The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan

China Mao Zedong

12 November 1937

Context
Mao addressed Communist Party members on November 12, 1937, after the fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan, calling for a total war of resistance against Japan and opposition to capitulationism within the united front.
Main themes
Transition from partial to total war of resistance, Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation, fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan, guerrilla warfare of the Eighth Route Army, Kuomintang one-party dictatorship, class capitulationism within the Party, national capitulationism of the right-wing bloc, independence and self-reliance within the united front, reform of the Kuomintang government and army, Soviet aid to China
Duration
~31 min
83rd percentile
Words
3,713
83rd percentile
Sentences
149
80th percentile
Readability
43
42nd percentile
Grade
13.5
62nd percentile
Syntax
3.02
51st percentile
Vocabulary
2.44
93rd percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 84%79%
  • Institutional 11%10%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Economic 1%1%
  • Ceremonial 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 6%

149 sentences in 61 paragraphs

I. The Present Situation Is One of Transition from a Partial War of Resistance to a Total War of Resistance

(1) We support every war of resistance against the offensive of Japanese imperialism, even a partial one. For it is a step forward from the policy of non-resistance, for it has a revolutionary character, and for it too is being fought in defence of the motherland.

(2) But we pointed out long ago (at the meeting of Party activists in Yan'an in April this year, at the National Conference of the Party in May, and in the resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in August) that a partial war of resistance waged by the government alone, without the participation of the masses of the people, is bound to fail. For it is not a complete national revolutionary war, for it is not a war of the masses.

(3) We advocate a complete national revolutionary war with the general mobilization of the people of the whole country, or what may be called a total war of resistance. For only such a war of resistance is a war of the masses, and only such a war can achieve the aim of defending the motherland.

(4) The partial war of resistance advocated by the Kuomintang, although it too is a national war, and although it too has a revolutionary character, is very incomplete in its revolutionary character. A partial war of resistance is bound to lead the war towards defeat, and can certainly not defend the motherland.

(5) This is the difference in principle between the Communist Party's position on the War of Resistance and the Kuomintang's present position on the War of Resistance. If Communists forget this principle, they will be unable to guide the War of Resistance Against Japan correctly, they will be powerless to overcome the one-sidedness of the Kuomintang, they will degrade Communists to an unprincipled position and degrade the Communist Party to the level of the Kuomintang. They will be committing a crime against the sacred national revolutionary war and against the task of defending the motherland.

(6) In a complete national revolutionary war, or total war of resistance, the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation put forward by the Communist Party must be carried out, and there must be a government and an army that carry out this programme in full.

(7) The situation after the fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan is as follows:

1. In north China, regular warfare, in which the Kuomintang was the main force, has ended, and guerrilla warfare, in which the Communist Party is the main force, has moved into the principal position. In Jiangsu and Zhejiang, the Kuomintang's front has been smashed, and the Japanese invaders are advancing on Nanjing and the Yangtze valley. The Kuomintang's partial war of resistance has already shown that it cannot hold out for long.

2. The governments of Britain, the United States, France and other countries have expressed support for China in their own imperialist interests, but this is still confined to verbal sympathy, with no substantial aid of any real strength.

3. The German and Italian fascists are doing their utmost to aid Japanese imperialism.

4. The Kuomintang is still unwilling to make any change in principle to its one-party dictatorship, by which it is conducting the partial war of resistance, or to its policy of controlling the people.

These are the circumstances on one side.

On the other side, we see the following:

1. The political influence of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army has spread enormously and very rapidly, and the cry of "saviours of the nation" is resounding throughout the country. The Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army are determined to persist in guerrilla warfare in north China, so as to defend the whole country and pin down the Japanese invaders' advance on the Central Plains and the Northwest.

2. The mass movement has advanced a step.

3. The national bourgeoisie has moved to the left.

4. The forces within the Kuomintang that favour reforming the status quo are growing.

5. The movement of the people of the world against Japan and in support of China is developing.

6. The Soviet Union is preparing to aid China with material strength.

These are the circumstances on the other side.

(8) Therefore, we are at present in a period of transition from a partial war of resistance to a total war of resistance. The partial war of resistance can no longer hold out, and the total war of resistance has not yet arrived. This is a transitional period of grave crisis, a gap between the old crop and the new.

(9) During this period, China's partial war of resistance may develop in three directions:

The first direction: the partial war of resistance ends and is replaced by a total war of resistance. This is the demand of the great majority of people in the country, but the Kuomintang has not yet made up its mind.

The second direction: the War of Resistance ends and is replaced by capitulation. This is the demand of the Japanese invaders, the traitors and the pro-Japanese clique, but it has met with the opposition of the great majority of the Chinese people.

The third direction: resistance and capitulation coexist in China. This would be the result of the Japanese invaders, the traitors and the pro-Japanese clique, being unable to achieve the aim of the second direction, carrying out their intrigues and schemes to split China's anti-Japanese front. They are now plotting this very move. This danger is gravely present.

(10) Judging from the present situation, the factors at home and abroad that do not permit capitulationism to prevail hold the upper hand. These factors are: Japan's resolute policy of subjugating China, which leaves China no choice but to fight; the existence of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army; the demands of the Chinese people; the demands of the majority of the members of the Kuomintang; the concern of Britain, the United States and France over the losses to their interests that a Kuomintang capitulation would bring; the existence of the Soviet Union and its policy of aiding China; the profound hopes the Chinese people place in the Soviet Union (and these hopes are not empty); and so on. If these factors are well organized, they will overcome not only the factors making for capitulation and split, but also the factors making for stagnation at the stage of the partial war of resistance.

(11) Therefore, the prospect of a transition from a partial war of resistance to a total war of resistance exists. To strive for this prospect is the common and urgent task of all members of the Communist Party of China, all progressive elements of the Kuomintang of China, and all the Chinese people.

(12) China's anti-Japanese national revolutionary war is now in a grave crisis. The crisis may be prolonged, or it may be overcome fairly quickly. The decisive factors, within China, are the co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and, on the basis of this co-operation, a change in the policy of the Kuomintang, and the strength of the masses of workers and peasants; outside China, the decisive factor is the aid of the Soviet Union.

(13) The Kuomintang needs to be reformed politically and organizationally, and such reform is also possible. This is mainly because of Japanese oppression, the united front policy of the Communist Party of China, the demands of the Chinese people, and the growth of new forces within the Kuomintang. Our task is to strive to get it to carry out this reform, so that it may serve as the basis for reforming the government and reforming the army. This reform will undoubtedly require the consent of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang; our position is that of making proposals.

(14) Reforming the government. We have put forward the policy of convening a provisional national assembly, which is both necessary and possible. This reform too will undoubtedly require the consent of the Kuomintang.

(15) The task of reforming the army is to build new armies and reform the old ones. If, within six months to a year, an army of 250,000 to 300,000 men imbued with a new political spirit can be built, then a turn for the better will surely begin to be seen on the anti-Japanese battlefield. Such a new army will influence and unite all the old armies. This is the military basis for the War of Resistance Against Japan to pass over to the strategic counter-offensive. This reform likewise requires the consent of the Kuomintang. The Eighth Route Army should play an exemplary role in the course of this reform. The Eighth Route Army itself should be expanded.

II. Capitulationism Must Be Opposed Both Within the Party and Throughout the Country

Within the Party, oppose class capitulationism

(16) In 1927 the capitulationism of Chen Duxiu led the revolution of that time to defeat. No Communist should ever forget this lesson of history, written in blood.

(17) With regard to the Party's line of the anti-Japanese national united front, before the Lugouqiao Incident the main danger within the Party was "Left" opportunism, that is, closed-doorism. This was mainly because the Kuomintang had not yet begun to resist Japan.

(18) Since the Lugouqiao Incident, the main danger within the Party is no longer "Left" closed-doorism but has shifted to Right opportunism, that is, capitulationism. This is mainly because the Kuomintang has now begun to resist Japan.

(19) As early as the meeting of Party activists in Yan'an in April, again at the National Conference of the Party in May, and especially at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in August (the Luochuan Meeting), we raised this question: in the united front, is the proletariat to lead the bourgeoisie, or the bourgeoisie the proletariat? Is the Kuomintang to draw over the Communist Party, or the Communist Party to draw over the Kuomintang? In terms of the present concrete political tasks, this question means: are we to raise the Kuomintang to the level of the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation and the total war of resistance advocated by the Communist Party, or are we to lower the Communist Party to the level of the Kuomintang's dictatorship of the landlords and bourgeoisie and its partial war of resistance?

(20) Why must the question be posed so sharply? Because:

On the one hand, there are the following circumstances: the compromising nature of the Chinese bourgeoisie; the Kuomintang's superiority in material strength; the slanders and insults against the Communist Party in the declaration and resolutions of the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang, and its clamour about "stopping the class struggle"; the Kuomintang's heartfelt wish for, and widespread propaganda about, "the capitulation of the Communist Party"; Chiang Kai-shek's attempts to bring the Communist Party under his control; the Kuomintang's policy of restricting and weakening the Red Army; the Kuomintang's policy of restricting and weakening the anti-Japanese democratic base areas; the scheme put forward at the Kuomintang's Lushan training course in July "to reduce the strength of the Communist Party by two-fifths in the course of the War of Resistance Against Japan"; the Kuomintang's enticement of Communist cadres with promotion and riches, wine, women and pleasure; the political acts of capitulation by certain radical petty-bourgeois elements (represented by Zhang Naiqi); and so on.

On the other hand, there are the following circumstances: the uneven theoretical level within the Communist Party; the lack, among many Party members, of experience of the co-operation between the two parties during the period of the Northern Expedition; the large number of petty-bourgeois elements within the Party; the reluctance of some Party members to continue the life of arduous struggle of the past; the existence of an unprincipled tendency to accommodate the Kuomintang in the united front; the emergence of a tendency towards new warlordism in the Eighth Route Army; the emergence of the question of the Communist Party's participation in the Kuomintang's organs of political power; the emergence of a tendency to accommodate in the anti-Japanese democratic base areas; and so on.

Because of these grave circumstances on both sides, the question of who leads whom must be posed sharply, and capitulationism must be resolutely opposed.

(21) Over the past several months, and chiefly since the War of Resistance began, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and its organizations at every level have waged a clear-cut and resolute struggle against this capitulationist tendency, both where it has already appeared and where it might appear, and have taken the necessary preventive measures, with good results.

On the question of participation in organs of political power, the Central Committee has issued a draft resolution.

In the Eighth Route Army, a struggle has begun against the tendency towards new warlordism. This tendency is shown in such phenomena as the reluctance of certain individuals, since the reorganization of the Red Army, to accept strictly the leadership of the Communist Party, the growth of individual heroism, and taking pride in receiving appointments from the Kuomintang (taking pride in becoming officials). Although this tendency towards new warlordism shares the same root (lowering the Communist Party to the level of the Kuomintang) and the same result (isolation from the masses) as the old tendency towards warlordism shown in such phenomena as beating and abusing people and breaking discipline, it has arisen in the period of the united front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and carries a particularly great danger, and therefore deserves special attention and must be resolutely opposed. The system of political commissars, which was abolished as a result of Kuomintang interference, and the name of the political department, which was changed to "political training office" as a result of Kuomintang interference, have now been restored. The new strategic principle of "independent and self-reliant guerrilla warfare in the mountains" has been put forward and firmly carried out, thereby basically ensuring the success of the Eighth Route Army in its fighting and its work. The Kuomintang's demand to send its own members to serve as cadres in the Eighth Route Army has been rejected, and the principle of the Communist Party's absolute leadership over the Eighth Route Army has been upheld. In the revolutionary anti-Japanese base areas, the principle of "independence and self-reliance within the united front" has likewise been put forward. The "parliamentarist" tendency has been corrected (not, of course, the parliamentarism of the Second International, which does not exist in the Chinese Party), and the struggle against bandits, enemy spies and saboteurs has been upheld.

In Xi'an, the unprincipled tendency (the tendency to accommodate) in the relations between the two parties has been corrected, and mass struggle has been launched anew.

In eastern Gansu, the situation is broadly the same as in Xi'an.

In Shanghai, Zhang Naiqi-ism, with its "fewer appeals, more suggestions", has been criticized, and a start has been made in correcting the tendency to accommodate in the work of national salvation.

In the guerrilla areas of the south — which are part of the fruits of our ten years of bloody war with the Kuomintang, which are the strategic strongpoints of the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war in the southern provinces, and which are forces that the Kuomintang tried to wipe out with its policy of "encirclement and suppression" even after the Xi'an Incident, and, after the Lugouqiao Incident, switched to trying to weaken by its policy of luring the tiger out of the mountains — our attention has been concentrated on: (1) preventing unconditional concentration (which would meet the Kuomintang's demand to uproot these strongpoints); (2) rejecting personnel sent by the Kuomintang; (3) guarding against the He Ming danger (the danger of being surrounded and disarmed by the Kuomintang).

In Liberation Weekly, a stern and correct attitude of criticism has been maintained.

(22) In order to persevere in the War of Resistance and win final victory, and in order to turn the partial war of resistance into a total war of resistance, we must adhere to the line of the anti-Japanese national united front, and we must expand and consolidate the united front. No proposal to split the united front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party can be permitted. "Left" closed-doorism must still be guarded against. But at the same time, in all united front work we must closely link it with the principle of independence and self-reliance. Our united front with the Kuomintang and with any other party or group is a united front on the basis of carrying out a definite programme. Without this basis there is no united front of any kind, and such co-operation becomes unprincipled action, an expression of capitulationism. Therefore, the explanation, practice and upholding of the principle of "independence and self-reliance within the united front" is the central link in leading the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war on to the road of victory.

(23) What is our aim in doing this? On the one hand, it is to hold the positions we have already won. These are our strategic starting point; if we lose these positions, there is nothing more to be said. But the main aim lies elsewhere, namely, in extending our positions, in achieving the positive aim of "mobilizing millions upon millions of the masses to enter the anti-Japanese national united front and overthrow Japanese imperialism". Holding our positions and extending our positions are inseparable. Over the past several months, still broader masses of the left wing of the petty bourgeoisie have rallied under our influence, the new forces in the Kuomintang camp are growing, mass struggle in Shanxi has developed, and the Party organization has also grown in many places.

(24) But it must be clearly understood that the organizational strength of the Party throughout the country is, generally speaking, still weak. The strength of the masses throughout the country is also still very feeble, and the basic masses of workers and peasants throughout the country have not yet been organized. All this is due, on the one hand, to the Kuomintang's policy of control and oppression, and on the other, to our own lack of work or insufficient work. This is the most fundamental weakness of our Party in the present anti-Japanese national revolutionary war. Unless this weakness is overcome, it will be impossible to defeat Japanese imperialism. To achieve this, we must carry out the principle of "independence and self-reliance within the united front", and we must overcome capitulationism or accommodationism.

Throughout the country, oppose national capitulationism

(25) What has been discussed above is class capitulationism. It leads the proletariat to adapt itself to the reformism and half-heartedness of the bourgeoisie. Unless this tendency is overcome, it will be impossible to wage a victorious anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, impossible to turn the partial war of resistance into a total war of resistance, and impossible to defend the motherland.

But there is another kind of capitulationism, namely national capitulationism, which leads China to adapt itself to the interests of Japanese imperialism, turning China into a colony of Japanese imperialism and all the Chinese people into slaves without a country. This tendency is at present arising in the right-wing bloc of the anti-Japanese national united front.

(26) The left-wing bloc of the anti-Japanese national united front consists of the masses led by the Communist Party, including the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie. Our task is to make every effort to expand and consolidate this bloc. The accomplishment of this task is the basic condition for reforming the Kuomintang, reforming the government and reforming the army; the basic condition for establishing a unified democratic republic; the basic condition for turning the partial war of resistance into a total war of resistance; and the basic condition for overthrowing Japanese imperialism.

(27) The intermediate bloc of the anti-Japanese national united front consists of the national bourgeoisie and the upper petty bourgeoisie. The elements represented by the major Shanghai newspapers have moved to the left; some people in the Fuxing Society have begun to waver, and some in the CC Clique are also wavering. The armies fighting the War of Resistance have received severe lessons, and some of their elements have begun, or are preparing, to reform. Our task is to win the intermediate bloc over to progress and change.

(28) The right-wing bloc of the anti-Japanese national united front consists of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie; it is the headquarters of national capitulationism. Fearing on the one hand the destruction of their property by the war, and on the other the rising of the masses, they inevitably tend towards capitulation. Among them, many are already traitors, many are already members of the pro-Japanese clique, many are preparing to join the pro-Japanese clique, many are wavering, and only a few individuals in special circumstances are firm. Some of them have temporarily joined the national united front only under compulsion and reluctantly. Generally speaking, it will not be long before they split away from the anti-Japanese national united front. At present, many of the worst elements among the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie are plotting to split the anti-Japanese national united front. They are factories of rumours, and rumours such as "Communist Party uprising" and "Eighth Route Army retreat" will multiply day by day from now on. Our task is to oppose national capitulationism resolutely and, in the course of this struggle, to expand and consolidate the left-wing bloc and to win the intermediate bloc over to progress and change.

The relation between class capitulationism and national capitulationism

(29) In the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, class capitulationism is in fact the reserve force of national capitulationism; it is the most pernicious tendency, one that aids the right-wing camp and leads the war to defeat. In order to win the liberation of the Chinese nation and the toiling masses, and in order to make the struggle against national capitulationism firm and vigorous, we must oppose the tendency towards class capitulation within the Communist Party and within the proletariat, and we must carry this struggle into every field of our work.