Words of the President of the Nation, Javier Milei, at the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange.

Argentina Javier Milei · President of Argentina

10 July 2025 · Anniversary of the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange · Buenos Aires Stock Exchange, Buenos Aires

Context
Milei addressed the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange on its anniversary in July 2025, arguing his administration is the best government in Argentine history after 18 months in office.
Main themes
Economic stabilization plan, fiscal surplus policy, inflation reduction, structural reforms, Argentina's best government claim, risk vs uncertainty, Menem government comparison, La Libertad Avanza electoral prospects, veto threat, Argentine economic history
Duration
~71 min
97th percentile
Words
8,503
97th percentile
Sentences
400
97th percentile
Readability
56
79th percentile
Grade
10.6
27th percentile
Syntax
3.07
56th percentile
Vocabulary
2.04
15th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 72%70%
  • Institutional 14%14%
  • Social 7%7%
  • Ceremonial 6%6%
  • Geopolitical 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 3%

400 sentences in 39 paragraphs

Good afternoon. Thank you very much for inviting me and allowing me to be part of this new anniversary of the Stock Exchange, where I come with so much pride, affection, and joy. Today's talk is basically to explain to you why we are the best government in history, even with 18 months in office. And it is interesting because a year ago when I came, it was a lot of promises, and now we have a lot of data, but clearly, I am not a Martian. I understand where I live, so before I start with the talk, I am going to make a small reflection on the daily micro situation.

Back in the 1920s, a great economist from the University of Chicago began to develop the concepts of uncertainty, and among the discussions between Viner and Frank Knight, the idea of risk and uncertainty began to emerge. And the reality is that the problem with uncertainty… I mean, what a nice moment to be able to explain this here today! You all know it. You know that the problem with uncertainty is that you cannot measure it, you cannot work with it, you cannot manage it; it is beyond the reach of what each of you can do. However, the difference with risk is that you can measure it. And when you can measure risk, you are clear about the measures you need to take to mitigate those risks. Therefore, even when they stab you in the back, if you knew, you probably have a safety vest on and nothing will happen. The stabbings exist, but the macroeconomics is a safety vest.

You might say, well, but I am tired of hearing economists who always get it right ex post. The decision-making process is a bit more complex. But those who had the opportunity to listen to my interview with Luis Majul yesterday morning will know that none of this that is happening surprises us, and we are prepared for this and we know we will be successful. And you know what? What happened today we already knew yesterday. They had some gesture on May 25, but they criticized my ways; now they know that Milei was right, but above all, the most important thing is that they know they are desperate. This is an act of desperation because they know that in October, La Libertad will sweep. Moreover, in light of what happened today, I bet 100,000 to one that everyone knows what I am going to do. So you know what? We are going to veto. And if the circumstance were to arise, which I do not believe, but if the veto were to fall, we will judicialize it, and even if the worst-case scenario were to happen, that suddenly the Justice had an act of speed on things that take many years to deal with and decided to take it in a very short time, even so, the damage they could cause could be minimal. It would only be a stain in two months, which on December 11, we will reverse in case it were to succeed. Which, as you will see, the policy of fiscal surplus is permanent.

So I have already given you the conclusion you wanted; now we are going to explain why we are the government of history. That said, the question is why do I say what I say? I mean, what do I base it on? There is a wonderful work by Gerardo Della Paolera, Bózzoli, and Irigoin, called “Passing the Buck.” “Passing the buck” is what happens in relay races when you pass the baton from one to another. So, using the macroeconomic pressure index developed by Barro, what these authors did was rank all the governments in Argentine history. And in that context, the best government in history was Menem's first government. And, moreover, the second government was rated as third. Furthermore, the authors made an improvement to the index to account for how fiscal numbers and privatizations impacted it; and even so, the first government remains the best government in history - so far - and Menem's second government was sixth with this correction. Moreover, Gerardo himself tells me: one of the defects of that index is that it did not consider, it was not very fair in terms of structural reforms. But the important thing is the characterization that one can make in a very stylized way of what Menem's government was. Menem's government basically had two elements: a stabilization plan —let's say, convertibility— and a set of structural reforms. In other words, that is the hard core that constituted it as the best government in history.

Therefore, in the first part of this talk, I will explain why in terms of the stabilization plan, our stabilization plan is not only better numerically but also conceptually, and not only that, I will also explain why our structural reforms or, if you prefer, the foundations of growth are much more solid, and obviously, afterwards, when we finish, we will discuss some issues of risks and so on. I will develop this that I just outlined in a deeper way.

So, the first thing is why we consider that the stabilization is much more successful than that of Menem's government. Well, in reality, if you look at it, our drop in the inflation rate is much faster, and this is very interesting because we often work with the wholesale price index, because it is anticipatory. So, since it is anticipatory, it can be seen more clearly, and we went from levels of 54% monthly to levels of deflation; that is, after nearly 17 years, we had a deflation figure. Thus, we went from levels that annualized were around 17,000 percent… Today I heard Ariel Coremberg talking about explaining why we were in what was the dynamics of a hyperinflation. That is, if one took it in what Cagan defined as hyperinflation, which in one month had more than 50% inflation. And when you looked at the daily and weekly inflation indicators, inflation was traveling between one and one and a half percent daily; that is, all the characteristics were given, and I understand that the extrapolation of that seems very exaggerated, but when you looked at the size of the monetary imbalance, we had a maturity of one day equivalent to four monetary bases, and we also had maturities in peso debt in a short period for nine monetary bases. That is to say, we could have multiplied the amount of money by 14 in a very short period of time, and there was also a monetary surplus that was double what there was before the Rodrigazo. So, I understand that counterfactuals often generate suspicion, but the clear elements for a true macroeconomic disaster were there.

You don’t like to look at it that way; you can look at the year-on-year rate, reaching levels around 300%. Today we will be traveling around 20. Therefore, that also shows a great success. And the most important thing is how this was achieved. So, this is very interesting because one of the things that did not happen was a prior hyperinflation. That is to say, convertibility came from two hyperinflationary episodes: it came from the hyperinflation of '89, from Alfonsín, and came from its own hyperinflation, when the Bunge & Born plan and then Erman’s ended up collapsing. Therefore, there was not that great blender machine that left the demand for money at such a low level that the very recomposition of the demand for money facilitated stabilization. But it is also very interesting that we achieved this without an expropriation. That is to say, we did not make a Bonex plan; we did not reprofile debt in pesos, putting a phrase to hide a default in our own currency. We resolved the problem of the Central Bank's balance sheet and the public sector's finances without expropriations, respecting the market.

But not only that, we also did it without price controls. None of us thought to violate the price system because as liberals, we respect the right to life, property, and freedom, and in strict rigor, price controls are a violation of property rights. Because fundamentally, what is the market? The market is a process of social cooperation where property rights are voluntarily exchanged. Voluntarily exchanged property rights, and from which the exchange generates relationships of exchange between money and goods that establishes a historical record called prices, and the price is a mechanism for transmitting information that generates, basically, a signal that makes agents coordinate around that signal; some will be buyers, others will be sellers, and if there are imbalances, an adjustment will occur. But all that mechanism is based on a basic institution, which is the right of property; if you violate the right of property, the signal is contaminated, and the market does not coordinate. One of the first demonstrations of why socialism failed, which is in Mises' work on socialism, is that socialism breaks economic calculation. Without property rights, prices are not prices; they are accounting records. In fact, the Russians spent a lot of money on spies trying to set prices. Therefore, without economic calculation, there is no coordination, and thus the system breaks down. And we understand that and respect it perfectly, which has to do with respecting property rights and freedom.

But, in addition, we did not go to a fixed exchange rate scheme. In fact, if you wanted to compare the evolution of inflation against convertibility, which did have a fixed exchange rate, you would have to subtract from the inflation of each month what was the crawling peg we had until we decided to float. But, moreover, another thing: in previous stabilization programs, basically, there was a tariff adjustment, and the stabilization plan was launched afterwards, to show a fairly quick success. Unlike that hypocrisy, we made the tariff recomposition from the very first moment. Therefore, even if we had reached levels or dynamics of inflation similar to those, with all these elements that our program has, it makes it the best stabilization program in history, much better than the convertibility plan. That is why I am so grateful to the best Minister of Economy in the world, Toto Caputo; to the President of the Central Bank, Santiago Bausili; let’s say, to the vice, to Vladimir, to José Luis Daza, and to the finance crack, Pablo Quirno.

But not only did we manage to stabilize the economy; when we managed to stabilize the economy, one of the things they told us was that we were going to sink the economy into a depression, and I remember that we talked about how we were going to have a V-shaped recovery, and I also used a Latin expression, that activity was going to rise like a diver's fart. Beyond that, in these days, they have been publishing comparative recoveries, and it is not that we only came out in a V, but also, of all the recoveries, this is the fastest recovery that has been recorded in successful stabilization programs. Therefore, we have also been successful in the way the level of activity came out.

But not only that, because despite having made this stabilization, with an adjustment in the Treasury of five points of GDP, with an adjustment of the Central Bank of 10 points of GDP. This is also very important because Toto pointed this out in an interview in a brilliant and clear way, and it is, look at the trap we were in that even if we had resolved the fiscal issue in a way that no one expected, right? Because after 123 years of deficit, where the times there was no deficit was because we were in default, then, because a restructuring that is not complete did not get us out of default, it was finalized in 2015, and there was no surplus then.

That said, everyone predicted that we were going to go to a cataclysm and so on. And the interesting thing is that, with such an adjustment, and also lowering inflation —something they said we could not do— because first it was not going to go below 30, then it was not going to go below 20, then it was not going to go below 8, then it was not going to go below 4… and it keeps going down. What happens is that it is not a uniform rectilinear movement, nor is it such a smooth parabola. I mean, one lives in a world with volatility. But aside from that, what is interesting is that when you look at it in seasonally adjusted terms, the EMAE, the December figure of 24 ended 6% above December of 23. That is to say, we not only managed to stabilize the economy very quickly, but also, the economy recovered very quickly, and ended, moreover, 6% above the previous year, despite having made the largest fiscal adjustment in history. That is to say, Keynesians have to start burning their books.

Not only that, because in the first quarter of this year we expanded by 5.7; and today, in the second quarter, the economy is coming to close between 7.5 and 8%. Thus, we managed to stabilize successfully and also make the fastest recovery, and with an economy that now grows above 6%.

But that's not all, because we are usually accused of being heartless, of being soulless, of being cruel. And this is also interesting, because it shows what happened to the poor. I mean, for the idiot who hid them, erasing the statistics, to come and tell me that I am cruel is quite insulting, at the very least; or the one who said we had fewer poor people than Germany. But aside from those outbursts, to put it somewhat elegantly, the reality is that poverty, the official indicator, is measured on a semiannual basis and reflects the average of the semester. So, if that variable is growing, the latest data is above the average, and therefore when the previous government comes to talk to me about the semiannual average, it is actually deceiving us, because that variable was in clear growth. But, moreover, there was not only that underestimation. Argentina uses the method of basic baskets, that is, compared against an income. And the problem lies in that many of the prices that appeared there, when you went to the shelf, were not there, because there were price controls. That is to say, you may not remember, but there were people with vests measuring the shelves, or thugs would come in trying to lower prices, or they sought to control the dollar with the police.

Consequently, what happened is that, in addition, those lines were underestimated and, therefore, when we did the honest assessment in the monthly measurement, that number jumped to 57%. See how dishonest many communicators are, because there they did give importance to the monthly estimate made by Martín González Rosada from the Di Tella University. Now they are not. Now they are trying to find something that is more average, to dilute the improvement as much as possible.

And from that 54% poverty rate, thanks to the enormous work of the Minister of Human Capital, Sandra Pettovello, along with the actions taken in the Ministry of Economy, what the entire team did, because what you will see is that, throughout this talk, what I will be showing you is the trick of how all the ministries work together to generate prosperity. The interesting thing is that today, from that fateful 57%, we have lifted 11 million Argentines out of poverty, whether the cockroaches like it or not.

Clearly, none of this would have been possible without the enormous work of Minister Patricia Bullrich in internal security. That is to say, property rights are respected with order. And I remember that it seemed impossible to end the blockades, and when we arrived, there had been 8,000 blockades in the last year. And thanks to the enormous work of Minister Bullrich and her entire team, they brought that number down to zero. Thank you, Minister.

We not only did that in terms of security, because one part is internal security, the other is security related to the outside, the Ministry of Defense. Where also, the enormous work carried out by Minister Petri made it so that, from being a country where we almost had our Armed Forces in extinction, after carrying out the largest military armament program in history, today Argentina ranks 23rd among world powers. But, as if all this were not enough, there is someone who undoubtedly stands out, and that is Professor Sturzenegger. We have made 2,500 structural reforms. So, not only have we had a stabilization program that is much more successful than convertibility, but we have also made 25 times more structural reforms. But we did this with 15% of the Chamber of Deputies, seven senators, one traitor, but with the best Chief of Staff in history, which is Guillermo Francos. To vary, Mariano, I don’t know about your subject. When you explain everything that he says, what he does is enormous, but it’s not my area. The same happens to me with Mario Lugones, who also does an enormous job, but I don’t even know the names of the bones. So it’s like my excessive focus… But well, there are five ministers, or at least six, who can say that I am quite intense with them.

I will now explain, then, the structure of the model that justifies this success. The first element is the role of macro stabilization, the role of macro balance, what we usually talk about: the three anchors, which are making the program now, Furiase, Vauthier, and Núñez; and it is, on one hand, the fiscal anchor. Based on the work of Cerro and Meloni, we had seen that all Argentine crises — this was later updated by Héctor Rubini — except for two cases, all Argentine crises had a fiscal origin. And the fiscal origin could be a large or excessively large imbalance. Therefore, at the center of all problems was fiscal policy. I emphatically recommend the first conference, the first interview that Toto gives, where the whole problem revolves around the fiscal deficit. I will do it with an example, to make it easier: we generated a fiscal deficit, first we tried to finance it with debt. Once we could no longer borrow, we defaulted, which broke the contracts. Argentina is the greatest defaulter in modern history; we have surpassed Ecuador. Not only that, but also, since there was no more financing, it was financed with monetary issuance. And that generated inflation. So, basically, what was done? Price controls, property rights were violated, offices were created to control prices. Now, what happens? When you create price controls, shortages appear. So, instead of fixing the problem, they patched it up by basically putting in place the Law of Shortages. That is to say, everything worked like this. To try to anchor, under the erroneous hypothesis that fluctuations in the exchange rate generate inflation, basically what they did was control the exchange rate. And then, that imbalance of issuance and inflation generated pressure in the exchange market. Reserves were lost. Instead of fixing the problem — which continued to be the fiscal deficit — what was done? Penal exchange law, persecution, capital controls. I mean, precisely, the entire regulatory framework in Argentina has to do with that: with this situation of not wanting to fix the origin of the problems, but rather attacking the causes.

Moreover, probably, nothing is more cowardly, for example, than the Law of Shelves. Because yes, the previous government had the cavemen they sent to control prices. Yes, cavemen, literally. But the Law of Shelves was worse, because in reality, instead of sending the unofficial thugs, who are transitory to this type of populist governments, since they are cowards and did not have the guts to do it themselves, they sent the thugs and if you want, officials. So, the problem extended beyond that government and left a law that also ruined the respect for property rights for everyone and on top of that, those shameless people talk about institutions, about respect for institutions and property, or they are stupid, or they are hypocrites, or cynical, but that is the reality of Argentina.

In addition, zero deficit has several important issues, because it is not zero deficit, the primary line, no, it is zero deficit in the financial line. This means, this means, that then the debt does not grow and if the debt does not grow anymore, the debt-to-GDP ratio is non-growing and, therefore, we become solvent intertemporally. Not for nothing is the country risk from levels of 3,000, today at 700. Despite the political caste, despite the fiscal degenerates, despite these primates, sorry for the primates, who believe that budget restriction is something flexible. And that has a very important impact, because it affects solvency, therefore, it affects country risk and that lowers the interest rate and that allows for capital accumulation. That allows the productivity of workers to be higher and better wages to be paid. That is to say, it is a contradiction when these beasts talk about caring for the well-being of the people and they dedicate themselves to manufacturing country risk. Because what they are doing is capitalizing the economy and those who are most harmed are those who have the least. But not only that: the fact of having made the fiscal adjustment meant returning 15 points of GDP to the people. So, instead of discussing hyperinflation, for example, banks began to function as banks, not as an office of the Central Bank. I mean, didn’t the financial system realize how it was functioning before? It was almost Soviet, it was an appendage of the Central Bank with a private facade. But to lend to the Central Bank. And that meant returning resources, increasing savings. And what does that do? It generates investment. And that is what generates economic growth. But, moreover, it was not only the fiscal issue: there was also the zero issuance policy. That is to say, sooner or later, the inflation rate will collapse, because inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, whether the heterodox beasts that inhabit this country like it or not, who ruined the lives of millions of Argentines. And, having fixed the amount of money more than a year ago, we know that by the middle of next year, inflation will cease to exist. Will there be fluctuations? Yes. It may go down faster or slower depending on what the fiscal degenerates do. But, inexorably, it will collapse.

But, moreover, by ending inflation, there is no longer noise over the price system. Remember that what I said? The price system is a mechanism for transmitting information. I can be a great communicator, but if from here a, I don’t know, a curtain of noise appeared, I will start to speak and you will not understand anything and not because you are not capable people, you will not understand anything because there is noise, that noise is inflation and by removing that noise, what appears is the true structure and that is what we have to work on. In fact, we are doing a lot to improve how the economy works. I will make an argument of steady state, I clarify, of steady state or what in Austrian economics is called, in uniform rotation economics. In uniform rotation economics, the price is equal to the average cost, that is to say, that you with the price can pay for wages, you will pay the cost of operation and maintenance, you will pay taxes and you will pay the return on capital in that steady state equilibrium. Basically, there is a part of the work that inevitably has to be done by the private sector by lowering operating and maintenance costs, that is, they have to be more efficient. There is a part of the work that we do and that is lowering taxes. We lowered taxes by more than two points in the last year. We did something that no one expected, we eliminated the country tax and we said we would do it and we did it and despite that, we continue with fiscal balance. But not only that, then, we are doing our part, the fiscal degenerates do not want the money to return to you. Because one of the hypotheses we are working with is that, if the economy expands, in case we achieve re-election and reach 2031 and the economy expanded at rates between 6 and 8%, we would lower taxes by one and a half points of GDP per year and we would be returning to good Argentines 500 billion dollars, that is, more than we have in debt. And you know what is being discussed in the rat's nest, in the filthy den where all the fiscal degenerates are who do not want to return your money.

And what is the third leg of this scheme is the free exchange rate. I remember that when we started, one of the things that happened when we decided to freeze the monetary base, we realized that we were going to have a monetization problem. Basically because if the economy grew, and that was something that was happening, it generated more demand for money. If inflation decreases, it generates more demand for money. So in the face of that situation, in addition, the monetary aggregates were coming from very depressed levels. Consequently, we were going to have a strong increase in the demand for money and without having a counterpart in supply, at the same moment that the money overhang is exhausted, we were going to have a problem of monetary suffocation. Because if one does not have the contractual structure prepared for deflation, it can lead to a stagnation of economic growth. In the face of that situation, we fulfilled one of our monetary promises that we were going to move to a regime of currency competition; in fact, today you can make transactions in the currency you want, but you could already do that since last year. But even so, we saw that it was not gaining traction. So, as we saw that we were not gaining traction, we considered that this partly had to do with the fact that the exchange rate control still existed, which seemed to us to be a vile, horrible tool, and which, in addition, I had committed to eliminate. However, I could not do it on the first day, because the imbalance of stocks would have precipitated us into hyperinflation. So, we started working on a program with the International Monetary Fund, of unique characteristics, which basically aimed to reverse the aberrations made by Kirchnerism. Remember that Kirchnerism would take, issue colored paper, leave it to the Central Bank, and take the reserves. I mean, for example, the reason why they fired Redrado from the Central Bank was that. I mean, the lady, the convict, wanted to set up the Bicentennial Fund. By the way, this happened during my government. The one who respects institutions, who does not interfere with the Justice and lets them act freely.

In that context, basically, what happened is that what we did was the reverse operation. Because basically, if you think about the problem of the condition of transversality, the terminal, final condition of an economy, you should rescue all those pesos. And to the extent that those pesos exceed the real assets you have on the asset side, you need an increasingly higher price level to close the Central Bank, because the holding at the final moment is zero. Think about how many pesos or dollars, or whatever you want to take, you are going to take the day after you leave. How many are you going to take to the other yard? Nothing. On the other side, that buys nothing. So, in that context, to the extent that one improved the balance sheet of the Central Bank, the long-term price level decreases, and, given today's price level, the slope that connects those two points decreases. Therefore, core inflation falls, long-term inflation... and that is how we built the Fund's program. We, in different ways: the Ministry of Economy did it one way, the Central Bank did it another way; and, let's say, I also developed another methodology to see how it was, if we could or could not get out of the control. Moreover, I think I mentioned it: the day I finished closing my numbers and was talking to Furiase, I was on the phone for four hours, talking late into the night —poor my ex-girlfriend, suffering from me—, that obviously I went to talk elsewhere and, well, then it has consequences when the media fill with garbage those calls.

But aside from that, what I want to get to is that, the next day, we met and had a meeting in Olivos, and we were all convinced that we had to end that vile tool that was the control. But in our numbers, from different places, we had all arrived at the conclusion that we needed 12 billion dollars. And, obviously, since Toto and I are very risk-averse, we said: "No, let's say 15, so we can roll ourselves in the market 3 billion," which would generate a strangulation that would make the market throw in the towel sooner or later. But well, then the press operations started again. And when it was not coming together, we were more in March, we had announced this and we knew —we had a confidentiality agreement with the Fund— and, therefore, we could not defend ourselves from all the nonsense that journalists and econochantas were saying, either out of ignorance or out of interests, or both at the same time. And it was very interesting, because they told us that we were not going to get out, that it was an election year, that we were not going to dare. And we ended up making a program that, if you add the renewal of the Chinese swap, the repo, and so on, is about 49 billion: almost 20 billion of quick access. And, consequently, we had the numbers. But there was political speculation. Freedom cannot be subject to political speculation, and that is why we lifted the control, despite it being an election year.

And there also appeared another discussion that was basically the price pass-through of the devaluation. I understand that if you look at Argentine history since the Central Bank exists, if you believe that there is a relationship between devaluation-inflation, empirically it is true. It is the same as if I had stood in 1801 when Malthus wrote and had subjected the model of Adam Smith and that of Malthus to empirical evidence, the econometricians would have given Malthus the victory. However, the hockey stick says that the one who was right was Adam Smith. So, if you look from the time there has been a Central Bank until now, the truth is that every time the issue of devaluation occurred, there was inflation afterwards, and the only period where there was no inflation was when the exchange rate was fixed. So, I understand that situation can occur. Now, in reality, first we have a problem, no, there is a conceptual problem. Think in terms of general equilibrium. Prices determining prices. I mean, it is a problem of circularity. I don’t know what general equilibrium model you would be solving. First point, I mean, you have a problem of inconsistency.

But, not only that, but also there is what is called the Hume-Cantillon effect. Suppose I have a fall in the demand for money, it doesn’t matter why, but I have a fall in the demand for money, it goes away, I can make an example, let’s suppose I am looking at the balance sheet of the Central Bank that there is going to be a huge wave of money. What are you going to do? Are you going to stay in pesos? If you know that the supply increases, the purchasing power of the peso falls, so what you have to do is run away. In that context, your demand for money falls, the price of the dollar rises, then the price of the dollar raises the tradables, then the wholesale prices rise, then the retail prices rise, and finally the wages rise. That is why devaluations are so unpopular. What I just described is called the Hume-Cantillon effect, which basically when the ignorant Keynes appeared, he broke all monetary theory and basically, then, economists ignore all monetary theory and all the monetary discussion prior to the appearance of that vile book commonly called General Theory. And one of the things we managed to demonstrate, while they said that inflation was going to go to 7 and then stabilize at 5 and so on, was to demonstrate that we got out of the control and inflation continues to fall and if it were not because we are still with the reconstitution of tariffs, inflation would still be lower and when, I already told you, when we finish cleaning the money overhang, inflation will disappear. It may be later, it may be sooner, it may be, let’s see, if the fiscal degenerates managed to do damage and generated a little more country risk and so on, what are they going to do, are they going to slow down growth, is the pace at which inflation falls going to slow down? But sooner or later it will end because we do not issue anymore. And that is the other element.

So, now comes the time to talk about structural reforms and growth. One of the main creatures that this model has, and that is a reason for worldwide admiration, is that we directly said: we have to change the issue of social policy. That ended, giving them the fish: they are going to learn to fish. And that is why we —let’s say— it is neither the Ministry of Social Action, nor of Social Welfare, nor anything like that. Our ministry that is in charge of social policies is called Human Capital. I mean, with which, in addition, we have paid tribute to George Stigler, Gary Becker, and Hirofumi Uzawa, and to the Chicago tradition. We have precisely dedicated a ministry to it. And the reason we did this is that when you look at the whole debate about economic growth —I’m not going to torment you with the whole debate—, I’m going to go to when the debate, the climax of the debate is a paper from 1989, by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil -David Romer-, basically, what it shows is that 70 percentage points of economic growth is explained by human capital. And you have first-generation and second-generation human capital. The first generation has to do with health. And there we have done great things, because that first part, which has to do with health, the issue was so big and so complex that we had to separate and have a separate ministry in the case of Health. But from Human Capital, what is given is assistance to Children and Family, that is, the containment of children when they arrive and until they can enter school. And it is interesting because we did several things. Today, the Universal Child Allowance and what is the Food Card covers 100% of the basket, when before the progressives, the good ones, the friends of the poor, did not reach 56.

Not only that, but as I had told you before, those prices were previously distorted and now they are real prices. Now they are prices, not accounting records. And there also happened something of enormous value: they said it was impossible to end the poverty managers. And the mechanism was very perverse because they said: "No, well, but if they charge on a card." Yes, the money was charged on the card, but where was the trick? The trick was that they had to go and make a provision; and when they had to sign the provision, that’s where the toll came. And that was the financing that these criminals, known as poverty managers, had. And with the great courage of Minister Pettovello and Minister Bullrich, we have taken the scam away from those —sorry for the term— tremendous sons of bitches who were ruining the lives of those who have the least. So now, in addition, they receive much more.

But we also worked on what is second-generation human capital, after the devastated situation left in education, Minister Pettovello launched the Literacy Plan. We proceeded to start evaluating, because what you do not measure you cannot fix and, in addition, the enormous task that is being carried out in all that is educational policy, where we have some secretaries and undersecretaries who are true stars and this, in addition, all this policy is linked to the labor market. Both in terms of the people, the children who leave school and can insert themselves into the labor market, as well as those who were left out of the labor market and can be retrained to re-enter the labor market and although we have already made advances in labor legislation, starting December 11 we will continue with labor reform.

And why is this so important? Because this will allow more people to enter the labor market, that is, Argentina has not had new jobs since 2011. The number of companies hiring labor has been fixed since 2008. Well, that is changing. But, in addition, Argentina also has a very low labor force participation rate. So to the extent that the labor market is flexible, that as the labor force participation rate changes and the economy grows, then, yes at that moment it will be possible to make a serious pension reform. Anything else they tell you in the meantime is smoke. But, it is not only this that we are doing in Human Capital, the other issue is our other star ministry, the other ministry that is a reason for worldwide admiration, is the Ministry of Deregulation which is headed by Dr. Sturzenegger.

The dissemination format, to explain what the Ministry is about, has been brilliantly articulated by Federico in several interviews. He says: of course, when he arrived at this government, what had changed was the question. Before, the question was how do we make the State efficient, how do we make what exists efficient. You will know that, for philosophical reasons, I do not ask myself that question in any way. That question almost generates repulsion in me, because, as Milton Friedman pointed out, there are four ways to spend: you can spend your own, someone else's, and you can spend on yourself or on others. The best way to spend is to spend your own money on yourself, because you know what you want and you know what it cost you to earn it. That is the best way to spend. Why? Because it maximizes benefits. Now, you, for example, can spend your money on others: gifts. You try to make a good impression with as little as possible. So, what do you do? You minimize the cost. In other cases, you can spend other people's money on yourself. Eduardo, you have no idea what some of those you have do: they spend your money, you don’t know how it’s spent when they go on a trip with yours. But then they are tremendous cheapskates. I will never forget: one day I was about to take a plane —let's say, in the time I worked with Eduardo—, thank you for everything I learned. And thanks to Miguel Ángel Broda, who is also there, and who made me a true economist. Thank you, professor. And it was very funny, because one day I ran into someone at the airport and he gave me a lecture on why he was traveling, not even in business class, he was traveling in first, I said: Oh how interesting, I listened and then I ran into him during vacation time at the airport and it was very funny, because of course, he was with family, so when it came time to board I said: Oh, well, excuse me, I’m going to stand in line because you are going to travel, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. He was traveling in the cheap seats, so he was spending his own money, let’s say, there, so what do I want to say? that spending other people's money on oneself generates waste. So what is the worst way to spend other people's money, on others? because you don’t know what it costs to earn it and you also have no idea what the other wants. Therefore, by definition, the State always functions poorly and does so inefficiently.

That is why I highly recommend that you read the wonderful work of that book that Axel Kaiser just published called “Mental Parasites,” how over the last 100 years, they filled our heads with socialist crap and we believe that things have to be done by the State; no, no, no, individual responsibility, let’s go. But it’s not easy to get out of there either. Remember that when the Hebrew people left Egypt after being in slavery for more than 400 years and cursing Pharaoh every day, when Moses said “let’s go,” one out of five left. Be careful. Freedom is a challenge that must be faced. But then the question cannot be how do we do it well, because the answer is: there is no way. So what changed, as Fede says, was the question. It is: Hey, does the State have to do this? Fortunately, he asks himself and his people; he doesn’t ask me everything, because he already knows what the answer is. But aside from that, by changing the answer, when changing the question, that is what has motivated this impressive State reform that Federico has carried out and that is basically one of the pillars of this great reform, which is the largest reform in Argentine history. We are the most reforming government in history. But, in addition, in a year and a half, we have done more than the last 120 years.

If what I am going to say is of any use to you: we have at least 1,500 more reforms. We will not stop until we become the freest country in the world. So there is more. Beyond this, what is the theoretical foundation? Where does the theoretical basis come from? That is expressed in a recent book of mine, called “Capitalism, Socialism, and the Neoclassical Trap.” There I talk about what is called the “hockey stick,” that series put together by Angus Maddison, which goes from the year zero onward. And if you look at it, what you have is that, until the year 1800 of the Christian era, GDP per capita was practically constant. To give you an idea: GDP per capita grew at a rate of 0.02%. That is, it took 3,500 years to double GDP per capita. However, starting from the year 1800, in a situation where the population multiplies by 10, productivity grows at least between 15 and 20 times. So, therefore, in economics, that is called increasing returns: the product grew more than proportionally, between 15 and 20 times. Now, what happens? The problem lies in that the flip side of that, in neoclassical economic theory, is called concentrated market structures. Or, if you want to be picky in terms of general equilibrium terminology, it is called non-convexities. And according to neoclassical theory, those are concentrated structures, at the limit they could be monopolies. And, according to the fucking Pareto optimality, that is bad. And I decided to call it fucking Pareto optimality. Because if I had to, in the year 1800, 95% of the population lived on less than a dollar a day —and if I maintained that same measure in real terms, that number today is less than 10%— how can someone tell me that such an increase in productivity, such an increase in well-being, is bad? That is why economists often irritate me. Because what happens? I imagine this situation, when I worked with Eduardo: imagine if I had gone and told Eduardo: "No, well, I have to choose between reality and the model." So, in front of the model, I say: "No, reality is wrong." Surely I wouldn’t have the good relationship I have with Eduardo. Because, in all fairness, I should have gotten a kick in the ass for being an idiot.

Economists have fallen so in love with the general equilibrium model that when reality does not map to the model, we are so arrogant that we call it market failure. No, market failure, no. I’m going to tell you something: There are no market failures. That is, because if the market is a process of social cooperation, where property rights are voluntarily exchanged, if the exchanges are voluntary, there can never be a failure. And if there were a violent act that does not allow those actions to be voluntary, that means there is someone exercising violence and that person who exercises violence systematically, who is it? The State. Therefore, when you think something is working poorly and believe there is a market failure, the first thing I recommend is to see if the State is not involved in the middle. And the second, which would be like the second theorem of Milei, is, if you, that is, even so, it continues to function poorly, change the model because it is wrong. And that is the basis for when neoclassicals start to regulate and try to assimilate a non-convex structure, a non-competitive structure, a structure that does not map with what we need mathematically for Pareto optimality, because it is nothing more than a monster thought out in mathematics and regulated, what you do is kill increasing returns and when you kill increasing returns you kill economic growth and what does Federico do all the time? He frees up increasing returns. That is to say, we are not yet aware of everything that has been done in terms of reform and all that is coming ahead in terms of growth.

The other issue that also plays a fundamental role is foreign relations. What we are doing to open the economy. You will have heard my statements at Mercosur, you will have seen the achievement we had with EFTA, we are advancing in an agreement with the European Economic Union, we are advancing in a preferential free trade agreement with the United States, while look at how the rest is doing: it seems that our international policy is working. And, in addition, there are additional drivers like RIGI, like tax reform, going to a system of fiscal competition and other issues that I have already pointed out. Therefore, it is clear that we have started the path that will make Argentina a world power in 30 or 40 years.

And so, if everything is wonderful, it’s done, but of course, life has risks and we must face them. We must face them and because things like today can happen, but again, what happens now, does anyone have any doubts? we are going to veto. If the veto holds, public spending does not change, the amount of money does not change, there will be a little volatility, nothing more, while this lasts and that’s it. So, everything remains the same. The other alternative is that, let’s suppose we do not get the numbers to defend the veto and that the socialist germ and the mental parasites advance on the brains of the people and then we cannot do it. Well, what has been sanctioned today violates this idea that you have to finance spending. Consequently, if the veto were to fall, what we are going to do is judicialize it, it is unlikely that we will find, we will have, a judicial solution before December 11. The times of Justice tend to be very slow. The only difference is that we will have a little more volatility in country risk, the growth rate will slow down, the rate at which inflation decreases will be slower, but in the long term nothing will happen. The long-term equilibrium will remain intact. Because justice, I bet, will continue to do justice and consequently this will not be able to happen. But, let’s suppose, let’s suppose now the worst-case scenario that miraculously if the veto does not pass, Justice has a sudden attack of speed, and then, in addition, rules against the Government. Well, all that process, no matter how fast it is, what will it be? hyper fast, a delirium of fast, what will it be? September. Okay. What do we have left? two months. Therefore, we will have an effect of increased public spending, of increased monetary issuance for the equivalent of two months and it is interesting, because both monetary policy and fiscal policy act with lags. And one of the reasons why it is so attractive to do populism is because the short-term effects arrive quickly and the bad effects arrive late in time.

So, in the short term, only expansive effects will be seen. Yes, country risk will rise, but two things happen there. First, the transmission mechanism in Argentina does not work much today. Why? Because Argentina has private non-financial credit equivalent to 9% of GDP. Nothing. It is not Chile, which has 100; it is not the United States. So the credit channel of monetary policy does not pull much. And neither do investments, because those who did not invest waiting to see what happens in October, had already not invested, so that does not pull either. Therefore, the bad effects will not operate and the part of the Keynesian party will operate. So, if we thought of making a resounding electoral result, it will be much more resounding. That is, they are shooting themselves in the foot. But, but even so, starting December 11, I will reverse it.

Consequently, this will only be a transitory effect. That is to say, how much will it impact? Nothing. That is: they will not take us out of monetary orthodoxy, they will not take us out of fiscal orthodoxy, they will not take us out of exchange rate orthodoxy, we will not abandon the regime of freedom under any circumstances. And, consequently, we will make Argentina great again. Long live freedom, damn it! Long live freedom, damn it! Long live freedom, damn it! Thank you very much.