On Protracted War

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

1 May 1938 · Lectures at the Yan'an Association for the Study of the War of Resistance Against Japan · Yan'an, China

Context
Mao delivered a lecture series, On Protracted War, in 1938 to Chinese Communists and the wider resistance, arguing that the war against Japan would be protracted but end in Chinese victory.
Main themes
Protracted war against Japan, refutation of national subjugation theory, critique of the theory of quick victory, comparison of Japanese and Chinese strengths and weaknesses, anti-Japanese national united front, guerrilla and mobile warfare, danger of compromise with Japan, international support and the Soviet Union, political mobilization of army and people, Abyssinia's defeat as a contrast
Duration
~261 min
99th percentile
Words
31,332
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Sentences
1,220
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Readability
41
38th percentile
Grade
13.9
66th percentile
Syntax
3.15
66th percentile
Vocabulary
2.24
59th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 91%89%
  • Ceremonial 3%3%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Economic 2%2%
  • Institutional 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

1,220 sentences in 153 paragraphs

Raising the Problem

(1) The first anniversary of the great War of Resistance Against Japan, July 7, is fast approaching. It will soon be a year since the strength of the whole nation was united to persevere in resistance and in the united front, and to wage heroic war against the enemy. This war is unprecedented in the history of the East and will also be great in the history of the world, and the people of the whole world are concerned about it. Every Chinese who suffers the calamities of war and struggles for the survival of his nation longs every day for victory. But what will the course of the war actually be? Can we win or not? Can we win quickly or not? Many people say it will be a protracted war, but why a protracted war? How is a protracted war to be waged? Many people say that final victory will be ours, but why will there be final victory? How is final victory to be won? Not everyone has settled these questions, and indeed most people have not settled them to this day. Then the defeatist advocates of national subjugation come forward and tell people: China will be subjugated, and final victory will not be China's. Certain impatient friends also come forward and tell people: China will win very soon, and there is no need to exert great effort. Are these arguments correct? We have always said they are not. But what we have said has not yet been understood by most people. This is partly because our propaganda and explanation have been insufficient, and partly because the development of objective events has not yet fully revealed its inherent nature and has not yet set its features clearly before people, so that they cannot see its whole trend and prospects and therefore cannot decide on their own complete set of policies and ways of acting. Now it is better: the experience of ten months of resistance is quite enough to smash the groundless theory of national subjugation, and quite enough to convince our impatient friends of the error of the theory of quick victory. In these circumstances many people ask for a summing-up explanation. This is especially so regarding protracted war, where there are the opposing views of the subjugationists and the advocates of quick victory, and also an understanding that is empty and without content. "Since the Lugouqiao Incident, 400 million people have exerted themselves together, and final victory will be China's." This formula circulates among broad masses of people. The formula is correct, but it needs to be given substance. The reasons why the War of Resistance and the united front have been able to persevere are many: all the parties and groups of the country, from the Communist Party to the Kuomintang; all the people of the country, from the workers and peasants to the bourgeoisie; all the armed forces of the country, from the main forces to the guerrilla units; internationally, from the socialist country to the justice-loving peoples of all countries; and on the enemy's side, from certain anti-war people at home to anti-war soldiers at the front. In short, all these factors have in our resistance exerted themselves in varying degrees. Every person of conscience should pay them respect. We Communists, together with the other parties engaged in the resistance and the people of the whole country, have only one direction, which is to strive to unite all forces and defeat the vicious Japanese bandits. July 1 of this year is the seventeenth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. So that every Communist may make a better and greater effort in the War of Resistance, there is also a need to study protracted war with emphasis. Therefore my lecture will study protracted war. I intend to touch on every problem connected with the subject of protracted war, but I cannot touch on everything, because not everything can be completely said in one lecture.

(2) All the experience of the ten months of resistance proves the error of two views: one is the theory that China is bound to be subjugated, the other is the theory of quick victory for China. The former produces a tendency to compromise, the latter produces a tendency to underrate the enemy. Both look at problems in a subjective and one-sided way; in a word, unscientifically.

(3) Before the war of resistance there were many arguments of the subjugation kind. For example it was said: "China's weapons are inferior to others', so she is bound to lose if she fights." "If China resists, she will certainly become another Abyssinia." After the war began, open subjugationism disappeared, but covertly it exists, and in large amounts. For example, an atmosphere of compromise rises and falls from time to time, and the ground of those who advocate compromise is "to fight on is to be subjugated." A student wrote a letter from Hunan saying: "In the countryside everything feels difficult. Doing propaganda work by myself, I can only talk to people wherever and whenever I find them. The people I speak to are not ignorant, benighted folk; they understand a little, and they are quite interested in what I say. But when I run into those relatives of mine, they always say: 'China can't win, she will be subjugated.' It is extremely annoying. Fortunately they do not go out and propagate it, otherwise it would be terrible. The peasants of course trust them more!" Subjugationists of this kind are the social basis of the tendency to compromise. People of this sort exist in every part of China, so the problem of compromise that may arise at any time in the resistance front will probably not disappear until the war ends. At this time, when Hsuchow has fallen and Wuhan is under tension, I think it is not without use to give this theory of subjugation a sharp rebuttal.

(4) In the ten months of resistance, various opinions that manifest impatience have also appeared. For example, at the beginning of the war many people had a groundless optimistic tendency; they underestimated Japan, and even thought that Japan could not fight her way into Shansi. Some people belittled the strategic position of guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance; they doubted the proposition that "taking the war as a whole, mobile warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary; taking the parts, guerrilla warfare is primary and mobile warfare supplementary." They did not approve of the strategic policy of the Eighth Route Army: "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions," and considered this a "mechanical" view. At the time of the Shanghai fighting some people said: "If we only fight for three months, the international situation will surely change, the Soviet Union will surely send troops, and the war can be settled." They pinned the prospects of the resistance mainly on foreign aid. After the victory at Taierchwang, some people maintained that the Hsuchow campaign should be a "semi-decisive battle," and said that the former policy of protracted war should be changed. They said such things as "This battle is the enemy's last struggle," and "If we win, the Japanese militarists will lose their footing spiritually and can only quietly await the Day of Judgement." One victory at Pinghsingkuan turned some people's heads; another victory at Taierchwang turned more people's heads. Then whether the enemy would attack Wuhan became a doubtful question. Many people thought: "Not necessarily"; many thought: "Certainly not." Such doubts can touch every important question. For example: is the strength for resistance sufficient? The answer might be affirmative, because the present strength already prevents the enemy from advancing further, so why add more strength? For example: is the slogan of consolidating and expanding the anti-Japanese national united front still correct? The answer might be negative, because the present state of the united front is already enough to drive back the enemy, so why consolidate and expand it? For example: should international diplomatic and propaganda work still be intensified? The answer might also be negative. For example: should we seriously carry out reform of the army system, reform of the political system, development of the mass movement, vigorous national defence education, suppression of traitors and Trotskyites, development of the war industry, improvement of the people's livelihood? For example: are the slogans of defending Wuhan, defending Canton, defending the Northwest and vigorously developing guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines still correct? All could be answered in the negative. Some people even, when the war situation takes a slight turn for the better, prepare to step up friction between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, turning their eyes from the outside to the inside. This situation arises after almost every fairly big victory or whenever the enemy's attack temporarily halts. All of the above we call political and military shortsightedness. These words sound as though they make sense, but in reality they are groundless, specious empty talk. Sweeping away such empty talk should be beneficial to waging the War of Resistance to victory.

(5) So the question is: will China be subjugated? Answer: No, she will not be subjugated; final victory will be China's. Can China win quickly? Answer: No, she cannot win quickly; the War of Resistance is a protracted war.

(6) The main points on these questions we indicated in general terms two years ago. As early as July 16, 1936, five months before the Sian Incident and twelve months before the Lugouqiao Incident, in a talk with the American journalist Mr. Snow, I had already made a general estimate of the situation in the Sino-Japanese war and put forward various policies for winning victory. For the sake of the record, it may be useful to copy out a few passages:

Under what conditions can China defeat and destroy the strength of Japanese imperialism? There must be three conditions: first, the completion of the anti-Japanese united front in China; second, the completion of the international anti-Japanese united front; third, the rise of the revolutionary movement of the people in Japan and of the Japanese colonies. From the standpoint of the Chinese people, the great unity of the Chinese people is the main one of the three conditions. How long do you think this war will last? It depends on the strength of China's anti-Japanese united front and on many other deciding factors in both China and Japan. That is to say, besides depending mainly on China's own strength, the aid given to China by other countries and the aid of the revolution in Japan are also very important. If China's anti-Japanese united front develops powerfully, and is effectively organized both horizontally and vertically, if the governments and peoples of the countries that recognize the threat of Japanese imperialism to their own interests give China the necessary aid, and if the revolution in Japan rises quickly, then this war will end quickly and China will win quickly. If these conditions cannot be realized soon, the war will be prolonged. But the result will be the same: Japan will certainly be defeated and China will certainly win. Only the sacrifices will be great, and there will be a very painful period to pass through. From the political and military point of view, how do you think the war will develop? Japan's continental policy has been fixed, and the view of those who think that compromising with Japan and sacrificing some more of China's territory and sovereignty can halt Japan's advance is only an illusion. We know for certain that even the lower Yangtze valley and the southern ports are already included in the continental policy of Japanese imperialism. Moreover, Japan also wants to occupy the Philippines, Siam, Vietnam, the Malay Peninsula and the Dutch East Indies, to cut off foreign countries from China and monopolize the southwest Pacific. That is Japan's maritime policy. At such a time China will no doubt be in an extremely difficult position. But most Chinese believe that these difficulties can be overcome; only the rich in the big commercial ports are defeatists, because they fear losing their property. Many people think that once the Chinese coast is blockaded by Japan, China will not be able to go on fighting. This is nonsense. To refute them we may cite the war history of the Red Army. In the War of Resistance, China's advantages are much greater than the Red Army's position in the civil war. China is a huge country; even if Japan could occupy areas with 100 to 200 million people, we should still be far from defeated. We would still have great strength to fight Japan, while Japan would constantly have to fight a defensive war in her rear throughout the war. The disunity and unevenness of China's economy is, on the contrary, advantageous to the War of Resistance. For example, cutting Shanghai off from the rest of China would by no means damage China as seriously as cutting New York off from the rest of the United States would damage the United States. Even if Japan blockades the Chinese coast, she cannot blockade China's northwest, southwest and west. So the central point of the problem is still the unity of the whole Chinese people to establish a nation-wide anti-Japanese front. This we put forward long ago. If the war drags on for a long time and Japan is not completely defeated, could the Communist Party agree to make peace and recognize Japanese rule in the Northeast? No. The Chinese Communist Party, like the whole people of the country, does not permit Japan to keep an inch of Chinese soil. In your view, what is the main strategic policy of this war of liberation? Our strategic policy should be to use our main forces to fight on a very long, shifting front. For the Chinese army to win, it must wage mobile warfare of a high degree over wide battlefields, advancing rapidly and withdrawing rapidly, concentrating rapidly and dispersing rapidly. This means large-scale mobile warfare, not positional warfare of deep trenches, high fortresses, defences in layer upon layer, relying solely on defence works. This does not mean abandoning all important military points; for these, positional warfare should be used wherever it is advantageous. But the strategic policy that turns the whole situation round must necessarily be mobile warfare. Positional warfare, though also necessary, is a secondary policy of an auxiliary nature. Geographically, the battlefield is so vast that we can carry out the most effective mobile warfare. When the Japanese army meets with our army's vigorous activity, it will have to be cautious. Their war machine is very cumbersome, slow in movement and limited in effect. If we concentrated our forces in a narrow position and offered resistance by attrition, we should lose our geographical and economic-organizational advantages and repeat the mistake of Abyssinia. In the first period of the war we must avoid all big decisive battles, and first use mobile warfare to wear down gradually the morale and fighting power of the enemy's army.

Besides using trained troops in mobile warfare, we must organize large numbers of guerrilla units among the peasants. It must be known that the anti-Japanese volunteers in the three northeastern provinces represent only a small part of the latent strength the peasants of the whole country can mobilize for resistance. The Chinese peasants have great latent strength; if properly organized and led, they can keep the Japanese army busy twenty-four hours a day and wear it out. It must be remembered that this war is fought in China, which means that the Japanese army will be entirely surrounded by hostile Chinese; the Japanese army will be forced to bring in the military supplies it needs and also guard them itself; it will have to use large forces to protect its lines of communication, always on guard against attack; and besides, it must keep a large part of its strength stationed in Manchuria and in Japan itself.

In the course of the war China can capture many Japanese soldiers and seize many weapons and much ammunition to arm herself; at the same time, by winning foreign aid, she can gradually strengthen the equipment of the Chinese army. Therefore China will be able in the later period of the war to engage in positional warfare and make positional attacks on the Japanese-occupied areas. Thus, under the long attrition of China's resistance, Japan's economy will be on the verge of collapse; amid countless battles her morale will be on the verge of decline. On China's side, the latent strength of resistance will surge higher day by day, and large numbers of revolutionary masses will keep pouring to the front to fight for freedom. All these factors, together with others, will enable us to make the final, fatal attacks on the fortresses and bases in the Japanese-occupied areas and drive the Japanese aggressor army out of China. (Snow: Red Star Over China)

The experience of ten months of resistance proves the correctness of the above points and will continue to prove it.

(7) As early as a little over a month after the Lugouqiao Incident, on August 25, 1937, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party stated clearly in its "Decision on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party":

The provocation at Lugouqiao and the occupation of Peiping and Tientsin are only the beginning of the Japanese bandits' large-scale attack on China proper. The Japanese bandits have already begun nation-wide war mobilization. Their propaganda of "not seeking to widen the conflict" is merely a smokescreen covering their attack.

The resistance at Lugouqiao on July 7 has become the starting point of nation-wide resistance in China.

China's political situation has from this time entered a new stage, the stage of actually carrying out resistance. The stage of preparation for resistance has passed. The most central task of this stage is: to mobilize all forces to win victory in the war of resistance.

The central key to winning victory in the war of resistance lies in developing the resistance already begun into a comprehensive, whole-nation resistance. Only such a comprehensive, whole-nation resistance can win final victory.

Because the present resistance still has serious weaknesses, in the course of the future resistance there may occur many unfavourable developments such as setbacks, retreats, internal splits, betrayals, and temporary and partial compromises. Therefore it should be seen that this resistance is an arduous protracted war. But we believe that the resistance already begun will, through the efforts of our Party and the whole people, break through all obstacles and continue to advance and develop.

The experience of ten months of resistance likewise proves the correctness of the above points and will continue to prove it.

(8) The tendencies of idealism and mechanism in questions of war are the epistemological root of all erroneous views. They look at problems in a subjective and one-sided way. Either they talk in a purely subjective way without any basis; or, basing themselves only on one side of a problem or its manifestation at one moment, they likewise subjectively exaggerate it and treat it as the whole. But people's erroneous views may be divided into two kinds: one is fundamental error, consistent in character, which is hard to correct; the other is accidental error, temporary in character, which is easy to correct. But since both are errors, both need to be corrected. Therefore, only by opposing the tendencies of idealism and mechanism in questions of war, and by adopting the objective and all-sided view in examining war, can correct conclusions on the questions of war be reached.

The Basis of the Problem

(9) Why is the War of Resistance a protracted war? Why will final victory be China's? What is the basis?

The Sino-Japanese war is not any other war; it is a life-and-death war between semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and imperialist Japan, fought in the 1930s of the twentieth century. Here lies the basis of the whole problem. Taking them separately, the two sides in the war have the following mutually opposed characteristics.

(10) On the Japanese side: first, she is a powerful imperialist country, whose military, economic and political-organizational strength is first-rate in the East and is among the strength of the five or six famous imperialist countries of the world. This is the basic condition of Japan's war of aggression; the inevitability of the war and the impossibility of China's quick victory rest on the imperialist system of this Japanese state and on her strong military, economic and political-organizational power. But second, because of the imperialist character of Japan's social economy, there arises the imperialist character of Japan's war, which is retrogressive and barbarous. Japanese imperialism, having reached the 1930s, because of its internal and external contradictions, has been not only compelled to wage an adventurist war on an unprecedented scale, but has been brought to the eve of its final collapse. In terms of social development, Japan is no longer a flourishing country; the war cannot bring about the prosperity that Japan's ruling class hopes for, but will bring about the opposite of what it hopes for, namely the death of Japanese imperialism. This is what is meant by the retrogressiveness of Japan's war. Together with this retrogressiveness, and the further characteristic that Japan is an imperialism with a military-feudal character, there arises the special barbarity of her war. This will arouse to the greatest degree the class antagonisms within Japan, the antagonism between the Japanese nation and the Chinese nation, and the antagonism between Japan and the majority of the countries of the world. The retrogressiveness and barbarity of Japan's war are the main basis for its inevitable defeat. And that is not all; third, although Japan's war is waged on the basis of her strong military, economic and political-organizational power, it is at the same time waged on a basis of inherent insufficiency. Japan's military, economic and political-organizational power is strong, but these powers are insufficient in quantity. Japan is comparatively small, and is short of manpower, military strength, finance and material resources, and cannot stand a long war. Japan's rulers hope to solve this difficult problem through war, but equally they will reach the opposite of what they hope for; that is to say, they launched the war to solve this difficult problem, and the result will be that war will increase their difficulties, and war will consume even what Japan originally had. Finally, fourth, although Japan can get the support of the international fascist countries, at the same time she cannot but meet with an international opposition that exceeds the strength of her international support. This latter force will gradually grow, and in the end not only will it offset the former's support, but it will bring its pressure to bear on Japan herself. This is the law that an unjust cause finds little support, and it arises from the very nature of Japan's war. To sum up, Japan's strong point is the strength of her war power, and her weak points are the retrogressive and barbarous nature of her war, the insufficiency of her manpower and material resources, and the paucity of international support. These are the characteristics on the Japanese side.

(11) On the Chinese side: first, we are a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. From the Opium War, the Taiping Revolution, the Reform Movement of 1898, the Revolution of 1911, right up to the Northern Expedition, all the revolutionary or reformist movements to get rid of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal status met with serious setbacks, and so this semi-colonial and semi-feudal status has been retained. We are still a weak country, and in military, economic and political-organizational strength we show ourselves inferior to the enemy. The inevitability of the war and the impossibility of China's quick victory also have their basis here. But second, the liberation movement of the Chinese people over the past hundred years, accumulated down to today, is different from that of any historical period. The various opposing forces, internal and external, have dealt the liberation movement serious setbacks, but at the same time they have steeled the Chinese people. Although China's military, economic, political and cultural strength today is not so great as Japan's, yet compared within China herself, there are factors more progressive than in any historical period. The Chinese Communist Party and the army under its leadership are the representatives of this progressive factor. China's liberation war today has, on this progressive basis, gained the possibility of protracted war and final victory. China is a country like the sun rising, in exactly the opposite contrast to the declining state of Japanese imperialism. China's war is progressive, and from this progressiveness arises the justice of China's war. Because this war is just, it can arouse the unity of the whole country, arouse the sympathy of the people of the enemy country, and win the support of most countries of the world. Third, China is also a very large country, vast in territory, rich in resources, large in population and large in numbers of soldiers, and can sustain a long war; this too is a contrast with Japan. Finally, fourth, the broad international support that arises from the progressiveness and justice of China's war stands in precise contrast to Japan's lack of support for an unjust cause. To sum up, China's weak point is the weakness of her war power, and her strong points are the progressiveness and justice of the nature of her war, her being a big country, and the abundance of international support. These are the characteristics of China.

(12) Seen thus, Japan's military, economic and political-organizational strength is great, but her war is retrogressive and barbarous, her manpower and material resources are insufficient, and the international situation is unfavourable to her. China, on the contrary, is comparatively weak in military, economic and political-organizational strength, but she is in an age of progress, her war is progressive and just, she has the condition of being a big country sufficient to sustain a protracted war, and most countries of the world will aid China. — These are the basic mutually contradictory characteristics of the Sino-Japanese war. These characteristics determined and are determining all the political policies and military strategy and tactics of both sides, and determined and are determining the protractedness of the war and the final victory of China rather than Japan. The war is a contest of these characteristics. In the course of the war each of them will change in accordance with its nature, and everything will arise from this. These characteristics exist in fact, are not fabricated to deceive; they are the whole of the basic elements of the war, not mutilated fragments; they run through all big and small questions on both sides and all stages of operations, and are not dispensable. In observing the Sino-Japanese war, if one forgets these characteristics one is bound to go wrong; and even if certain opinions are believed for a time and seem not wrong, the course of the war will prove them wrong. We shall now base ourselves on these characteristics to explain all the questions we want to explain.

Refuting the Theory of National Subjugation

(13) The subjugationists, seeing only one factor, the comparison of enemy and our strength, formerly said "resistance means subjugation," and now say "to fight on is to be subjugated." If we merely say that although the enemy is strong he is a small country, and although China is weak she is a big country, that is not enough to convince them. They can bring up the historical evidence of the Yuan dynasty's destruction of the Sung and the Ching dynasty's destruction of the Ming to prove that a small but strong country can destroy a large but weak one, and that the backward can destroy the progressive. If we say that this was in ancient times and is not a basis, they can bring up the fact of Britain's destruction of India to prove that a small and strong capitalist country can destroy a large and weak backward country. So other grounds must be put forward in order to shut the mouths of all subjugationists and convince them, and to give all those engaged in propaganda work sufficient arguments to persuade those who are still unclear and still unsteady, and to consolidate their confidence in resistance.

(14) What are these grounds that should be put forward? They are the characteristics of the epoch. The concrete reflection of this characteristic is Japan's retrogression and lack of support, and China's progress and abundance of support.

(15) Our war is not any other war; it is the war between China and Japan in the 1930s. On the side of our enemy, first, she is an imperialism near death, already in an age of retrogression, not only different from the time of Britain's destruction of India, when Britain was still in the progressive age of capitalism, but different even from Japan herself at the time of the First World War twenty years ago. This war is launched on the eve of the great collapse of world imperialism, first of all of the fascist countries, and the enemy launches this adventurist war, with its character of a last struggle, precisely for this reason. Therefore the result of the war will be the destruction not of China but of the ruling clique of Japanese imperialism; this is an inescapable necessity. Furthermore, when Japan wages war, it is a time when countries all over the world have either already encountered war or are about to encounter it, and everyone is or is preparing to fight against barbarous aggression, and the country China is bound up with the interests of the majority of countries and peoples of the world. This is the source of the opposition from the majority of countries and peoples of the world which Japan has already aroused and will deepen.

(16) And China's side? It cannot be compared with any other historical period. Semi-colonial and semi-feudal society is her characteristic, and therefore she is called a weak country. But at the same time she is in a progressive age of history, and this is the main basis on which she can defeat Japan. When we say the War of Resistance is progressive, we do not mean progress in the ordinary general sense, not the sort of progress of Abyssinia's war of resistance against Italy, nor the sort of progress of the Taiping Revolution or the Revolution of 1911, but the progress of China today. Where does the progress of China today lie? It lies in the fact that she is no longer a completely feudal country, that she has capitalism, that she has a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, that she has the broad masses of people who are awakened or awakening, that she has the Communist Party, that she has a politically progressive army, namely the Chinese Red Army led by the Communist Party, and that she has decades of revolutionary traditional experience, especially the seventeen years of experience since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. This experience has educated the Chinese people and educated the Chinese parties, and today it happens to serve as the basis for unity in resistance to Japan. If it can be said that in Russia there would have been no victory in 1917 without the experience of 1905, then we too can say that without the experience of these seventeen years there would be no victory in the resistance to Japan. These are the domestic conditions.

The international conditions make China not isolated in the war, and this too is without precedent in history. In history, whether China's wars or India's wars, they were isolated. Only today do we meet the unprecedentedly broad and unprecedentedly deep people's movement that has arisen or is arising in the world, and its aid to China. The Russian revolution of 1917 also met with world support, and the Russian workers and peasants won because of it, but the scale of that support was not so broad as today's, nor was its nature so deep. Today's people's movement in the world is developing on an unprecedented scale and with unprecedented depth. The existence of the Soviet Union is an even more important factor in international politics today; it will certainly aid China with the greatest enthusiasm, a phenomenon that did not exist at all twenty years ago. All this has created and is creating the important conditions indispensable for China's final victory. Large-scale direct aid is not yet there at present and awaits the future, but China, with the conditions of progress and of being a big country, can prolong the time of the war and hasten and await international aid.

(17) Add to this the condition that Japan is a small country, small in territory, poor in resources, small in population and small in numbers of soldiers, while China is a big country, vast in territory, rich in resources, large in population and large in numbers of soldiers; so besides the comparison of strong and weak there is also the contrast of small country, retrogression, lack of support versus big country, progress, abundance of support, and this is the basis on which China will never be subjugated. The comparison of strong and weak determines that Japan can run rampant in China for a certain period and to a certain extent, that China must inevitably travel a hard stretch of road, and that the War of Resistance is a protracted war and not a quick-decision war; but the contrast of small country, retrogression, lack of support versus big country, progress, abundance of support determines that Japan cannot run rampant to the end, that she will inevitably meet final defeat, that China will never be subjugated and will inevitably win final victory.

(18) Why was Abyssinia subjugated? First, she was not only a weak country but a small one. Second, she was not so progressive as China; she was an ancient country passing from slavery to serfdom, without capitalism, without bourgeois parties, much less a Communist Party, without an army like China's, much less an army like the Eighth Route Army. Third, she could not wait for international aid, and her war was isolated. Fourth, and this is the main point, there were errors in the leadership of the resistance to Italy. Abyssinia was subjugated for these reasons. Yet in Abyssinia there is still a fairly extensive guerrilla war, and if it can be kept up, it will be possible to use it to recover the homeland in the changes to come in the world.

(19) If the subjugationists bring up the history of failure of China's modern liberation movements to prove that "resistance means subjugation" and "to fight on is to be subjugated," our answer is also in one phrase: the times are different. China herself, the interior of Japan, and the international environment are all different from the past. Japan is stronger than in the past, while China's semi-colonial and semi-feudal status is still unchanged and her strength is still rather weak; this is a serious situation. Japan can for the time being still control her own people, and can still use the contradictions among the countries of the world as a tool in her invasion of China; these are facts. But in the course of a long war, changes of the opposite kind are bound to occur. This is not yet fact, but it will inevitably become fact in the future. This the subjugationists cast aside and ignore. And China? Not only does she now have new men, new parties, a new army and a new anti-Japanese policy, greatly different from more than ten years ago, but all these will inevitably go forward and develop. Although the liberation movements of history repeatedly suffered setbacks, so that China was unable to accumulate greater strength to use in today's War of Resistance — a profoundly regrettable lesson of history, so that from now on we must never again destroy any revolutionary force ourselves — still, on the existing basis, adding great efforts, we can certainly advance step by step and strengthen the power of resistance. The great anti-Japanese national united front is the general direction of such efforts. As regards international aid, although large-scale direct aid cannot be seen for the moment, the international situation is fundamentally different from the past, and large-scale and direct aid is in the making. The innumerable failures of China's modern liberation movements each had its objective and subjective causes, and none can be compared with today's situation. Today, although there are many difficult conditions which determine that the War of Resistance is a hard war, such as the strength of the enemy and our weakness, the fact that the enemy's difficulties have only just begun and our progress is still far from enough, and so on, yet the favourable conditions for defeating the enemy are many, and we need only add subjective effort to overcome the difficulties and win victory. In history there has never been a time whose favourable conditions can be compared with today's, and this is the reason why the War of Resistance will certainly not end in failure like the liberation movements of history.

Compromise or Resistance? Corruption or Progress?

(20) The groundlessness of the theory of subjugation is as stated above. But there are many other people who are not subjugationists; they are patriots who nevertheless harbour deep anxiety about the situation. They have two problems: one is fear of compromise with Japan, the other is doubt whether politics can improve. These two worrying problems are discussed among broad numbers of people without a base from which to find a solution. We shall now examine these two problems.

(21) It was said before that the problem of compromise has its social roots, and as long as these social roots exist the problem of compromise will not fail to arise. But compromise will not succeed. To prove this we must still look for grounds on three sides: Japan, China and the international scene. First, the Japanese side. Right at the beginning of the war we estimated that a time would come when an atmosphere of compromise would be brewed, namely after the enemy occupied North China and Kiangsu and Chekiang, when he might resort to means of inducing surrender. Later this move did indeed come; but the crisis soon passed, one reason being that the enemy adopted a general policy of barbarity and carried out open plunder. If China surrendered, everyone would become a slave of a lost country. This plundering policy of the enemy, the policy of destroying China, has material and spiritual sides, and both are applied generally to the Chinese; not only to the lower masses, but to the upper elements — of course somewhat more politely to the latter, but there is only a difference of degree and no difference in principle. By and large the enemy is transplanting to the interior his old methods of the three Northeastern Provinces. Materially, he plunders the ordinary people of their food and clothing, making the broad masses cry from hunger and cold; he plunders the means of production, so that China's national industry is ruined and enslaved. Spiritually, he destroys the national consciousness of the Chinese people. Under the rising sun flag every Chinese can only be an obedient subject, a beast of burden, and is not allowed the least trace of Chinese spirit. This barbarous policy of the enemy will be applied still deeper into the interior. His appetite is large and he does not wish to stop the war. The policy declared by the Japanese cabinet on January 16, 1938 is still firmly carried out, and he cannot but carry it out, which has enraged the Chinese of every stratum. This arises from the retrogressiveness and barbarity of the enemy's war; "there is no escaping the calamity," and so an absolute enmity is formed. We estimate that at a certain time the enemy's means of inducing surrender will appear again, certain subjugationists will begin to wriggle again, and it is hard to avoid their colluding with certain international elements (there are such people inside Britain, the United States and France, especially upper-class elements in Britain), conspiring together in evil. But the general trend is such that it cannot be made to surrender; the firmness and special barbarity of Japan's war determine one side of this question.

(22) Second, the Chinese side. There are three factors for China's persevering in resistance. One, the Communist Party, which is the reliable force leading the people in resistance to Japan. Another, the Kuomintang, which, because it relies on Britain and the United States, will not surrender if Britain and the United States do not tell it to surrender. Another, the other parties, most of which oppose compromise and uphold resistance. These three unite with one another, and whoever compromises stands on the side of the traitors and is condemned by everyone. All who are unwilling to be traitors cannot but unite and persevere in resistance to the end, and compromise in practice is hard to bring off.

(23) Third, the international side. Apart from Japan's allies and certain elements among the upper strata of the capitalist countries, the others are not favourable to China's compromise but favourable to China's resistance. This factor affects China's hope. Today the people of the whole country have a hope that international forces will certainly aid China with growing strength. This hope is not empty; in particular the existence of the Soviet Union inspires China's resistance. The unprecedentedly powerful socialist Soviet Union has always shared weal and woe with China. The Soviet Union is fundamentally the opposite of the profit-seeking upper-stratum elements of all the capitalist countries; it takes as its mission aiding all weak and small nations and revolutionary wars. The non-isolation of China's war rests not only generally on the aid of the whole international community, but particularly on the aid of the Soviet Union. China and the Soviet Union are geographically close, which increases Japan's danger and facilitates China's resistance. The geographical closeness of China and Japan increases the difficulty of China's resistance. But the geographical closeness of China and the Soviet Union is a favourable condition for China's resistance.

(24) From this a conclusion can be drawn: the danger of compromise exists, but it can be overcome. Because even if the enemy's policy can be changed to a certain extent, a fundamental change is impossible. Inside China there are social roots of compromise, but those opposing compromise are the majority. Among the international forces a part also favour compromise, but the main forces favour resistance. When these three factors are combined, the danger of compromise can be overcome and resistance persevered in to the end.

(25) Now to answer the second question. The improvement of domestic politics cannot be separated from persevering in resistance. The more politics improves, the more resistance can be persevered in; the more resistance is persevered in, the more politics can improve. But basically it depends on persevering in resistance. Bad phenomena in all aspects of the Kuomintang exist seriously, and the historical accumulation of these irrational factors has caused great anxiety and distress among broad numbers of patriots. But the experience of resistance has already shown that the progress of the Chinese people in ten months is worth that of how many years in the past, and there is no ground for pessimism. The corrupt phenomena accumulated by history, although they seriously obstruct the speed of growth of the people's resisting strength, reduce the victories of the war and invite losses in the war, yet the general situation in China, Japan and the world does not permit the Chinese people not to progress. Because of the existence of the factors obstructing progress, that is the corrupt phenomena, this progress is slow. Progress and the slowness of progress are the two characteristics of the present situation, and the latter does not at all match the urgent demands of the war; this is what makes patriots so worried. But we are in a revolutionary war, and revolutionary war is an antitoxin, which will not only eliminate the enemy's poison but also cleanse our own filth. Every just revolutionary war is very powerful; it can transform many things, or open the way to transforming things. The Sino-Japanese war will transform both China and Japan; so long as China persists in resistance and in the united front, she will surely be able to turn old Japan into a new Japan and old China into a new China, and the people and things in both China and Japan will be transformed during and after this war. It is proper that we look at resistance and national reconstruction in connection. To say that Japan can also be transformed means that the aggressive war of Japan's rulers will end in defeat, and there is the possibility of arousing a revolution of the Japanese people. The day of the victory of the revolution of the Japanese people will be the time of Japan's transformation. This is closely linked with China's resistance, and this prospect should be seen.

The Theory of National Subjugation Is Wrong, and So Is the Theory of Quick Victory

(26) We have made a comparative study of the basic contradictory characteristics between the enemy and ourselves — strong and weak, large and small, progressive and retrogressive, abundant and scant support — have refuted the theory of subjugation, and have answered why compromise is not easy and why politics can progress. The subjugationists take the one contradiction of strong and weak seriously and exaggerate it into the argument for the whole problem, while neglecting the other contradictions. Their mention only of the comparison of strong and weak is their one-sidedness; their exaggerating this one-sided thing and regarding it as the whole is their subjectivity. So taken as a whole they have no basis and are wrong. As for those who are not subjugationists and not consistent pessimists, but are merely bewildered for a time by the strength or weakness of the situation between enemy and us at a given moment and in a given part, or by corrupt phenomena at home, and so fall for a time into a pessimistic frame of mind, we must also point out to them that the source of their view is likewise a tendency to one-sidedness and subjectivity. But they are easier to correct; they will understand with just a reminder, because they are patriots and their errors are temporary.

(27) But the advocates of quick victory are also wrong. Either they fundamentally forget the contradiction of strong and weak and remember only the other contradictions; or they exaggerate China's strong points to the point of departing from the real situation and turning them into something else; or they take the strong-weak phenomenon at one time and place for the strong-weak phenomenon in the whole, a leaf before the eye hiding Mount Tai, and think themselves right. In short, they lack the courage to acknowledge the fact that the enemy is strong and we are weak. They often obliterate this, and so obliterate one side of the truth. They also lack the courage to acknowledge the limitations of their own strong points, and so obliterate another side of the truth. From this they commit errors big or small; here too subjectivity and one-sidedness are at work. The hearts of these friends are good, and they too are patriots. But "the Master's aim is indeed great," yet the Master's view is wrong, and acting on it will certainly meet with a wall. Because the estimate does not accord with the true state of things, action cannot attain its aim; if one forces it through, the army is defeated and the country subjugated, and the result is no different from that of the defeatists. So this too is unacceptable.

(28) Do we deny the danger of subjugation? We do not. We recognize that before China lie two possible futures, liberation and subjugation, and the two are in fierce struggle. Our task is to realize liberation and avoid subjugation. The condition for realizing liberation is basically China's progress, together with the enemy's difficulties and the world's aid. We differ from the subjugationists: we recognize, objectively and all-sidedly, that both the possibilities of subjugation and liberation exist at the same time, emphasize that the possibility of liberation is predominant and the conditions for attaining liberation, and strive to win those conditions. The subjugationists, subjectively and one-sidedly, recognize only the one possibility of subjugation, deny the possibility of liberation, let alone point out the conditions for liberation and strive to win them. We also recognize the tendency to compromise and the corrupt phenomena, but we also see other tendencies and other phenomena, and point out that of the two the latter will gradually gain predominance over the former, that the two are struggling fiercely, and point out the conditions for the realization of the latter, striving to overcome the tendency to compromise and to change the corrupt phenomena. Therefore we are not pessimistic, while the pessimists are the opposite.

(29) Nor do we dislike quick victory; everyone would approve of driving out the "devils" tomorrow morning. But we point out that without certain conditions quick victory exists only in the head and does not exist objectively; it is only fancy and false reasoning. Therefore we estimate objectively and all-sidedly all the circumstances of enemy and ourselves, point out that only strategic protracted war is the sole road to final victory, and reject the groundless theory of quick victory. We advocate striving for all the conditions necessary to win final victory; the more conditions are met by one degree, and the earlier by one day, the more certain victory is by one degree, and the earlier the time of victory by one day. We hold that only so can the course of the war be shortened, and we reject the theory of quick victory that covets cheap gains and loves empty talk.

Why a Protracted War?

(30) Now let us study the question of protracted war. The question "why a protracted war?" can be correctly answered only on the basis of all the basic factors in the comparison of enemy and ourselves. For example, to say merely that the enemy is an imperialist strong country and we are a semi-colonial and semi-feudal weak country is to risk falling into the theory of subjugation. For a weak country simply fighting a strong one cannot, in theory or in practice, produce a protracted result. The same is so of large or small alone, or progressive or retrogressive alone, or abundant or scant support alone. Large annexing small and small annexing large are common occurrences. A progressive country or thing, if not strong in power, is often destroyed by a large and retrogressive country or thing. Abundance or scarcity of support is an important factor, but it is an accessory one, and the extent of its effect depends on the basic factors of the two sides themselves. Therefore when we say that the War of Resistance is a protracted war, it is a conclusion arising from the interrelation of all the factors of enemy and ourselves. The enemy is strong and we are weak, and we are in danger of subjugation. But the enemy has other shortcomings and we have other advantages. The enemy's advantages can be weakened by our efforts, and his shortcomings can also be enlarged by our efforts. On our side it is the reverse: our advantages can be strengthened by our efforts, and our shortcomings overcome by our efforts. Therefore we can win final victory and avoid subjugation, while the enemy will meet final defeat and cannot avoid the collapse of the whole imperialist system.

(31) Since the enemy has only one advantage and all the rest are shortcomings, and we have only one shortcoming and all the rest are advantages, why can no balanced result be reached, and why instead has the present superiority of the enemy and inferiority of ours come about? Obviously one cannot look at the question so formally. The matter is that the degree of difference between enemy and us in strength at present is too great; the enemy's shortcomings have not yet developed, and cannot develop for the time being, to the degree necessary to reduce his strong factors, and our advantages have not yet developed, and cannot for the time being develop, to the degree necessary to make up for our weak factors; so balance cannot appear, and what appears is imbalance.

(32) The enemy is strong and we are weak, the enemy is superior and we are inferior. This situation, although it has changed somewhat through our efforts to persevere in resistance and in the united front, has not yet undergone a fundamental change. Therefore, at a certain stage of the war, the enemy can win a certain degree of victory, and we will suffer a certain degree of defeat. But why are both sides limited to a certain degree of victory or defeat within this certain stage, unable to exceed it and reach complete victory or complete defeat? Because, first, the original condition of the enemy's being strong and ours weak is relative and not absolute; second, our efforts to persevere in resistance and in the united front further bring about this relative situation. Take the original condition: although the enemy is strong, his strength has been reduced by other unfavourable factors, but it has not yet been reduced to the degree necessary to destroy his superiority; although we are weak, our weakness has been supplemented by other favourable factors, but not yet to the degree necessary to change our inferiority. Thus the enemy is relatively strong and we are relatively weak; the enemy is relatively superior and we are relatively inferior. The strength and weakness, superiority and inferiority of both sides were originally not absolute, and in addition our efforts during the war to persevere in resistance and in the united front have further changed the original situation of strength and weakness, superiority and inferiority between enemy and us, so that enemy and we are limited to victory or defeat of a certain degree within a certain stage, creating the situation of protracted war.

(33) But the situation keeps changing. During the war, so long as we can employ correct military and political tactics, make no mistakes of principle, and exert our best efforts, the enemy's unfavourable factors and our favourable factors will both develop as the war goes on, and will certainly continue to change the original degree of strength and weakness between enemy and us, and to change continually the situation of superiority and inferiority. On reaching a new stage there will occur big changes in the degree of strength and weakness and in the situation of superiority and inferiority, leading to the result of the enemy's defeat and our victory.

(34) At present the enemy can still barely use his strong factors, and our resistance has not yet basically weakened him. The factors of his insufficient manpower and material resources are not yet enough to stop his advance; on the contrary they are still enough to sustain his advance to a certain degree. The factors that intensify class antagonism in his own country and the resistance of the Chinese nation, namely the retrogressiveness and barbarity of the war, have not yet created conditions fundamentally hampering his advance. The factor of the enemy's international isolation is also in process of change and development and has not yet reached complete isolation. Munitions capitalists and war-material capitalists in many countries that express support for us are still supplying Japan with large quantities of war materials in their pursuit of profit, and their governments are still unwilling to apply practical sanctions against Japan together with the Soviet Union. All this determines that our resistance cannot win quickly but can only be a protracted war. On China's side, the weak factors, shown in military, economic, political and cultural respects, although they have made a certain degree of progress in ten months of resistance, are still very far from the degree necessary to stop the enemy's advance and prepare for our counter-offensive. Moreover in the quantitative respect, there has had to be some weakening. Our various favourable factors, though all playing a positive role, need tremendous efforts yet to reach the degree sufficient to halt the enemy's advance and prepare our counter-offensive. At home, overcoming corrupt phenomena and increasing the speed of progress, abroad, overcoming the forces helping Japan and increasing the forces against Japan, are not yet present realities. All this again determines that the war cannot be won quickly but can only be a protracted war.

The Three Stages of the Protracted War

(35) Since the Sino-Japanese war is a protracted war and final victory will belong to China, it is reasonable to suppose that this protracted war will concretely manifest itself in three stages. The first stage is the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage is the period of the enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage is the period of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat. The concrete circumstances of the three stages cannot be foretold, but judging by present conditions, certain major points in the trend of the war can be indicated. The course of objective reality will be exceedingly rich and full of twists and turns, and no one can produce an "almanac" of the Sino-Japanese war; but sketching an outline of the trend of the war is necessary for strategic direction. Therefore, although what is sketched cannot entirely fit future facts and will be corrected by facts, sketching an outline is still needed for the sake of firmly and purposefully conducting the strategic direction of protracted war.

(36) The first stage has not yet ended. The enemy's intention is to capture the three points Canton, Wuhan and Lanchow, and link the three points together. To achieve this aim the enemy must put in at least fifty divisions, about one and a half million men, take a year and a half to two years, and spend over ten thousand million yen. For the enemy to penetrate so deep, the difficulties are extremely great and the consequences would be beyond imagining. As for completely occupying the Canton-Hankow Railway and the Sian-Lanchow highway, he will go through extremely dangerous fighting and may not be able to carry out his intention fully. But our operational plans should take as a basis the possibility that the enemy may occupy the three points and even some parts of areas beyond the three points and may link them up, and deploy for protracted war, so that even if the enemy does so we have the means to deal with it. The form of war we adopt in this stage is mainly mobile warfare, supplemented by guerrilla warfare and positional warfare. Positional warfare, although in the first period of this stage it was placed in the main position because of the subjective errors of the Kuomintang military authorities, is still supplementary when the whole stage is viewed. In this stage China has formed a broad united front and achieved unprecedented unity. Although the enemy has already used and will use the despicable means of inducing surrender, trying without great effort to realize his quick-decision plan and to conquer the whole of China, those of the past have failed and those of the future will also hardly succeed. In this stage, although China has suffered considerable losses, at the same time she has made considerable progress, and this progress becomes the main basis for continuing resistance in the second stage. In this stage the Soviet Union has already given our country large amounts of aid. On the enemy's side, morale has begun to show decline; the keenness of the enemy's army in the attack was less in the middle period of this stage than in the beginning, and will be still less at the end. The enemy's finances and economy have begun to show signs of exhaustion, war-weariness among the people and soldiers has begun to appear, "war distress" has begun to show inside the group directing the war, and pessimism about the prospects of the war is growing.

(37) The second stage can be called the stage of strategic stalemate. At the end of the first stage, because of the enemy's insufficient strength and our firm resistance, the enemy will have to decide on a terminal point of his strategic offensive within certain limits, and after reaching this point he will stop his strategic offensive and enter the stage of safeguarding his occupied areas. In this stage the enemy's intention is to safeguard his occupied areas, to hold them as his own by the deceptive method of organizing puppet governments, and to extract as much as possible from the Chinese people, but in front of him he meets stubborn guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare, taking advantage of the emptiness behind the enemy lines, will in the first stage have a general development, establish many bases, and basically threaten the enemy's safeguarding of his occupied areas, so in the second stage there will still be extensive fighting. In this stage the form of operations on our side is mainly guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare. China will still be able to keep large numbers of regular troops, but because on one hand the enemy takes the strategic defensive in the large cities and main roads that he occupies, and on the other hand China's technical conditions cannot for the time being be completed, it will still be difficult to launch a strategic counter-offensive immediately. Apart from the forces on the frontal defence, our army will go in large numbers behind the enemy lines, deploy comparatively dispersed, rely on all the areas not occupied by the enemy, and in coordination with the armed people, wage extensive and fierce guerrilla warfare on the enemy's occupied areas, and as far as possible lure the enemy into mobile warfare to destroy him, as in the present example of Shansi. The war of this stage is cruel, and the localities will suffer serious destruction. But guerrilla warfare can win, and if well done may enable the enemy to hold only about one third of his occupied area, while about two thirds remains ours; this will be a great defeat for the enemy and a great victory for China. Then, the whole of the enemy-occupied area will be divided into three kinds of areas: the first the enemy's base areas, the second the guerrilla base areas, the third the guerrilla zones contested by both sides. The length of time of this stage depends on how the strength of enemy and ourselves increases or decreases and changes, and on how the international situation changes; in general we must prepare to give it a rather long time, and must endure this hard stretch of road. This will be a very painful period for China, with economic difficulties and the disruption by traitors as two great problems. The enemy will go all out in activities to wreck China's united front, and all the traitor organizations in the enemy-occupied areas will merge and form a so-called "unified government." Within our ranks, because of the loss of the big cities and the difficulties of the war, vacillating elements will loudly advocate compromise, and pessimism will grow seriously. Our task at this time is to mobilize the masses of the whole country, to persevere in the war with one heart and one mind and without the slightest wavering, to expand and consolidate the united front, to eliminate all pessimism and compromise, to advocate hard struggle, to carry out new wartime policies, and to endure this hard stretch of road. In this stage the whole country must be called upon resolutely to maintain a unified government and oppose splitting, to strengthen operational technique according to plan, to reform the army, to mobilize the whole people, and to prepare for the counter-offensive. In this stage the international situation will change to be still more unfavourable to Japan; although a "realist" turn of the Chamberlain type that accommodates the so-called "accomplished facts" may appear, the main international forces will change to give China further aid. Japan's threat to the South Seas and to Siberia will be more serious than in the past, and may even lead to the outbreak of new wars. On the enemy's side, the several tens of divisions bogged down in the Chinese quagmire cannot be extracted. Extensive guerrilla warfare and the people's anti-Japanese movement will wear out this large body of Japanese troops, on one hand consuming them in great numbers, and on the other hand further increasing their psychology of homesickness and war-weariness up to anti-war feeling, thus disintegrating this army spiritually. Although it cannot be said that Japan's plunder in China can absolutely achieve nothing, since Japan lacks capital and is hampered by guerrilla warfare, rapid and large achievements are impossible. This second stage is the transitional stage of the whole war, and will also be the most difficult period, but it is the pivot of the change. Whether China becomes an independent country or sinks into a colony is decided not by whether the big cities are lost in the first stage, but by the degree of effort of the whole nation in the second stage. If we can persevere in resistance, in the united front and in protracted war, China will in this stage gain the strength to turn from weak to strong. Of the three acts of the drama of China's resistance, this is the second act. Through the efforts of all the actors, the most brilliant final act can be well performed.

(38) The third stage is the stage of counter-offensive to recover lost territory. Recovering lost territory depends mainly on the strength that China herself prepared in the preceding stage and continues to grow in this stage. But one's own strength alone is still not enough; we must also rely on the aid of international forces and of changes inside the enemy country, otherwise we cannot win, and so this increases the tasks of China's international propaganda and diplomatic work. In this stage the war is no longer strategic defensive but will become strategic counter-offensive, and in appearance will manifest itself as strategic offensive; it is no longer strategic interior lines but will gradually become strategic exterior lines. Only on reaching the banks of the Yalu River will this war be considered ended. The third stage is the last stage of the protracted war, and what is meant by persevering in the war to the end is to go through the whole of this stage. The main form of war we adopt in this stage will still be mobile warfare, but positional warfare will rise to an important position. If it can be said that positional defence in the first stage could not be regarded as important, because of the conditions of the time, then positional attack in the third stage will become quite important, owing to the change of conditions and the needs of the tasks. Guerrilla warfare in this stage will still supplement mobile and positional warfare and play its role of strategic coordination, unlike the second stage, where it becomes the main form.

(39) Seen thus, the long duration of the war and the cruelty that goes with it are plain. The enemy cannot swallow China whole, but he can occupy many places in China for a considerably long time. China also cannot quickly drive Japan out, but the greater part of the land will still be China's. In the end the enemy is defeated and we win, but we must go through a hard stretch of road.

(40) The Chinese people in such a long and cruel war will be well steeled. The various political parties participating in the war will also be steeled and tested. The united front must be persevered in; only by persevering in the united front can the war be persevered in; only by persevering in the united front and in the war can there be final victory. If so, all difficulties can be overcome. After crossing the hard stretch of road of the war, the smooth road to victory will arrive; this is the natural logic of the war.

(41) In the three stages, the changes in the strength of enemy and ourselves will go forward along the following path. In the first stage the enemy is superior and we are inferior. Our inferiority has to be estimated as undergoing two different kinds of change from before the resistance to the end of this stage. The first is downward. China's original inferiority, through the attrition of the first stage, will become more serious, that is, shrinkage of territory, population, economic strength, military strength, cultural institutions and so on. At the end of the first stage there may be shrinkage to a considerable extent, especially in the economic respect. This will be used as a ground by the subjugationists and compromisers. But one must see the second kind of change, the upward change. This means the experience in the war, the progress of the army, the progress of politics, the mobilization of the people, the development of a new direction in culture, the emergence of guerrilla warfare, the growth of international aid, and so on. In the first stage, what goes downward is the old quantity and quality, expressed mainly in quantity. What goes upward is new quantity and quality, expressed mainly in quality. This second kind of change gives us the basis for being able to hold out and win final victory.

(42) In the first stage, there are also two kinds of change on the enemy's side. The first is downward, shown in: casualties of several hundred thousand, consumption of weapons and ammunition, decline of morale, discontent among people at home, shrinkage of trade, expenditure of over ten thousand million yen, reproach of international public opinion, and so on. This side again gives us the basis for being able to hold out and win final victory. But one must also estimate the enemy's second kind of change, the upward change. That is, he has enlarged his territory, population and resources. On this point again arises the basis that our resistance is a protracted war and cannot win quickly, and at the same time it will be used by some people as a ground for the theory of subjugation and compromise. But we must estimate the temporariness and partiality of this upward change of the enemy. The enemy is an imperialist about to collapse, and his occupation of Chinese soil is temporary. The vigorous development of China's guerrilla warfare will in fact confine his occupied areas to narrow belts. Moreover, the enemy's occupation of Chinese territory has produced and deepened Japan's contradictions with foreign countries. Furthermore, according to the experience of the three Northeastern Provinces, for a considerably long time Japan can in general only be in a period of outlay of capital and not in a period of harvest. All this again is the basis on which we smash the theory of subjugation and compromise and establish the theory of protractedness and of final victory.

(43) In the second stage, the changes on both sides described above will continue to develop; the concrete circumstances cannot be foretold, but in general Japan will continue downward and China continue upward. For example, Japan's military and financial strength will be consumed in large quantities in China's guerrilla warfare, discontent among the people at home will increase, morale will decline further, and she will feel more isolated internationally. China's politics, military affairs, culture and mobilization of the people will progress further, guerrilla warfare will develop further, economically there will be a certain degree of new development relying on small industry in the interior and extensive agriculture, international aid will gradually increase, and the situation will be greatly changed from the present. This second stage may take a considerably long time. During this time the comparison of strength between enemy and us will undergo huge and opposite changes, China rising gradually and Japan declining gradually. Then China will emerge from inferiority and Japan from superiority, first reaching a position of balance, and then a position in which superiority and inferiority are reversed. Then China in general will complete preparations for the strategic counter-offensive and reach the stage of carrying out the counter-offensive and driving the enemy out of the country. It should be repeated that the so-called turning inferiority into superiority and completing the preparations for the counter-offensive include the growth of China's own strength, the growth of Japan's difficulties and the growth of international aid; combining all these strengths can form China's superiority and complete the preparations for counter-offensive.

(44) Given the unevenness of China's political and economic condition, the strategic counter-offensive in the third stage will in its earlier period not be a uniform posture for the whole country, but will be regional in character, rising here and falling there. The enemy's attempts to break China's united front by various divisive means will not weaken in this stage, so the task of China's internal unity becomes still more important, and care must be taken that internal discord does not cause the strategic counter-offensive to be abandoned halfway. In this period the international situation will change to be greatly favourable to China. China's task is to use this international situation to win her own complete liberation and establish an independent democratic state, and at the same time thereby to help the world anti-fascist movement.

(45) China from inferiority to balance to superiority, Japan from superiority to balance to inferiority; China from defence to stalemate to counter-offensive, Japan from offence to consolidation to retreat — this is the course of the Sino-Japanese war, the inevitable trend of the Sino-Japanese war.

(46) So the question and conclusion are: will China be subjugated? Answer: No, she will not be subjugated; final victory is China's. Can China win quickly? Answer: No, she cannot win quickly; it must be a protracted war. Is this conclusion correct? I think it is correct.

(47) Having said this, the subjugationists and compromisers will again come forward and say: for China to go from inferiority to balance requires military and economic strength equal to Japan's; to go from balance to superiority requires military and economic strength exceeding Japan's; but this is impossible, and therefore the conclusion above is incorrect.

(48) This is the so-called "theory that weapons decide everything," a mechanism in questions of war, a view that looks at problems subjectively and one-sidedly. Our view is the opposite: we see not only weapons but also people. Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; the decisive factor is people, not things. The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power but also a contest of manpower and morale. Military and economic power has to be wielded by people. If the great majority of the Chinese, the great majority of the Japanese, and the great majority of the people of all countries are on the side of the War of Resistance, then can the military and economic power that a small number of Japanese hold by force still be counted as superiority? If it is not superiority, then does not China, which holds comparatively inferior military and economic power, become superior? There is no doubt that so long as China persists in resistance and in the united front, her military and economic power can be gradually strengthened. And our enemy, weakened by the long war and by internal and external contradictions, will inevitably undergo the opposite change in his military and economic power. In these circumstances, can China still not become superior? Nor is that all: at present we cannot count the military and economic power of other countries openly and in large amounts as strength on our side, but can we not in the future? If Japan has more enemies than China alone, if in the future one or several countries openly defend against or attack Japan with a considerable amount of military and economic power, and openly aid us, then will not superiority lie even more on our side? Japan is a small country, her war is retrogressive and barbarous, and her international position will become more isolated; China is a big country, her war is progressive and just, and her international position will become one of more abundant support. After long development, can all this still not definitely change the situation of superiority and inferiority between enemy and us?

(49) The advocates of quick victory do not know that war is a contest of strength; before there has been a certain change in the comparison of the strength of the two sides in the war, to hold a strategic decisive battle and to want to reach the road of liberation ahead of time is also without basis. If their opinion is put into practice it will surely meet a wall. Or else they only talk to give themselves pleasure and do not really intend to do it. In the end Mr. Fact comes forward and pours a ladle of cold water on these talkers, proving that they are only empty talkers who covet cheap gains and want to get more harvest with less effort. This sort of empty talk exists now and has existed in the past, but it is not yet very much; when the war develops to the stalemate stage and the counter-offensive stage, empty talk may increase. But at the same time, if China's losses in the first stage are rather great and the second stage drags on very long, the theory of subjugation and compromise will become even more widespread. So our fire should be directed mainly at the theory of subjugation and compromise, and secondary fire at the empty-talk theory of quick victory.

(50) The protractedness of the war is settled, but how many years and months the war will go through nobody can foretell; this depends entirely on the degree of change in the strength of enemy and ourselves. All those who want to shorten the time of the war have only one way, which is to strive to increase our own strength and reduce the enemy's. Concretely, only to strive to win more victories in battle and wear down the enemy's troops, to strive to develop guerrilla warfare and confine the enemy's occupied areas to the smallest range, to strive to consolidate and expand the united front and unite the strength of the whole country, to strive to build a new army and develop a new war industry, to strive to promote progress in politics, economy and culture, to strive to mobilize the people of all circles — workers, peasants, merchants, students — to strive to disintegrate the enemy army and win over the enemy's soldiers, to strive in international propaganda to win international aid, and to strive to win the aid of the Japanese people and other oppressed nations; only by doing all this can the time of the war be shortened, and there is no other cunning shortcut.

A War of Jigsaw Pattern

(51) We can assert that the protracted War of Resistance will appear in the history of human warfare as a glorious and special page. The form of war in a jigsaw pattern is a rather special point, produced by the contradictory factors of Japan's barbarity and insufficient troops and China's progressiveness and vast territory. A war of jigsaw pattern has existed in history, as in the three-year civil war after the Russian October Revolution. But its characteristics in China are its special protractedness and extensiveness, which will break historical records. This jigsaw pattern is expressed in the following several situations.

(52) Interior lines and exterior lines — The War of Resistance as a whole is in the position of fighting on interior lines; but in the relation between the main forces and the guerrilla units, the main forces are on interior lines and the guerrilla units on exterior lines, forming the spectacle of pincers on the enemy. The same is so of the relation between guerrilla areas. Each guerrilla area regards itself as interior lines and the other areas as exterior lines, again forming many lines of fire pincering the enemy. In the first stage of the war, the regular troops fighting on strategic interior lines are retreating, but the guerrilla units fighting on strategic exterior lines will advance with long strides extensively towards the enemy's rear, and in the second stage will advance still more vigorously, forming the strange pattern of retreat and advance.

(53) Having a rear and having no rear — The main forces make use of the general rear of the country and extend their operational lines to the final limit of the enemy-occupied areas. The guerrilla units detach themselves from the general rear and extend their operational lines behind the enemy. But in every guerrilla area there is still its own small-scale rear, on which they depend to establish non-fixed operational lines. Distinct from this are the guerrilla units sent out by each guerrilla area to operate temporarily behind the enemy of that area; they not only have no rear but also have no operational lines. "Fighting without a rear" is a characteristic of revolutionary war in the new era under the conditions of vast territory, progressive people, and an advanced party and advanced army; there is nothing to fear and much to gain, it should not be doubted but promoted.

(54) Encirclement and counter-encirclement — Viewing the war as a whole, because of the enemy's strategic offensive and exterior-line operations, and our strategic defensive and interior-line position, there is no doubt that we are in the enemy's strategic encirclement. This is the enemy's first kind of encirclement of us. Because we adopt, with numerically superior forces, the policy of exterior-line operations in campaigns and battles against the enemy advancing on us by several routes from strategic exterior lines, we can place one or several of the enemy's advancing columns inside our encirclement. This is our first kind of counter-encirclement of the enemy. Again, from the standpoint of the guerrilla bases behind the enemy lines, each isolated base is under the enemy's encirclement from four or three sides, the former as with Wutai Mountain, the latter as with northwest Shansi. This is the enemy's second kind of encirclement of us. But if we look at the various guerrilla bases in connection, and look at the guerrilla bases and the positions of the regular army in connection, we in turn encircle many enemy forces; for example in Shansi we have already encircled the Tatung-Puchow Railway on three sides (the east and west sides and the southern end) and encircled the city of Taiyuan on four sides; there are many such encirclements in Hopei, Shantung and other provinces. This is again our second kind of counter-encirclement of the enemy. Thus enemy and we each impose on the other two kinds of encirclement, rather like a game of weichi: the campaigns and battles by which the enemy deals with us and we deal with him are like capturing pieces, and the enemy's strongpoints (such as Taiyuan) and our guerrilla bases (such as Wutai Mountain) are like making "eyes." If the weichi game on a world scale is counted in, there is also a third kind of encirclement of enemy and us, namely the relation between the aggressor front and the peace front. The enemy uses the former to encircle China, the Soviet Union, France, Czechoslovakia and other countries, and we use the latter to counter-encircle Germany, Japan and Italy. But our encirclement is like the palm of the Buddha: it will turn into a Five-Element Mountain spanning the universe, and finally press these new-style Monkey Kings — the fascist aggressors — down under the mountain, never to turn over for all eternity. If we can establish diplomatically a Pacific anti-Japanese front, treating China as one strategic unit, the Soviet Union and other possible countries each as a strategic unit, and the Japanese people's movement too as a strategic unit, forming a net of heaven and earth from which the fascist Monkey King has nowhere to flee, that will be the time of the enemy's death. In fact, the day Japanese imperialism is completely overthrown will surely be the time when this net of heaven and earth is by and large spread. This is not a joke in the least, but the inevitable trend of the war.

(55) Large pieces and small pieces — One possibility is that the enemy-occupied areas will take up the larger part of China proper, while the intact areas of China proper form only a smaller part. This is one situation. But within the larger part occupied by the enemy, apart from the Northeastern Provinces and the like, he can in fact only occupy the big cities, main roads and some plains; in importance these are first-class, but in area and population they may be only a smaller part of the enemy-occupied area, while the widely developed guerrilla areas actually make up the larger part. This is another situation. If we go beyond China proper and count in Mongolia, Sinkiang, Chinghai and Tibet, then in area the part of China not lost is still the larger part, and the enemy-occupied area, including the Northeastern Provinces, is also only the smaller part. This is yet another situation. The intact areas are of course important and should be developed with great effort, not only in politics, military affairs and economy, but also in culture. The enemy has turned our former cultural centres into culturally backward areas, and we must turn our former culturally backward areas into cultural centres. At the same time, developing the extensive guerrilla areas behind the enemy is also exceedingly important, and they should be developed in all respects, including cultural work. Taken together, China will be one where the large pieces, the countryside, become areas of progress and light, while the small pieces occupied by the enemy, especially the big cities, will temporarily become areas of backwardness and darkness.

(56) Seen thus, the long and extensive War of Resistance is a war of jigsaw pattern in all aspects, military, political, economic and cultural; this is a marvel in the history of war, a heroic feat of the Chinese nation, an earth-shaking undertaking. This war will not only affect China and Japan and greatly promote the progress of both countries, but will affect the world and promote the progress of all countries, first of all of oppressed nations like India. All the Chinese people should consciously throw themselves into this war of jigsaw pattern; this is the form of war by which the Chinese nation seeks its own liberation, the special form of war of liberation waged by a semi-colonial big country in the 1930s and 1940s of the twentieth century.

War for Perpetual Peace

(57) The protractedness of China's War of Resistance cannot be separated from the struggle for perpetual peace in China and the world. At no historical period has war been so close to perpetual peace as today. Since the appearance of classes, human life for thousands of years has been full of wars, and every nation has fought countless wars, either within national groups or between national groups. In the imperialist period of capitalist society the wars have been fought on an especially great scale and with special cruelty. The first imperialist great war of twenty years ago was unprecedented in past history, but it was not yet the last war. Only the war that has now begun is close to the last war, that is, close to perpetual peace for mankind. At present one third of the world's population has already entered the war; look: one Italy, then one Japan, one Abyssinia, then one Spain, and one China besides. The countries taking part in the war have altogether almost 600 million people, nearly one third of the total population of the world. The characteristics of the present war are that it is without interruption and has a nature close to perpetual peace. Why without interruption? After Italy fought Abyssinia, Italy went on to fight Spain, Germany also took a share, and Japan went on to fight China. Who is to follow? Without doubt Hitler will go on to fight the great powers. "Fascism is war," not a bit wrong. The present war will not be interrupted as it develops into a world war, and the calamity of war for mankind cannot be avoided. Why then do we say this war is close to perpetual peace? This war arises on the basis of the development of the general crisis of world capitalism, begun in the First World War; because of this general crisis, the capitalist countries are forced into new wars, and above all the fascist countries are forced into the adventure of new wars. We can foresee that the result of this war will not be the salvation of capitalism but its movement towards collapse. This war will be greater and more cruel than the war of twenty years ago, all nations will inevitably be drawn in, the war will drag on a long time, and mankind will suffer great pain. But because of the existence of the Soviet Union and the rising level of consciousness of the people of the world, great revolutionary wars will without doubt appear in this war, to oppose all counter-revolutionary wars, so that this war has the character of a war for perpetual peace. Even if there is still a period of war afterwards, it will not be far from perpetual peace in the world. Once mankind has eliminated capitalism, it reaches the era of perpetual peace, and then there will be no more need for wars. Then there will be no armies, no warships, no military aircraft, no poison gas. From then on mankind will not see war for hundreds of millions of years. The revolutionary war that has already begun is a part of this war for perpetual peace. The war between China and Japan, with a population of over 500 million, will occupy an important place in this war, and the liberation of the Chinese nation will come out of this war. The future liberated new China cannot be separated from the future liberated new world. Therefore our War of Resistance contains the character of a war for perpetual peace.

(58) Wars in history are of two kinds, one just and one unjust. All progressive wars are just, and all wars that obstruct progress are unjust. We Communists oppose all unjust wars that obstruct progress, but do not oppose progressive, just wars. As to the latter kind of war, we Communists not only do not oppose them but actively take part in them. In the former kind of war, for example the First World War, both sides fought for imperialist interests, so the Communists of the whole world resolutely opposed that war. The method of opposing was, before the war broke out, to try our utmost to prevent it from breaking out; once it broke out, as far as possible to oppose war with war, just war against unjust war. Japan's war is an unjust war obstructing progress, which the people of the whole world, including the Japanese people, should oppose and are opposing. In our China, from the people to the government, from the Communist Party to the Kuomintang, all have raised the banner of righteousness and are waging a national revolutionary war against aggression. Our war is sacred and just, progressive and peace-seeking. It seeks not only the peace of one country but the peace of the world, not only temporary peace but perpetual peace. To attain this aim we must fight a life-and-death struggle, must be prepared for every sacrifice, persevere to the end, and never stop until the aim is reached. Although the sacrifices are great and the time long, the new world of perpetual peace and perpetual light is already clearly set before us. Our faith in waging war is built on this new China and new world of perpetual peace and perpetual light that we strive for. Fascism and imperialism want to prolong war to no end; we want to end the war in a not very distant future. For this aim, the majority of mankind should make the greatest efforts. The 450 million Chinese make up one quarter of mankind, and if they can exert themselves together, overthrow Japanese imperialism, and create a free and equal new China, their contribution to winning perpetual peace for the whole world will without doubt be exceedingly great. This hope is not empty; the course of the world's social economy has already approached this point, and we need only add the effort of the majority, and within a few decades we can certainly reach the goal.

The Role of Conscious Activity in War

(59) What has been said above all explains why the war is protracted and why final victory is China's, and in general speaks of "what is" and "what is not." Below we turn to study the question of "how to do" and "how not to do." How is the protracted war to be waged and how is final victory to be won? This is the question to be answered below. For this we shall explain in order the following questions: the role of conscious activity in war, war and politics, political mobilization for the War of Resistance, the object of war, offence within defence, quick decision within protractedness, exterior lines within interior lines, initiative, flexibility, planning, mobile warfare, guerrilla warfare, positional warfare, war of annihilation, war of attrition, the possibility of exploiting the enemy's weaknesses, the question of decisive engagements in the War of Resistance, the army and the people as the foundation of victory. Let us begin with the question of conscious activity.

(60) When we oppose looking at problems subjectively, we mean that a person's thinking, if not based on and not in conformity with objective facts, is fancy and false reasoning, and acting upon it leads to failure, so it must be opposed. But everything has to be done by people; protracted war and final victory will not appear without people doing them. To do them, someone must first, on the basis of objective facts, derive thoughts, reasoning and opinions, and put forward plans, policies, strategy and tactics, so that they can be done well. Thoughts and so forth are subjective things, doing or action is the subjective appearing in the objective, and both are the special activity of mankind. We call this activity "conscious activity," and it is the characteristic by which man differs from things. All thinking based on and in conformity with objective facts is correct thinking, and all doing or action based on correct thinking is correct action. We must promote such thinking and action, and promote this conscious activity. The War of Resistance is to drive out imperialism and change old China into new China, and only by mobilizing the whole Chinese people and bringing into play altogether their conscious activity in resistance to Japan can the aim be reached. Sitting still means only being destroyed, with no protracted war and no final victory.

(61) Conscious activity is the characteristic of mankind. Mankind shows this characteristic intensely in war. Victory or defeat in war is of course decided by the conditions of the two sides, military, political, economic, geographical, the nature of the war, international support and so on, but not by these alone; with these alone there is only the possibility of victory or defeat, which does not itself decide the outcome. To decide victory or defeat subjective effort must be added, that is, directing the war and carrying on the war, which is conscious activity in war.

(62) Those who direct a war cannot seek victory beyond the limits permitted by objective conditions, but they can and must actively strive for victory within the limits of objective conditions. The stage of activity of war commanders must be built on what objective conditions permit, but on this stage they can direct many vivid, spirited and majestic dramas. On the given objective material basis, the commanders of the War of Resistance must bring their power into play, lead the whole army, overthrow the enemies of the nation, change the condition of our invaded and oppressed society and state, and create a free and equal new China; here our ability of subjective direction is useful and must be used. We do not approve of any commander in the War of Resistance who departs from objective conditions and becomes a rash blunderer, but we must advocate that every commander in the War of Resistance become a brave and wise general. They must have not only the courage to overwhelm the enemy but also the ability to master the changes and development of the whole war. Commanders swim in the sea of war; they must not let themselves sink, but must determine to reach the other shore step by step. Strategy and tactics, as the laws of directing war, are the art of swimming in the sea of war.

War and Politics

(63) "War is the continuation of politics"; in this sense war is politics, war itself is an action of a political nature, and since ancient times there has been no war without a political character. The War of Resistance is a revolutionary war of the whole nation, and its victory cannot be separated from the political aim of the war — driving out Japanese imperialism and establishing a free and equal new China — cannot be separated from the general policy of persevering in resistance and in the united front, from the mobilization of the whole people, from the political principles of unity between officers and men, unity between army and people, and disintegration of the enemy army, from the good execution of the united front policy, from the mobilization of culture, from the efforts to win the aid of international forces and of the people of the enemy country. In a word, war cannot be separated from politics for a single moment. If among the anti-Japanese military men there is a tendency to belittle politics and isolate war, turning into absolutists of war, that is wrong and should be corrected.

(64) But war has its particularity, and in this sense war is not simply equal to politics in general. "War is the continuation of politics by other, special means." When politics develops to a certain stage and can no longer go forward as before, war breaks out to sweep away the obstacles on the political road. For example, China's semi-independent status is an obstacle to the political development of Japanese imperialism, and Japan wants to sweep it away, so she launched a war of aggression. And China? Imperialist oppression has long been an obstacle to China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, so there have been many wars of liberation attempting to sweep away this obstacle. Japan now uses war to oppress, wanting to cut off completely the road of advance of the Chinese revolution, so China had to wage the War of Resistance, determined to sweep away this obstacle. Once the obstacle is removed, the political aim is attained and the war ends. If the obstacle is not swept away completely, the war must continue until it is carried through. For example, if the task of resistance to Japan is not completed, anyone who seeks compromise is bound to fail; because even if for some reason compromise is made, the war will still break out again, the broad masses of the people will certainly not submit, and will certainly continue the war and carry through its political aim. Therefore it can be said that politics is war without bloodshed and war is politics with bloodshed.

(65) Based on the particularity of war, there is a special set of organizations, a special set of methods and a special process of war. The organization is the army and everything attached to it. The method is the strategy and tactics for directing war. The process is a special form of social activity in which hostile armies, using strategy and tactics favourable to themselves and unfavourable to the enemy, attack or defend. Therefore, the experience of war is special. All those who take part in war must break out of ordinary habits and become accustomed to war before they can win victory in war.

Political Mobilization for the War of Resistance

(66) Such a great national revolutionary war cannot be won without general and deep political mobilization. Before the war of resistance there was no political mobilization for resistance to Japan; this was a great shortcoming of China, and we have already lost a move to the enemy. After resistance began, political mobilization has also been very far from general, let alone deep. The great majority of the people have heard the news from the enemy's guns and aeroplane bombs. This is also a kind of mobilization, but it was done for us by the enemy, not by ourselves. People in remote areas who cannot hear the guns are still living quietly there to this day. This situation must change, or else a life-and-death war cannot be won. We must not lose another move to the enemy; on the contrary, we must exploit this move greatly to defeat the enemy. This move is of enormous importance; inferiority in weapons and so on is of secondary importance, while this move is really of first importance. To mobilize the common people of the whole country is to create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, to create the conditions that make up for our deficiency in weapons and so on, and to create the prerequisite for overcoming all difficulties of the war. To win victory we must persevere in resistance, in the united front and in protracted war. But all of this cannot be separated from mobilizing the common people. To want victory and yet neglect political mobilization is called "driving the shaft south and the wheels north," and the result will certainly be to cancel victory.

(67) What is political mobilization? First of all, it is telling the army and the people the political aim of the war. Every soldier and every person must be made to understand why the war is being fought and what it has to do with them. The political aim of the War of Resistance is "to drive out Japanese imperialism and establish a free and equal new China"; this aim must be told to all soldiers and civilians, in order to create a high tide of resistance and make several hundred million people unite as one in contributing everything to the war. Second, merely explaining the aim is not enough; the steps and policies for attaining this aim must be explained, that is, there must be a political programme. We now have the "Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation" and the "Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction," and these should be popularized among the army and people, and the entire army and people mobilized to carry them out. Without a clear and concrete political programme the whole army and whole people cannot be mobilized to fight Japan to the end. Next, how to mobilize? By word of mouth, by leaflets and notices, by newspapers and books, by plays and films, by schools, by mass organizations, by cadres. What exists now in the Kuomintang areas is a drop in the ocean, and the methods do not suit the taste of the masses and the manner is remote from them; this must be changed in earnest. Next, one mobilization is not enough; the political mobilization for the War of Resistance is constant. It is not a matter of reciting the political programme to the common people, for no one listens to such recitation; it must be linked with the developing circumstances of the war and with the lives of the soldiers and common people, so that the political mobilization of the war becomes a constant movement. This is a matter of enormous importance, on which the war must first of all rely for victory.

The Object of War

(68) Here we are not speaking of the political aim of the war; the political aim of the War of Resistance is "to drive out Japanese imperialism and establish a free and equal new China," which has been mentioned before. What is spoken of here is war as the politics of bloodshed, the war in which two armies kill each other, and what its fundamental object is. The object of war is nothing other than "to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy" (to destroy the enemy means to disarm him, which is also called "depriving the enemy of the power of resistance," and not to destroy him physically in full). In ancient wars the spear and shield were used: the spear was for attack, to destroy the enemy; the shield was for defence, to preserve oneself. Down to the weapons of today these two continue. Bombers, machine-guns, long-range guns and poison gas are the development of the spear; air-raid shelters, steel helmets, concrete fortifications and gas masks are the development of the shield. The tank is a new weapon combining the two in one. Attack is the main means of destroying the enemy, but defence cannot be dispensed with. Attack is directly for destroying the enemy and also for preserving oneself, because if the enemy is not destroyed, one will be destroyed. Defence is directly for preserving oneself, but at the same time is also a means of assisting attack or preparing to go over to attack. Retreat belongs to the category of defence and is a continuation of defence, while pursuit is a continuation of attack. It should be pointed out that of the objects of war, destroying the enemy is primary and preserving oneself is secondary, because only by destroying the enemy on a large scale can one effectively preserve oneself. Therefore attack, the main means of destroying the enemy, is primary, while defence, the auxiliary means of destroying the enemy and a means of preserving oneself, is secondary. In the actual practice of war, although defence is primary at many times and attack primary at other times, yet looking at the war as a whole, attack is still primary.

(69) How do we explain advocating courage and sacrifice in war? Is it not contradictory to "preserving oneself"? It is not contradictory; the two are opposites that complement each other. War is politics with bloodshed and has to be paid for, sometimes at an extremely high price. Partial and temporary sacrifice (non-preservation) is for the sake of the preservation of the whole and for ever. We say that in the offensive means basically aimed at destroying the enemy there is at the same time the function of preserving oneself; the reason lies here. Defence must at the same time have offence and should not be pure defence; this too is the reason.

(70) The object of war, to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy, is the essence of war and the basis of all war action, from technical action up to strategic action, all of which carry through this essence. The object of war is the basic principle of war, and all technical, tactical, campaign and strategic principles cannot be separated from it in the least. What is the meaning of the firing principle "take cover, and bring fire to bear"? The former is for preserving oneself, the latter for destroying the enemy. Because of the former, using terrain and cover, advancing in rushes, opening out formations and various other methods arise. Because of the latter, clearing fields of fire, organizing a fire net and various other methods also arise. In tactics, assault units, holding units and reserves: the first is for destroying the enemy, the second for preserving oneself, and the third is prepared to be used according to circumstances for either of the two purposes — either reinforcing the assault units or acting as pursuit units, both for destroying the enemy; or reinforcing the holding units or acting as covering units, both for preserving oneself. In this way all technical, tactical, campaign and strategic principles, and all technical, tactical, campaign and strategic actions, cannot be separated from the object of war in the least; it extends over the whole of war and runs through the war from beginning to end.

(71) The directors of the War of Resistance at all levels cannot direct the war apart from the various mutually opposed basic factors between China and Japan, nor can they direct the war apart from this object of war. The various mutually opposed basic factors between the two countries, unfolding in the actions of the war, turn into mutual struggle to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy. In our war, we strive in every battle to win a victory big or small, we strive in every battle to disarm part of the enemy and to damage part of his men, horses and materials. Accumulating these results of partial destruction of the enemy, we form big strategic victories and achieve the final political aim of driving the enemy out of the country, defending the motherland and building a new China.

Offence Within Defence, Quick Decision Within Protractedness, Exterior Lines Within Interior Lines

(72) Now let us study the concrete strategic policy of the War of Resistance. We have already said that the strategic policy of the resistance is protracted war; yes, this is entirely correct. But this is a general policy, not yet a concrete policy. How is protracted war to be concretely waged? This is the question we are to discuss now. Our answer is: in the first and second stages, that is, the enemy's stage of offence and stage of consolidation, there should be offensive campaigns and battles within the strategic defensive, campaigns and battles of quick decision within strategic protractedness, and exterior-line campaigns and battles within strategic interior lines. In the third stage there should be the strategic counter-offensive.

(73) Because Japan is a strong imperialist country and we are a weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, Japan adopts the policy of strategic offence, while we are in the position of strategic defence. Japan attempts a strategic quick decision, and we should consciously adopt strategic protractedness. Japan uses several tens of divisions of army with rather strong fighting power (at present up to thirty divisions) and part of her navy to encircle and blockade China from land and sea, and uses her air force to bomb China. At present the Japanese army has occupied a long front from Paotow to Hangchow, and the navy has reached Fukien and Kwangtung, forming operations on exterior lines over a large area. We are in the position of interior-line operations. All this is created by the characteristic that the enemy is strong and we are weak. This is the situation on one side.

(74) But on the other side, it is just the reverse. Japan, though strong, has insufficient troops. China, though weak, has vast territory, a large population and many soldiers. Two important results arise here. First, with few troops confronting a big country, the enemy can only occupy some of the big cities, main roads and certain plains. Consequently, in his occupied areas, there are left vast stretches of territory that he cannot occupy, which gives China's guerrilla warfare a wide area for activity. In the country as a whole, even if the enemy can occupy the line Canton-Wuhan-Lanchow and the areas near it, areas outside are hard for him to occupy, which gives China the general rear and the central bases for waging protracted war and winning final victory. Second, with few troops confronting many troops, the enemy is in the encirclement of the many. The enemy attacks us by separate routes, the enemy is on strategic exterior lines and we on strategic interior lines, the enemy is on the strategic offensive and we on the strategic defensive; it looks as if we are very unfavourably placed. But we can make use of the two strong points of vast territory and many troops, not wage dead-fixed positional warfare, but adopt flexible mobile warfare, using several divisions against one of his, several tens of thousands of men against ten thousand, several columns against one column, from the exterior lines of the battlefield suddenly encircling one column of his and attacking it. Thus the enemy's exterior lines and offence in strategic operations will in campaign and battle operations have to turn into interior lines and defence. Our interior lines and defence in strategic operations will in campaign and battle operations turn into exterior lines and offence. As to one column of his, so to the other columns. Both these points arise from the characteristic that the enemy is small and we are large. Moreover, although the enemy's troops are few, they are strong troops (in weapons and the training of personnel), and our troops, though many, are weak troops (also only in weapons and the training of personnel, not in morale); therefore in campaign and battle operations we should not only use many troops against few, and exterior lines against interior lines, but must also adopt the policy of quick decision. To achieve quick decision, in general we should not attack an enemy at rest but attack an enemy on the move. We concentrate large forces in advance, under cover, beside the road the enemy must pass, and while the enemy is on the move advance suddenly, encircle and attack him, take him unprepared and settle the battle swiftly. If it is done well, we may destroy him wholly, largely or partly; if it is not done well, we still inflict heavy casualties on him. As in one battle, so in the others. Not to speak of more, if we win one fairly large victory every month, like Pinghsingkuan and Taierchwang, we can greatly dishearten the enemy, raise the morale of our army, and call forth the world's support. Thus our strategic protractedness becomes quick decision in the fighting on the battlefield. The enemy's strategic quick decision, after many defeats in campaigns and battles, has to be changed into protractedness.

(75) The campaign and battle policy described above can be put in a sentence: "offensive battles of quick decision on exterior lines." This is the opposite of our strategic policy of "defensive protracted war on interior lines"; but it is precisely the necessary policy for realizing that strategic policy. If the campaign and battle policy were likewise "defensive protracted war on interior lines," as in the early period of the resistance, it would be entirely unsuited to the two conditions that the enemy is small and we are large, that the enemy is strong and we are weak; it would certainly fail to reach the strategic aim, fail to reach overall protracted war, and we would be beaten by the enemy. So we have always advocated that the country form a number of big field army formations, with strength twice, three times or four times that of each of the enemy's field formations, adopt the policy above, and wage manoeuvre against the enemy over the vast battlefield. This policy is useful not only for regular warfare but also for guerrilla warfare, and it must be used. It applies not only to one stage of the war but to the whole course of the war. In the stage of strategic counter-offensive, when our technical conditions have strengthened and the situation of the weak against the strong has completely disappeared, we shall still use many troops on exterior lines to wage offensive battles of quick decision, and shall be even better able to achieve the effect of large captures. For example, if we use two, three or four mechanized divisions against one enemy mechanized division, we can be even more certain of destroying that division. That several big fellows can easily beat one big fellow is a truth contained in common sense.

(76) If we resolutely adopt "offensive battles of quick decision on exterior lines" in battlefield operations, we shall not only change the situation of strength and weakness, superiority and inferiority between enemy and us on the battlefield, but shall gradually change the overall situation. On the battlefield, because we attack and the enemy defends; we are many troops on exterior lines, the enemy few troops on interior lines; we are for quick decision, and the enemy, though trying to prolong and wait for help, cannot decide the matter; then on the enemy's side the strong becomes weak and superiority turns into inferiority; on our side, conversely, the weak becomes strong and inferiority turns into superiority. After winning many such victories, the overall situation between enemy and us will change. That is to say, after the victories of many offensive battles of quick decision on exterior lines are put together, we gradually strengthen ourselves and weaken the enemy, and the overall situation of strength and weakness, superiority and inferiority cannot but be affected and change. By then, combined with our other conditions, and combined with the changes inside the enemy and the favourable international situation, we can bring the overall situation between enemy and us to balance, and then from balance to our superiority and the enemy's inferiority. That will be the time for us to carry out the counter-offensive and drive the enemy out of the country.

(77) War is a contest of strength, but strength changes its original form in the course of the war. Here, subjective effort, winning more victories and making fewer mistakes, is the decisive factor. Objective factors possess the possibility of this change, but to realize this possibility requires correct policy and subjective effort. At this time the subjective role is decisive.

Initiative, Flexibility, Planning

(78) The campaign and battle offensive of quick decision on exterior lines spoken of above has its central point in one thing, offence; exterior lines refers to the scope of the offence, quick decision to the time of the offence, so it is called "offensive battles of quick decision on exterior lines." This is the best policy for carrying out protracted war, and is the policy of so-called mobile warfare. But carrying out this policy cannot be separated from initiative, flexibility and planning. We shall now study these three questions.

(79) Conscious activity was spoken of above; why then speak of initiative? Conscious activity speaks of conscious action and effort, the characteristic by which man differs from things, and this human characteristic is shown especially intensely in war, as said above. The initiative spoken of here is the freedom of action of an army, as distinguished from the state of being forced into unfreedom. Freedom of action is the lifeblood of an army, and an army that loses this freedom is close to being defeated or destroyed. A soldier's being disarmed is the result of his losing freedom of action and being forced into a passive position. So too with the defeat of an army. For this reason both sides in a war strive for the initiative and strive to avoid passivity. The offensive battles of quick decision on exterior lines that we propose, and the flexibility and planning for realizing such offensive battles, can all be said to be for winning the initiative, so as to force the enemy into a passive position and attain the aim of preserving ourselves and destroying the enemy. But initiative or passivity cannot be separated from superiority or inferiority in war strength. Hence it also cannot be separated from correctness or error in subjective direction. In addition, there are cases of using the enemy's misjudgements and unpreparedness to win our own initiative and force the enemy into passivity. Below we analyse these points.

(80) Initiative cannot be separated from superiority in war strength, and passivity cannot be separated from inferiority in war strength. Superiority or inferiority in war strength is the objective basis of initiative or passivity. The position of strategic initiative is of course easier to hold and exercise in the strategic offensive, but initiative that runs through from beginning to end and extends everywhere, that is, absolute initiative, is possible only with absolute superiority against absolute inferiority. When a healthy, strong man wrestles with a gravely ill man, the former has absolute initiative. If Japan had no many insurmountable contradictions, for example if she could put several million to ten million troops into the field at once, had financial resources several times greater than now, had no hostility from the masses and foreign countries, and did not carry out barbarous policies that bring about desperate resistance from the Chinese people, then she could maintain an absolute superiority, and she would have an absolute initiative that runs through from beginning to end and extends everywhere. But in history such cases of absolute superiority exist at the end of wars and campaigns and are rare at the beginning. For example, in the First World War, on the eve of Germany's surrender, the Allies had become absolutely superior and Germany absolutely inferior, with the result that Germany was defeated and the Allies won; this is an example of absolute superiority and inferiority existing at the end of a war. Again, on the eve of the victory at Taierchwang, the isolated Japanese troops there, after bitter fighting, were already in absolute inferiority, and our army had created absolute superiority, with the result that the enemy was defeated and we won; this is an example of absolute superiority and inferiority at the end of a campaign. Wars and campaigns may also end in relative superiority and inferiority or in a state of balance, and then in war a compromise appears, and in a campaign a stand-off. But in general, victory and defeat are decided by absolute superiority and inferiority in the majority. All these are the endings of wars or campaigns, not their beginnings. The final end of the Sino-Japanese war can be predicted: Japan will be defeated through absolute inferiority and China will win through absolute superiority; but at present the superiority and inferiority of both sides are not absolute but relative. Japan, owing to the favourable factor of her strong military, economic and political-organizational power, has superiority over our weak military, economic and political-organizational power, and so she has the basis of her initiative. But because her military strength and so on are small in quantity, and she has many other unfavourable factors, her superiority is reduced by her own contradictions. Upon reaching China, she again meets China's vast territory, large population, many soldiers and firm national resistance, and her superiority is reduced again. Thus in the overall situation her position becomes one of relative superiority, and therefore the exercise and maintenance of her initiative are restricted and become relative. On China's side, although in strength she is inferior, thus creating a certain passive posture strategically, yet in the extent of territory, population and number of troops, and also in the enmity and morale of the people and army, she is superior, and this superiority, together with other favourable factors, reduces the degree of inferiority of her military and economic strength and so on, making it a relative strategic inferiority. Hence it also reduces the degree of passivity, so that she is only in a strategically relative passive position. But passivity is always disadvantageous and we must strive to escape from it. The military method is to resolutely carry out offensive battles of quick decision on exterior lines and launch guerrilla warfare behind the enemy, obtaining in campaign mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare many local superiorities and positions of initiative over the enemy. Through many such local superiorities and local positions of initiative in campaigns, we can gradually create strategic superiority and the strategic initiative, and escape from strategic inferiority and passivity. This is the mutual relationship between initiative and passivity, between superiority and inferiority.

(81) From this one can also understand the relationship between initiative or passivity and subjective direction. As said above, our relative strategic inferiority and strategic passivity can be escaped from, by artificially creating many local superiorities and local positions of initiative for ourselves, so as to strip the enemy of his many local superiorities and local positions of initiative and throw him into inferiority and passivity. Putting these local things together makes up our strategic superiority and strategic initiative, and the enemy's strategic inferiority and strategic passivity. Such a change depends on correct subjective direction. Why? We want superiority and the initiative, and the enemy wants them too; from this point of view war is a contest of the subjective ability of the commanders of the two armies in vying for superiority and initiative, using as ground the material basis of military strength, finance and so on. In the result of the contest, there are victors and vanquished; apart from comparison of objective material conditions, the victor must owe it to correct subjective direction and the vanquished to mistaken subjective direction. We admit that the phenomena of war are harder to grasp and less certain than any other social phenomena, that is, they have more of what is called "probability." But war is not supernatural; it is still a necessary movement in the world, and therefore Sun Tzu's law, "Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles without danger," is still a scientific truth. Error arises from ignorance of the enemy and of oneself, and the special character of war also makes it impossible in many cases for people to know fully the enemy and themselves, which gives rise to the uncertainty of war situations and war actions, and gives rise to errors and defeats. But whatever the war situation and war action, it is possible to know their general outline and main points. First by various means of reconnaissance, then by the commander's intelligent inference and judgement, it is possible to reduce errors and realize generally correct direction. Having this "generally correct direction" as a weapon, we can win more victories, turn inferiority into superiority, and passivity into initiative. This is the relation between initiative or passivity and the correctness of subjective direction.

(82) That the correctness or not of subjective direction affects the change of superiority and inferiority, initiative and passivity, can be believed all the more from the historical facts of strong armies being defeated and weak armies winning. There are very many such cases in Chinese and foreign history. In China: the battle of Chengpu between Chin and Chu, the battle of Chengkao between Chu and Han, Han Hsin's defeat of Chao, the battle of Kunyang between Hsin and Han, the battle of Kuantu between Yuan and Tsao, the battle of Chipi between Wu and Wei, the battle of Yiling between Wu and Shu, the battle of Feishui between Chin and Chin, and so on; abroad, Napoleon's many campaigns and the civil war in the Soviet Union after the October Revolution: all won by few striking many, by inferiority against superiority. In each, first using one's local superiority and initiative against the enemy's local inferiority and passivity, winning one battle, then going on to the rest and defeating them one by one, the whole situation was thereby turned into superiority and into initiative. For the enemy who originally held superiority and initiative it was the reverse; through his subjective errors and internal contradictions, he could lose completely his very good or fairly good position of superiority and initiative, and become a defeated general or a king of a lost country. From this it can be seen that the superiority or inferiority of war strength is indeed the objective basis that decides initiative or passivity, but it is not yet initiative or passivity as actual things; only through struggle, through the contest of subjective ability, does actual initiative or passivity appear. In the struggle, owing to correctness or error of subjective direction, inferiority can be turned into superiority and passivity into initiative; and superiority can also be turned into inferiority and initiative into passivity. That all ruling dynasties could not defeat revolutionary armies shows that some single superiority does not yet settle the position of initiative, still less final victory. Initiative and victory can, on the basis of the real situation, through the active exercise of subjective ability and by obtaining certain conditions, be seized by the inferior and passive side from the hands of the superior and active side.

(83) Misjudgement and unpreparedness can lose superiority and initiative. Therefore deliberately creating misjudgement in the enemy and attacking him when he is unprepared is a method, and an important one, of creating superiority and seizing the initiative. What is misjudgement? "On Mount Pakung every bush and tree looked like soldiers" is an example of misjudgement. "Make a noise in the east and strike in the west" is one way of creating misjudgement in the enemy. When excellent mass conditions exist that are sufficient to seal off information, the use of various methods of deceiving the enemy can often effectively plunge him into the predicament of wrong judgement and wrong action, so that he loses his superiority and initiative. "In war one never tires of deception" refers to this thing. What is unpreparedness? It is having made no preparation. Superiority without preparation is not true superiority and has no initiative. Understanding this, an army that is inferior but prepared can often launch an unexpected offensive against the enemy and defeat the superior. We say that an enemy on the move is easy to strike, precisely because he is unprepared. These two things — creating misjudgement in the enemy and attacking him when he is unprepared — are giving the enemy the uncertainty of war while giving ourselves as much certainty as possible, to win our superiority and initiative, and win our victory. The prerequisite for achieving these is superior organization of the masses. Therefore, to arouse all the common people who oppose the enemy, arm them all, make wide-ranging attacks on the enemy, and at the same time use this to seal off information and cover our army, so that the enemy cannot know where and when our army will attack him, creating the objective basis of his misjudgement and unpreparedness, is exceedingly important. The Chinese Red Army in the agrarian revolutionary war period, though with weak forces it often won victories, owed enormously to the organized and armed masses. A national war should by rights obtain still wider support from the masses than the agrarian revolutionary war; but because of historical errors the masses are scattered, and not only cannot be quickly used by us but are sometimes used by the enemy. Only by resolutely and extensively arousing the whole mass of the people can we get inexhaustible supply for all the needs of the war. In this method of war of giving the enemy misjudgement and unpreparedness in order to fight and defeat him, it will also certainly play a great part. We are not Duke Hsiang of Sung, and do not want his asinine ethics of benevolence and righteousness. We want to seal the enemy's eyes and ears as far as possible, turn them into blind men and deaf men, throw their commanders' minds as much as possible into confusion, make them into madmen, and use this to win our own victory. All this too is the mutual relation between initiative or passivity and subjective direction. Defeating Japan cannot do without this subjective direction.

(84) By and large, in his stage of offence, Japan, because of the strength of her forces and her use of our historical and present subjective errors, has in general been in the position of initiative. But this initiative, because of the many unfavourable factors that she herself carries, the subjective errors she has also committed in the war (to be discussed in detail later), and the many favourable factors on our side, has begun partially to weaken. The enemy's defeat at Taierchwang and his entanglement in Shansi are clear proof. The wide development of our guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines places the garrison of his occupied areas entirely in a passive position. Although at this moment the enemy is still in his strategic offensive with the initiative, his initiative will end with the cessation of his strategic offensive. The insufficiency of the enemy's forces, which leaves no possibility of unlimited offensive, is the first source of his inability to keep the initiative. Our offensive campaigns, the guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines and other conditions are the second source of his having to stop his offensive at a certain limit and being unable to keep the initiative. The existence of the Soviet Union and other international changes are the third source. From this it can be seen that the enemy's position of initiative is limited and can also be destroyed. If China can in methods of operations persevere in the campaign and battle offensive of the main forces, vigorously develop guerrilla warfare behind the enemy, and politically arouse the masses on a large scale, our strategic initiative can be gradually established.

(85) Now let us speak of flexibility. What is flexibility? It is the thing that concretely realizes initiative in operations, that is, the flexible employment of forces. The flexible employment of forces is the central task of the direction of war and also the hardest to do well. The business of war, apart from organizing and educating the army, organizing and educating the people and so on, is employing the army in battle, and everything is for victory in battle. Organizing the army and so on is of course difficult, but employing the army is more difficult, especially in circumstances of the weak against the strong. To do this requires immense subjective ability, requires overcoming the confusion, obscurity and uncertainty characteristic of war and finding in it order, light and certainty, in order to realize flexibility in command.

(86) The basic policy of battlefield operations in the War of Resistance is offensive battles of quick decision on exterior lines. In carrying out this policy there are the tactics or methods of dispersing and concentrating forces, advancing in separate columns and converging attack, attack and defence, assault and holding, encirclement and outflanking, advance and withdrawal. It is easy to understand these tactics; flexibly using and changing them is not easy. Here there are three joints: time, place and troops. If the time is not right, the place is not right, or the circumstances of the troops are not right, victory cannot be achieved. For example, in attacking an enemy on the move, if we strike too early, we expose ourselves and give the enemy conditions for taking precautions; if we strike too late, the enemy has already concentrated and halted, and it becomes a matter of gnawing a hard bone. This is the question of timing. If the point of assault is chosen on the left flank, just at the enemy's weak point, victory is easy; if on the right flank, we hit a nail of the enemy's and cannot achieve effect. This is the question of place. If a certain task is carried out by one of our units, victory is easy; if the same task is given to another unit, results are hard to get. This is the question of the circumstances of the troops. Not only must tactics be used, they must be changed. Attack turns into defence, defence into attack, advance into withdrawal, withdrawal into advance, holding units into assault units, assault units into holding units, and the mutual changing of encirclement, outflanking and so on, according to the circumstances of the enemy and our units, and of the terrain of enemy and us, to change them in time and appropriately, is an important task of flexible command. As in command in battle, so in command in campaigns and strategy.

(87) What the ancients called "the marvel of application lies in one's mind," this "marvel" we call flexibility, which is the product of the intelligent commander. Flexibility is not rash action; rash action should be rejected. Flexibility is a talent whereby an intelligent commander, on the basis of objective circumstances, "sizing up the time and the situation" (the situation including the enemy's, ours and that of the terrain), adopts timely and appropriate methods of handling things; it is what is called "the marvel of application." Based on this marvel of application, offensive battles of quick decision on exterior lines can win more victories, can turn the situation of superiority and inferiority between enemy and us, can realize our initiative over the enemy, can overwhelm and smash the enemy, and final victory will belong to us.

(88) Now let us speak of planning. Because of the uncertainty peculiar to war, realizing planning in war is much harder than realizing planning in other undertakings. But "in all things success depends on prior preparation, and without prior preparation failure is certain"; without plans and preparation made beforehand, victory in war cannot be won. There is no absolute certainty in war, but there is not no relative certainty of some degree. Our own side is comparatively certain. The enemy's side is very uncertain, but there are also omens to be sought, clues to be examined, and phenomena before and after to think over. This constitutes what is called a certain degree of relative certainty, and planning in war has an objective basis. The development of modern technology (telegraph, wireless, aircraft, motor vehicles, railways, steamships and so on) has further increased the possibility of planning in war. But because war has only a rather low degree and a very short time of certainty, planning in war is hard to make complete and fixed; it moves with the movement of war (or flow, or shifting), and differs in degree according to the size of the scope of the war. Tactical plans, such as plans of attack or defence by small formations and small units, often have to change several times a day. Campaign plans, that is, plans for the action of big formations, can generally last to the end of a campaign, but partial changes within that campaign are frequent and complete changes occasionally occur. Strategic plans, which are based on the overall situation of the two sides in the war, have a greater degree of fixity, but they too apply only within a certain strategic stage, and when the war moves to a new stage, the strategic plan must be changed. Tactical, campaign and strategic plans each being fixed and changed according to their scope and circumstances is an important joint in war command, and is also the concrete implementation of flexibility in war, the actual marvel of application. The commanders of the War of Resistance at all levels should pay attention to this.

(89) Some people, on the basis of the fluidity of war, fundamentally deny the relative fixity of war plans or war policies, saying that such plans or policies are "mechanical." This view is wrong. As stated in the previous paragraph, we fully admit that because the circumstances of war have only relative certainty and war flows (or moves, or shifts) swiftly forward, war plans or policies should also be given only relative fixity, and must be changed or revised in time according to changes of circumstances and the flow of war; if we did not do so we would become mechanists. But by no means can the relatively fixed war plans or policies within a certain period of time be denied; to deny this is to deny everything, even war itself, even the speaker himself. Because the circumstances and actions of war have their relative fixity, the war plans or policies arising correspondingly must also be given relative fixity. For example, because the circumstances of the war in North China and the dispersed operations of the Eighth Route Army have their fixity within a certain stage, it is entirely necessary within that stage to give relative fixity to the strategic operational policy of the Eighth Route Army, "guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions." Campaign policies are applicable for a shorter time than the strategic policy above, and tactical policies for a still shorter time, yet all have their fixity for a certain time. To deny this, war would have no way to start; it would be without settled views, neither this nor that, or both this and that, a relativism of war. No one denies that even a policy applicable within a certain time is flowing; without this flow there would be no abolition of this policy and adoption of another. But this flow is limited, that is, it flows within the range of the various different war actions that carry out this policy, and not the flow of the fundamental nature of this policy; that is to say, it is a flow in number, not a flow in quality. This fundamental nature does not flow at all within a certain time; what we call relative fixity within a certain time refers to this. In the whole river of absolutely flowing war there is relative fixity at each particular stage — this is our view of the fundamental nature of war plans or war policies.

(90) Having spoken of the defensive protracted war on strategic interior lines and the offensive battles of quick decision on exterior lines in campaigns and battles, and having spoken of initiative, flexibility and planning, we can say a few words in summary. The War of Resistance should be planned. War plans, that is the concrete application of strategy and tactics, must have flexibility so that they can adapt to the circumstances of the war. At every point attention must be paid to turning inferiority into superiority and passivity into initiative, in order to change the situation between enemy and us. And all this is expressed in the offensive battles of quick decision on exterior lines in campaigns and battles, and at the same time is expressed in the defensive protracted war on interior lines in strategy.

Mobile Warfare, Guerrilla Warfare, Positional Warfare

(91) The content of the war, offensive battles of quick decision on exterior lines in campaigns and battles within strategic interior lines, strategic protractedness and strategic defence, is expressed in the form of war as mobile warfare. Mobile warfare is the form in which regular formations carry out offensive campaigns and battles of quick decision on exterior lines over long fronts and large theatres of war. At the same time it includes the so-called "mobile defence" carried out at certain necessary moments to facilitate carrying out such offensive battles, and also includes the positional attack and positional defence that play a supplementary role. Its characteristics are: regular formations, superior forces in campaigns and battles, offensiveness and mobility.

(92) China's territory is vast and her troops numerous, but the army is insufficient in technique and training; the enemy has insufficient forces, but his technique and training are comparatively good. In such circumstances, there is no doubt that offensive mobile warfare should be the main form of operations, supplemented by other forms, making up mobile warfare as a whole. Here we must oppose the so-called "retreat without advance" flightism, and also oppose the so-called "advance without retreat" desperate-fighting-ism.

(93) One of the characteristics of mobile warfare is its fluidity, which not only permits but requires the field army to advance and withdraw in great strides. But this has no point in common with flightism of the Han Fu-chu type. The basic requirement of war is: destroy the enemy; its other requirement is: preserve oneself. The aim of preserving oneself is to destroy the enemy, and destroying the enemy is the most effective means of preserving oneself. Therefore mobile warfare can by no means be used as an excuse by people like Han Fu-chu, and it is by no means only movement to the rear without movement forward; such "movement" negates the basic offensiveness of mobile warfare, and the result of carrying it out is that, great as China is, she would be "moved" away.

(94) But another kind of thinking is also wrong, the so-called desperate-fighting-ism of advance without retreat. We advocate mobile warfare whose content is offensive battles of quick decision on exterior lines in campaigns and battles, which includes the supplementary positional warfare and also "mobile defence" and retreat; without these mobile warfare cannot be fully carried out. Desperate-fighting-ism is military shortsightedness, and its root is often fear of losing territory. The desperate fighters do not know that one of the characteristics of mobile warfare is its fluidity, which not only permits but requires the field army to advance and retreat in great strides. On the positive side, in order to put the enemy in a disadvantageous position and fight in a way advantageous to us, we often require the enemy to be on the move, and require many conditions favourable to us, such as favourable terrain, an easily struck enemy situation, inhabitants who can seal off information, the enemy's fatigue and unpreparedness, and so on. This requires the enemy's advance and does not hesitate at temporarily losing part of the territory. Because temporary and partial loss of territory is the price of keeping and recovering territory wholly and for ever. On the negative side, whenever we are forced into an unfavourable position that fundamentally endangers the preservation of our strength, we should retreat boldly, in order to preserve our strength and strike the enemy again at a new opportunity. The desperate fighters do not know this principle; clearly already in a definitely unfavourable situation, they still fight over the gain or loss of a city or a bit of ground, and the result is that not only are city and ground both lost but the strength is also not preserved. We have always advocated "luring the enemy in deep" because this is the most effective military policy for a weak army fighting a strong army in strategic defence.

(95) Among the forms of operations in the War of Resistance, the main one is mobile warfare, and next to it comes guerrilla warfare. We say that in the war as a whole, mobile warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary; we mean that deciding the fate of the war depends mainly on regular warfare, especially on mobile warfare within it, and guerrilla warfare cannot bear the main responsibility of deciding the fate of the war. But this is not to say that the strategic position of guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance is not important. The strategic position of guerrilla warfare in the whole War of Resistance is second only to mobile warfare, because without the supplement of guerrilla warfare the enemy cannot be defeated either. To say so includes the strategic task of the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare. In a long and cruel war, guerrilla warfare does not stop at its original position; it will raise itself to mobile warfare. Thus the strategic function of guerrilla warfare is twofold: one is supplementing regular warfare, the other is turning itself into regular warfare. As for the unprecedentedly wide and unprecedentedly lasting significance of guerrilla warfare in China's War of Resistance, its strategic position cannot be belittled at all. Therefore, in China, guerrilla warfare itself has not only tactical problems but its own special strategic problems. I have already spoken of this question in my essay "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan." It was said earlier, of the forms of operations in the three strategic stages of the War of Resistance, that in the first stage mobile warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare and positional warfare supplementary. In the second stage guerrilla warfare will rise to the primary position, supplemented by mobile warfare and positional warfare. In the third stage mobile warfare will rise again to be the main form, supplemented by positional warfare and guerrilla warfare. But the mobile warfare of this third stage will no longer be borne entirely by the original regular army, but part of it, perhaps quite an important part, will be borne by the original guerrilla forces raised from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare. Looking at the three stages, guerrilla warfare in China's War of Resistance is by no means dispensable. It will perform an unprecedentedly great act in the history of human warfare. For this reason, among the several million regular troops of the whole country, it is entirely necessary to designate at least several hundred thousand men, to disperse them in all the enemy-occupied areas, to arouse and coordinate with the armed people, and to carry on guerrilla warfare. The designated troops must consciously take on this sacred task, and must not think that fighting fewer big battles makes them for the time look unlike national heroes and lowers their standing; this thought is wrong. Guerrilla warfare has not such swift results and spectacular fame as regular warfare, but "a long road tests a horse's strength, and a long time shows a man's heart"; in a long and cruel war, guerrilla warfare will show its great power, and is truly an undertaking of no small account. Moreover regular troops dispersed can wage guerrilla warfare and, concentrated, can wage mobile warfare; the Eighth Route Army does exactly this. The Eighth Route Army's policy is: "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions." This policy is entirely correct, and the views of those who oppose it are incorrect.

(96) Defensive and offensive positional warfare cannot in general be carried out under China's technical conditions today, and this is also where we show our weakness. Moreover the enemy takes advantage of China's vast territory to avoid our positional installations. Therefore positional warfare cannot be used as an important means, much less as the main means. But in the first and second stages of the war, local positional warfare included within the scope of mobile warfare and playing a supplementary role in campaign operations is possible and necessary. The so-called "mobile defence" of a semi-positional character, adopted for the purpose of resisting step by step in order to wear down the enemy and gain time, is even more a necessary part of mobile warfare. China must strive to increase new-type weapons so that in the stage of strategic counter-offensive she can fully carry out the task of positional attack. The stage of strategic counter-offensive will without doubt raise the position of positional warfare, because at that time the enemy will hold his positions firmly, and without our powerful positional attack coordinated with mobile warfare the aim of recovering lost territory cannot be reached. Even so, in the third stage we must still strive to make mobile warfare the main form of war. Because the art of leading war and the activeness of men, in positional warfare like that of Western Europe after the middle of the First World War, died more than half. But in operating within China's vast territory, and with China for a rather long time still retaining her technical poverty, "liberating war from the trenches" naturally appears. Even in the third stage, although China's technical conditions have improved, she still may not be able to surpass the enemy, and so she will be forced to strive for mobile warfare of a high degree, or she cannot reach the aim of final victory. Thus in the whole War of Resistance, China will not make positional warfare the main form, and the main and important forms are mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. In these forms of war the art of leading war and the activeness of men can get full chance for play, and this is a blessing in our misfortune!

War of Attrition, War of Annihilation

(97) It was said before that the essence of war, the object of war, is to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy. But the forms of war for attaining this object, mobile warfare, positional warfare and guerrilla warfare, differ in degree in their effects when realized, and so generally there is the distinction between so-called war of attrition and war of annihilation.

(98) First we can say that the War of Resistance is a war of attrition and at the same time a war of annihilation. Why? The enemy's strong factors are still being brought into play, and strategic superiority and initiative still exist; without campaign and battle annihilation, we cannot effectively and swiftly reduce his strong factors or destroy his superiority and initiative. Our weak factors also still exist, and we have not yet escaped strategic inferiority and passivity; to gain time, strengthen domestic and international conditions and change our unfavourable state, we also cannot succeed without campaign and battle annihilation. Therefore, campaign annihilation is the means of reaching the aim of strategic attrition. In this sense annihilation is attrition. For China to be able to wage protracted war, attrition by means of annihilation is the main means.

(99) But what reaches the aim of strategic attrition also includes campaign attrition. In general mobile warfare carries out the task of annihilation, positional warfare carries out the task of attrition, and guerrilla warfare carries out the task of attrition and at the same time the task of annihilation; the three differ from one another. In this sense war of annihilation differs from war of attrition. Campaign attrition is supplementary, but it is also needed in protracted operations.

(100) In theory and in need, in the stage of defence China should make use of the mainly annihilating character of mobile warfare and the partly annihilating character of guerrilla warfare, plus the mainly attritional character of supplementary positional warfare and the partly attritional character of guerrilla warfare, to attain the strategic aim of wearing down the enemy in great quantities. In the stage of stalemate, we continue to use the annihilating and attritional character of guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare to wear down the enemy in great quantities again. All this is to make the war situation protracted, gradually to change the situation between enemy and us, and prepare the conditions for the counter-offensive. In the strategic counter-offensive, we continue to attain attrition by annihilation, so as finally to drive out the enemy.

(101) But in fact, the experience of ten months is that many, even most, mobile warfare campaigns have turned into wars of attrition; and the annihilating function that guerrilla warfare should have has also not been raised in certain areas to the proper degree. The advantage of this situation is that in any case we have worn the enemy down, which has significance for protracted operations and final victory, and our blood has not been shed in vain. But the disadvantage is: first, the wearing down of the enemy is insufficient; second, we ourselves can hardly avoid being worn down more and capturing less. Although the objective cause of this situation should be recognized, that is the difference between enemy and us in technique and in the training of personnel, yet in theory and in practice, in any case, it should be advocated that the main forces strive in all favourable cases to carry out war of annihilation. Although guerrilla units, in order to carry out many concrete tasks, such as sabotage and harassment, cannot but conduct pure war of attrition, yet it must still be advocated and strived for that in all favourable cases in campaigns and battles they conduct operations of annihilation, to attain the aim of both wearing down the enemy in great quantities and supplementing ourselves in great quantities.

(102) The exterior lines, quick decision and offence of offensive battles of quick decision on exterior lines, and the mobility of mobile warfare, in the form of battle mainly mean adopting the tactics of encirclement and outflanking, and therefore concentrating superior forces. So concentrating forces and adopting the tactics of encirclement and outflanking are the necessary conditions for carrying out mobile warfare, that is offensive battles of quick decision on exterior lines. But all this is for the aim of annihilating the enemy.

(103) The strong point of the Japanese army lies not only in its weapons but also in the training of its officers and men — its organization, its self-confidence formed through never having been defeated before, its superstition regarding the Emperor and spirits, its arrogance and self-importance, its contempt for the Chinese, and other characteristics; this was created by the Japanese militarists' many years of arbitrary education and Japanese national habits. This is the main reason why our army inflicts many casualties and captures few prisoners. This point was underestimated by many people in the past. The destruction of this thing needs a long process. First we must take this characteristic seriously, and then work patiently and according to plan from many sides — politically, in international propaganda, in the Japanese people's movement — toward this point; and military war of annihilation is also one of the methods. Here, pessimists can use this to lead to the theory of subjugation, and passive military men can use it to oppose war of annihilation. We are the opposite: we consider that this strong point of the Japanese army can be destroyed and has already begun to be destroyed. The method of destruction is mainly winning over politically. With Japanese soldiers, we do not insult their self-respect but understand and guide this self-respect, and by the method of lenient treatment of prisoners lead them to understand the anti-people aggressionism of the Japanese rulers. On the other hand, we show before them the indomitable spirit and heroic, tenacious fighting power of the Chinese army and the Chinese people, that is, we give them the blow of war of annihilation. In operations, the experience of ten months proves that annihilation is possible, and the campaigns of Pinghsingkuan, Taierchwang and so on are clear proof. The Japanese army's morale has begun to waver, the soldiers do not understand the aim of the war, they are in the encirclement of the Chinese army and people, their courage in charging is far less than the Chinese soldier's, and so on; these are all objective conditions favourable to our waging war of annihilation, and these conditions will develop more and more as the war is protracted. On the point of destroying the enemy's arrogance by war of annihilation, annihilation is also one of the conditions for shortening the course of the war and hastening the liberation of the Japanese soldiers and the Japanese people. In the world cats make friends with cats only; I have never heard of a cat making friends with a mouse.

(104) On the other hand, it should be acknowledged that in the degree of technique and training of personnel we are at present inferior to the enemy. Hence annihilation to the highest limit, for example capturing all or most of the enemy, is difficult in many cases, especially in fighting on the plains. The excessive demand of the advocates of quick victory on this point is also wrong. The correct requirement for the War of Resistance should be: war of annihilation as far as possible. In all favourable cases, in every battle concentrate superior forces and adopt the tactics of encirclement and outflanking — if we cannot encircle the whole, encircle a part; if we cannot capture all that is encircled, capture part of what is encircled; if we cannot capture part of what is encircled, inflict heavy casualties on part of what is encircled. And in all cases unfavourable to carrying out war of annihilation, carry out war of attrition. For the former, use the principle of concentrating forces; for the latter, the principle of dispersing forces. In the relations of command in campaigns, for the former use the principle of centralized command; for the latter the principle of decentralized command. These are the basic policies of battlefield operations in the War of Resistance.

The Possibility of Exploiting the Enemy's Weaknesses

(105) As regards the enemy's vulnerability to defeat, it has its basis also in the enemy's command. Since ancient times there has been no general who made no mistakes, and just as we ourselves can hardly avoid making slips, there are slips to be found in the enemy; the possibility of exploiting the enemy's weaknesses exists. Strategically and in campaigns, the enemy in ten months of war of aggression has already made many mistakes. The major ones number five. One is gradual increase of forces. This arises from the enemy's underestimation of China, and also from the insufficiency of his own forces. The enemy has always looked down on us; after taking advantage of the Northeast four provinces, and in addition occupying eastern Hopei and northern Chahar, all these were counted as the enemy's strategic reconnaissance. The conclusion he drew was: a heap of loose sand. Accordingly he thought China not worth a fight, laid down the so-called "quick decision" plan, put in a few forces, and tried to frighten us into collapse. In the past ten months, the great unity and the great power of resistance of China were not anticipated by him; he forgot that China is already in an age of progress, and that in China there already exist advanced parties, an advanced army and an advanced people. When it did not work, he gradually increased his forces, from a dozen or so divisions, time after time, up to thirty. To go further forward he must increase again. But because of confrontation with the Soviet Union, and because of inherent insufficiency in men and money, Japan's maximum number of troops and her final points of attack must be restricted within limits. Two, no main direction of attack. Before the Taierchwang campaign the enemy in Central China and North China divided his forces generally equally, and each side again divided equally internally. In North China, for example, forces were divided equally among the three railways, Tientsin-Pukow, Peiping-Hankow and Tatung-Puchow; each line lost some in casualties, some were left garrisoning occupied areas, and going further forward there were no troops. After the defeat at Taierchwang, lessons were summed up and the main forces were concentrated in the direction of Hsuchow; this mistake was for the time corrected. Three, no strategic coordination. In the enemy's two groups in Central China and North China, within each group there was general coordination, but between the two groups there was very little. When the southern section of the Tientsin-Pukow line attacked Hsiaopengpu, the northern section did not move; when the northern section attacked Taierchwang, the southern section did not move. After both places met misfortune, the Minister of the Army came to inspect and the Chief of the General Staff came to direct, and for the time coordination was achieved. Inside the Japanese landlord-bourgeoisie and militarists there exist rather serious contradictions, which are developing, and the lack of coordination in the war is one of their concrete expressions. Four, loss of strategic opportunity. This was shown conspicuously in the pauses after the occupation of Nanking and Taiyuan, mainly because of insufficient forces and having no strategic pursuit units. Five, much encirclement, little annihilation. Before the Taierchwang campaign, in the campaigns of Shanghai, Nanking, Tsangchow, Paoting, Nankou, Hsinkou, Linfen and so on, many were routed and few captured, showing the clumsiness of his command. These five — gradual increase of forces, no main direction of attack, no strategic coordination, loss of opportunity, much encirclement and little annihilation — were the weak points of Japanese command before the Taierchwang campaign. After the Taierchwang campaign, although some have been corrected, given such factors as his insufficiency of forces and internal contradictions, it is impossible for him not to repeat mistakes. And what is gained here is lost there. For example, concentrating North China forces at Hsuchow left big gaps in the North China occupied areas and gave guerrilla warfare the chance to develop freely. These are the enemy's own mistakes, not mistakes we made him make. On our side, we can still deliberately create the enemy's mistakes, that is, by our own intelligent and effective moves, under the cover of the organized masses, create misjudgement in the enemy and manoeuvre him into our range, such as "make a noise in the east and strike in the west"; the possibility of this was spoken of earlier. All this shows that our victory in war can also find a certain source in the enemy's command. Although we should not make this an important basis of our strategic plan — on the contrary, it is the reliable course for our plans to rest on the assumption that the enemy makes few mistakes — and since we exploit the enemy's weaknesses, the enemy can exploit ours, and giving the enemy as few weaknesses to seek as possible is also a task of our command; still, the enemy's command errors have actually existed and will still occur, and can be created by our efforts, all of which suffice for our use, and the anti-Japanese generals should grasp them with all their might. The enemy's strategic and campaign command is mostly poor, but his battle command, that is, unit tactics and small-formation tactics, has considerable merit, and we should learn from him on this point.

The Question of Decisive Engagements in the War of Resistance

(106) The question of decisive engagements in the War of Resistance should be divided into three kinds: all campaigns and battles in which we are sure of winning should be fought resolutely as decisive engagements; all campaigns and battles in which we are not sure should avoid decisive engagement; and strategic decisive engagements that gamble on the nation's destiny should be avoided altogether. The characteristics by which the War of Resistance differs from many other wars are also shown in this question of decisive engagements. In the first and second stages, the enemy is strong and we are weak, and the enemy's demand is that we concentrate our main forces for decisive battle with him. Our demand is the opposite: it lies in choosing favourable conditions, concentrating superior forces, and fighting decisive campaigns and battles with him where we are sure, such as Pinghsingkuan, Taierchwang and many other battles; and avoiding decisive engagements under unfavourable conditions in which we are not sure, such as the policy adopted in the Changte and other campaigns. Strategic decisive engagements that stake the nation's destiny we simply do not do, as in the recent retreat from Hsuchow. Thus the enemy's "quick decision" plan was destroyed, and he had to follow us in waging protracted war. This policy cannot be carried out in a country of small territory, and is also hard to carry out in a country politically too backward. We are a big country and in an age of progress, and this can be done. If strategic decisive engagements are avoided, "as long as the green hills remain, there will be no shortage of firewood"; although some territory is lost, there is still vast room for manoeuvre, which can promote and await domestic progress, international reinforcement and the enemy's internal collapse; this is the best policy for the War of Resistance. The impatient advocates of quick victory cannot endure the hard road of protracted war and try for quick victory; as soon as the situation takes a slight turn for the better they blow up a clamour for strategic decisive engagement, and if followed the whole resistance would suffer heavily, protracted war would be buried, and it would exactly fall into the enemy's poisonous trap; it is truly the worst policy. Not fighting decisive engagements means giving up territory; there is no doubt about this, and in unavoidable circumstances (and only in such circumstances) it can only be given up boldly. When circumstances reach this point, there should be no lingering regret whatever; this is the correct policy of trading space for time. In history, Russia, by avoiding decisive battle and carrying out bold retreat, defeated Napoleon, who for a time shook the world. China should do the same now.

(107) Are we not afraid of being cursed for "non-resistance"? We are not. Not fighting at all and compromising with the enemy is the doctrine of non-resistance, which should not only be cursed but is entirely not to be permitted. Resolute resistance, but avoiding the enemy's poisonous trap, not letting our main forces be lost under one blow of the enemy and so affecting the continuance of resistance — in a word, avoiding subjugation — is entirely necessary. To have doubts about this is shortsightedness in questions of war, and the result will certainly be to end up in the same company as the subjugationists. We criticized the so-called "advance without retreat" desperate-fighting-ism precisely because if such desperate-fighting-ism became a general fashion, the result would be the danger that resistance could not be continued and would in the end lead to subjugation.

(108) We advocate decisive engagements under all favourable conditions, whether battles or campaigns big or small, and on this no passivity is permitted. Only such decisive engagements can attain the aim of annihilating and wearing down the enemy, and every anti-Japanese soldier must do it resolutely. For this purpose partial and fairly large sacrifices are necessary, and the view of avoiding any sacrifice is the view of cowards and sufferers from Japan-phobia, and must be resolutely opposed. The killing of the flightists Li Fu-ying, Han Fu-chu and others was right. Advocating in war the spirit and action of courage, sacrifice and heroic advance is something absolutely necessary under a correct operational plan and cannot be separated from protracted war and final victory. We sternly condemned the so-called "retreat without advance" flightism and upheld the enforcement of strict discipline precisely because only such heroic decisive engagement under a correct plan can defeat a strong enemy; while flightism is the direct supporter of the theory of subjugation.

(109) Fighting heroically in front, and giving up territory behind: is that not self-contradictory? Is not the blood of these heroic fighters shed in vain? This is a very improper question. Eating in front and shitting behind: is that not eating for nothing? Sleeping in front and getting up behind: is that not sleeping for nothing? Can the question be put like this? I think not. To go on eating without end, to go on sleeping without end, to go on fighting heroically right to the Yalu River — this is the fancy of subjectivism and formalism, and does not exist in real life. Who does not know that when blood is shed in battle to gain time and prepare the counter-offensive, though some territory still cannot be avoided being given up, time is gained, the aim of annihilating and wearing down the enemy is achieved, our own battle experience is gained, the people who had not risen have risen, and our international position is increased? Is such blood shed in vain? Not in the least. Giving up territory is for preserving military strength and is precisely for preserving territory too; because if we do not give up part of the territory under unfavourable conditions but blindly fight decisive engagements of no certainty, the result will be that after losing our military strength, we shall lose all the territory too, to say nothing of recovering lost land. A capitalist doing business needs capital, and after losing everything he is no capitalist. A gambler also needs stakes; if he stakes everything in one throw and unluckily misses, he has no means of gambling again. Things go in a winding course and not straight through, and war is the same; only formalists cannot understand this principle.

(110) I think even decisive engagements in the stage of strategic counter-offensive are the same. At that time although the enemy is inferior and we superior, the principle of "carry out favourable decisive engagements, avoid unfavourable decisive engagements" still applies, and so it is right up to reaching the Yalu River. Thus we can stand throughout in the initiative, and all the enemy's "challenges," and other people's "goading," should be shelved and ignored, without being moved in the slightest. The anti-Japanese generals must have such firmness to count as brave and wise generals. Those who "jump at a touch" are not worth speaking to about this. In the first stage we are in a certain degree of strategic passivity, but in all campaigns we should also be in the initiative, and in every later stage we should be in the initiative. We are advocates of protractedness and of final victory, not advocates of a one-throw stake like gamblers.

The Army and the People Are the Foundation of Victory

(111) Japanese imperialism, confronting a revolutionary China, will never relax its attack and suppression; its imperialist nature determines this. If China does not resist, Japan will occupy China peacefully without firing a shot; the loss of the four Northeastern provinces is a precedent. If China resists, Japan will press against this resistance and will not stop until her pressure cannot exceed China's resistance; this is an inevitable law. The ambition of the Japanese landlord-bourgeoisie is very great; in order to attack southward to the South Sea Islands and northward to Siberia, they adopt the policy of breaking through the middle and first attack China. Those who think Japan will stop at the right point after occupying North China and the Kiangsu-Chekiang area completely fail to see that Japanese imperialism, having developed to a new stage and approaching the boundary of death, is no longer the same as Japan in history. When we say that Japan's number of troops and points of attack have fixed limits, we mean: on Japan's side, on the basis of her strength, since she also wants to launch attacks elsewhere and defend against an enemy on another side, she can only put out a certain amount of strength to attack China to the limit of her ability; on China's side, which has shown her own progress and tenacious resistance, one cannot imagine that only Japan attacks fiercely and China has no necessary resistance. Japan cannot occupy the whole of China, but in all areas within her ability she will spare no effort to suppress China's resistance, and until Japan's internal and external conditions bring Japanese imperialism into direct crisis of entering the grave, she will not stop this suppression. There are only two outlets in Japan's domestic politics: either the entire ruling class collapses quickly, the regime passes to the people, and the war thereby ends — but for the time being there is no such possibility; or the landlord-bourgeoisie become more and more fascist and sustain the war until the day of their own collapse, and Japan is going exactly on this road. There is no third road. Those who hope that the moderates of the Japanese bourgeoisie will come out and stop the war have only an illusion. The moderates of the Japanese bourgeoisie have already become prisoners of the landlords and the financial oligarchs; this has been the reality of Japanese politics for many years. After Japan has attacked China, if China's resistance has not yet dealt Japan a fatal blow and Japan still has sufficient strength, she will certainly attack the South Seas or Siberia, or even both places. When the European war breaks out, she will play this move; the wishful calculations of Japan's rulers are very large. Of course there is the possibility that because of the strength of the Soviet Union and Japan's great weakening in the war in China, she may have to stop the original plan of attacking Siberia and take a fundamentally defensive attitude toward it. But when this situation appears, it will not be a relaxation of Japan's attack on China but on the contrary an intensification of her attack on China, because then she will have only the one road of devouring the weak. Then the tasks of China's persevering in resistance, in the united front and in protracted war will appear all the more serious, and there must be no relaxing in the slightest.

(112) In these circumstances, the main condition for China to defeat Japan is the unity of the whole country and progress in all fields ten or a hundred times greater than in the past. China is already in an age of progress and already has great unity, but the present degree is still very far from enough. That Japan has occupied so much land is on the one hand because of Japan's strength and on the other because of China's weakness; and this weakness is entirely the result of the accumulation of historical errors over a hundred years, especially the last ten, which confined China's progressive factors to today's state. Now to defeat such a strong enemy is impossible without long and extensive effort. There are many things to strive for, and I shall speak here only of the two most fundamental aspects: progress of the army and of the people.

(113) Renovating the army system cannot be separated from modernization, strengthening technical conditions; without this the enemy cannot be driven across the Yalu River. The employment of the army requires progressive and flexible strategy and tactics; without this too victory cannot be won. But the foundation of the army is the soldiers; without a progressive political spirit permeating the army, and without progressive political work to carry out this permeation, true unity between officers and men cannot be attained, the utmost enthusiasm for resistance of officers and men cannot be aroused, and all technique and tactics cannot get the best basis for bringing into play the effect they should have. We say that although Japan's technical conditions are superior she will in the end fail, apart from the blows of annihilation and attrition we give, because the morale of her army will in the end waver with our blows and the union of weapons and men is unstable. We on the contrary have in the political aim of the War of Resistance the unity of officers and men. Here lies the basis for the political work of all anti-Japanese armies. The army should carry out democratization to a certain degree, mainly abolishing the feudal system of beating and abuse and having officers and men share weal and woe in life. Thus the aim of unity between officers and men will be attained, the army will increase its fighting power greatly, and a long and cruel war will not fail to be sustained.

(114) The deepest source of the great power of war lies in the masses of the people. The main reason Japan dares to bully us is the unorganized state of the Chinese masses. Overcoming this shortcoming, we place the Japanese aggressors before our hundreds of millions of people who have stood up, like a wild buffalo charging into a ring of fire; one shout from us will give it a great fright, and this wild buffalo is bound to be burned to death. On our side, the army must have a ceaseless flow of replenishment; the present "press-gang methods" and "buying-soldiers methods" practised recklessly below urgently need to be forbidden and changed into extensive and ardent political mobilization; then it will be easy to have several million become soldiers. The finances for resistance are very difficult, but when the masses are mobilized, finance too is no problem; how could a country of such vast land and numerous people suffer from poverty? The army must become one with the masses, so that the army in the eyes of the masses is their own army; such an army will be invincible in the world, and a mere Japanese imperialism will not be enough to fight.

(115) Many people, when they fail to get relations between officers and men and between army and people right, think the methods are wrong; I always tell them it is a question of basic attitude (or basic purpose), and this attitude is respect for the soldiers and respect for the people. Starting from this attitude, there are various policies, methods and forms. Apart from this attitude, policies, methods and forms are bound to be wrong, and the relations between officers and men and between army and people will certainly not be got right. The three great principles of political work in the army: the first is unity between officers and men, the second is unity between army and people, the third is disintegration of the enemy army. For these principles to be carried out effectively, all must start from the basic attitude of respect for the soldiers, respect for the people, and respect for the personality of enemy prisoners who have laid down their arms. Those who think it is not a question of basic attitude but of technique are really mistaken and should be corrected.

(116) At this time when defending Wuhan and other places has become an urgent task, arousing the entire enthusiasm of the whole army and the whole people to support the war is a very serious task. The task of defending Wuhan and other places must without doubt be seriously put forward and carried out. But whether it can definitely be defended and not lost is decided not by subjective wishes but by concrete conditions. Politically mobilizing the whole army and the whole people to struggle is one of the most important concrete conditions. If we do not strive to win all the necessary conditions, if even one of the necessary conditions is lacking, we shall inevitably repeat the mistake of the fall of Nanking and other places. Where China's Madrid will be depends on which place possesses the conditions of Madrid. In the past there was not a Madrid; in the future we should win several, but it depends entirely on the conditions. The most basic of the conditions is the broad political mobilization of the whole army and the whole people.

(117) In all work, the general policy of the anti-Japanese national united front should be persevered in. Because only this policy can persevere in resistance and in protracted war, can generally and deeply improve relations between officers and men and between army and people, can arouse the entire enthusiasm of the whole army and the whole people to fight for defending all areas not lost and recovering all areas already lost, and can win final victory.

(118) This question of politically mobilizing the army and the people is really too important. The reason why we do not hesitate to speak of this point again and again is that without it there is no victory. Without many other necessary things there is of course also no victory, but this is the most basic condition for victory. The anti-Japanese national united front is the united front of the whole army and the whole people, and is by no means merely the united front of the party headquarters and party members of a few parties; mobilizing the whole army and the whole people to take part in the united front is the fundamental aim of initiating the anti-Japanese national united front.

Conclusion

(119) What is the conclusion? The conclusion is: "Under what conditions can China defeat and destroy the strength of Japanese imperialism? There must be three conditions: first, the completion of the anti-Japanese united front in China; second, the completion of the international anti-Japanese united front; third, the rise of the revolutionary movement of the people in Japan and of the Japanese colonies. From the standpoint of the Chinese people, the great unity of the Chinese people is the main one of the three conditions." "How long will this war last? It depends on the strength of China's anti-Japanese united front and on many other deciding factors in both China and Japan." "If these conditions cannot be realized soon, the war will be prolonged. But the result will be the same: Japan will certainly be defeated and China will certainly win. Only the sacrifices will be great, and there will be a very painful period to pass through." "Our strategic policy should be to use our main forces to fight on a very long, shifting front. For the Chinese army to win, it must wage mobile warfare of a high degree over wide battlefields." "Besides using trained troops in mobile warfare, we must organize large numbers of guerrilla units among the peasants." "In the course of the war ... gradually strengthen the equipment of the Chinese army. Therefore China will be able in the later period of the war to engage in positional warfare and make positional attacks on the Japanese-occupied areas. Thus, under the long attrition of China's resistance, Japan's economy will be on the verge of collapse; amid countless battles her morale will be on the verge of decline. On China's side, the latent strength of resistance will surge higher day by day, and large numbers of revolutionary masses will keep pouring to the front to fight for freedom. All these factors, together with others, will enable us to make the final, fatal attacks on the fortresses and bases in the Japanese-occupied areas and drive the Japanese aggressor army out of China." (Talk with Snow, July 1936.) "China's political situation has from this time entered a new stage, ... The most central task of this stage is: to mobilize all forces to win victory in the war of resistance." "The central key to winning victory in the war of resistance lies in developing the resistance already begun into a comprehensive, whole-nation resistance. Only such a comprehensive, whole-nation resistance can win final victory." "Because the present resistance still has serious weaknesses, in the course of the future resistance there may occur many unfavourable developments such as setbacks, retreats, internal splits, betrayals, and temporary and partial compromises. Therefore it should be seen that this resistance is an arduous protracted war. But we believe that the resistance already begun will, through the efforts of our Party and the whole people, break through all obstacles and continue to advance and develop." (August 1937, "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party.") These are the conclusions. The subjugationists look at the enemy as a god and at themselves as straw; the advocates of quick victory look at the enemy as straw and at themselves as gods; both are wrong. Our view is the opposite: the War of Resistance is a protracted war, and final victory is China's — this is our conclusion.

(120) My lecture ends here. The great War of Resistance is unfolding, and many people hope for a summing-up of experience so as to win complete victory. What I have said is only the general things from ten months of experience, and may also be counted as a summing-up. This question deserves to arouse wide attention and discussion; what I have said is only a general outline, and I hope you will study and discuss it, and give me corrections and additions.