Speech by Federal President Dr. h. c. Joachim Gauck at the 70th German Lawyers' Day on September 16, 2014, in Hanover:

Germany Joachim Gauck · Former Federal President of Germany

18 September 2014 · 70th German Lawyers' Day · Hannover, Germany

Context
Gauck addressed the 70th German Lawyers' Day in Hanover on September 16, 2014, reflecting on the rule of law and Germany's reckoning with past dictatorships.
Main themes
Rule of law, processing of historical injustices, East German SED regime, Nazi-era crimes, legal accountability, transitional justice, German legal tradition, digital revolution challenges, European legal unity, freedom and democracy, recognition of law's value
Duration
~41 min
91st percentile
Words
4,922
91st percentile
Sentences
251
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Readability
53
71st percentile
Grade
10.7
29th percentile
Syntax
2.95
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Vocabulary
2.13
32nd percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 78%75%
  • Ceremonial 10%9%
  • Social 7%7%
  • Geopolitical 4%4%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

251 sentences in 60 paragraphs

The German jurists are celebrating their 70th Legal Day, and I am pleased to have come to Hannover.

However, that is not the only reason I am glad to be here. I recognized relatively late the value of the legal system and the importance of law for all communities. I will explain why during the course of this speech. This rule of law – an achievement that has been denied to many Germans for various reasons at different times – is such an impressive structure that many people need a whole lifetime to understand how important and fundamental it is.

Just as you have gathered representatives of the legal professions every two years over the course of one and a half centuries, with a break during the Nazi regime when the development of the rule of law in Germany could not be accompanied, commented on, and advanced by a Legal Day. It was a state of devastated law.

We have already heard from the introductory speech that we are never in a state of eternal certainty and perfectly fitting norms in the rule of law. And if there needed to be any proof of that, this forum is the best.

We take it too easily for granted that Germany is today a rule of law in which citizens can develop freely and protected. We too easily forget: The rule of law is not a matter of course. It must be constantly nurtured and developed. And it is good that this work is not left solely to politicians, parties, and interest groups. It is good that the German Legal Day exists.

It has often been ahead of its time with its recommendations to the politics of its day. I mention, for example, the year 1950. At that time, one topic of the Legal Day was "European Legal Unity." Today, the German Legal Day is dealing with major new challenges, such as the consequences of the digital revolution, and it is debating that in certain immigrant milieus, culturally-religious ideas shape a different understanding of law. I wish you fruitful and productive discussions, not only in these areas.

When the Permanent Deputation of the German Legal Day invited me to speak here, I gladly accepted the invitation. And I thought I should bring a topic of my life and my interests that has shaped me for many years – at least the years I have been able to live in freedom – namely, the processing of the injustices of past dictatorships.

As I sat in my seat in the front row earlier and was able to listen to this wonderful octet, I was reminded of a situation a few days ago when the Federal Social Court in Kassel celebrated its 60th anniversary. There were also brass players, strong types, and they had nothing less on the program than Handel's Hallelujah. And I did not know exactly to whom it was directed – to the president of the court, to all the jurists who were guests, or to me as a former pastor? I could not quite piece it together. But then something like a lightning struck my brain and my spirit, and I interpreted it as a Hallelujah for the fact that we find ourselves in a landscape of unbending law, of not complete, but of unbending law. That is surely worthy of every praise.

In my speech, I will hint at the backgrounds that lead me to speak this way. I know that this sounds too euphoric to some. Just as it sounds too euphoric to some when I speak with pathos about freedom. But there are enough people in Europe who, because they have lost it, appreciate the goods of law and the value of freedom in a special way. That is why they also speak about it in a special way. Therefore, I would like to offer you, the various legal professions gathered here, a tribute. I am not an artist; otherwise, I would do it like the octet earlier and touch your hearts with my tribute. You will now have to make do with a sparse speech.

Of course, it is the speech of a burned child. In these years, we remember that 25 years ago the magical autumn and winter of 1989 took place. When more and more people in East Germany overcame their fear and ultimately dethroned the rulers, they not only paved the way for freedom and democracy but also for the rule of law. And here stands one before you who was able to initiate and shape a piece of legally framed engagement with the past.

How well has the processing of the deeds of the SED regime succeeded? Has justice and legal peace returned? Those who believe that such questions no longer interest anyone today should listen: In Brandenburg, an Enquete Commission has just spent four years dealing extensively with this topic.

The questions regarding the legal processing of the much greater guilt of the Germans for the Nazi crimes have – and rightly so – not fallen silent to this day. There are still investigations, and occasionally there are trials. But above all, victims and their relatives still ask why the former tormentors, some of whom are still alive today, have not been held accountable.

This is not solely a German issue. In many countries, people must deal with the destructive legacy of violence and injustice, and not a few look to our country, also to our double experience with the processing of guilt.

I find it worthwhile to reflect on the possibilities and limits of legal engagement with dictatorial injustice for another reason. This engagement raises fundamental questions. Namely: What can law do? What can we expect from the law and what not? What does law have to do with justice? What must we do to ensure that law can do what it is supposed to do? If we want to protect our rule of law, we must confront such questions.

Surely all of you here in the hall know the famous sentence that Bärbel Bohley – who founded the new forum almost exactly 25 years ago – formulated shortly after German reunification: "We wanted justice and got the rule of law." For all of you here, it is a melancholic dictum. A little threatening too. But for countless people in the country, it came straight from the heart, right from their feelings. That is why legal professionals must endure such questions. And they will respond to them with care and determination.

Let us delve into this: This was a word from the perspective of those affected, but perhaps also somehow understandable. Let us put ourselves for a moment in that time. The proceedings against Honecker – what did the Politburo not have on its conscience? But then the proceedings are discontinued because the man is ill. Completely clear for someone who lives and has grown up in a legal system. But completely incomprehensible for many people who would have said: "With the same state of health, he would have oppressed us for many more years: Why can we not treat him like a normal person?" Many other high officials also experienced rather lenient justice. The sense of such a form of justice did not yet exist for most people in the country that had perished at that time.

Let us look at other proceedings, the so-called border guard trials. They almost universally ended with suspended sentences. Now let us imagine those who were imprisoned in the GDR for criticizing the regime. Or let us imagine those who lost a close person during an escape attempt. Or even just those who suffered under lies and indoctrination. Let us imagine the millions who were denied freedom, robbed of life opportunities, and deprived of fundamental rights. They could easily perceive such decisions as weakness and some even as capitulation of the rule of law.

Now let us ask ourselves how this assessment comes about, which may be foreign to you because you are familiar with the law, because you have grown up with it, because the legal norms and legal practice have accompanied and shaped a part of your life. Now let us look again at the other side. What would the reference to the law have brought us in the times of the GDR, us, the oppressed? Of course, one or the other would have understood us. But much more important for the oppressed at that time was that they had the better morality. Morality was a strong weapon against the oppressors; it was on the side of the oppressed. With moral reasons, we could call out to the rulers: "You are taking away rights and freedoms that are due to me." But when the oppressors no longer had power, when after 1989 it was about building democracy, many of us, but not all, felt that the better morality alone was no longer enough – by the way, neither was the sense of justice of the oppressed.

Thus, during this transformation period from dictatorship to democracy, a process had to take place anew, which occurred in the rule of law at the beginning of the time when law became the norm against the power of the rulers. I still remember clearly: As a spokesperson for a citizens' movement in 1989 in my homeland and later as a head of authority, I felt, and all political actors felt it at that time: We need legal norms if we do not want to accept arbitrariness again.

I have a very small example from practice when I was just newly appointed to oversee the Stasi files as a head of authority. From the citizens' movement, also from Bärbel Bohley, for example, came the call: "Well, everyone takes their Stasi file; we have secured it now. After all, it is ours, and everyone takes it home." That sounds very good at first. The oppressed are put in a position to take possession of the ruling knowledge of their oppressors themselves.

We wanted that too – we representatives. But we had to ensure that there was now data protection law and other legal norms. It could not be done like that with taking a bundle of files home, and we had to understand: We need rules, legal norms. And we did not want to accept arbitrariness again. There is also an arbitrariness of the good. But we did not want that. We had to understand that the rule of law is only strong if it remains true to its rules, even and especially towards those who have disregarded and abused the law. Its value lies precisely in guaranteeing the equality of all before the law, in guaranteeing legal certainty and thus ultimately also legal peace. The state cannot provide revenge or compensation for all the life opportunities robbed by the dictatorship – even if after dictatorships this need clearly, sometimes overtly, emerges, and by the way, it is humanly understandable that these needs exist.

But to the rules of criminal engagement with guilt belongs, no matter how difficult it is, that even the lawbreaker enjoys legal certainty and that a perpetrator – however deserving of punishment their actions may seem – can only be legally convicted if their act, measured against the law and legal standards valid at the time of the act, is also punishable.

Many had to learn this first. Around 100,000 investigations were initiated after 1989 due to SED injustices, a truly remarkable number. Then 1,286 main proceedings were opened, and just over 750 defendants were convicted, with only 40 receiving prison sentences without probation. When I mention these numbers, the mention of the numbers is associated with the following impression: "Wonderful! The judiciary has fulfilled its duty when it began to investigate. It has shown the population: We take seriously what you have suffered." But we also feel why so many compatriots were shocked at the, as they saw it, "unnecessary leniency of the rule of law." They had not yet been able to recognize the blessings I just spoke of and that you are familiar with, due to your life in a rule of law. Some are still working on that today.

The difficult questions that had to be answered again in the time after 1989 were particularly demonstrated by the border guard trials. Precisely because the prohibition of retroactivity is so important, the much-discussed and then applied Radbruch formula showed: It is not only about legal questions; it is also about complex legal philosophical questions. With it, the Radbruch formula, in exceptional cases, when there is an unbearable contradiction between positive law and justice, material justice can be valued higher than legal certainty.

Another limit of legal engagement with the past was also difficult for many affected to accept. It lies in the fact that a law fundamentally asks about the unlawful and culpable behavior of individuals. "The Politburo" or "the Stasi" could be morally condemned, but not legally as a collective.

The individualization of guilt was already one of the essential problems in the much more hesitant judicial confrontation with the incomprehensible mass crimes under National Socialist rule in earlier times. For concrete details and individual acts were often hardly provable. At this point, we remember Fritz Bauer, the courageous Hessian Attorney General and initiator of the Auschwitz trial. He had already concluded back then – an extreme minority opinion – that the judiciary privatizes and neutralizes the collective crime against the Jews by atomizing the overall events. He would probably have been electrified by how the judgment against the alleged concentration camp guard John Demjanjuk was justified a few years ago.

But even where judgment and punishment are insufficient, judicial efforts are not in vain. Criminal proceedings have a clarifying function when it comes to systematic injustice. It was the great merit of Fritz Bauer that in the Auschwitz trial, 22 defendants stood trial, thus allowing for a complex picture of their terrible actions in the camps to be formed. And the border guard trials after 1989 showed how border soldiers were integrated into a system of injustice through instructions and indoctrination. However, these proceedings also made it clear what scope for action remained for the individual.

Thus, criminal proceedings sharpened the view of entanglement in guilt. They sent a public message to both the perpetrators and the victims. It was injustice, and it is people, not systems, who commit this injustice. And this injustice is pursued, even if it seems to be formally legalized and was promoted by those in power.

So what can law do? What can we expect from it? What not? The answer is: Law can do what it is allowed to do. What cannot be condemned according to the principles of the rule of law cannot be condemned.

It is important to clearly articulate and openly defend this. For it relieves us of overly great hopes and protects us from disappointments. The legal processing of injustice is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for justice and legal peace. This applies generally, but especially in dealing with a troubled past. We would overburden the law if we assigned it the sole task of processing an unjust regime, also to delegitimize it, and to bring about an internal societal reconciliation.

The clarifying function of the law also has limits. The questions of justice are determined by the specific case and by the legal requirements, and they are also restricted by them. Historians, for example, do not need a formal shooting order in black and white to arrive at a judgment about guilt and complicity in the killing of refugees at the border. However, legal, public, and historical processing often complement each other very well in their approach to the truth. Historians have illuminated the background of certain acts, and in the end, it is also the task of the media and the public to ask: "Who bore responsibility for which injustice?"

Especially because so many had committed injustices during the SED regime without having made themselves guilty in a criminal sense, it was – also for me personally – important to understand that there are different dimensions of guilt.

In this regard, one person particularly helped me, who played an enormous role in the public discourse in the early phase of the Federal Republic: Karl Jaspers. He had already dealt with the entanglement of the Germans in the atrocities under the Nazi regime in 1946. In his small work "The Question of Guilt," I read that there is this multidimensionality of guilt: the criminal dimension of guilt, but also the moral and certainly the political responsibility, and then for believing people, of course, a metaphysical dimension of guilt. By presenting this, it becomes clear to every reader what he then states: Each of these dimensions of guilt needs its own instance for processing.

Therefore, the court is not the all-encompassing processing instance for every kind of guilt. Bringing this into the public discourse of unjust regimes after their end is of enormous importance for a satisfying discourse within societies. I think the discourse will not be satisfying at first, but it will initially divide – and it must divide. There is no real compromise between lies and truth, between right and wrong. That does not exist. There are many necessary compromises, but for that, one must be educated to the capacity for judgment, and the categories for judgment must be established. The categories to become capable of judgment are indeed different in criminal law than in the other areas where we rightly speak of guilt and have the duty to think about guilt and responsibility.

I found these thoughts liberating at the time when I took on an important role in the processing of the SED injustice. I was also able to make peace with the judgments of the different instances against perpetrators because I saw that we were in the public debate. Here is the instance that must process political responsibility, the public discourse, because we had a powerful other opportunity to call injustice "injustice" and to delegitimize it. We did not have to wait for judges to become capable of judgment. And it is important that we all make this clear to ourselves and assure those who find it so difficult to enter into a positive relationship with the legal system: There is this possibility of non-criminal delegitimization.

This certainly does not only apply to Germany and the processing phenomena after dictatorships. It is a globally important tool for dealing with times of injustice in public discourse.

At that time, I really needed these thoughts: I was a member of the People's Chamber and was late in my approach to the building of law. I then became the chairman of a special committee to oversee the dissolution of the Ministry for State Security and later the commissioner for the Stasi files. And I really experienced that it was healing for inner peace and a new beginning in united Germany that we created various legal possibilities to publicly penetrate and discuss the knowledge of a never-legitimized power.

Let us look at another element that had to be shaped legally during this time: the right to access files for individuals, who received a piece of restitution of stolen freedom and personal rights with this right. But it was also necessary to build trust in the new institutions of the new democracy. Thus, another legally ordered element of processing dictatorship was created, namely the possibility to review the public service.

In this review process, names and facts could be revealed. One could name who, as an unofficial or even official employee of the State Security, had suppressed freedom, who had bent human rights, and who had denounced fellow human beings. One could name individuals who had distinguished themselves from others and from other applicants in the public service through such clandestine activities. They could be shown to have a lack of suitability for positions of trust in the public service. This was intended to create more trust among the population in times of transformation, as the public service is always an instrument of dictators against the population in times of dictatorship. Incidentally, through file opening and review, it could be prevented that people like Ibrahim Böhme or Wolfgang Schnur, who had acted as informants for years, became prime ministers or ministers.

Also, the individual confrontation and – where possible – reconciliation between perpetrator and victim could, in my experience, only take place if clarification had preceded it. For one can only forgive what one knows, and only to whom one knows.

At that time, there were voices that did not want this form of confrontation with injustice. Some sought a final law or a general amnesty. Their motives were varied. Some were driven by personal interests or by the fear of having to correct misjudgments regarding the GDR simply. Others considered societal peace to be endangered, or they referred to Eastern European countries where this form of processing had not yet taken hold, or to Spain after Franco's rule with the politics of Punto Final.

Ultimately, however, these voices were drowned out. There were no majorities for such a practice in the various political parties. More powerful in our country was the experience of how painful the repression of the past can be and how healing an open confrontation with it can be. We were aware of the outrageous leniency towards the perpetrators of the Nazi regime in the period after 1945. We knew about the silence regarding the injustice and the lack of empathy towards the victims. We were aware of the societal wounds that had erupted in the late 1960s and 1970s in the old Federal Republic precisely on this issue.

It should not be the case again after 1990 – for the sake of the victims and for the sake of societal peace. Ultimately, there was thus a courageous political and societal consensus in 1990 for an open approach to the past.

If such a consensus is lacking, it is often individuals who play a significant role in overcoming the resistance to confronting the committed injustice in society and politics. For the West German post-war society, Fritz Bauer describes in his memoirs his often lonely struggle when he occasionally felt while walking through his office building as if he were in enemy territory. It is mainly to him and a few other comrades, especially in the Ludwigsburg Central Office, that we owe what was achieved in terms of judicial processing of Nazi crimes.

Nevertheless, in retrospect, the shame over the countless failures of the judiciary, over cleverly obscured amnesties, and over justifications for case dismissals that must have sounded like mockery in the ears of the victims prevails. There are still unatoned crimes and victims who do not necessarily ask for punishment but for the official acknowledgment that injustice was committed.

However, this retrospective not only contains a reference to past events and to the deficits and desiderata of the legal system. This retrospective also contains a warning, a warning for the possibilities of legally structured confrontations to continue to fight against injustice, to use the existing possibilities, and, where necessary, to expand them. This also applies internationally. Politics and justice are called upon here together. Many victim groups of the Nazi era had to work for decades to gain recognition, such as forced laborers or deserters. Others have not yet fully achieved this. For example, around 360,000 people who were sterilized against their will are still not recognized as victims of Nazi persecution in the sense of the Federal Compensation Act.

In 1989, to return to that point, we found no legal norm that would have helped us deal with the files of the secret police, but we had to figure out for ourselves how our political intentions could be implemented in a lawful manner. The right to informational self-determination, for which we had no law, but at least the ruling of our highest German court in a highly interesting case – the census ruling, which had been postulated a few years earlier – came to our aid.

I knew some things about the Federal Republic, but these nuances of the legal system were unknown to me. I then learned it through a distinguished jurist, Hans-Jörg Geiger, who was then nearby and became the director of the authority. This encounter was very important. For what we did had to be legally structured.

The introduction of the idea of the right to informational self-determination was something of a milestone – also in the acceptance of the right to access files by a legally educated public. From then on, self-determination included that anyone who had been spied on had the right to know what had been collected or planned about him and against him by the Ministry for State Security or by the SED, including who had participated in it.

Today, all of this is established and settled. It sounds self-evident. But I will not forget how persistently we had to fight for the idea of disclosing the files. Politically, because it seemed inconvenient or simply too sensitive to many involved at the time, and legally, because countless problems had to be considered, rights weighed against each other, and procedures had to be found. All of this was a learning process on how a kind of tribunal-free access to files could be made possible.

Today we can say that the Stasi Files Act was an innovative piece of legislation, created in a unique historical situation. It was a special legal regulation that did not need to attach the stigma of special law to itself. It fit into the developed legal system of the matured Federal Republic of Germany.

Time and again, I and my successors in the office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records have been asked by guests from abroad, from Eastern Europe, but also from Arab countries, from Latin America, from South Africa, from Asia: Most recently, the Tunisian National Assembly expressed interest in how our laws reconcile transparency for victims with the necessary data protection. That the German rule of law has developed innovations to promote transformations from dictatorship to democracy – this is a reason for genuine joy for me.

I would like to connect a concluding remark to this and advocate for both expansion and self-restraint.

At the beginning, I formulated: "Law is not only law, it also becomes." It can be what is desired, enacted, and enforced. Behind this lies the call to you, who are gathered here: Continuously adjust our law where it is no longer up to date. Seek the best legal solutions when life realities have changed.

Some areas of law have only developed in the past few decades, you know this better than I do: data protection, environmental law. New developments require the corresponding legal framework. The concern about lawless spaces on the Internet exists worldwide. I was pleased to see what a prominent role it played in the opening lecture; it has occupied us for years. I ask myself: How can we secure the right to informational self-determination that we have fought for in this vast area? I am also looking forward to your debates this year, for example, on the topic of copyright in the digital world.

What can national legal systems still achieve in cross-border areas? Or what can we expect from international law in light of spectacular violations of international law? There have been many hopeful developments in the past 25 years, such as the establishment of the International Criminal Court. It stands for the promise of the international community that those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes will be held accountable.

In conclusion, I repeat another thought: Law can do what it is allowed to do. Especially under the public and political pressure that often weighs on the judiciary, our rule of law has had and continues to have to prove itself. You bear a great responsibility to resist this pressure and to satisfy only the appropriate expectations. Such pressure arises, for example, when public prejudgments are made in the media or in politics even during an investigation. Such pressure also arises from the often understandable expectations of victims and their relatives.

But let us be clear again, law cannot answer all questions of every guilt. The question of the involvement of lesser offenders or the silent tolerance of the many is particularly difficult and often cannot be answered criminally at all. Not all political and social backgrounds can therefore be illuminated in a judicial process. Thus, we must repeatedly ask what law can do and what it cannot do. But we must also ask what we must achieve so that it can do what it should be able to do.

We have experienced in Germany that law is fragile, that it can be abused. But what have we experienced afterward? – a highly impressive phase of German rule of law. And we are together glad and happy that this well-developed rule of law is not in danger of being hollowed out, at least not if we also legally accept the new challenges, whether they are technological or cultural in nature.

Our rule of law needs the visionaries who will advance it into new terrain. And it needs the many who will defend it. In this sense, I wish you a good and fruitful Day of Lawyers.