half of it. What that did was take away the financing from these criminals. So, with the same money, we were giving double the assistance to the people. Aside from what was later increased. In parallel - as we knew they would complain - we said that those who block would not receive payment and that the streets could not be blocked. So, also, Dr. Bullrich set up a Security Protocol and we coordinated this with the Ministry of Infrastructure so that, in the different means of transportation, people could report and denounce those who extorted and pressured them to go to the marches. At that time, Belliboni said he would bring 50,000 people when in reality he was planning to bring 100,000, and something very interesting happened because only 3,000 ended up showing up and there were 12,000 security forces, meaning there were more security forces than people.

And that also allowed us to fulfill another electoral demand. We were asked to lower inflation and to end insecurity. We are lowering inflation and we started to tackle the problem of insecurity. Obviously, that was not going to be free, since today, the Ministry of Human Capital is constantly being torpedoed by this group of criminals, a group of thieves is moving - part of the agenda - and they give space to those criminals that we always said we had to push out of the way, and now they are kicking and inventing a lot of lies. We found out that there are ghost kitchens, that is, kitchens where money was sent and they did not exist, or kitchens that claimed to have a certain number of people and it turns out that, I don’t know, they said they served 500 and - when you go - you realize there was only room for 50. Not only that, but they also quoted food bags that they did not want to put the ID of the people who received that benefit, and when you looked at the food bags, they diluted the quality and pocketed the difference. And, moreover, they were found near the places where the - supposed - supermarkets were, where they sold this food. It was a truly sinister business. So, of course, if you take that away from these criminals, they are going to kick and scream. The question is, but whose side are you on then? On the side of Minister Pettovello, who is fighting with all the thieves or on the side of the thieves? Sometimes Argentina is a very strange country.

Not only that, but another very important thing that has to do with the sanitation of the Central Bank and the situation of the foreign exchange market; we had a deficit in the external accounts, we had been losing reserves a lot, we were 11.5 billion dollars negative, in net terms. In fact, the previous government smoked, from the Central Bank, the equivalent of 45 billion dollars. So, the first decision was… sorry… now I work a lot by talking, it’s part of the job and part of the job is also to travel. It’s interesting because I hate traveling and now they criticize me because I travel a lot. I’m going to tell you a funny anecdote, I worked in a company, in a group, called Corporación América and my job involved traveling a lot, and I hated having to travel so much because I missed Conan a lot. I mean, now I miss him five times more and they curse me because I travel, if I hate traveling. But, again, Argentina is a very strange country. Look if I wouldn’t be more comfortable staying in Olivos. But they also invented that I wasn’t going to Italy, and poor Esteban running around trying to figure out if I was going or not. Yes, I’m going to Italy, I’m going to the G7 Meeting. So, they invented that I wasn’t traveling, then they invented that - now - I changed my mind and that I am going. The decision was always that I was going. Argentina is a strange country, especially with the envelopes for journalists, who, obviously, rant all the time because we cut their official funding. I mean, it wasn’t a campaign promise, it’s another promise fulfilled: we cut the funding to those criminals. And let them compete, like all of you do. Living off the State, that’s not competing, that’s living off the State. Obviously, the media will edit this applause and - surely - will put something that is a boo.

So, one of the very important decisions that had to be made was what to do with the exchange rate? We knew we couldn’t free it due to the stock problem we had on the Central Bank’s balance sheet. So, the question was where to set the exchange rate? This was also a very important decision. I remember this decision because “Toto” Caputo, “Santi” Bausili, Fede Furiase, and Martín Gutiérrez were there, we were - at the Hotel Libertador - where I stayed for three months. But it was great, it was the Hotel “El Libertador,” I mean, it couldn’t be clearer, and it was purple. I mean, spontaneous order doesn’t fail, guys. Adam Smith is always right, unless the government is involved. But I ask you not to blame the invisible hand, blame the iron fist of the State.

In that sense, the market consensus was that the exchange rate had to be at $600. I love it because those same people who said we had to take it to $600, in their best inflation scenarios, gave a higher inflation rate than the one we had, and they are the same ones who complained about the exchange rate lag. They lost the discussion so scandalously that - fortunately - they no longer mentioned the problem, but they keep ranting. That is to say, I am not to blame for them using bad models and being wrong. So, in that sense, the other alternative that the economic team proposed to me was $800, and I said: “no, let’s take it to $1000.” So, then they told me: “no, what happens is that we are going to be charging the Country Tax” and what we thought to set at that moment, $800 was correct and was equivalent to setting it at $1000.

This is not a trivial matter. That was not chosen trivially. Because in that way, it resembled, in some way, the exchange rate that was in the market. What that was going to do was strongly reduce the excess demand for foreign currency. And by reducing the excess demand for foreign currency, what it was going to do was reduce the excess supply of bonds, so the bonds had to recover and, therefore, lower the country risk, something that until recently we had managed to break the 1200 line, we were on our way to 1,100, and to break 1,000, but politics came along and took it to 1,600. But don’t worry because this is determined by the condition of intertemporal solvency and again: I will not deliver zero deficit. So sooner or later we will break it.

Aside from that, it implied that the drop in activity would be smaller and that the loss of jobs would be smaller and that the drops in real wages would be smaller and, therefore, contribute to not having a greater increase, in terms of poor and indigent people. And this is interesting because if the initial conditions were worse than those of 2001, we, making an adjustment equivalent to 15 points of GDP, in social terms should have been a catastrophe and in terms of activity as well. Remember that, in the 2002 crisis, GDP fell by 10.9%, but in the second quarter it fell by 16. We made a much larger adjustment and, even so, with a much larger adjustment, the drop - in the first quarter - was 7%. And everything should be flying, in terms of social disaster and yet, it does not happen. And on top of that, they have the audacity to criticize Pettovello’s management because he has a margin of error of 3 in 10,000. You have to be shameless. They take a medication, self-medicate with a margin of error of 5% and complain about 3 in 10,000. Argentina is a strange country. Or it shows when the envelopes are not filled. That was also a super successful decision that, obviously, was very criticized. What was the flip side? We bought 17.5 billion dollars. In addition, we restructured the balance of the Central Bank and put the equity back in positive terms. It is important that you also take into account, because now those who start to alert because reserves are being lost appear. I’m going to tell you something: if you look at the program, what do we have? It’s a sort of crawling peg, that is, in the end, there is a sort of fixing the exchange rate and moving it at a certain rate.

Why do I clarify this? Because if you are controlling the price, the flip side is that you will have fluctuations in quantities, so what will happen to you with foreign currencies has to do with seasonality, and the seasonality - of the third quarter - is that Argentina loses reserves in the third quarter. I mean, it’s a natural result. In fact, the program we have in force, with the Fund, estimates that we would have to lose at least 2 billion dollars in reserves, but since we are overachieving…, we are overachieving in the fiscal target, in the monetary target, and in the exchange rate target. So, we have room to lose more than 3 billion dollars. I warn you because it won’t be long before they say: “oh, the program is collapsing, they are losing reserves.” No, it’s a problem of seasonality, guys.

Another issue that was also very important is that we had to reduce the quasi-fiscal. That is, it was 10 points of GDP. And there was also a very, very brave decision, on the part of the economic team and the truth is that the joint management of “Toto” Caputo, Pablo Quirno, and Santiago Bausili was very important. This is an interesting discussion, given my marked orthodoxy for so long, there were no shortage of geese who began to criticize the lack of independence of the Central Bank. This is great. Now, I don’t know if - sometimes - they do it because they are clumsy, or they are malicious, or both at the same time. It is obvious that the directions were going to be interdependent. Moreover, I will tell you something: in Cabinet meetings, not only is Caputo there, Bausili is also there. So why do we do that? Because - in reality - when we received the Central Bank, the Central Bank was bankrupt. And it was bankrupt because the State had put a lot of papers in it or who do you think is the largest creditor of the national State? The Central Bank. In fact, I already mentioned before, that the previous government took from the Central Bank, defrauded Argentines - because what it is doing is degrading the backing of the pesos that are circulating - for 45 billion dollars. So, if the State was the one that bankrupted the Central Bank, it is logical that the State restores the balance sheet of the Central Bank. That’s why - at this stage - there isn’t all the independence one would like. Why? Because it is the State that bankrupted the Central Bank. Once that is restored, we can talk about the independence of the Central Bank. But those same geese are the ones who said in parallel that the assets that the Central Bank had were worth zero, that is, what I’m saying is the inconsistency of the arguments.

And in that sense, one of the most interesting things, because there the serial blunders also made a big mistake, was what to do with the interest rate and the issue of remunerated accounts? So, while conventional theory, to put it one way, uses the interest rate to lower inflation, we thought of lowering inflation by lowering the interest rate. It was a very challenging thing. Of course, because we believe that inflation is, always and everywhere, a monetary phenomenon generated by an excess of money supply. Whether it is because the supply rises or because demand falls. And that causes the peso to lose purchasing power and that all prices expressed in monetary units rise. Understanding that also helps to understand what is happening with the dollar.

Because the dollar is just another price in the economy and rises based on real factors or monetary factors. And you are seeing the exchange rate rise and there is neither a problem of increased supply nor a problem of decreased demand. And this is interesting and also has to be internalized, is that we do not have a free exchange market. By not having a free exchange market, you do not buy dollars directly, you buy them indirectly, via bonds. And the problem with bonds is that they are not only used to buy dollars, but in reality, it is trading Argentine debt. And if you have a group of fiscal degenerates voting crazy projects to break the fiscal balance, what you are doing is contaminating the instrument you use to - indirectly - buy dollars. So, just as they try to undermine solvency and make the Country Risk jump from below 1200 to 1600, the flip side is that you are vitiating that instrument and seeing a higher exchange rate, but it does not obey monetary issues, but rather a group of stupid thieves and criminals who only want to blow up the fiscal balance to overthrow the government. That is to say, some destitutionists.

In that context, for us, what needed to be done was to arbitrate the rate in dollars, not the rate in pesos. And, in fact, the initial evaluatory jump had to ensure that the expectations of devaluation were mapped with our crawling peg and with our inflation hypotheses. And that is happening. And in the midst of all this, as we were stabilizing the economy, there was an enormous task by Pablo Quirno to rebuild the curve in pesos. And what did that allow us? It allowed us to start removing interest-bearing liabilities from the Central Bank and to transfer them to where they should have always been, which was in the Treasury. Because, fundamentally, what was happening? The previous government was running a fiscal deficit, filling it with bonds to the Central Bank, taking dollars, taking pesos, and since those pesos were left in circulation, it was withdrawing them by paying interest rates, and thus the LELIQs ballooned. So, in that sense, if we had listened to what the economists said about raising the real interest rate in pesos, today we would have a ratio of interest-bearing liabilities of 8 to 1 against the base, and not only that, but we would also surely be talking about the carry trade problem, we would also be talking about the LELIQs balloon problem, and when hyperinflation would explode. In other words, once again: the market of analysts got it wrong.

And that is a valid theoretical discussion. From my point of view, wanting to control... Let’s see, if I ask any of you what you think about Moreno controlling prices, you will tell me he is a caveman. Now, one has to be fatally arrogant, worse than Moreno, to believe that one can control present prices and future prices. And the interest rate is that. It is the relative price of present goods with respect to the future. That is to say, when you control the interest rate, you are pretending to control present and future prices. In other words, those who talk to you about the rate are conceptually worse than Moreno. And not only that, but they also deny the monetary nature of inflation, but what needs to be understood is that we must banish that Keynesian aberration that the interest rate is determined in the money market. That is to say, the interest rate exists because time exists, not because money exists. It exists because time exists; it is a mechanism of intertemporal coordination to carry present consumption into the future, savings; or to carry present production into the future, investment. And that exists—independently—of whether the Central Bank exists or whether money exists. Therefore, fiddling with the interest rate is not a healthy thing, anywhere. So, that was also an important bet because we needed to decompress that source of money creation and, honestly, we achieved it because the adjustment today, in the Central Bank, amounts to 9 points of GDP and we have 6 in the Treasury. Therefore, we are at 15 points of GDP. We made the largest fiscal adjustment in history, not only in Argentina, but in the history of humanity, and we did it in three months. Nothing is impossible if one wants to achieve it.

And, finally, in this that also seems very interesting to me, how long is left to open the capital controls? To open the capital controls, what we need to do is finish cleaning the balance sheet of the Central Bank. One of the problems was to end the interest-bearing liabilities. It is interesting because today the ratio between interest-bearing liabilities and monetary base is 1.2. That is, we have 15 trillion pesos of monetary base and 18 trillion pesos of interest-bearing liabilities. So we brought it down to 1.2, but there is something more interesting: of those 18 trillion we have in interest-bearing liabilities, 12 trillion are in the hands of the public sector. Of those 12 trillion, 7 are in the hands of Banco Nación, where the counterpart is that there are deposits from the Treasury, for 3.5 trillion. Therefore, there are 7 trillion—of those 12—that are not a problem. Additionally, there are 3 trillion that correspond to Banco Provincia, but since the communist dwarf generates a fiscal deficit, it has Banco Provincia under severe pressure, taking financing from it. Therefore, they are liquidity constrained and cannot touch it. And part of what remains is held by Ciudad and a very small part remains in the rest of the provinces. Therefore, we only have 6 trillion pesos left to solve the problem of interest-bearing liabilities, and we have had auctions in which we received offers of up to 18 trillion pesos. This means that the Bausili-Quirno tandem has cornered the interest-bearing liabilities. And the other thing we lack, and this is one of the great perversions committed by the previous government and endorsed by the IMF, is that since no one wanted to finance the Treasury, they preferred financing from the Central Bank, but they needed that not to be reflected in the balance sheet of the Central Bank. So they financed it with contingent instruments, with some Puts that are not even European, that is, they are American, they can be exercised at any time. That represents, accounting-wise, only the Put is recorded, so you see there the number is negligible, but if that contingent is executed, it becomes four points of GDP. This is not minor because the monetary base today, in Argentina, is 2.8% of GDP. And if you add the interest-bearing liabilities, we are at six points of GDP. This is important because in the 21st century, that ratio has been around 9 or 10% of GDP. This means that, technically, from a monetary standpoint, we are ready to exit unless the Puts are executed, which can be executed at any time. Therefore, we are finishing with the problem of the interest-bearing liabilities, and when we finish with the problem of the Puts, then we will indeed open the capital controls, and this story of the capital controls will come to an end.

So, the reality is that the achievements are undeniable. We have collapsed inflation, if you want to take it in IPC, from 25%, the next figure will be between 4 and 5%. If we split it in half, 4.5. The core is traveling at levels of 2.2 to 2.5. In other words, it is working. You are not going to lower the inflation rate by magic. If I take the wholesale price, which was the one that was anticipated, we went from 17,000 to 50. I understand that 50 is outrageous, but 17,000 was much worse. And it has, moreover, other characteristics that I think are worth highlighting. In other very successful programs, there was a mega crisis beforehand, and a large part of the work was done by the crisis liquefying the monetary instruments. So it was all a rebound in the demand for money; it was much easier to stabilize that way.

Not only that, but also, in many of those cases, they violated property rights with compulsory placements of bonds. Well, why can’t we determine the timing? This also seems funny; one has to be too stupid or very ill-intentioned; we cannot determine the timing because as we are doing all operations in the market, it depends on the willingness of individuals who want to make the different exchanges. Consequently, I cannot determine what day it will be because it depends on the decision of the people. It is not a lack of a plan; it is respecting freedom. A bunch of communists.

One more thing. In other programs, there have been price controls; here there are no price controls; they are free. And we are stabilizing, moreover, with a recomposition of relative prices due to the suppressed prices left by the previous government. Therefore, if they wanted to be intellectually honest, they should not look at the general inflation; what should they look at to see how the fight against inflation is going? The core, but of course, there it looks too good, and to all those who anticipated the apocalypse, it doesn’t add up. So they have to wash their guilt. Therefore, the anti-inflationary policy is truly succeeding. In fact, when we came to power, 84% of Argentines believed there would be hyperinflation; today that number is less than 20%. From discussing hyperinflation, today we are talking about 30-year mortgage loans, and all that in less than 5 months. Sometimes, Argentines are very strange, especially those who depend on the envelope. Not only that, I warn you that not only journalists depend on the envelope; there are supposed intellectuals who also roam the channels that respond to envelopes, that is, there are professionals who are part of this setup, I warn you. In other words, the caste is not only the thieving politicians, but also the prebendary businessmen, the media and bribed journalists, but there are also professionals who are complicit in these aberrations. So, another thing that was demanded of us was to end insecurity, and boy, are we doing it. Look at the success of the National Government's intervention in Rosario. Yesterday, Minister Bullrich traveled precisely to announce the achievements we had made six months later, in how much we had reduced the number of homicides, for example. So we are also successful there. Now that we are killing inflation, what do they tell us now? Now they are going to hyper-recession.

Well, we knew we would have an impact on activity, but when you start looking at the data, today the diffusion index already exceeds 50% if you look at it for April, with April data. And when you start looking at it with May data, the number is even much higher. In other words, the economy hit a floor and started to come out. So, everything seems to show that the worst is already over, that we found the floor, and now we start to discuss whether we are facing the Nike pipe or we are in a “V.” But, again, from saying that we were practically going to destroy everything, now we are discussing what type of recovery we are facing. It is wonderful how the entire discussion changed in six months.

So, that has to do with the short-term dynamics. As for the long-term dynamics, there is a very important role of what the DNU has been and what the Bases Law is, which are things that contribute to long-term growth. The DNU remains in force, and if the Bases Law passes... I remind you that the largest structural reform in history was made by Menem, and the Bases Law is five times larger than Menem's reform. And if you add the DNU—which is functioning—we are in a reform eight times larger than the largest structural reform in Argentine history, which was Menem's. So, truly, what part is “there is no program”? We sent a thousand reforms to Congress, two hundred were thrown out, five hundred remained in Bases, and the DNU continues to move forward with three hundred. In other words, even the denigrated DNU—as they denigrate it—is three times larger than Menem's reform. And if you think it is not valuable, ask someone who has to rent. With the phenomenal increase in the number of properties for rent and how the real cost of rent has fallen. For all those who disbelieve in the market economy, I would dedicate Maradona's phrase. But be careful, there are two. I refer to one that can be summarized in three letters: LTA. So, to the detractors, I dedicate Maradona's phrase. Now, what is the meaning of these reforms? These reforms—if they pass—would make Argentina climb 90 places in terms of economic freedom.

That means that Argentina would begin to resemble countries like Germany, France; and the reality is that it would be a remarkable advance, but not enough for me. Probably, now they are downgrading their economic freedom indices, but the ideal was to resemble at least the first, that is, Ireland; a country that was the most miserable in Europe and today has a per capita GDP 50% higher than that of the United States. But the truth is that even Ireland does not satisfy us. We have 3,200 more structural reforms to send, and if we do not send them now, we will send them starting December 11, 2025. In other words, we are going to change Argentina, we are going to be a liberal Argentina, and we are going to be the most liberal country in the world, and in 40 years we will become the first world power. Thank you very much.