Words of the President of the Nation at the Real Estate Investment Congress

Argentina Javier Milei · President of Argentina

15 August 2024 · Real Estate Investment Congress

Context
Milei addressed the Real Estate Investment Congress on August 15, 2024, defending his government's economic record and criticizing the Kirchnerist opposition's intellectual dishonesty.
Main themes
Economic inheritance crisis, inflation and monetary imbalance, poverty and homelessness, Kirchnerism criticism, real estate and economic recovery, formal vs informal employment, public sector employment, GDP stagnation, Argentina's economic history, fiscal and monetary reform
Duration
~78 min
97th percentile
Words
9,349
97th percentile
Sentences
348
96th percentile
Readability
55
76th percentile
Grade
12.0
45th percentile
Syntax
3.29
81st percentile
Vocabulary
2.12
30th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 78%76%
  • Institutional 10%9%
  • Ceremonial 6%6%
  • Social 6%5%
  • Geopolitical 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

348 sentences in 73 paragraphs

I see that the effects of the recovery are becoming noticeable; we are all happy.

Well, basically, in light of what the debate is, today I am going to give a talk that is more technical than political, given the dirtiness of the debate. In particular, regarding society and the intellectual dishonesty with which the orcs debate, or how they try to install topics. Because it seems that now they are very concerned about poverty, about the homeless, but it seems that in the previous four years there were neither poor nor homeless, and when they had been in government before, they had hidden them under the carpet because they said it was stigmatizing.

That is why, although I believed that we should stop talking so much about the inheritance or something, unfortunately, the intellectual dishonesty of Kirchnerism and its political partners forces us to recount why what we are doing in the rest of the world is considered a miracle, while here they are starting to find things that did not exist until eight months ago, as if the problem of poverty and homelessness were a problem that is generated in a single day.

In that sense, when we came to power, we were facing the worst inheritance that any government has received in the entire history of Argentina. We combined elements of the three worst crises that Argentina has had in history. In terms of the monetary aspect, we had a monetary surplus, a monetary imbalance as a consequence of capital controls, which manifested itself in a gap of 3 to 1 with the exchange rate, that is, a gap of 200%. The monetary surplus was double that which existed before the Rodrigazo. A crisis that meant that, at the time of having to chisel the external accounts, it multiplied the inflation rate by six.

With Kirchnerism bringing inflation around 250%, that alone as a floor would have put inflation in terms of 1500%. And, in fact, given that the imbalance was also double, at least that alone would have taken the inflation rate to levels of around 3000%.

Not only that, but also, as if all this were not enough, we combined it with a Central Bank balance that was even worse than that which existed during the early days of 1989, that is, prior to Alfonsín's hyperinflation, who had to flee from power with an inflation rate of 5000% per year. In that situation, the ratio of interest-bearing liabilities to what relates to the monetary base was four times. This means that we would have multiplied the inflation rate by four times, which means that, as if nothing, we would have gone to inflation levels of 12,000%.

And as if all this were not enough, we also had social indicators that were worse than those of 2001. Therefore, we were facing a true catastrophe, truly facing a lamentable social, economic, and financial situation.

To this picture, some additional elements are added: the Argentine economy had not genuinely grown since 2011, that is, it had fluctuations around the same level, which had peaked in 2011 and had never been surpassed. This implies that, at the time of coming to power, we were with a per capita GDP between 13 and 15% below the level that had been observed in 2011. Not only that, formal employment was stuck at 6 million people, at 6 million jobs, and that number had not moved. The only thing that had increased significantly was informal employment. That is to say, those who boast of caring for and protecting workers generated a larger informal employment sector than that in the formal sector; there were eight million people in the informal sector compared to the formal sector. What a nice way to care for workers the national workers' movement has.

As if that were not enough, since not even sufficient formal employment was being generated, the number of public employees was raised to 4 million people; that is, a covert way of lying about the unemployment rate, whose counterpart was the fall in real wages. It is no coincidence that when they left power, there were 40% poor, 10% indigent, two out of three children were already poor; it is not something new, they were already poor, and one of the greatest offenses generated by Kirchnerism was that one-third of workers, when historically work had been an element of upward social mobility, one-third of workers were poor even while working. Not only that, but also, in addition to that lamentable picture of activity, employment, wages, poverty, and indigence, it was accompanied by a rising inflation rate. It seems they discovered that inflation has now appeared. It is very interesting because, after what was the successful convertibility program, which was the best economic program in history - except for the fact that we are improving it - basically Kirchnerism had different levels of inflation. Néstor Kirchner brought inflation to an average of around 10%; Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, in her first government, brought it to 20; in her second government, she brought it to 30; Macri brought it to 40; and Alberto Fernández ended up leaving with around 250% inflation. That is to say, look at the dynamics in which the inflation rate was accelerating.

Not only that, but also, in December of last year, in the first week, inflation was traveling at a rate of 1% daily, that in annualized terms, and I warn you that the inflation rate is calculated in exponential terms, that is, that implies, or if you want a geometric growth for those who want to do it in discrete terms. And that means an inflation of around 3700 annually; not only that, but as if this were not enough, when you calculated two weeks of December, that is, already when we were about to take office, that rate had accelerated to levels of 7500% annually. And this, which seems like an exaggeration, I remember that when we had to take office, one of the things, beyond the "there is no money," I explained the risk of hyperinflation, and in that context, wholesale inflation, which tends to lead, showed a monthly index of 54%; 54% monthly, I tell you, annualized is 17,000%.

Therefore, this is how the macro dynamics was coming. There will always be someone who says that this scenario was not translatable, and in reality, what made it translatable or not had to do with whether there was monetary validation, and not to mention that there were many who proposed that monetary validation. So, basically, the question is then, what did we find on the fiscal and monetary side that could enable such an aberration to become reality.

Or how the Soviet wants to make us believe, which is actually a fiction and just a matter of little calculations. The problem is that he does not know how to do it even with an abacus because he does not know how to add even with an abacus.

In that sense, more or less, when you study the literature on early crisis indicators, one of the indicators is twin deficits, that is, the combination of the fiscal deficit with what would be the current account deficit. In general, when you have twin deficits of four points of GDP, that is a yellow alert. When you have 8% of GDP, it is a red alert and you are going to take a tremendous hit. Well, we inherited twin deficits of 17 points of GDP. Not only that, of those 17 points of GDP, 15 were generated by the public sector, by the State, either by the Treasury and by the Central Bank, where of those 15, five corresponded to the national Treasury and 10 corresponded to the Central Bank. As you may have heard referred to as quasi-fiscal deficit. At the same time, we had debt maturities; we had 25 billion dollars in external debt maturities, where the vast majority of those maturities were with multilateral credit organizations; and here there was also a problem because Argentina had systematically violated what were the agreements with the Fund, the targets with the International Monetary Fund. In this, it would be unfair to blame everything on Kirchnerism because if there is something that has characterized Argentina throughout its history, it is not complying with the targets agreed upon with the International Monetary Fund.

On the other hand, to that same situation, there were debt maturities in pesos equivalent to 90 billion dollars. But not only that; there were other additional problems that basically had to do with the bankruptcy of the Central Bank. Basically, one of the things that the previous government did was leave us with about four monetary bases in the format of what are called interest-bearing liabilities or repos. But, instead of being the LELIQs, which had terms of 30, 60, 90, 120, 180, and so on, they left us all those interest-bearing liabilities for one day. That is to say, that in one day we could have quintupled the amount of money. Therefore, when you do the math before, it was not 3000 times four, but it was times five, a 15,000% inflation was underlying in all that monetary issuance.

But we also had stock problems, problems of debt within the Central Bank. One of the problems we had was the debt of the SIRA, which was the debt of importers, and imports were stalled, basically because the Central Bank had 11 billion dollars in negative international reserves. That is to say, the Central Bank was literally bankrupt. In fact, the reckoning was made during our management, and basically what we showed is that Kirchnerism broke the Central Bank equivalent to 45 billion dollars. A true scandal.

But we not only had the problem of the SIRA, which was blocking the problem of imports and, therefore, it became very difficult to produce, but also, of the imports, only 15% was being paid. Which imposed a very complicated cash logic for importers and producers. I warn you that today that number is already above 90. In addition, there were dividends held back equivalent to 10 billion dollars. And there was something hidden that, when you looked at the balance of the Central Bank, was not noticeable, which was a position of contingent securities that are the famous puts, a true irresponsibility, both of the previous government and the head of the IMF mission, who endorsed it. Because they were equivalent to four points of GDP. What happens is that you, those puts, were not recorded at the value of the contingency, but were recorded at the value of the contingent, that is, for the put itself, it is a matter of accounting. So, if they are to be exercised, you have a huge problem that is not manifested in the balance. That is to say, there was complicity to hide those four points of GDP inside the balance of the Central Bank, because as the previous government did not meet the monetary targets, did not meet the fiscal targets, did not meet the targets within the balance of the Central Bank, then they created a mechanism by which that debt was not visible.

So, what was the big bet, the big bet of the previous government. Basically, they did not believe that we were libertarian liberals; they believed that we were libertarian liberals, and the bet they made was that on the first day, ignoring the stock and flow problems, where I just described the mess that existed in terms of stocks and in terms of flows, we would liberate happily. I don't need to tell you that if we quintupled the amount of debt of the Central Bank in the monetary base, if we defaulted on commercial debt, if we defaulted on debt with dividends and defaulted on debt with the outside, let's say, all that issue would have generated the bases to create hyperinflation with five, with four monetary bases maturing in one day. Therefore, in one day we would have quintupled the amount of money, we would have unleashed a phenomenal mega crisis, this would have exploded in the middle of the holidays, and you know that the national and popular movement likes to stir up violence in December and January; you would have had again a Kirchnerist government that supposedly was going to come to save everything.

Fortunately, we did not give them that pleasure. From the very first moment, we were clear about the magnitude of the challenge we had. I remember that, in that first stage, in fact, we had cabinet meetings every day. I remember going to Casa Rosada every day, arriving at 8 in the morning and leaving around midnight. They were, the truth, very intense, very hard moments. But it is also true that it created a spirit of camaraderie with the entire cabinet, a cabinet of which I am absolutely proud and I am aware that we are carrying out a heroic feat that will be marked in textbooks because we are committed to making the best government in the history of Argentina.

Basically, then, the first objective that was clear: we had to avoid hyperinflation. We, convinced that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, were convinced that what needed to be done was to stop the issuance. And of those elements related to issuance, there were issues related to the fiscal deficit, and in issues related to the quasi-fiscal deficit, the quasi-fiscal had to be closed, and the Treasury had to be adjusted.

I remember that during the campaign, I campaigned with a chainsaw; in fact, there is a video of me, which is the most popular video on the planet and that today many liberals around the world use in their campaigns, which is the famous "out." That famous "out" emerged while I was on Joni Viale's program explaining how the adjustment would be. One of the things Joni had proposed to me was to put the structure of the State and, live, I would cross out each of the ministries we were going to eliminate. And, by the way, I say it here, I am proud that among the things we eliminated, we eliminated the sinister Ministry of Women and the sinister INADI, which were used to ideologically persecute.

In fact, I remember that when I said those State dependencies were dens of ideological persecution, I remember I was called all sorts of names. With the number of insults, I could have filled more dump trucks than those associated with the SIRA. But aside from that, these days I have been vindicated. I say this because a militant journalist said that the 'I believe you, sister' was a rhetorical question and a political action. That is to say, she ended up confessing that it was a way to persecute opponents, charging them with aberrant crimes that we later found out were the aberrant crimes they committed.

So, the first thing we did was to reduce the number of ministries. We started with the "out" and thus brought the number of ministries down to 9. Originally, we had the idea of reducing them to 8, but the dynamics required a certain structure, so it had to be brought to 9. Specifically, the Ministry of Health had to remain within Human Capital, but the dynamics imposed by the health sector and the perversion of Kirchnerism forced us to slightly change the original strategy.

And, in that sense, another thing we did was zero deficit. I remember some past econochanta with black dye saying that an adjustment of more than one point of GDP per year was impossible, was heroic, that obviously wanting to make an adjustment of five points of GDP was impossible. In other words, they basically called me a liar, saying that there would be no such thing as the chainsaw. In fact, when we went to make the agreement with the International Monetary Fund, all the econochantas, along with the one I mentioned, all said that the program was inconsistent. This is very funny because if there is something that the International Monetary Fund manages correctly and precisely, it is checking the consistencies of the programs. In that sense, the agreement that had already fallen with the previous government, the team, of which the textbooks will remember with the best Minister of Economy in history, Toto Caputo, and the President of the Central Bank, Santiago Bausili. A task that would have taken about three months, they achieved in a weekend.

So, when they said we had no plan, it seems we did have a plan, and if we hadn't had a plan, we would have blown up. Because if we had started reciting: comprehensive plan, comprehensive plan, let's say and do nothing, or do more of the same with a lot of timidity. Something like hot ice cream, let's say, the obese skeleton, no, we would have blown up. So, in that context, I remember that the Fund was asking us, 'well, at least meet the goals that the orcs did not meet,' so given the deviation they had left, it was already a challenge, and what surprised the International Monetary Fund was that we had set more ambitious goals, and, in fact, our goal was zero deficit. Imagine with all the econochantas here saying that the only thing that could be adjusted was one point of GDP, it seemed that they valued our drive, our strength, our will, but they seemed happy if we reached the Fund's number. We set ourselves the goal of zero deficit, which we wanted to achieve in 2024, that is, this year. The interesting thing is that this giant I have as Minister of Economy, of whom I am so proud, became so engrossed, he and his team, with the achievement of zero deficit. We did not have to wait to achieve it in December of this year; we achieved it in the first month of management in January.

Moreover, let me tell you an anecdote: one day we were in a cabinet meeting, and then Toto had to go to another meeting, and he left. When he left, I stayed with the rest of the ministers and said to them: "Look, the effort that man is making; it is enormous. I ask each of the ministers to also reduce spending by 10% in each of their ministries." It is surprising because within a week, all the ministries had brought me proposals to reduce the deficit. We were so committed to that that, in the initial phase, the adjustment did not end up being five points of GDP, but ended up being equivalent to 7 points of GDP. Obviously, there was an overreaction; we had to put the accounts in order. And today we have started to restore those items; today the result of zero deficit is a reality.

First, they questioned us that it was temporary; they found a financial surplus in January, in February, March. Then they said we weren't paying things, and when we started paying things, there was also one in April, there was also one in June, in May and in June. And I warn that, although the July number is negative, due to the heavy interest burden, because, just as you have the seasonality of the payment of the half bonus in June and December, which, against all odds, we had a financial fiscal surplus in June. When you take the accumulated, we have money left over. In fact, there is so much money left over that within the Central Bank account we have 17 trillion pesos accumulated. Therefore, the zero deficit program continues, and from now until the end of the year, we will also end up absorbing an additional 9 trillion pesos. Therefore, the fiscal result is guaranteed, and not only that, but we have already guaranteed the rollover of the debt for part of next year.

And not only that, but we also had the problem of remunerated liabilities, the quasi-fiscal deficit of ten points of GDP. This is interesting because no one talked about the quasi-fiscal deficit during the campaign; of course, it was a very important technical problem but distant from the public. So, no one talked about it. So I felt lonelier than Adam on Mother's Day raising that issue. But the order of magnitudes was staggering. If we knew that the fiscal problem was large and was five points of GDP, imagine the problem of the Central Bank: being ten points of GDP, it was double. That is to say, two-thirds of the problem were in the Central Bank.

And while no one had any solution and thought this would fix itself, something incredible, it would fix itself. Or those who proposed things suggested raising the interest rate. Something that, if we had actually done it, we would have tested with the traditional stabilization mechanism, instead of having a ratio of four remunerated monetary bases against one, today we would have about 10 monetary bases against one, and today we would be discussing the rollover of that debt and the carry trade, when hyperinflation would explode. However, in a titanic, cyclopean task by Santiago Bausili, he achieved what no one would have imagined, because not even the public debate part managed to eliminate the quasi-fiscal deficit. That is to say, he managed to make an adjustment of 10 points of GDP in 6 months.

Argentina made a fiscal adjustment in 6 months of 15 points of GDP, something that has never been seen in the history of humanity, and we did it. And in this way, we managed to stop hyperinflation. Because hyperinflation, when we came in December, in wholesale, we were traveling at 17,000%. The last wholesale data, which was from last month, was 2.7%. That is to say, if you annualize the 2.7%, we went from 17,000 to 35%. But since we also have a devaluation guideline of 2% per month, inflation has been traveling at less than 0.7. This means that, annualized, today inflation would be traveling purely at about 8% per year.

It must be for this reason that the world talks about the economic miracle in Argentina, and the misery of the econochantas and politicians does not allow them to recognize the heroic feat.

While I have the speech prepared in terms of everything we have achieved, now I will tell you what the next facets of the government program are and how this will translate into economic growth. I do not want to fail to mention the enormous work that has also been carried out in other areas.

In this sense, when we won the elections, I always say that it is as if I have a new job, yes, with a little more responsibility than normal, but my job description says to end inflation, to make the economy freer, basically to end insecurity and for the economy to grow again, that is what my job description says. By the way, the fiscal issue is not a minor issue, no, because in the last 123 years Argentina had a deficit for 113. That is, it only had a positive financial result in 10, but in those 10, they are cases where Argentina was in default, so it did not pay the interests, so it never had a positive financial result like the one we have. Therefore, it is something new in Argentine history for a government to have a financial surplus.

But going back to the job description, one of the things they asked me is to end insecurity, and there I want to highlight the enormous work of that monumental Minister I have in the security field, who is Dr. Patricia Bullrich, who has been very generous and that history will also give her recognition, not only for the support that she and President Macri gave us for the second round and that while the entire analog red circle, especially the perisobres, anticipated that Massa would win, we won 56 to 44, we beat him by 12.

So, not only did she have that gesture, but also together with Dr. Petri they basically decided to join the government. Dr. Petri is doing a truly superlative job, re-equipping the Armed Forces, as it had never been done in the last 50 years, and Dr. Bullrich, when I spoke with her, she pointed out to me that she was interested in another area because she had already been in Security, and I asked her that the problems were too big and that I needed her to return to cover the Security portfolio, and she is doing a brilliant job; not only did she have the greatness to accept the position, but she is exterminating insecurity and the blockades have ended, the damn blockades that ruined us every day.

On the other hand, basically the champions who cry so much for the shirtless, for the humble, for the vulnerable, which would be the most correct word to use, love the poor so much that all they did was multiply them; we from the Ministry of Human Capital are truly concerned with providing support. One of the things that happened is in the last quarter of last year, Kirchnerism. I say, GDP had already fallen by 2.5, basically in the first quarter it fell 2.6; if you take year against year it was 5.1. But think that something slightly similar was only done, not of these magnitudes during the second quarter of 2002, and there GDP had fallen 16%. That is to say, we must have done something right for the fall to be a third of that brutal fall, but that was done with Peronism in power, so there was no problem, and the supermarket looting that occurred in December when they took down De la Rúa, did not happen to Duhalde anymore.

That said, if social policy had indeed been bad, we would have had an explosion, and that did not happen. Because basically, one of the things that everyone complained about was the managers of poverty, and there we also fought a very strong battle with Minister Pettovello at the forefront, and we wanted to end the scam of the poverty managers. And this is not minor because the point was, we knew that the first quarter was going to be very tough, and we had to generate the mechanism of social containment, therefore, what happened within the Ministry of Human Capital was important, and one of the first things that Minister Pettovello resolved with great judgment - who was also very criticized for doing this - was to automatically eliminate what was called the counterpart of the plan.

Obviously, all the well-meaning progressive bolu-progressives came out to criticize it, because how are they going to give the benefit in exchange for nothing, and the reality is that in that counterpart was where corruption was hidden. Because basically, people received the plan, it is true, they received it from a card, but then they had to go and leave proof that they had given the counterpart, and that was where they took half of what they received. Specifically, they were given two plans, one they collected, and the other they gave to the criminal managers of poverty.

In fact, it was so strong when this impact occurred that Belliboni quickly came out to threaten us with a march, saying he was going to call 50,000 people, because they basically expected it to be 100,000. But the interesting thing about having removed the intermediaries was that people now received the same amount of money, but the most vulnerable received double the money. In addition, we set up a reporting line; I remember that when this happened there were about 18,000 reports, where basically, those who cut off did not get paid, and in that context, also with the work of the Minister of Infrastructure at that time, Dr. Ferraro, in combination with the Ministry of Security of Dr. Bullrich, an operation was undertaken, either to inform people in the means of transport about the policy designs of Minister Pettovello and the security setup of Minister Bullrich.

That day, when they expected to bring 100,000 people, they ended up bringing 3,000 people. There were six times more police officers than people in the march, and from that day on we began to win the fight against insecurity; and when we had to take charge of problems that were not ours, like the one in Rosario, the operation designed by Dr. Bullrich caused the number of homicides to drop by 70%, meaning we are also doing this in terms of security and social containment.

But another thing I committed to, and it is my goal, is for Argentina to be the freest country in the world. And with that, we started an agenda of deregulation, and we sent a DNU and sent the Base Law. Argentina's largest structural reform in its entire history was the one carried out during Carlos Menem's first government; it was the largest structural reform in Argentine history. If we consider the DNU and the Base Law, which we managed to pass despite having 15% of the Chamber of Deputies and 10% of the Senate, the combination of those two reforms is eight times larger than the reform Menem made. We have just made the largest reform in Argentine history.

Therefore, that also lays the groundwork for Argentina to grow in the long term. This implies a jump in economic freedom indicators of 90 places, meaning we are starting to resemble some European countries. But I have news for you: that is not enough for me. It is not enough for me to resemble Germany, it is not enough for me to resemble France, it is not enough for me to resemble Italy. I want Argentina to be the freest country in the world and we have 3,200 structural reforms pending.

That is, if what we did seems large to you, four times more is coming. In other words, there will be real freedom here. And I must also deeply thank another of the ministers I have the pride and honor to count among our ranks, who is that colossus named Federico Sturzenegger. I warn you that I am a fan of all my ministers. In fact, look at how wonderful what Minister Cúneo Libarona did recently with the jury trial; or Minister Mario Russo, who is so criticized for dengue, which has to do with decisions made a year ago. I tell you that Dr. Mario Russo has just completed all the dengue vaccinations for next year. It seems to me that one must think a lot to say that there is no management in this government. Those who understood it, understood it. It is not a jab at someone I hold in high esteem, I warn you. That is why I said: one must think a lot.

Let’s talk about what is to come. Basically, the two pillars, from here on out, are two. Sorry, I was naming the Soviet and it stuck with me. You can accuse me of being redundant, not of being stupid.

Aside from that, the first major element is zero deficit. For this budget, we are writing the budget presentation in a different way to ensure compliance with the zero deficit. Basically, how were budgets made until now? Expenses were determined, there was a certain expenditure; a hypothesis of income was presented based on estimated growth and estimated inflation. What that generated was a fiscal result, they took the interests and from that they derived the financial result. And given the financial result, they determined the financing and arranged the financing.

Well, that has ceased to be the way in which the budget is designed in Argentina. The government will present a budget that starts from the hypothesis of zero deficit; that is, zero deficit is the rule, there will no longer be any more fiscal financial deficit. This means that we will never again take on debt to finance the treasury; what you will find is the rollover of the debt, natural things, but there will be no more debt taken on to finance the financial deficit. This implies that, for the deficit to be zero, the primary result, that is, the operational result, must be equal to the interests. Once we ensure that the primary result is equal to the interests, which are determined by the previous debt and what is paid in interest, the income is determined. There will be a hypothesis of income, there must inevitably be a hypothesis of income; that hypothesis of income obviously has to do with a hypothesis of GDP growth and a hypothesis of inflation. But, since we are convinced that the inflation rate will continue to decrease, we do not want to create a budget that becomes unbalanced because we are successful in the inflation rate and we lower it faster than we thought.

In that sense, one of the things we do: we determine the income, there is a set of public spending items that move automatically, linked to those inflation and growth items. And the remainder, under that base scenario, is determined for the rest of the items. Therefore, public spending adjusts to the levels of income we have.

And, therefore, we ensure the primary result equal to the interests and that ensures the zero deficit. In case the numbers go down, the residual item, given the initial weights, is how they will adjust, so that the primary result is always maintained equal to the interests and the zero deficit. And in case the income goes up, get ready, because we will start with the tax cuts.

In fact, we have already started with the tax cuts. In September, the reduction of the PAIS tax from 17.5 to 7.5 will come into effect, and in December the PAIS tax will be eliminated.

Not only that, but also, those who have listened to my speech at the Rural will have seen the whole battery of measures we used for the agricultural sector, which are already underway. We said we would lower taxes and we are doing it. But not only that, we are lowering the most perverse tax of all, which is the inflation tax. The real burden that an economy has to face is the size of public spending. When I take the case of the national state and the Central Bank, we have returned to good Argentines 15 points of GDP. That is indeed a tax cut.

In fact, since you are in the real estate sector, aside from the fact that you cannot deny that it has been a true success to eliminate the rental law. While in December we were discussing whether we were going to hyperinflation or not, today mortgage loans have returned for 30 years. Indeed, we have made a radical change in that.

At the same time, in parallel, a policy of zero monetary issuance is already underway. Basically, when we arrived, we had four open monetary issuance taps, but in a flooding manner. Don’t tell me I don’t use metaphors well. There must be something that has made me a poet. But aside from this, we found ourselves with a source, with a tap, which was the fiscal deficit. One was the remunerated liabilities, another was the puts, and another was the external sector, and that was what generated monetary issuance in Argentina. The first step was the zero deficit and, therefore, from the beginning of the management, we cut off financing to the treasury, but that was not enough, because we had the problem of quasi-fiscal deficit and there, in a huge task between the president of the Central Bank, Santiago Bausili, and another colossus in our Secretary of Finance, Dr. Pablo Quirno, who began to rebuild the peso curve. It allowed us that by June-July we managed to end the burden and torment that was the issue of remunerated liabilities and the quasi-fiscal deficit. That is, this adjustment of 10 points of GDP. Another that will also have to be remembered by history, because what Dr. Pablo Quirno has done is truly monumental.

At the same time, that was not enough; I remember that I had to go to present at the Stock Exchange and we announced the monetary phase that has to do with zero excess supply. This is, money would only be issued for the external sector, assuming that issuance for the external sector is demand for money and that then, if one fixes the exchange rate or has a mechanism like the one we have, which is like fixing the exchange rate… which is the crawling peg, basically what you have is that when you give some characteristics of those, people go and buy pesos, because they basically need them to make transactions, so that money is being demanded and, therefore, supply and demand are mapped and consequently there is no pressure on prices.

When we were announcing that at the Stock Exchange, that we had the negotiation with the puts underway, we made the announcement and on Monday, when Dr. Caputo and Dr. Bausili were in a meeting with the banks at 10 in the morning, trying to close the problem of the puts, the treacherous stab from Banco Macro came, executing the equivalent of 2 billion dollars in one day, trying to generate a process of economic panic that would skyrocket the economic program and the government itself, and it is the first time in history that an Argentine government manages to face a daily run equivalent to 2 billion dollars. And that was done in this government, and they could not bring us down.

I still remember what we had to swing during that Monday with the economic team, with the Central Bank, to neutralize such a stab. But of course, the government’s financial position is so solid, this that I told you, that we have 17 trillion pesos from the Treasury deposited in the Central Bank, allowed us to remove those 2 trillion pesos that had to be paid to Banco Macro.

And since they failed, the following week they were talking about looking for an exchange rate between 1800 and 1000 and… sorry, at $2000. In the face of that situation, I remember that with Dr. Caputo we were in the United States, we were in Idaho, before I had to present in Sun Valley, and then we decided to launch the hardest and most aggressive stage of the monetary program, which was zero issuance. And basically, I tell this to correct the nonsense that economists say, who talk about intervention and all those things, when you have a non-intervention equilibrium, the exchange rate is free, the variation of reserves is null, and the variation of the amount of money is null.

In that context, where you generate that situation, obviously there will be no inflation, that is, it is calibrated, but it is with a free market. Now, what is the point, is that due to the fact that we still have stock imbalances we have controls and in that context, where we still have controls, the problem lies in that the dollars that are deposited in the… that are taken to the MULC, it is not that they are buying pesos, it is not that they want to buy pesos, but that they are forced to sell dollars. Therefore, that is not demand for money and, therefore, an excess supply of money is generated that continues to feed the delay in the inflation rate.

That is why, while we do not solve the stock problem, which is already much smaller than what we had at the beginning, what we decided to do is that those pesos that we threw into the street, through the purchases of the MULC, we withdrew by delivering part of the dollars and as there was a gap, of every 3 dollars we bought in the MULC, one remained in the Central Bank. In that sense, see that the previous intervention was 3 dollars, let’s suppose the case of 3 dollars and now there was an intervention of only one dollar, yes, but the variation of the amount of money that gave null, which was what we were looking for; that is, that in this equilibrium there is less intervention and there is less monetary issuance. That is to say, and this is what is going to do, is accelerate even more the fall of the inflation rate, you will see that this program has something that is unprecedented because it is a program that to stabilize did not generate hyperinflation before, which liquefied all financial assets, unlike what an idiot said who claimed there was a Bonex plan, there was none. What happens is that, of course, they predicted it during the campaign, so they had to say some kind of absurdity. And there is one who directly said the stupidity, which is coincidentally related to another who stabbed from behind, obviously, coward.

And not only that, but also, then, there was no hyperinflation, there was no expropriation, the exchange rate was not fixed, because there is a crawling peg, in that sense the 2% monthly, and, moreover, all this is done in a context of recomposition of relative prices. Because when you look at the picture of relative prices, the distortions are much smaller, therefore, it is already an unprecedented economic program in Argentine history and now, those who wanted the dollar between 1800 and 2000 are crying and walking like baboons, because the exchange rate today reached $1250. Naturally, this now leads us to the question that follows… well, now there will be a small part in which I will speak in Latin, as Professor De Pablo would say. That is to say, I am going to unleash a tremendous curse, that means, which has to do with the idiots who say: ‘Oh well, but now fewer reserves are being accumulated and since fewer reserves are being accumulated, the government will not be able to pay.’ Even though we have secured all payments for January, which is when the big maturities are, the big debt maturities are in January and July, it is when interest is paid and debt is paid. So, it is incredible, because what they are telling me is that I have to buy dollars with monetary issuance, that is to say, that bunch of sons of bitches, I warn you that I labeled them, but I have not justified it yet, the justification comes now: what they are telling me is that I should screw the Argentine people with inflationary tax to pay the debt, that is why they are tremendous sons of bitches.

If that argument were true, then all countries with a flexible exchange rate would be in default. But not only that, the dollars to pay the debt must be bought by the Treasury in the MULC with a fiscal surplus. That is the honest way to do it. Because if you buy them with monetary issuance without fiscal effort, what is going to happen? What they are saying is that later the treasury will go and defraud the Central Bank, it will take the dollars and you will be left with colored paper and you will be screwed again. And we are not going to do that.

Therefore, now the new question is: when do we come out of the capital controls? That is to say, they are so stupid that they do not understand that they are facing a liberal government. That thing about determining dates is very authoritarian collectivist dirigiste. That is to say, if I am taking a whole economic policy scheme in which I return freedom to the agents, I depend on meeting goals based on whether the agents want to achieve them.

And that, the capital controls, when are we going to come out of the capital controls? Look, this is interesting, “no, because they need so many dollars”; all that is a lie. I will tell you how it is. At the moment that the demand for money, as a consequence of economic growth —I remind you that the econochantas said we were going into a depression or that it was an “L” or I don’t know what—, the economy hit bottom between April and May, and today it is in strong recovery. But aside from that, what that does is that the demand for money is recomposed. That recomposition of the demand for money causes the demand for monetary base to rise. And as banks see that they are having demand for credit, what are they going to do? They are going to come out of the LEFI position and what are they going to start doing? Asking for money. And there, the monetary base in the traditional format will resemble the broad monetary base. The moment you see that, the counterpart is that, in addition, the inflation rate is going down. And when those two concepts of monetary base unify and become one, it means that we have finished cleaning the money overhang, the excess supply of money is over and I can open the capital controls. Why? Because basically there is no more money left in the economy. And with no more money left in the economy, it’s like giving you a gun without bullets: pull the trigger as much as you want, you have no bullets, you won’t be able to do anything.

Therefore, the day when the traditional monetary base maps with the broad monetary base, what you will have as a counterpart is that, having eliminated the excess supply of money, inflation is practically nil. For which reason I do not want to fix the budget in terms of spending, because my bet is to lower inflation more aggressively. In that context, the capital controls can be opened. Now, if you look, all that conversion is a market, it is impossible to know. Therefore, I cannot say “yes, it will be on such a day.” But I can say with complete certainty that the day this occurs, as a milestone, the capital controls make no sense. Therefore, let’s say we are also working on what is the exit from the capital controls.

But the campaign, look, the campaign had three things. No one can say that I deceived them: there was the chainsaw, I just described the chainsaw; I said I would pursue the corrupt, I pursue the corrupt; I said I would lower insecurity, and we are destroying it. But another thing I campaigned on was carrying a dollar, of course, they made a dollar with my face and I carried it proudly, which had to do with this idea of eliminating the Central Bank. That is to say, the idea of currency competition, which ultimately ends with the elimination of the Central Bank.

So, that also generates a sort of fear. Again, let’s see, if they are not trained in economics, what are they going to do? They will ask an economist; what they do not know, what you do not have incorporated, is that Argentine economists are so stupid. Not only those from Argentina, I warn you, there are others who are also stupid and have weight in decisions, and they also cause quite a few problems. Fortunately, they were sidelined.

But, aside from that, this is interesting because what happens now if we reach the situation where the money that exists is the money that has truly cleaned the monetary surplus? Therefore, now there is no excess money. And, what happens if now the economy continues to grow? There a problem arises, because the problem is that people will demand more money and it turns out that the amount of money is fixed. And what is the consequence of that? The consequence of that is that the economy, with economic growth, would have to enter deflation. The problem lies in that if the economy is not flexible enough at that moment, as financial assets travel faster than real assets, it could end up slowing down growth or directly sinking the economy into a depression or recession. So, how do we monetize the economy if the amount of money is fixed? Currency competition, where other currencies start to compete. What are we going to do? We are going to let Argentines, as the capital controls will no longer exist, be able to make their transactions in another currency. So, what happens? Those dollars, for example, that enter the system instead of issuing money to buy them, will be able to be used directly for transactions.

As the economy grows, the Argentines themselves who demand money will be monetizing the economy, bringing more dollars into the economy. And one of the things that happens is that, if dynamically the amount of pesos is fixed and the amount of dollars starts to grow—I say dollars to simplify the thing, because if not currency competition, competition and all the time, it’s like a polynomial that I have to be extrapolating all the time—, then, what is going to happen? At one point, you have the amount of pesos fixed and the dollars that start to grow and the truth is that at some point there will be so many dollars in the economy that perhaps that day we can close the Central Bank. And that day, if I am still in government, do not doubt that I will close it.

Finally, now I left the best, which is the issue of economic growth. So, what is going to generate economic growth in this economy, if I put it in the terminology used by the bastard children of Adam Smith, that is, those who do not know about growth and only look at the evolution of GDP, I could say that GDP will expand, I could say that GDP is growing, I will say expand, but they will manifest it as an increase in GDP. That increase in GDP, for example, one of the things you have is that for more than three months salaries have been outpacing inflation. That is to say, real wages are rising in Argentina. Not only that, but real wages in Argentina are rising, but pensions are also rising, today pensions are better than in December of last year, that is to say, there is a recomposition of salaries and a recomposition of pensions; fundamentally, we are having a recomposition of the wage mass that will transform into demand and that, given the idle installed capacity, allows us to expand the level of activity without price pressures. Therefore, one of the factors of expansion and rebound you will see there.

The other has to do with the stock cycle, the truth is that Argentines last year already saw the punch coming and one way you have to protect yourself from inflation is by accumulating stocks. So, what was done was to generate many stocks, in fact, an artificial situation of activity level was created, which, if it had not been, would have been much worse at the end of the K regime and in that context, one of the things that happened is that many stocks were accumulated to protect against inflation and those stocks, you cannot have them infinitely; so, they started to liquidate them in the first part of this year, which exacerbated the drop in the level of activity. But of course, they also cannot live with zero stock and the very recomposition of the stock cycle will also generate expansion, that is to say, that, in the short term, temporarily, GDP will rebound for two factors: due to the recomposition of salaries and pensions, and due to the recomposition of stocks.

But that is not enough, that is not genuine economic growth, that is a rebound. So, the question is: how do we grow, and also there the economists err again, which does not surprise me that they err in terms of growth, because the vast majority are Keynesians, therefore, they are stupid, therefore, they do not know about intertemporality. And in reality, what makes an economy grow is investment, but you have to finance investment and it is financed with savings. Well, the fact that the State has been removed from the middle and that we have reduced the fiscal deficit by 15 points of GDP, are 15 points of savings that return to the private sector to invest, to accumulate capital, to be more productive, for Argentine production to rise and for real wages to also rise, and thus reduce the number of poor and indigent people. That is a source of growth.

On the other hand, our firm commitment, with a policy of zero issuance, will make us stop suffering from inflation and that inflation stops distorting relative prices, and, therefore, that allows us to better and more efficiently guide investment within the private sector and, therefore, that will also generate a leap in economic growth. But also, very importantly, is the fiscal issue, because when we say zero deficit, it means that debt does not rise. And if debt does not rise, the debt-to-GDP ratio, even if GDP remains constant, is non-growing and if it is non-growing the country is solvent intertemporally, it means it can pay its debt. And if its debt falls or its debt-to-GDP ratio falls or does not grow, country risk falls. I remind you that when we took office it was at 2900 basis points. I give you the news that today it broke the line of 1500, despite the fiscal degenerates.

Naturally, as we continue with this, country risk will continue to fall. That country risk falling means that the interest rate will fall, it means that, in addition, capital accumulation will continue. And obviously when this happens GDP will increase, employment will increase, real wages will increase and obviously this will also reduce the number of poor and indigent people, making Argentina continue to grow and do so significantly. Another thing that I also forgot in the middle is that the elimination of capital controls removes a weight and a brake on economic activity, and by freeing that, that excess artificial supply as a counterpart to the excess demand in the foreign exchange market also generates a rebound effect.

And finally, let’s say, this is the last of the reflections regarding what generates growth. We, as I told you before, have undertaken the largest structural reform in the history of Argentina. In fact, it is the largest structural reform in Argentine history; it is 8 times larger than the one Menem did. But for us it is not enough, it is not enough to reach levels of economic freedom as I told you before, like those of Germany, France, and Italy. We want to be the freest country in the world. Every day we remove regulations; we have 3200 structural reforms pending and we are going to make Argentina the freest country in the world. Because those countries that are freer are 12 times richer than repressed countries, have 25 times fewer poor people in the standard format and 50 times fewer in the extreme format. Therefore, embracing the ideas of freedom will make Argentina the most prosperous country on Earth.

In short, I ask you not to accompany us as mere spectators, to enjoy how the Argentine miracle unfolds, which will make Argentina great again. I ask you to get involved and to be truly leading actors in this miracle that will make Argentina a great world power. That is why I ask that God protect the Argentines, that the forces of heaven accompany us, and long live freedom, damn it! Long live freedom, damn it! Long live freedom, damn it!