Problems of War and Strategy

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

6 November 1938 · Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

Context
Mao addressed a Chinese Communist Party conference on November 6, 1938, during the War of Resistance Against Japan, arguing that war is the central task of the revolution and urging the whole Party to study military affairs.
Main themes
Armed seizure of political power, characteristics of the Chinese revolution, war as the principal form of struggle, party command of the gun, war history of the Kuomintang, war history of the Chinese Communist Party, shifts from civil war to national war, strategic position of anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, guerrilla and regular warfare, eighteen advantages of guerrilla warfare, study of military theory
Duration
~46 min
93rd percentile
Words
5,567
93rd percentile
Sentences
176
86th percentile
Readability
33
22nd percentile
Grade
16.4
86th percentile
Syntax
3.43
91st percentile
Vocabulary
2.27
67th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
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Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 83%82%
  • Institutional 12%11%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Ceremonial 2%2%
  • Economic 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

176 sentences in 39 paragraphs

I China's Characteristics and Revolution

The central task and the highest form of war and revolution is the armed seizure of political power, is war settling the issue. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution is universally correct; whether in China or in foreign countries, it is correct in every case.

But under the same principle, as regards the manner in which proletarian parties carry out this principle under various conditions, it is not uniform, owing to the difference in conditions. In the capitalist countries, in periods when there is no fascism and no war, the conditions there are that inside the country the feudal system no longer exists, and what exists is the bourgeois democratic system; externally there is no national oppression, and what exists is one's own nation oppressing other nations. Based on these characteristics, the task of the proletarian parties of the capitalist countries lies in, through prolonged legal struggle, educating the workers, building up their strength, and preparing finally to overthrow capitalism. There, it is prolonged legal struggle, it is making use of the parliamentary rostrum, it is economic and political strikes, it is organizing trade unions and educating the workers. The form of organization there is legal, and the form of struggle is bloodless (non-war). On the question of war, the Communist Parties there oppose the imperialist wars of their own countries; if such a war occurs, the Party's policy is to bring about the defeat of the reactionary government of their own country. The only war they themselves want is the civil war under preparation. But this war, until the bourgeoisie is in a state of real impotence, until the majority of the proletariat has the determination to rise in armed insurrection and to wage war, until the peasant masses have already voluntarily come to the aid of the proletariat, insurrection and war should not be launched. When the time for insurrection and war comes, it is again first to occupy the cities and then to attack the countryside, and not the reverse of this. All this is what the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries once did in this way, and what was confirmed in the October Revolution in Russia.

China, however, is different. China's characteristics are: it is not an independent and democratic country, but a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country; internally it has no democratic system, and suffers oppression by the feudal system; externally it has no national independence, and suffers oppression by imperialism. Therefore, there is no parliament that can be utilized, and no legal right to organize the workers to hold strikes. Here, the task of the Communist Party is, fundamentally, not to enter into insurrection and war through prolonged legal struggle, nor first to occupy the cities and afterwards take the countryside, but to take the opposite road.

For the Chinese Communist Party, when imperialism is not launching armed attack, it is either, together with the bourgeoisie, to carry on civil war against the warlords (the running dogs of imperialism), for example the Guangdong war and the Northern Expedition from 1924 to 1927; or to unite the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie and carry on civil war against the landlord class and the comprador bourgeoisie (likewise the running dogs of imperialism), for example the Agrarian Revolutionary War from 1927 to 1936. When imperialism launches armed attack, it is then to unite all classes and strata in the country that oppose the foreign aggressors, and carry on a national war directed outward, for example the present War of Resistance Against Japan.

All this indicates the difference between China and the capitalist countries. In China, the principal form of struggle is war, and the principal form of organization is the army. All else, for example the organization of the people and the struggles of the people and so on, is all very important, is all definitely indispensable, definitely must not be ignored, but all is for the sake of war. All organization and struggle before the outbreak of war is for the purpose of preparing for war, for example that period from the May Fourth Movement (1919) to the May Thirtieth Movement (1925). All organization and struggle after the outbreak of war, then, directly or indirectly coordinates with the war; for example, in the period of the Northern Expedition, all organization and struggle in the rear of the revolutionary army directly coordinated with the war, and all organization and struggle within the areas ruled by the Northern warlords indirectly coordinated with the war. Again, for example, in the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, all organization and struggle inside the Red areas directly coordinated with the war, and all organization and struggle outside the Red areas indirectly coordinated with the war. And again, for example, in the present period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, all organization and struggle in the rear of the anti-Japanese army and in the areas occupied by the enemy army is likewise directly or indirectly coordinated with the war.

"In China, it is armed revolution opposing armed counter-revolution. This is one of the characteristics of the Chinese revolution, and also one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution." This judgment of Comrade Stalin's is entirely correct; whether as regards the Northern Expedition, as regards the Agrarian Revolutionary War, or as regards today's War of Resistance Against Japan, it is correct in all cases. These wars are all revolutionary wars; the objects the wars oppose are all counter-revolution; the principal elements participating in the wars are all the revolutionary people; the only difference lies in whether it is civil war or national war; whether it is war carried on by the Communist Party alone or war carried on jointly by the two parties, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Of course, these distinctions are important. They indicate that the main body of the war has a distinction of broad and narrow (the alliance of workers and peasants, or the alliance of workers, peasants and the bourgeoisie), and that the object of the war has a distinction of internal and external (opposing domestic enemies, or opposing foreign enemies; and domestic enemies are further divided into the Northern warlords or the Kuomintang), and indicate that China's revolutionary war has dissimilar content in the various periods of its historical course. Yet all are armed revolution opposing armed counter-revolution, all are revolutionary wars, and all express the characteristics and advantages of the Chinese revolution. The judgment that revolutionary war "is one of the characteristics of the Chinese revolution, and also one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution" entirely suits China's circumstances. The principal task of China's proletarian party, and the task it has faced almost from the beginning, is to unite as many allies as possible, organize armed struggle, and, according to circumstances, oppose internal or external armed counter-revolution, and struggle to win national and social liberation. In China, apart from armed struggle, there is no place for the proletariat and the Communist Party, and no revolutionary task whatsoever can be accomplished.

On this point, our Party, in the five or six years from its founding in 1921 up until it took part in the Northern Expedition in 1926, had insufficient understanding. At that time it did not understand the extreme importance of armed struggle in China, did not seriously prepare for war and organize an army, and did not pay attention to the study of military strategy and tactics. In the course of the Northern Expedition, it neglected the winning over of the army and one-sidedly laid stress on the mass movement; as a result, once the Kuomintang turned reactionary, all the mass movements collapsed. For a long period after 1927, many comrades still placed the Party's central task on preparing urban insurrections and on work in the White areas. The fundamental change of some comrades on this question came after the victory in opposing the enemy's third "encirclement and suppression" in 1931. But there was still no change of the whole Party; some comrades still did not think as we do now.

Experience tells us that China's problems cannot be solved apart from armed force. To recognize this is of advantage for carrying on a victorious War of Resistance Against Japan hereafter. The concrete facts of the armed resistance of the whole people in the War of Resistance Against Japan will educate the whole Party to recognize further the importance of this question; every Party member must at every moment be prepared to take up arms and go to the front. This conference of ours has further decided that the main aspect of the Party's work is in the war zones and behind the enemy lines, and has given a still clearer orientation. As for such phenomena as some Party members being willing to do the Party's organizational work, willing to do the work of the mass movement, but unwilling to study war and take part in war, and some schools not paying attention to encouraging students to go to the front, this is still a dose of good medicine suited to the illness. Within the greater part of China's territory, the Party's organizational work and mass-movement work are directly linked to armed struggle; there is not, and cannot be, separate and isolated Party work or mass movement. In a part of the rear relatively distant from the war zones (such as Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan) and in a part of the areas controlled by the enemy (such as Beiping, Tianjin, Nanjing and Shanghai), the Party's organizational work and mass movement also coordinate with the war, and can only and should only obey the demands of the front. In one sentence, the whole Party must pay attention to war, study military affairs, and prepare to fight.

II The War History of the Chinese Kuomintang

Let us take a look at the history of the Kuomintang, take a look at how it has paid attention to war; this is of benefit.

From the time Sun Yat-sen organized small revolutionary groups, he carried out several armed uprisings against the Qing. By the period of the Tongmenghui, it was even more filled with the deeds of armed uprising, up until the Revolution of 1911, which by armed force overthrew the Qing dynasty. In the period of the Chinese Revolutionary Party, an armed movement against Yuan Shikai was carried out. The later southward movement of the navy, the Northern Expedition from Guilin, and the founding of Whampoa were all Sun Yat-sen's undertakings of war.

Chiang Kai-shek replaced Sun Yat-sen and created the Kuomintang's age of military full flourish. He looks upon the army as life itself, and has passed through the three periods of the Northern Expedition, civil war, and resistance against Japan. The Chiang Kai-shek of the past ten years is counter-revolutionary. For the sake of counter-revolution, he created a huge "Central Army." He who has an army has power; war settles everything — this basic point he has grasped very tightly. On this point, we should learn from him. On this point, both Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek are our teachers.

After the Revolution of 1911, all the warlords loved their soldiers as their own lives; they all set store by the principle that "he who has an army has power."

Tan Yankai was a clever bureaucrat; he rose and fell several times in Hunan, and never served as provincial governor alone, but wanted to be military governor and concurrently provincial governor. Later, when he became Chairman of the National Government in Guangdong and in Wuhan, he still concurrently held the post of commander of the Second Army. China has many such warlords; they all understand China's characteristics.

China also has some political parties that do not want an army; the principal one among them is the Progressive Party, but it too understood that it had to rely on a warlord before it could hold office. Yuan Shikai, Duan Qirui and Chiang Kai-shek (those attached to Chiang being the Political Science Clique, transformed from a section of the Progressive Party) became its backers.

A few small parties whose history is not long, such as the Youth Party and others, have no army, and therefore cannot make any showing.

The bourgeois political parties of foreign countries do not need each directly to command a portion of the army. China, however, is different; owing to feudal division, among the groups or parties of the landlords or the bourgeoisie, whoever has guns has power, and whoever has more guns has greater power. A proletarian party situated in such an environment should see clearly the centre of the problem.

Communist Party members do not contend for personal command of the army (they absolutely must not contend for it, and must never again learn from Zhang Guotao), but they must contend for the Party's command of the army, and must contend for the people's command of the army. Now it is a national war of resistance, and we must also contend for the nation's command of the army. To suffer from infantile disorder on the question of command of the army is certainly to get not a single thing. For several thousand years the laboring people have fallen for the old tricks of deception and intimidation of the reactionary ruling classes, and it is very hard for them to awaken to the importance of themselves grasping the gun. The oppression of Japanese imperialism and the war of resistance of the whole people have pushed the laboring people onto the stage of war; Communist Party members should become the most conscious leaders of this war. Every Communist Party member should understand this truth: "Political power comes out of the barrel of a gun." Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun is absolutely not permitted to command the Party. But with guns one can indeed also build a Party; the Eighth Route Army built a big Party in North China. One can also build cadres, build schools, build culture, and build the mass movement. Everything in Yan'an was built by the gun. Everything comes out of the barrel of a gun. Viewed from the standpoint of the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the principal component of state power. Whoever wants to seize state power, and wants to keep it, should have a powerful army. Some people laugh at us as holding the "theory of the omnipotence of war." Yes, we are believers in the omnipotence of revolutionary war; this is not bad, it is good, it is Marxist. The guns of the Russian Communist Party built a socialism. We want to build a democratic republic. The experience of class struggle in the era of imperialism tells us: the working class and the laboring masses can defeat the armed bourgeoisie and landlords only by the force of the gun; in this sense, we may say that the whole world can be remade only by means of the gun. We are advocates of the abolition of war; we do not want war; but war can be abolished only by going through war; to be without the gun one must take up the gun.

III The War History of the Chinese Communist Party

Although our Party, in the three or four years from 1921 (the founding of the Chinese Communist Party) to 1924 (the First National Congress of the Kuomintang), did not understand the importance of directly preparing for war and organizing an army; and from 1924 to 1927, and even for a period after that, its understanding of this was still insufficient; yet beginning with its participation in the Whampoa Military Academy in 1924, it had already entered a new stage and begun to understand the importance of military affairs. Through assisting the Kuomintang in the Guangdong war and the Northern Expedition, the Party had already taken hold of a part of the army. The revolution failed, and bitter lessons were learned; thereupon there were the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the Guangzhou Uprising, and it entered the new period of creating the Red Army. This period was an extremely critical period in which our Party thoroughly recognized the importance of the army. Without the Red Army of this period and the wars it carried on — that is to say, if the Communist Party had adopted Chen Duxiu's liquidationism — today's War of Resistance Against Japan and its being sustained over a long period would be inconceivable.

The emergency conference of the Party Centre on August 7, 1927, opposed Right opportunism in politics and enabled the Party to advance a great step. The Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in January 1931 nominally opposed "Left" opportunism in politics, but in reality committed anew the error of "Left" opportunism. The content and historical role of these two conferences were not the same, but neither of these two conferences emphatically touched upon questions of war and strategy; this was a reflection of the fact that at that time the centre of gravity of the Party's work had not yet been placed upon war. After the Party Centre moved to the Red areas in 1933, the situation underwent a fundamental change, but on questions of war (and on all principal questions) errors of principle were again committed, causing the revolutionary war to suffer serious losses. The Zunyi Conference of 1935, however, was principally directed against opportunism in war, and placed the question of war in the first place; this was a reflection of the environment of war. Up to today, we can say with confidence that the Chinese Communist Party, in seventeen years of struggle, has not only tempered a firm Marxist political line, but has also tempered a firm Marxist military line. We not only know how to apply Marxism to solve political problems, but also know how to apply Marxism to solve problems of war; we have not only brought up a large body of powerful backbone cadres able to run the Party and run the state, but have also brought up a large body of powerful backbone cadres able to run the army. This is a revolutionary fresh flower watered by the hot blood of countless martyrs; it is not only the glory of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people, but also the glory of the Communist Parties of the world and the people of the world. Within the scope of the world, there are still only the three armies led by the Communist Parties of the three countries, the Soviet Union, China and Spain, that belong to the side of the proletariat and the laboring people; the Parties of the other countries still have no military experience, and so our army and our military experience are especially worthy of being treasured.

In order victoriously to carry on today's War of Resistance Against Japan, expanding and consolidating the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and all the guerrilla units led by our Party is extremely important. Under this principle, the Party should dispatch the best, and a sufficient number, of Party members and cadres to the front. Everything for victory at the front; organizational tasks must be subordinated to political tasks.

IV The Shifts in the Party's Military Strategy in the Civil War and the National War

The question of changes in our Party's military strategy deserves to be given study. It will be spoken of as divided into the two processes of civil war and national war.

The process of the civil war may, in the main, be divided into two strategic periods, an earlier and a later. In the earlier period, what was principal was guerrilla warfare; in the later period, what was principal was regular warfare. But the so-called regular warfare was of the Chinese type; it was manifested only in concentrating forces to fight mobile warfare and in a certain degree of concentration and planning in command and in organization; in other respects it was still of a guerrilla character, of a low level, and cannot be classed together with foreign armies, and it also differed somewhat from the army of the Kuomintang. Therefore, this kind of regular warfare, in a certain sense, is guerrilla warfare raised to a higher level.

In the process of the War of Resistance Against Japan, as far as our Party's military tasks are concerned, it will also, in the main, be divided into two strategic periods. In the earlier period (including the two stages of strategic defense and strategic stalemate), what is principal is guerrilla warfare; in the later period (the stage of strategic counter-offensive), what will be principal is regular warfare. But the guerrilla warfare of the earlier period of the War of Resistance Against Japan has much content different from the guerrilla warfare of the earlier period of the civil war, because it is the Eighth Route Army, regular in character (to a certain degree), that is dispersed to carry out guerrilla tasks; the regular warfare of the later period of the War of Resistance Against Japan will also differ from the regular warfare of the later period of the civil war; this is said in envisaging that, after the army is equipped with new-type weapons, the army and operations will undergo a great transformation. The army at that time will acquire a high degree of concentration and organization; operations will acquire a high degree of regularity, greatly reducing their guerrilla character; what is of a low level will change into what is of a high level, and what is of the Chinese type will change into what is of the world type. This will be the undertaking of the stage of strategic counter-offensive.

From this it can be seen that, between the two processes of the civil war and the War of Resistance Against Japan and the four strategic periods, there exist in all three strategic shifts. The first is the shift between domestic guerrilla warfare and domestic regular warfare. The second is the shift between domestic regular warfare and anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare. The third is the shift between anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare and anti-Japanese regular warfare.

Among the three shifts, the first shift once encountered very great difficulties. Here there were tasks on two sides. On the one hand, it was necessary to oppose the Right tendency of localism and guerrilla-ism, of wallowing in guerrilla character and being unwilling to shift toward regular character; this arose because cadres underestimated the already changed enemy situation and tasks. In this respect, taking the Central Red Area as an example, arduous work of education was done before it was gradually brought to shift over. On the other hand, it was necessary to oppose the "Left" tendency of excessively valuing regularization, of centralism and adventurism; this arose because a section of the leading cadres overestimated the enemy situation and the tasks, and, without looking at the actual conditions, mechanically applied foreign experience. In this respect, in the Central Red Area, over a long period of three years (before the Zunyi Conference), an extremely great sacrifice was paid, and only then was it corrected out of the lesson of blood. This correction was the achievement of the Zunyi Conference.

The second shift was one situated between two different processes of war; this was a matter of the autumn of 1937 (after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident). At this time, the enemy was new, namely Japanese imperialism; the friendly army was the former enemy, the Kuomintang (it still harbored hostility toward us); the battlefield was North China, vast in territory (temporarily the front of our army, but before long it would become the enemy's rear for a long period). Our strategic shift was an extremely grave shift carried out under these special circumstances. Under these special circumstances, the former regular army and mobile warfare had to be transformed into a guerrilla army (what is meant is dispersed employment, not organization and discipline) and guerrilla warfare, before they could conform to the enemy situation and the tasks. But such a shift then manifested itself, in appearance, as a retrogressive shift, and therefore this shift ought to have been extremely difficult. What might have occurred at this time was, on the one hand, the tendency to take the enemy lightly, and on the other hand, the disease of fearing Japan; these all occurred in the Kuomintang. When the Kuomintang shifted from the battlefield of civil war to the battlefield of national war, mainly because it took the enemy lightly, and at the same time there also existed a kind of disease of fearing Japan (represented by Han Fuju and Liu Zhi), it suffered many losses that ought not to have been suffered. We, however, carried out this shift quite smoothly; not only did we not suffer setback, but on the contrary we won greatly. This was obtained because the broad ranks of cadres in good time accepted the correct guidance of the Centre and flexibly observed the situation, although serious disputes had once occurred between the Centre and a section of the military cadres. This shift bears extremely greatly upon the perseverance, development and victory of the entire War of Resistance Against Japan, and upon the future of the Chinese Communist Party; one has only to think of the historical significance of anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare for the destiny of China's national liberation, and one will know it. China's anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, as regards its special vastness and protracted character, is not only unprecedented in the East, but may also be unprecedented in the entire history of mankind.

As for the third shift, from anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare to anti-Japanese regular warfare, it belongs to the future of the development of the war; it is estimated that at that time new circumstances and new difficulties will again arise, and for the present we need not speak of it.

V The Strategic Position of Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare

Speaking of the War of Resistance Against Japan as a whole, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare is auxiliary, because the final destiny of the War of Resistance Against Japan can be settled only by regular warfare. As far as the whole country is concerned, in the three strategic stages of the whole process of the War of Resistance Against Japan (defense, stalemate, counter-offensive), in both the first and the last stages, regular warfare is primary, supplemented by guerrilla warfare. In the middle stage, owing to the situation in which the enemy holds on to the occupied areas and we, though preparing the counter-offensive, are not yet able to carry out the counter-offensive, guerrilla warfare will manifest itself as the principal form, supplemented by regular warfare; but this, in the whole war, is only one stage among the three stages, although its duration may be the longest. Hence, speaking of the whole, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare is auxiliary. If one does not recognize this situation, does not understand that regular warfare is the key to settling the final destiny of the war, and does not pay attention to the building of the regular army and to the study and direction of regular warfare, one cannot defeat Japan. This is one aspect.

But guerrilla warfare occupies an important strategic position in the whole war. Without guerrilla warfare, if one neglects the building of guerrilla detachments and guerrilla armies, and neglects the study and direction of guerrilla warfare, one will likewise be unable to defeat Japan. The reason is that the greater half of China will become the enemy's rear; if there is not the most extensive and most persevering guerrilla warfare, and the enemy is allowed to sit in secure occupation, utterly without worry about the rear, then the losses of our main forces on the front will certainly be great, the enemy's offensive will certainly be still more rampant, a situation of stalemate will be hard to appear, continued resistance may waver; even if not so, then our counter-offensive strength will be insufficiently prepared, when the counter-offensive comes there will be no response, the enemy's consumption may obtain compensation, and other such unfavorable circumstances will all occur. If these circumstances appear, and one does not in good time develop extensive and persevering guerrilla warfare to overcome them, to defeat Japan will also be impossible. Therefore, although guerrilla warfare occupies an auxiliary position in the war as a whole, it in fact occupies an extremely important strategic position. To resist Japan while neglecting guerrilla warfare is undoubtedly extremely wrong. This is the other aspect.

The possibility of guerrilla warfare exists so long as the condition of a large country is present; therefore ancient times also had guerrilla warfare. But the perseverance of guerrilla warfare can appear only under the leadership of the Communist Party. Hence the guerrilla wars of ancient times were for the most part guerrilla wars that failed; only in modern times, when there are large countries that have a Communist Party, countries such as the Soviet Union and China in the period of civil war, is there victorious guerrilla warfare. On the question of war, the division of labor between the two parties, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, in the War of Resistance Against Japan, speaking of present and general conditions, is that the Kuomintang undertakes regular warfare on the front and the Communist Party undertakes guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines; this is necessary, it is appropriate, and they need each other, coordinate with each other, and assist each other.

From this it can be understood how important and necessary it is that our Party's military strategic orientation shifted from the regular warfare of the later period of the civil war to the guerrilla warfare of the earlier period of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Summing up its advantages, there are the following eighteen items: (1) reducing the occupied areas of the enemy army; (2) expanding the base areas of our army; (3) in the stage of defense, coordinating with operations on the front and pinning the enemy down; (4) in the stage of stalemate, holding fast to the base areas behind the enemy lines, which favors the reorganization of the army on the front; (5) in the stage of counter-offensive, coordinating with the front and recovering lost territory; (6) most rapidly and most effectively expanding the army; (7) most universally developing the Communist Party, so that a branch can be organized in every village; (8) most universally developing the mass movement, so that the entire people behind the enemy lines, apart from the enemy's strongpoints, can all be organized; (9) most universally establishing anti-Japanese democratic political power; (10) most universally developing anti-Japanese culture and education; (11) most universally improving the people's livelihood; (12) most convenient for disintegrating the enemy's army; (13) most universally and most enduringly influencing the hearts of the people of the whole country and rousing the morale of the whole country; (14) most universally pushing forward the progress of friendly armies and friendly parties; (15) suiting the condition that the enemy is strong and we are weak, so that we ourselves suffer fewer losses and win more battles; (16) suiting the condition that the enemy is small and we are big, so that the enemy suffers more losses and wins fewer battles; (17) most rapidly and most effectively creating large numbers of leading cadres; (18) most convenient for solving the problem of provisions.

In the long struggle, guerrilla detachments and guerrilla warfare should not stop at their original position, but develop toward a higher stage, and gradually change into a regular army and regular warfare; of this too there is no doubt. We shall, by passing through guerrilla warfare, accumulate strength, and build ourselves into one of the decisive factors in smashing Japanese imperialism.

VI Pay Attention to the Study of Military Questions

All questions of the mutual hostility of the two armies are settled by relying on war; China's survival or extinction hinges on the victory or defeat of the war. Therefore, the study of military theory, the study of strategy and tactics, and the study of political work in the army admit of no delay. Although the study of tactics is insufficient, the comrades who have engaged in military work for ten years have already had many achievements, and have already put forward many new things based on Chinese conditions; the shortcoming lies in their not having been summed up. The study of questions of strategy and questions of the theory of war has up to now still been limited to the work of an extremely small number of people. The study of political work has achievements of the first order; so rich is its experience, and so many and so good are its new creations, that in the whole world, apart from the Soviet Union, it is we who are to be counted; but the shortcoming lies in the insufficiency of comprehensiveness and of systematic character. For the needs of the whole Party and the whole country, the popularization of military knowledge has become an urgent task. All of this should be paid attention to hereafter, and the theory of war and strategy is the backbone of everything. Through the study of military theory, to arouse interest and call upon the whole Party to pay attention to the study of military questions, I consider necessary.