- Context
- Mao addressed Communist Party members on November 12, 1937, after the fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan, calling for a total war of resistance against Japan and opposition to capitulationism within the united front.
- Main themes
- Transition from partial to total war of resistance, Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation, fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan, guerrilla warfare of the Eighth Route Army, Kuomintang one-party dictatorship, class capitulationism within the Party, national capitulationism of the right-wing bloc, independence and self-reliance within the united front, reform of the Kuomintang government and army, Soviet aid to China
- Duration
- ~31 min
- Words
- 3,713
- Sentences
- 149
- Readability
- 43
- Grade
- 13.5
- Syntax
- 3.02
- Vocabulary
- 2.44
Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other149 sentences in 61 paragraphs
I. The Present Situation Is One of Transition from a Partial War of Resistance to a Total War of Resistance
(1) We support every war of resistance against the offensive of Japanese imperialism, even a partial one. For it is a step forward from the policy of non-resistance, for it has a revolutionary character, and for it too is being fought in defence of the motherland.
(2) But we pointed out long ago (at the meeting of Party activists in Yan'an in April this year, at the National Conference of the Party in May, and in the resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in August) that a partial war of resistance waged by the government alone, without the participation of the masses of the people, is bound to fail. For it is not a complete national revolutionary war, for it is not a war of the masses.
(3) We advocate a complete national revolutionary war with the general mobilization of the people of the whole country, or what may be called a total war of resistance. For only such a war of resistance is a war of the masses, and only such a war can achieve the aim of defending the motherland.
(4) The partial war of resistance advocated by the Kuomintang, although it too is a national war, and although it too has a revolutionary character, is very incomplete in its revolutionary character. A partial war of resistance is bound to lead the war towards defeat, and can certainly not defend the motherland.
(5) This is the difference in principle between the Communist Party's position on the War of Resistance and the Kuomintang's present position on the War of Resistance. If Communists forget this principle, they will be unable to guide the War of Resistance Against Japan correctly, they will be powerless to overcome the one-sidedness of the Kuomintang, they will degrade Communists to an unprincipled position and degrade the Communist Party to the level of the Kuomintang. They will be committing a crime against the sacred national revolutionary war and against the task of defending the motherland.
(6) In a complete national revolutionary war, or total war of resistance, the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation put forward by the Communist Party must be carried out, and there must be a government and an army that carry out this programme in full.
(7) The situation after the fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan is as follows:
1. In north China, regular warfare, in which the Kuomintang was the main force, has ended, and guerrilla warfare, in which the Communist Party is the main force, has moved into the principal position. In Jiangsu and Zhejiang, the Kuomintang's front has been smashed, and the Japanese invaders are advancing on Nanjing and the Yangtze valley. The Kuomintang's partial war of resistance has already shown that it cannot hold out for long.
2. The governments of Britain, the United States, France and other countries have expressed support for China in their own imperialist interests, but this is still confined to verbal sympathy, with no substantial aid of any real strength.
3. The German and Italian fascists are doing their utmost to aid Japanese imperialism.
4. The Kuomintang is still unwilling to make any change in principle to its one-party dictatorship, by which it is conducting the partial war of resistance, or to its policy of controlling the people.
These are the circumstances on one side.
On the other side, we see the following:
1. The political influence of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army has spread enormously and very rapidly, and the cry of "saviours of the nation" is resounding throughout the country. The Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army are determined to persist in guerrilla warfare in north China, so as to defend the whole country and pin down the Japanese invaders' advance on the Central Plains and the Northwest.
2. The mass movement has advanced a step.
3. The national bourgeoisie has moved to the left.
4. The forces within the Kuomintang that favour reforming the status quo are growing.
5. The movement of the people of the world against Japan and in support of China is developing.
6. The Soviet Union is preparing to aid China with material strength.
These are the circumstances on the other side.
(8) Therefore, we are at present in a period of transition from a partial war of resistance to a total war of resistance. The partial war of resistance can no longer hold out, and the total war of resistance has not yet arrived. This is a transitional period of grave crisis, a gap between the old crop and the new.
(9) During this period, China's partial war of resistance may develop in three directions:
The first direction: the partial war of resistance ends and is replaced by a total war of resistance. This is the demand of the great majority of people in the country, but the Kuomintang has not yet made up its mind.
The second direction: the War of Resistance ends and is replaced by capitulation. This is the demand of the Japanese invaders, the traitors and the pro-Japanese clique, but it has met with the opposition of the great majority of the Chinese people.
The third direction: resistance and capitulation coexist in China. This would be the result of the Japanese invaders, the traitors and the pro-Japanese clique, being unable to achieve the aim of the second direction, carrying out their intrigues and schemes to split China's anti-Japanese front. They are now plotting this very move. This danger is gravely present.
(10) Judging from the present situation, the factors at home and abroad that do not permit capitulationism to prevail hold the upper hand. These factors are: Japan's resolute policy of subjugating China, which leaves China no choice but to fight; the existence of the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army; the demands of the Chinese people; the demands of the majority of the members of the Kuomintang; the concern of Britain, the United States and France over the losses to their interests that a Kuomintang capitulation would bring; the existence of the Soviet Union and its policy of aiding China; the profound hopes the Chinese people place in the Soviet Union (and these hopes are not empty); and so on. If these factors are well organized, they will overcome not only the factors making for capitulation and split, but also the factors making for stagnation at the stage of the partial war of resistance.
(11) Therefore, the prospect of a transition from a partial war of resistance to a total war of resistance exists. To strive for this prospect is the common and urgent task of all members of the Communist Party of China, all progressive elements of the Kuomintang of China, and all the Chinese people.
(12) China's anti-Japanese national revolutionary war is now in a grave crisis. The crisis may be prolonged, or it may be overcome fairly quickly. The decisive factors, within China, are the co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and, on the basis of this co-operation, a change in the policy of the Kuomintang, and the strength of the masses of workers and peasants; outside China, the decisive factor is the aid of the Soviet Union.
(13) The Kuomintang needs to be reformed politically and organizationally, and such reform is also possible. This is mainly because of Japanese oppression, the united front policy of the Communist Party of China, the demands of the Chinese people, and the growth of new forces within the Kuomintang. Our task is to strive to get it to carry out this reform, so that it may serve as the basis for reforming the government and reforming the army. This reform will undoubtedly require the consent of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang; our position is that of making proposals.
(14) Reforming the government. We have put forward the policy of convening a provisional national assembly, which is both necessary and possible. This reform too will undoubtedly require the consent of the Kuomintang.
(15) The task of reforming the army is to build new armies and reform the old ones. If, within six months to a year, an army of 250,000 to 300,000 men imbued with a new political spirit can be built, then a turn for the better will surely begin to be seen on the anti-Japanese battlefield. Such a new army will influence and unite all the old armies. This is the military basis for the War of Resistance Against Japan to pass over to the strategic counter-offensive. This reform likewise requires the consent of the Kuomintang. The Eighth Route Army should play an exemplary role in the course of this reform. The Eighth Route Army itself should be expanded.
II. Capitulationism Must Be Opposed Both Within the Party and Throughout the Country
Within the Party, oppose class capitulationism
(16) In 1927 the capitulationism of Chen Duxiu led the revolution of that time to defeat. No Communist should ever forget this lesson of history, written in blood.
(17) With regard to the Party's line of the anti-Japanese national united front, before the Lugouqiao Incident the main danger within the Party was "Left" opportunism, that is, closed-doorism. This was mainly because the Kuomintang had not yet begun to resist Japan.
(18) Since the Lugouqiao Incident, the main danger within the Party is no longer "Left" closed-doorism but has shifted to Right opportunism, that is, capitulationism. This is mainly because the Kuomintang has now begun to resist Japan.
(19) As early as the meeting of Party activists in Yan'an in April, again at the National Conference of the Party in May, and especially at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in August (the Luochuan Meeting), we raised this question: in the united front, is the proletariat to lead the bourgeoisie, or the bourgeoisie the proletariat? Is the Kuomintang to draw over the Communist Party, or the Communist Party to draw over the Kuomintang? In terms of the present concrete political tasks, this question means: are we to raise the Kuomintang to the level of the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation and the total war of resistance advocated by the Communist Party, or are we to lower the Communist Party to the level of the Kuomintang's dictatorship of the landlords and bourgeoisie and its partial war of resistance?
(20) Why must the question be posed so sharply? Because:
On the one hand, there are the following circumstances: the compromising nature of the Chinese bourgeoisie; the Kuomintang's superiority in material strength; the slanders and insults against the Communist Party in the declaration and resolutions of the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang, and its clamour about "stopping the class struggle"; the Kuomintang's heartfelt wish for, and widespread propaganda about, "the capitulation of the Communist Party"; Chiang Kai-shek's attempts to bring the Communist Party under his control; the Kuomintang's policy of restricting and weakening the Red Army; the Kuomintang's policy of restricting and weakening the anti-Japanese democratic base areas; the scheme put forward at the Kuomintang's Lushan training course in July "to reduce the strength of the Communist Party by two-fifths in the course of the War of Resistance Against Japan"; the Kuomintang's enticement of Communist cadres with promotion and riches, wine, women and pleasure; the political acts of capitulation by certain radical petty-bourgeois elements (represented by Zhang Naiqi); and so on.
On the other hand, there are the following circumstances: the uneven theoretical level within the Communist Party; the lack, among many Party members, of experience of the co-operation between the two parties during the period of the Northern Expedition; the large number of petty-bourgeois elements within the Party; the reluctance of some Party members to continue the life of arduous struggle of the past; the existence of an unprincipled tendency to accommodate the Kuomintang in the united front; the emergence of a tendency towards new warlordism in the Eighth Route Army; the emergence of the question of the Communist Party's participation in the Kuomintang's organs of political power; the emergence of a tendency to accommodate in the anti-Japanese democratic base areas; and so on.
Because of these grave circumstances on both sides, the question of who leads whom must be posed sharply, and capitulationism must be resolutely opposed.
(21) Over the past several months, and chiefly since the War of Resistance began, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and its organizations at every level have waged a clear-cut and resolute struggle against this capitulationist tendency, both where it has already appeared and where it might appear, and have taken the necessary preventive measures, with good results.
On the question of participation in organs of political power, the Central Committee has issued a draft resolution.
In the Eighth Route Army, a struggle has begun against the tendency towards new warlordism. This tendency is shown in such phenomena as the reluctance of certain individuals, since the reorganization of the Red Army, to accept strictly the leadership of the Communist Party, the growth of individual heroism, and taking pride in receiving appointments from the Kuomintang (taking pride in becoming officials). Although this tendency towards new warlordism shares the same root (lowering the Communist Party to the level of the Kuomintang) and the same result (isolation from the masses) as the old tendency towards warlordism shown in such phenomena as beating and abusing people and breaking discipline, it has arisen in the period of the united front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and carries a particularly great danger, and therefore deserves special attention and must be resolutely opposed. The system of political commissars, which was abolished as a result of Kuomintang interference, and the name of the political department, which was changed to "political training office" as a result of Kuomintang interference, have now been restored. The new strategic principle of "independent and self-reliant guerrilla warfare in the mountains" has been put forward and firmly carried out, thereby basically ensuring the success of the Eighth Route Army in its fighting and its work. The Kuomintang's demand to send its own members to serve as cadres in the Eighth Route Army has been rejected, and the principle of the Communist Party's absolute leadership over the Eighth Route Army has been upheld. In the revolutionary anti-Japanese base areas, the principle of "independence and self-reliance within the united front" has likewise been put forward. The "parliamentarist" tendency has been corrected (not, of course, the parliamentarism of the Second International, which does not exist in the Chinese Party), and the struggle against bandits, enemy spies and saboteurs has been upheld.
In Xi'an, the unprincipled tendency (the tendency to accommodate) in the relations between the two parties has been corrected, and mass struggle has been launched anew.
In eastern Gansu, the situation is broadly the same as in Xi'an.
In Shanghai, Zhang Naiqi-ism, with its "fewer appeals, more suggestions", has been criticized, and a start has been made in correcting the tendency to accommodate in the work of national salvation.
In the guerrilla areas of the south — which are part of the fruits of our ten years of bloody war with the Kuomintang, which are the strategic strongpoints of the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war in the southern provinces, and which are forces that the Kuomintang tried to wipe out with its policy of "encirclement and suppression" even after the Xi'an Incident, and, after the Lugouqiao Incident, switched to trying to weaken by its policy of luring the tiger out of the mountains — our attention has been concentrated on: (1) preventing unconditional concentration (which would meet the Kuomintang's demand to uproot these strongpoints); (2) rejecting personnel sent by the Kuomintang; (3) guarding against the He Ming danger (the danger of being surrounded and disarmed by the Kuomintang).
In Liberation Weekly, a stern and correct attitude of criticism has been maintained.
(22) In order to persevere in the War of Resistance and win final victory, and in order to turn the partial war of resistance into a total war of resistance, we must adhere to the line of the anti-Japanese national united front, and we must expand and consolidate the united front. No proposal to split the united front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party can be permitted. "Left" closed-doorism must still be guarded against. But at the same time, in all united front work we must closely link it with the principle of independence and self-reliance. Our united front with the Kuomintang and with any other party or group is a united front on the basis of carrying out a definite programme. Without this basis there is no united front of any kind, and such co-operation becomes unprincipled action, an expression of capitulationism. Therefore, the explanation, practice and upholding of the principle of "independence and self-reliance within the united front" is the central link in leading the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war on to the road of victory.
(23) What is our aim in doing this? On the one hand, it is to hold the positions we have already won. These are our strategic starting point; if we lose these positions, there is nothing more to be said. But the main aim lies elsewhere, namely, in extending our positions, in achieving the positive aim of "mobilizing millions upon millions of the masses to enter the anti-Japanese national united front and overthrow Japanese imperialism". Holding our positions and extending our positions are inseparable. Over the past several months, still broader masses of the left wing of the petty bourgeoisie have rallied under our influence, the new forces in the Kuomintang camp are growing, mass struggle in Shanxi has developed, and the Party organization has also grown in many places.
(24) But it must be clearly understood that the organizational strength of the Party throughout the country is, generally speaking, still weak. The strength of the masses throughout the country is also still very feeble, and the basic masses of workers and peasants throughout the country have not yet been organized. All this is due, on the one hand, to the Kuomintang's policy of control and oppression, and on the other, to our own lack of work or insufficient work. This is the most fundamental weakness of our Party in the present anti-Japanese national revolutionary war. Unless this weakness is overcome, it will be impossible to defeat Japanese imperialism. To achieve this, we must carry out the principle of "independence and self-reliance within the united front", and we must overcome capitulationism or accommodationism.
Throughout the country, oppose national capitulationism
(25) What has been discussed above is class capitulationism. It leads the proletariat to adapt itself to the reformism and half-heartedness of the bourgeoisie. Unless this tendency is overcome, it will be impossible to wage a victorious anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, impossible to turn the partial war of resistance into a total war of resistance, and impossible to defend the motherland.
But there is another kind of capitulationism, namely national capitulationism, which leads China to adapt itself to the interests of Japanese imperialism, turning China into a colony of Japanese imperialism and all the Chinese people into slaves without a country. This tendency is at present arising in the right-wing bloc of the anti-Japanese national united front.
(26) The left-wing bloc of the anti-Japanese national united front consists of the masses led by the Communist Party, including the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie. Our task is to make every effort to expand and consolidate this bloc. The accomplishment of this task is the basic condition for reforming the Kuomintang, reforming the government and reforming the army; the basic condition for establishing a unified democratic republic; the basic condition for turning the partial war of resistance into a total war of resistance; and the basic condition for overthrowing Japanese imperialism.
(27) The intermediate bloc of the anti-Japanese national united front consists of the national bourgeoisie and the upper petty bourgeoisie. The elements represented by the major Shanghai newspapers have moved to the left; some people in the Fuxing Society have begun to waver, and some in the CC Clique are also wavering. The armies fighting the War of Resistance have received severe lessons, and some of their elements have begun, or are preparing, to reform. Our task is to win the intermediate bloc over to progress and change.
(28) The right-wing bloc of the anti-Japanese national united front consists of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie; it is the headquarters of national capitulationism. Fearing on the one hand the destruction of their property by the war, and on the other the rising of the masses, they inevitably tend towards capitulation. Among them, many are already traitors, many are already members of the pro-Japanese clique, many are preparing to join the pro-Japanese clique, many are wavering, and only a few individuals in special circumstances are firm. Some of them have temporarily joined the national united front only under compulsion and reluctantly. Generally speaking, it will not be long before they split away from the anti-Japanese national united front. At present, many of the worst elements among the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie are plotting to split the anti-Japanese national united front. They are factories of rumours, and rumours such as "Communist Party uprising" and "Eighth Route Army retreat" will multiply day by day from now on. Our task is to oppose national capitulationism resolutely and, in the course of this struggle, to expand and consolidate the left-wing bloc and to win the intermediate bloc over to progress and change.
The relation between class capitulationism and national capitulationism
(29) In the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, class capitulationism is in fact the reserve force of national capitulationism; it is the most pernicious tendency, one that aids the right-wing camp and leads the war to defeat. In order to win the liberation of the Chinese nation and the toiling masses, and in order to make the struggle against national capitulationism firm and vigorous, we must oppose the tendency towards class capitulation within the Communist Party and within the proletariat, and we must carry this struggle into every field of our work.
The original Chinese. The tags above are read on the English translation's sentences.
一 目前形势是处在片面抗战到全面抗战的过渡期中
(一)我们赞助一切反对日本帝国主义进攻的抗战,即使是片面的抗战。因为它比不抵抗主义进一步,因为它是带着革命性的,因为它也是在为着保卫祖国而战。
(二)但是我们早就指出(今年四月延安党的活动分子会议,五月党的全国代表会议,八月中央政治局的决议):不要人民群众参加的单纯政府的片面抗战,是一定要失败的。因为它不是完全的民族革命战争,因为它不是群众战争。
(三)我们主张全国人民总动员的完全的民族革命战争,或者叫作全面抗战。因为只有这种抗战,才是群众战争,才能达到保卫祖国的目的。
(四)国民党主张的片面抗战,虽然也是民族战争,虽然也带着革命性,但其革命性很不完全。片面抗战是一定要引导战争趋于失败的,是决然不能保卫祖国的。
(五)这是共产党的抗战主张和现时国民党的抗战主张的原则分歧。如果共产党员忘记了这个原则性,他们就不能正确地指导抗日战争,他们就将无力克服国民党的片面性,就把共产主义者降低到无原则的地位,把共产党降低到国民党。他们就是对于神圣的民族革命战争和保卫祖国的任务犯了罪过。
(六)在完全的民族革命战争或全面抗战中,必须执行共产党提出的抗日救国十大纲领,必须有一个完全执行这个纲领的政府和军队。
(七)上海太原失陷后的形势是这样的:
1、在华北,以国民党为主体的正规战争已经结束,以共产党为主体的游击战争进入主要地位。在江浙,国民党的战线已被击破,日寇正向南京和长江流域进攻。国民党的片面抗战已表现不能持久。
2、英、美、法等国政府为它们自己的帝国主义的利益表示援助中国,还限于口头上的同情,而没有什么实力的援助。
3、德意法西斯竭力援助日本帝国主义。
4、国民党对于它的用以进行片面抗战的一党专政及其对民众的统制政策,还不愿意作原则上的改变。
这些是一方面的情形。
另一方面则表现:
1、共产党和八路军的政治影响极大地极快地扩大,“民族救星”的声浪在全国传布着。共产党和八路军决心坚持华北的游击战争,用以捍卫全国,钳制日寇向中原和西北的进攻。
2、民众运动开展了一步。
3、民族资产阶级的左倾。
4、国民党中主张改革现状的势力正在增长。
5、世界人民反对日本和援助中国的运动正在发展。
6、苏联正在准备用实力援助中国。
这些是又一方面的情形。
(八)因此,目前是处在从片面抗战到全面抗战的过渡期中。片面抗战已经无力持久,全面抗战还没有来到。这是一个青黄不接的危机严重的过渡期。
(九)在此期间,中国的片面抗战可能向三个方向发展:
第一个方向,结束片面抗战,代以全面抗战。这是国内大多数人的要求,但是国民党还没有下决心。
第二个方向,结束抗战,代以投降。这是日寇、汉奸和亲日派的要求,但是遭到了中国大多数人的反对。
第三个方向,抗战和投降并存于中国。这将是日寇、汉奸和亲日派无法达到第二个方向的目的,因而实行其破裂中国抗日阵线的阴谋诡计的结果。他们正在策动这一着。这个危险严重地存在着。
(十)依目前形势看来,国内国际不许可投降主义得势的因素,占着优势。这些因素是:日本坚决灭亡中国的方针使中国处于非战不可的地位,共产党和八路军的存在,中国人民的要求,国民党内多数党员的要求,英、美、法顾虑到国民党投降对于它们利益的损失,苏联的存在及其援助中国的方针,中国人民对于苏联的深切希望(这种希望不是空的)等等。如果把这些因素好好地组织起来,不但将克服投降和分裂的因素,也将克服停顿于片面抗战的因素。
(十一)因此,从片面抗战转变到全面抗战的前途是存在的。争取这个前途,是一切中国共产党员、一切中国国民党的进步分子和一切中国人民的共同的迫切的任务。
(十二)中国抗日民族革命战争现在是处在严重的危机中。危机也许将延长,也许将较快地被克服。决定的因素,在中国内部是国共两党的合作和在这一合作的基础上的国民党政策的转变,是工农群众的力量;在中国外部是苏联的援助。
(十三)国民党有在其政治上组织上加以改造的必要,也有这种可能。这主要地是因为日本的压迫,中国共产党的统一战线政策,中国人民的要求,国民党内部新生力量的增长。我们的任务是争取它实现这一改造,以便作为改造政府和改造军队的基础。这一改造无疑须得到国民党中央的同意,我们是站在建议的地位。
(十四)改造政府。我们提出了召集临时国民大会的方针,这也是必要的和可能的。这一改造也无疑须得到国民党的同意。
(十五)改造军队的任务是建立新军和改造旧军。如能在半年到一年内建立二十五万到三十万具有新的政治精神的军队,则抗日战场上必能开始看到转机。这种新军将影响并团结一切旧军。这是抗日战争转入战略反攻的军事基础。这一改造,同样须得到国民党的同意。八路军应在这一改造过程中起模范作用。八路军本身应该扩大。
二 在党内在全国均须反对投降主义
在党内,反对阶级对阶级的投降主义
(十六)一九二七年陈独秀的投降主义,引导了那时的革命归于失败。每个共产党员都不应忘记这个历史上的血的教训。
(十七)关于党的抗日民族统一战线的路线,在卢沟桥事变以前,党内的主要危险倾向是“左”倾机会主义,即关门主义。这主要是因为国民党还没有抗日的缘故。
(十八)在卢沟桥事变以后,党内的主要危险倾向,已经不是“左”倾关门主义,而转变到右倾机会主义,即投降主义方面了。这主要是因为国民党已经抗日了的缘故。
(十九)还在四月延安党的活动分子会议时,又在五月党的全国代表会议时,特别是在八月中央政治局会议(洛川会议)时,我们就提出了这样的问题:在统一战线中,是无产阶级领导资产阶级呢,还是资产阶级领导无产阶级?是国民党吸引共产党呢,还是共产党吸引国民党?在当前的具体的政治任务中,这个问题即是说:把国民党提高到共产党所主张的抗日救国十大纲领和全面抗战呢,还是把共产党降低到国民党的地主资产阶级专政和片面抗战?
(二十)为什么要这样尖锐地提出问题呢?这是因为:
一方面,中国资产阶级的妥协性,国民党实力上的优势,国民党三中全会的宣言和决议对于共产党的污蔑和侮辱以及所谓“停止阶级斗争”的叫嚣,国民党关于“共产党投降”的衷心愿望和广泛宣传,蒋介石关于统制共产党的企图,国民党对于红军的限制和削弱的政策,国民党对于抗日民主根据地的限制和削弱的政策,国民党七月庐山训练班提出的“在抗日战争中削弱共产党力量五分之二”的阴谋计划,国民党对共产党干部所施行的升官发财酒色逸乐的引诱,某些小资产阶级急进分子在政治上的投降举动(以章乃器为代表),等等情况。
另一方面,共产党内理论水平的不平衡,许多党员的缺乏北伐战争时期两党合作的经验,党内小资产阶级成分的大量存在,一部分党员对过去艰苦斗争的生活不愿意继续的情绪,统一战线中迁就国民党的无原则倾向的存在,八路军中的新军阀主义倾向的发生,共产党参加国民党政权问题的发生,抗日民主根据地中的迁就倾向的发生,等等情况。
由于上述两方面的严重的情况,必须尖锐地提出谁领导谁的问题,必须坚决地反对投降主义。
(二十一)几个月以来,主要是抗战以来,共产党中央及其各级组织,对这种已经发生的和可能发生的投降主义倾向作了明确而坚决的斗争和必要的预防,并且收到了成效。
在参加政权问题上,中央发出了一个决议案的草案。
在八路军中,开始向新军阀主义倾向作斗争。这种倾向,表现在红军改编后某些个别分子不愿意严格地接受共产党的领导、发展个人英雄主义、以受国民党委任为荣耀(以做官为荣耀)等等现象上面。这个新军阀主义倾向虽然和表现在打人、骂人、破坏纪律等等现象上面的老的军阀主义倾向同其根源(把共产党降低到国民党),同其结果(脱离群众);然而它是在国共两党统一战线时期发生的,它带着特别大的危险性,所以特别值得注意,需要坚决地加以反对。因受国民党干涉而取消的政治委员制度,因受国民党干涉而改为政训处的政治部的名称,现在已经恢复了。提出了“独立自主的山地游击战”这个新的战略原则,并坚持地执行之,因而基本上保证了八路军作战上和工作上的胜利。拒绝了国民党派遣他们的党员来当八路军干部的要求,坚持了共产党绝对领导八路军的原则。在各革命的抗日根据地,同样提出了“统一战线中的独立自主”这个原则。纠正了“议会主义”倾向(当然并不是第二国际的议会主义,这种议会主义在中国党内是没有的),坚持了反对土匪、敌探和破坏者的斗争。
在西安,纠正了两党关系上的无原则倾向(迁就倾向),重新开展了群众斗争。
在陇东,情况和西安大体相同。
在上海,对“少号召,多建议”的章乃器主义给了批评,开始纠正了救亡工作中的迁就倾向。
在南方各游击区——这是我们和国民党十年血战的结果的一部分,是抗日民族革命战争在南方各省的战略支点,是国民党在西安事变后还用“围剿”政策企图消灭、在卢沟桥事变后又改用调虎离山政策企图削弱的力量——我们的注意力集中在:(1)无条件集中(适应国民党拔去这些支点的要求)的防止;(2)国民党派人的拒绝;(3)何鸣危险(被国民党包围缴械的危险)的警戒。
在《解放周刊》,坚持了严正的批评态度。
(二十二)为了坚持抗战和争取最后胜利,为了变片面抗战为全面抗战,必须坚持抗日民族统一战线的路线,必须扩大和巩固统一战线。任何破裂国共两党的统一战线的主张是不许可的。“左”倾关门主义仍然要防止。但是在同时,在一切统一战线工作中必须密切地联系到独立自主的原则。我们和国民党及其它任何派别的统一战线,是在实行一定纲领这个基础上面的统一战线。离开了这个基础,就没有任何的统一战线,这样的合作就变成无原则的行动,就是投降主义的表现了。因此,“统一战线中的独立自主”这个原则的说明、实践和坚持,是把抗日民族革命战争引向胜利之途的中心一环。
(二十三)我们这样做的目的何在呢?一方面是在保持自己已经取得的阵地。这是我们的战略出发地,丧失了这个阵地就一切无从说起了。但是主要的目的还在另一方面,这就是为了发展阵地,为了实现“动员千百万群众进入抗日民族统一战线,打倒日本帝国主义”这个积极的目的。保持阵地和发展阵地是不可分离的。几个月来,更广大的小资产阶级的左翼群众是在我们的影响下团结起来了,国民党营垒中的新生力量是在增长中,山西的群众斗争是发展了,党的组织在许多地方也发展了。
(二十四)但是必须清楚地懂得,党的组织力量,在全国,一般地说来还是微弱的。全国的群众力量也还是很薄弱,全国工农基本群众还没有组织起来。所有这些,一方面由于国民党的控制和压迫的政策,另一方面则是由于我们自己的没有工作或工作不足。这是我党在现时抗日民族革命战争中的最基本的弱点。不克服这个弱点,是不能战胜日本帝国主义的。要达到这个目的,一定要实行“统一战线中的独立自主”这个原则,一定要克服投降主义或迁就主义。
在全国,反对民族对民族的投降主义
(二十五)上面说的是阶级对阶级的投降主义。它引导无产阶级去适合资产阶级的改良主义和不彻底性。不克服这个倾向,就不能进行胜利的抗日民族革命战争,就不能变片面抗战为全面抗战,就不能保卫祖国。
但是还有一种投降主义,这就是民族对民族的投降主义,它引导中国去适合日本帝国主义的利益,使中国变为日本帝国主义的殖民地,使所有的中国人变为亡国奴。这个倾向在现时是发生于抗日民族统一战线的右翼集团中。
(二十六)抗日民族统一战线的左翼集团是共产党率领的群众,包括无产阶级、农民和城市小资产阶级群众。我们的任务,是用一切努力去扩大和巩固这个集团。这一任务的完成,是改造国民党、改造政府、改造军队的基本条件,是统一的民主共和国建立起来的基本条件,是变片面抗战为全面抗战的基本条件,是打倒日本帝国主义的基本条件。
(二十七)抗日民族统一战线的中间集团是民族资产阶级和上层小资产阶级。上海各大报所代表的成分是左倾了;复兴社中有一部分人是开始动摇了,CC团中也有一部分人在动摇中。抗战的军队是得到了严重的教训,其中某些成分是开始了或准备着改造。我们的任务,是争取中间集团的进步和转变。
(二十八)抗日民族统一战线的右翼集团是大地主和大资产阶级,这是民族投降主义的大本营。一方面害怕战争对于他们的财产的破坏,另一方面害怕民众的起来,他们的投降倾向是必然的。他们中间,许多人已经是汉奸,许多人已经是亲日派,许多人是准备作亲日派,许多人在动摇中,仅仅个别有特殊情况的分子是坚决的。他们中间有些人之所以暂时加入民族统一战线,是被迫的和勉强的。一般地说来,他们之从抗日民族统一战线中分裂出去是为期不远的。目前大地主和大资产阶级中的许多最坏的分子,正在策动分裂抗日民族统一战线。他们是谣言的制造厂,“共产党暴动”、“八路军退却”一类的谣言,今后将要与日俱增。我们的任务是坚决地反对民族投降主义,并且在这个斗争中,扩大和巩固左翼集团,争取中间集团的进步和转变。
阶级投降主义和民族投降主义的关系
(二十九)在抗日民族革命战争中,阶级投降主义实际上是民族投降主义的后备军,是援助右翼营垒而使战争失败的最恶劣的倾向。为了争取中华民族和劳动群众的解放,为了使反对民族投降主义的斗争坚决有力,必须反对共产党内部和无产阶级内部的阶级的投降倾向,要使这一斗争开展于各方面的工作中。
