On Putting Down the Rebellion in Tibet

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Communist Party of China

15 April 1959

Context
Mao addressed an audience of Chinese leaders on April 15, 1959, on the Tibetan rebellion, announcing a buy-out policy for non-counter-revolutionary aristocrats and rejecting foreign claims that the rebels could not be wiped out.
Main themes
Suppression of the Tibetan rebellion, buy-out policy for progressive aristocrats, Tibetan serf system and reform, 80,000 lamas and religious reform, Alsop's claim that 200,000 troops were needed, Hu Shih's methodology, Indian reactions and the 1954 Five Principles treaty, Dalai Lama's possible return, British Foreign Secretary Lloyd's position, confiscation of rebel arms, Tibetan areas of Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu and Yunnan
Duration
~22 min
70th percentile
Words
2,630
70th percentile
Sentences
168
84th percentile
Readability
73
99th percentile
Grade
6.8
1st percentile
Syntax
2.83
25th percentile
Vocabulary
2.06
20th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 40%39%
  • Social 29%27%
  • Institutional 19%18%
  • Economic 8%8%
  • Ceremonial 4%4%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

168 sentences in 9 paragraphs

Some people have sympathy for Tibet, but they sympathize only with the minority, not with the majority. Out of a hundred people they sympathize with a few, namely those rebels, and not with the ninety-odd percent. Abroad there are some people whose sympathy for Tibet extends to only ten or twenty thousand people, thirty or forty thousand at most. Tibet proper (speaking only of the three areas of Chamdo, Front Tibet and Rear Tibet) has about 1.2 million people. Take 1.2 million, subtract a few tens of thousands, and you still have over 1.1 million, and some people in the world have no sympathy for them. We are the opposite: we sympathize with these 1.1-odd million and not with that minority.

What sort of people is that minority? They are the exploiters and oppressors. Speaking of aristocrats, the Panchen and Ngapo can also be counted as aristocrats, but there are two kinds of aristocrats: progressive aristocrats and reactionary aristocrats, and these two belong to the progressive aristocrats. The progressives advocate reform. They say do away with the old system, just give it up. The old system is bad and does the Tibetan people no good. First, the population does not flourish; second, wealth does not prosper. Tibet's territory is large, its population is now too small, and it must develop. I spoke about this with the Dalai. I said, you must increase your population. I also said, your Buddhism, that is, Lamaism, I do not believe in it, but I approve of your believing in it. However, could some of the rules be changed a little? Out of your 1.2 million people there are 80,000 lamas, and these 80,000 lamas do not produce. First, they do not produce material goods; second, they do not produce people. Look, as far as clergy are concerned, Protestant Christianity allows marriage, Islam allows marriage, and Catholicism does not. Tibetan lamas cannot marry either, so they do not produce people. At the same time, lamas should engage in production, in agriculture and industry; only then can things be sustained for a long time. Don't you want to believe in Buddhism forever, as long as heaven and earth endure? I am not in favor of believing in Buddhism forever, but if you want to believe in it, what can be done about that! We have no way at all of stopping it. Whether or not to believe in a religion can only be decided by each person for himself.

As for the aristocrats, what attitude should we take toward those revolutionary aristocrats who stand on the side of progress and advocate reform? And toward the middle-of-the-roaders who are not so revolutionary, who stand in the middle wavering back and forth but do not stand on the side of counter-revolution? My personal view is this: as for their land and their manors, could we use the method we apply to the national bourgeoisie, that is, carry out a buy-out policy, so that they do not lose out? For example, our Central People's Government could take care of their livelihood in full. You get only that much by exploiting the serfs anyway, and the Central Government will give you just as much, so why must you exploit serfs in order to be comfortable?

As I see it, Tibet's serf system is like the manorial system of our Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. Call them slaves, and they are not slaves; call them free peasants, and they are not free peasants. It is a serf system somewhere between the two. The aristocrats sitting on the volcano of the serf system are not secure; every day they feel an earthquake is coming. Why not just give it up? Do away with that serf system, do away with that manorial system, give up that bit of land and hand it over to the peasants. But what will they eat? I think that for revolutionary aristocrats and revolutionary manor lords, as well as middle-of-the-road aristocrats and middle-of-the-road manor lords, so long as they do not stand on the side of counter-revolution, we use the buy-out policy. I am consulting with all of you to see whether this will do. Right now we are putting down the rebellion; reform is not yet on the agenda. In the future, when reform comes, all revolutionary aristocrats, as well as the wavering middle-of-the-roaders, in short, all who do not stand on the side of counter-revolution, will not be made to lose out. That is, we will follow the method we now use with the capitalists. Moreover, we will take care of them for the rest of their lives. The capitalists are taken care of for life too. After a few years of fixed interest, you still have to keep taking care of them: you have to give them work, give them a salary, give them employment, and keep taking care of them for life. In this way the peasants (over 95 percent of the population) get land, the peasants no longer hate these aristocrats, and the hatred is gradually untied.

There is a Japanese newspaper that has been squawking. It ran a piece saying that the Communist Party had suffered a great defeat on the Tibet question and that the whole world opposes the Communist Party. If we suffered a great defeat, then who won a great victory? There must be someone who won a great victory. Someone suffered a great defeat and nobody won a great victory, how could there be such a thing? You tell me, who actually won and who lost? Suppose we Chinese did suffer a great defeat on the Tibet question. In that case, who won a great victory? Can it be said that the Indian interventionists won a great victory? I think that is hard to say too. If they won a great victory, why are they weeping bitter tears as if they had lost their own parents? Do you think there is some sense in what I am saying?

There is also an American, named Alsop, who writes a column. From so far away he earnestly wrote an article saying that Tibet could not be pacified without 200,000 troops, and that these 200,000 troops would need 10,000 tons of supplies a day. It would be impossible to transport that much, he said; the mountains in Tibet are terribly high, and it is hard for the Communist army to get there. He therefore concluded that the rebels could not be wiped out. Can the rebels be wiped out or not? I think everyone has this question. Whether they can actually be wiped out is something that people who have not been there in person, and have never fought a guerrilla war, cannot know. Here is my answer: putting down the rebellion does not require 200,000 troops; it requires only 50,000, one quarter of 200,000. Before 1956 we had just 50,000 people there (cadres included). In that year, 1956, we withdrew more than 30,000, leaving just over 10,000. At that time we did earnestly announce that there would be no reform for six years. We said that after six years, if they still did not agree, we could postpone it further; that is what we said. You know, the Tibetan nationality as a whole is not 1.2 million people but 3 million. Tibet proper, as I just said (Chamdo, Front Tibet, Rear Tibet), has 1.2 million. Where are the others? Mainly in western Sichuan, that is, the former Xikang area, and in northwestern Sichuan, places like Maoergai, Songpan and Aba. These places have the most Tibetans. Second is Qinghai, with 500,000. Third is southern Gansu. Fourth is northwestern Yunnan. These four areas total 1.8 million people. When the Sichuan Provincial People's Congress met to discuss carrying out some democratic reform in the Tibetan areas, word of it got out and spread at once to the former Xikang area, and some people launched an armed rebellion. Now the Tibetan areas of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan have all been reformed, and the people there are armed. Tibetans have shouldered rifles and organized self-defense forces, and they are very brave. If these four areas could clean out the rebels, why can't Tibet? You say it's complicated, but the former Xikang area was extremely complicated. The rebels of former Xikang were defeated and fled to Tibet. When they got there, they raped, looted and plundered, robbing everything in sight. They had to eat, so they had to rob, and so they came into conflict with the Tibetans. Those who ran there from former Xikang and from Qinghai number over 10,000. Do these 10,000-odd people need to eat or not? They do, so where does the food come from? They have been eating their way back and forth among the 1.2 million people. Counting from July of last year, they have been eating off them for almost a year now. This time we have knocked the rebels down and confiscated their guns. In Shigatse, for example, we confiscated the guns of the local government's armed forces, and in Gyantse and Yadong too. In the places where the guns were confiscated, the masses are delighted. The common people feared three things of theirs. First, they feared their seal, that is, the official stamp. Second, they feared their guns. Third, there was a whip of law, which the common people greatly feared. Once these three were taken away, the masses were overjoyed, extremely happy, and helped us carry off the guns and ammunition. The common people of Tibet suffer terribly. The reactionary serf owners there actually gouge out people's eyes and actually pull out their tendons. They even take the leg bones of girls in their teens to make musical instruments, and use human skulls as cups to drink wine from. Such utterly barbaric rebels can certainly be wiped out. It takes not 200,000 troops but just 50,000 to wipe them out completely. Does wiping them out mean killing them all? No. Wiping them out does not mean killing them; it means capturing them and educating and remolding them, including reactionaries, people like Surkhang, for example. As for such people who have fled abroad, if they come back, repent and turn over a new leaf, we will not kill them.

Next, a Chinese person's views. This man is in Taiwan and his name is Hu Shih. He says that, as he sees it, this "revolutionary army" (that is, the rebels) cannot be wiped out. He says he is from Huizhou. When the Japanese invaded China they occupied Anhui, but they did not go into Huizhou. Why? Huizhou has too many mountains and the terrain is complicated. The Japanese did not even dare to go into the mountains of Huizhou, so would the Communists dare to go into those mountains in Tibet? I say Hu Shih's methodology is wrong; that "bold hypothesis" of his is dangerous. He makes a bold hypothesis and reasons like this: Huizhou's mountains are small and still the Japanese did not dare to go in, so Tibet's mountains are much bigger and much higher, and how could the Communists dare to go in there? Hence the conclusion: the Communists will certainly not dare to go in, and the Communists cannot wipe out the rebel forces there. Now we must criticize Hu Shih's methodology. I think he is going to lose. He does not "verify carefully" at all; he has only the "bold hypothesis."

Some people, such as some in the Indian bourgeoisie, are a little different; they are two-sided. On the one hand, they are very unhappy and strongly oppose our resolute suppression of the rebellion that began after 20 March. They strongly oppose this policy of ours, and they sympathize with the rebels. On the other hand, they do not want to fall out with us. They bear in mind that over the past several thousand years China and India have never fallen out and have had no war. At the same time, they see that the flowers fall and nothing can be done; the flowers have already fallen. In 1954 China and India concluded a treaty, the one that declared the Five Principles, and they recognized that Tibet is part of China, Chinese territory. They have held something back and not burned their bridges. The British are the craftiest. The British Foreign Secretary, Lloyd, is questioned by one Labour MP after another, and every time he professes to know nothing. He says: we have no information, we British have no contact with Tibet, we have no personnel there, so I have nothing to report. He keeps saying this. He also says that we must wait until that man from Tibet comes out and see how he acts before we say anything. What he means is to wait until the Dalai comes out and see what he says. The Chinese Communist Party has not shut the door. We have said that the Dalai was carried off under duress, and we have published his three letters. At this session of the People's Congress, Premier Zhou's report will address this matter. We hope the Dalai will come back, and we have even proposed that in this election not only the Panchen but also the Dalai be elected. He is a young man, only twenty-five now. If he lives to eighty-five, that is another sixty years from now, and by then it will be the twenty-first century. What will the world be like then? It will change. By then, I believe, he will come back. If he does not come back for fifty-nine years, in the sixtieth year he may come back. By then the whole world will have changed. This is the land of his parents; he was born here and grew up here. Now he is in a foreign country, dependent on the goodwill of others, and even his few guns have been taken away. By taking this attitude we hold more of the initiative; we have not burned our bridges.

The Premier's report will say that we hope the Dalai will return to the country. If he is willing to return and can break free of those reactionaries, we hope he will return. But in fact it looks as though it is hard for him to return now. He cannot break away from that crowd. Besides, as to his own frame of mind, the last time he went to India he did not want to come back, while the Panchen did want to come back. At that time the Premier talked him round, and perhaps Nehru did as well, telling him it was better to come back than not to. That was what he was told then: what use is it for you to go to India? You would be nothing but an exile living on others, just eating there, cut off from the masses, cut off from the land and people of your motherland. Even now we see no sign of a resolve to reform. As for saying that he wants reform, that he stands on the side of the people, on the side of the working people, it appears not. Can that worldview of his change? Perhaps it can change in sixty years, and perhaps it will not take sixty years. But as things look now, it is also hard for him to come back all at once. If he wants to come back, he can come back tomorrow, but he has to carry out reform and has to put down the rebellion, that is, he has to come over completely to our side. It looks as though, in fact, that will be very hard for him to do all at once. But we will not burn our bridges.