Speeches and Comments at the Lushan Conference

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

10 July 1959 · Lushan Conference · China

Context
Mao addressed the Lushan Conference and the Central Committee plenum in a series of speeches between July 10 and August 16, 1959, admitting responsibility for Great Leap errors while attacking critics as right opportunists and wavering middle-of-the-roaders.
Main themes
Unity of the Party, admission of mistakes in the Great Leap Forward, the General Line, 'nine fingers and one finger' assessment, people's communes and the communist wind, public canteens, the 10.7 million tonne steel campaign, criticism of right opportunists and middle-of-the-roaders, planning failures and overall balance, Li Yunzhong's letter, Peng Dehuai and the Gao-Rao precedent, policy of unity-criticism-unity
Duration
~78 min
97th percentile
Words
9,404
97th percentile
Sentences
577
99th percentile
Readability
64
93rd percentile
Grade
8.4
6th percentile
Syntax
2.74
16th percentile
Vocabulary
2.15
38th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 47%44%
  • Social 27%25%
  • Economic 16%15%
  • Ceremonial 8%7%
  • Geopolitical 4%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 5%

577 sentences in 48 paragraphs

10 July 1959

I. Unify Understanding, Achieve Unity, Admit Mistakes

The question of unity.

If our understanding of the situation is not consistent, there can be no unity. If we want unity within the Party, we must first get the issues clear and unify our thinking. Some comrades lack an all-round analysis of the situation; we must help them see what has been gained and what has been lost.

We must get the issues clear. Some people say the General Line is fundamentally wrong. But what is the so-called General Line? It is nothing more than "more, faster, better, more economically," and "more, faster, better, more economically" cannot possibly be wrong.

If we explain the reasoning clearly and lay the problems out in the open, we can always get seventy percent of the people to stand under the General Line.

We must admit our shortcomings and mistakes. Taking one particular area, taking one particular problem, it may be ten fingers, nine fingers, seven fingers, or three fingers, two fingers. But taking the situation as a whole, it is only a matter of one finger. That is how the overall situation stands: nine fingers and one finger.

I always tell foreign comrades: please come back in ten years and see whether we were right. Because whether a line is correct or not is a question of practice; it takes time, and it must be proven by the results of practice. We should say that we still have no experience in construction, and will need at least another ten years. In the meetings of this past year, we have always analysed problems, resolved problems, upheld the truth and corrected mistakes. Some comrades in the Party do not understand the situation as a whole, and it must be explained to them: in terms of certain specific facts, there really have been cases where the losses outweighed the gains, but taken overall, one cannot say the losses outweighed the gains. Gaining experience always means paying tuition.

23 July 1959

II. Oppose Two Tendencies, Safeguard the Unity of the Party

You have said so much; allow me to say a little, may I? I took sleeping pills three times and still couldn't sleep.

I want to put forward some views. I have read the comrades' minutes, speeches and documents, and talked with some of the comrades. I feel there are two tendencies, and I will talk about them here.

One is that people cannot be touched; at the slightest touch they explode. Wu Zhihui said: touch Sun Ke and he jumps. So some comrades feel under pressure, that is, they do not want people to say bad things, they only want people to say good things, and do not want to hear bad things. I urge these comrades to listen. There are three kinds of talk, and the mouth has two uses. A person has one mouth: its first function is eating, its second is the duty of speaking. You have a pair of ears, so you must listen. If he wants to talk, what can you do about it? Some comrades just don't like hearing bad things. Good words and bad words are all words, and you must listen to them all. There are three kinds of talk: first, the correct; second, the basically correct or not entirely correct; third, the basically incorrect or incorrect. The two ends are opposites. Correct and incorrect are opposites.

Now we are being attacked from both inside and outside the Party. The rightists say: why did the First Emperor of Qin fall? Because he built the Great Wall. Now we are building Tiananmen and we are going to collapse—that is what the rightists say. Within the Party some views have not yet been fully expressed; they are concentrated in the reactions at the Jiangxi Party School, and they exist everywhere. All the rightist talk has come out, represented by Long Yun, Chen Mingshu, Luo Longji and Zhang Bojun. The Jiangxi Party School represents it within the Party; some of those people are rightists, vacillating elements. They do not see the whole picture; with a bit of work they can be brought round. Some people have problems in their history, have been criticised, and also think everything is an utter mess, as in the material from the Guangzhou Military Region. All these remarks were made outside the meeting. We combine what is inside the meeting with what is outside. It's a pity Lushan is too small to invite them all. People like those of the Jiangxi Party School, Luo Longji, Chen Mingshu—this is the responsibility of the Jiangxi people; the houses are too small!

Whatever the talk, it all comes down to saying things are an utter mess. That is very good; the more they say it is an utter mess, the better, and the more we must listen. During the Rectification we coined the phrase "brace yourself and hold out." I have said to some comrades: hold out, brace yourself and hold out. For how long? One month, three months, half a year, a year, three years, five years, ten years, eight years. Some of our comrades say "protracted war," and I very much agree. Comrades of this kind are the majority.

Gentlemen present, you all have ears—so listen! It is unpleasant to hear, but welcome it! Once you think about it that way, it won't sound so unpleasant! Why should we let people speak? The reason is that the Divine Land will not sink and the sky will not fall. Because we have done some good things, our backs are straight. Most of our comrades should stiffen their backs. Why aren't they stiff? It is nothing more than that for a period there were too few vegetables, too few hairpins, no soap, proportions out of balance, a tight market, so that people became tense. I don't see anything to be tense about. I'm tense too; it would be a lie to say I'm not. In the first half of the night you're tense, and in the second half of the night you take a sleeping pill and you're not tense anymore.

They say we have become divorced from the masses, but in fact the masses still support us. I think the difficulties are temporary—three months, that's all. Around the Spring Festival, I think the masses and we were very closely bound together. There is a little petty-bourgeois fanaticism, but not all that much. I agree with the comrades' views; the problem is the commune movement. I went to Suiping and talked in detail for over two hours. The Party secretary of the Chayashan Commune told me that in July, August and September, an average of three thousand people a day came to visit—thirty thousand in ten days, three hundred thousand in three months. I've heard that Xushui and Qiliying also had as many visitors; people came from everywhere except Tibet. Like the monk Xuanzang going to fetch the scriptures. These people were all county, commune and brigade cadres, with some prefectural cadres too. Their idea was: the people of Henan and Hebei have created experience and broken Roosevelt's "freedom" from want. This enthusiasm for building communism—how should we view it? Is it petty-bourgeois fanaticism? I don't think it can be put that way; they wanted a bit more, that's all—they just wanted a bit more. Is this analysis appropriate? In three months, three hundred thousand people making pilgrimages—a mass movement this broad, you cannot pour cold water on it. You can only persuade: "Comrades, your hearts are in the right place, but the thing is hard to accomplish; you can't be impatient, you must go step by step. You can only eat meat one bite at a time; trying to become fat in one bite won't work." Lin Biao eats a jin of meat a day and still isn't fat, and wouldn't be in ten years. The Commander-in-Chief's and my fatness did not come in a day. These cadres lead several hundred million people. At least thirty percent are activists; thirty percent are negative elements, together with landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, bureaucrats, middle peasants and some poor peasants; forty percent go with the tide. How many people is thirty percent? A hundred-and-something million. They demanded communes, demanded canteens, wanted large-scale cooperation; they were extremely enthusiastic. They wanted to do it—can you call this petty-bourgeois fanaticism? This is not the petty bourgeoisie; these are poor peasants and lower-middle peasants, proletarians and semi-proletarians. Those going with the tide were also willing; those unwilling were the thirty percent. In short, thirty percent plus forty percent makes seventy percent—three hundred and fifty million people were fervent for a period; they wanted to do it. For two-odd months around the Spring Festival they became unhappy; they changed. When cadres went down to the countryside, people no longer talked to them; they served sweet potatoes and thin gruel with no smile on their faces. This is called [the consequence of] blowing the "communist wind." The "communist wind" also has to be analysed; there was petty-bourgeois fanaticism in it. Who were these people? The "communist wind" was mainly blown by cadres at the county and commune levels, especially some commune cadres, who blew a "communist wind" against the production brigades and small teams. That was bad, and the masses did not welcome it. We firmly corrected it and persuaded them; in a month's effort, in March and April, we suppressed the wind. What should be returned was returned, and the accounts between communes and brigades were settled. This month of account-settling education was beneficial; in a very short time it made them understand that egalitarianism won't do, that "first equalising, second requisitioning, third withdrawing funds" won't do. I hear that now most people have come round, and only some are still nostalgic for the "communist wind" and can't let go. Where else could you find such a great school, such a short training course, that educates several hundred million people and several million cadres? Things must be handed back; you can't say what's yours is mine and just pick it up and walk off. Since ancient times there has been no such rule, and ten thousand years from now you still won't be able to just pick things up and walk off. The only ones who do are the Green and Red Gangs—the Green ones steal, the Red ones rob, openly with torches and weapons, exploiting other people's labour without paying, destroying exchange of equal value. Song Jiang's government was called the "Hall of Loyalty and Righteousness"; they robbed the rich to help the poor, with full justification, and could pick things up and walk off, because what they took belonged to local tyrants and evil gentry. That charter, I think, is acceptable. What Song Jiang robbed was the "birthday convoy"; likewise what we seized when we struck down the local tyrants was ill-gotten wealth—"no harm in robbing it"; it was scraped from the peasants and returned to the peasants. We stopped striking down local tyrants long ago. Striking down local tyrants, dividing up the land, turning things over to the public—that too was fine, because that too was ill-gotten wealth. When we blew the communist wind and took the wealth of production brigades and small teams, picking up fat pigs and cabbages and walking off, that was wrong. Even toward imperialist property we have three methods: requisition purchase, buying out, squeezing out. How could we exploit the property of the labouring people? Why did this wind die down in just over a month? It proves our Party is great, glorious and correct. In March, April and May, several million cadres and several hundred million peasants were educated; things were explained clearly and they came round. Mainly it was the cadres: they didn't understand whether this wealth was rightfully gotten, couldn't distinguish the boundaries, hadn't studied political economy well, hadn't grasped the law of value, exchange of equal value, distribution according to work. In a few months they were persuaded and stopped doing it.

Those who fully understand may not exist; there are those who partly understand, who understand seventy or eighty percent. They haven't understood the textbook yet, so tell them to read it; at the commune level you can't manage without knowing some political economy. If they can't read, it can be explained to them. If they understand partly, they needn't read books; they can be educated with facts. Emperor Wu of Liang had a minister, Chen Fazhi, who couldn't read a single character. Forced to compose a poem, he recited it and had someone else write it down. He said some scholars are not even as good as this old man who learns with his ears. Of course I'm not against eliminating illiteracy. Old Ke says the whole people should go to university, and I agree too, but the fifteen years will have to be extended. Then in the Northern and Southern Dynasties there was a general surnamed Cao who wanted to compose a poem after a battle: "When the army set out, sons and daughters grieved; on return, the reed pipes and drums resound. May I ask the passer-by: how does this compare with Huo Qubing?" And in the Northern Dynasties there was Hulü Jin's "Song of the Chile": "The Chile river, beneath the Yin mountains; the sky like a domed yurt, covering the plains on all sides. The sky so blue, the wilds so vast; the wind blows, the grass bends, and cattle and sheep appear." He too couldn't read a single character. If a person who can't read a single character can be a chief minister, why can't our commune cadres and peasants listen to political economy? I think everyone can learn it; explain it to them. Political economy can be explained to people who can't read; explain it and they'll understand. They understand it more easily than intellectuals. I myself haven't read the textbook; I've only read a bit of it, which is what gives me the right to speak. We must squeeze out the time and have a study movement for the whole Party.

We don't know how many self-criticisms we have made. Since the Zhengzhou Conference last year we have made them over and over; there were six-level conferences and five-level conferences, and all made self-criticisms. When people from Beijing went on and on, they just wouldn't listen. We've made self-criticism many times—haven't you heard? I urge those comrades: people have mouths! Let them speak! Listen to people's opinions. I think some problems won't be resolved at this meeting; some people won't give up their views. So we'll just drag it out! One year, two years, three years, five years. It won't do if you can't stand to hear grumbling; you must make it a habit. I say: brace yourself and hold out! At worst they curse your ancestors to the third generation. This is hard too. When I was young, in middle-school days, I too would fill up with anger whenever I heard bad things said. "If others do not offend me, I will not offend them; if others offend me, I will certainly offend them; others offend first, I strike back after"—I haven't abandoned this principle even now. Now I've learned to listen, to brace myself and hold out, to listen for a week or two, and then counter-attack. I urge comrades to listen; whether you agree or not is your business. If you don't agree, and if I'm wrong, I'll make a self-criticism.

Second, I urge another group of comrades not to waver at such a critical juncture. As far as I can observe, some comrades are wavering. They too say the Great Leap Forward, the General Line and the people's communes are all correct, but we must see which side the thinking of their speeches stands on, in which direction they are speaking. These people are the second kind, the "basically correct, partly incorrect" kind, but they are somewhat wavering. Some people waver at critical moments; in every great storm they have not been firm. Historically there have been four lines: the Chen Duxiu line, the Li Lisan line, the Wang Ming line, the Gao-Rao line. Now there is one General Line. In great storms some comrades can't stand firm and dance the yangge. Doesn't the Chiang gang call us the yangge dynasty? These comrades dance the yangge. They are burning with anxiety and want to do well by the country; that is good. What class is this? Bourgeois or petty-bourgeois? I won't say now. At the Nanning conference, the Chengdu conference and the Party Congress, I spoke about the wavering in 1956 and 1957; we didn't put tall hats on anyone, we treated it as a question of method of thinking. If one speaks of petty-bourgeois fanaticism, then turning it around, the opposition to rash advance back then was bourgeois cold, cheerless, sad and dejected defeatism and pessimism. We didn't put tall hats on them, because these comrades are different from the rightists; they also want socialism, they just lacked experience, and at the slightest stir of wind in the grass they couldn't keep their footing and opposed rash advance. Those who opposed rash advance last time have stood firm this time. Comrade Enlai, for instance, has great drive; he learned the lesson of that time. I believe Comrade Chen Yun will also stand firm. It is precisely some of those who criticised Comrade Enlai that time who have this time taken their place. They don't talk about rash advance, but there is the flavour of opposing rash advance. For example, "there are losses and there are gains." Putting "gains" after was carefully weighed. If we were to put tall hats on, this would be bourgeois wavering, or, one grade lower, petty-bourgeois wavering. Because the rightist character is often under bourgeois influence; under the pressure of imperialism and the bourgeoisie they turn right.

One mistake per production brigade—over seven hundred thousand production brigades, over seven hundred thousand mistakes, all published, printed all year round—could you finish printing them or not? And then there's the length of the articles; I think it would take at least a year. What would the result be? Our country would collapse. Then even if the imperialists didn't come, the people at home would rise up and overthrow us all. If you run a newspaper that prints bad things every day, people will have no heart for work; never mind a year, we'd perish within a week. Printing seven hundred thousand items, printing only bad things—that would no longer be proletarian; that would be a bourgeois state, that would be the bourgeois Zhang Bojun's "design institute." Of course no one present advocates this; I'm exaggerating. If we do ten things and nine are bad, and they're all printed in the papers, we will certainly perish and we ought to perish. Then I will go, go to the countryside and lead the peasants to overthrow the government. If you, the Liberation Army, won't follow me, I'll go and find the Red Army. But I think the Liberation Army will follow me.

I urge some comrades to pay attention to the direction of what they say. The content of what they say, though, is basically correct and partly inappropriate. If you want others to be firm, first be firm yourself; if you want others not to waver, first don't waver yourself. This is another lesson. These comrades, as I see it, are not rightists; they are middle-of-the-roaders, not leftists (leftists without quotation marks). The reason I speak of direction is that some people have run into some snags, their heads are broken and bleeding, they are burning with anxiety, they can't keep their footing, they have wavered and moved to the middle. Whether exactly they are left of centre or right of centre still has to be analysed. They are repeating the road of the comrades who made mistakes in the second half of 1956 and the first half of 1957. They are not rightists, but they have thrown themselves to the edge of the rightists, still thirty kilometres from the rightists, because the rightists very much welcome this line of argument. With the line some comrades are taking now, it would be strange if the rightists didn't welcome it. Comrades like these are pursuing brinkmanship, which is quite dangerous. If you don't believe it, wait and see. These words are said in front of a large crowd and are somewhat hurtful, but not saying them now would be bad for these comrades.

I'm adding one topic to the topics I set: the question of unity. It should still be written as a separate section, holding up the banner of unity: the unity of the people, the unity of the nationalities, the unity of the Party. If I don't speak, would it be beneficial or harmful to these comrades? Harmful! So I must still speak. We are a Marxist party. The people on the first side must listen to others, and the people on the second side must also listen to others. People on both sides must listen to others. Do I say I should still speak? One thing is to speak, the other is to listen to others. I was in no hurry to speak; I braced myself and held out. Why am I no longer bracing myself and holding out now? I held out for over twenty days, the meeting is almost over—might as well run it to the end of the month. Marshall went up Lushan eight times, Chiang Kai-shek three times; why can't we go up Lushan once? We have the right.

On the canteen question: canteens are a good thing and beyond reproach. I am in favour of actively running them well. Voluntary participation, grain distributed to households, savings kept by the individual. If a third are kept nationwide, I'll be satisfied. The moment I say this, Wu Zhipu gets tense. Don't be afraid; in Henan and some other provinces fifty percent of canteens are still there. You can try it and see; don't get rid of them. I'm speaking of the country as a whole. If a third of the peasants, a hundred and fifty million, keep it up, that would be tremendous. My second hope is about half, two hundred and fifty million—a few more places like Henan, Sichuan, Hunan, Yunnan, Shanghai and so on. Gain experience; some have broken up and will have to be restored. Canteens were not our invention; they were created by the masses. In Hebei some were run in 1956, before communisation; in 1958 they spread very fast. Zeng Xisheng said canteens save labour. I think there's another point: saving materials. Without that latter point they can't last. Can it be done? It can be done. I suggest the Henan comrades set up a full set of mechanisation, for example running water, something so water doesn't have to be carried. That way you can save labour and save materials. Having about half of them break up now is beneficial. Commander-in-Chief, I agree with what you said, but my view also differs from yours. They must break up some, but they must not all break up. I'm a middle-of-the-roader; Henan, Sichuan, Hubei and others are leftists. But a rightist has appeared: the Academy of Sciences' Changli investigation team says canteens have no good points at all. They attack one point and ignore the rest, using the method of the "Rhapsody on the Lechery of Master Dengtu." Dengtu attacked Song Yu on three counts: handsome, lecherous, eloquent—he must not go into the inner palace, it's very dangerous. Song Yu retorted: "Handsomeness was given by my parents, eloquence was taught by my teachers, and lechery—there is no such thing. Of the beauties under heaven, none surpass those of Chu; of the beauties of Chu, none surpass those of my village; of the beauties of my village, none surpass the daughter of my eastern neighbour. Add a fraction and she would be too tall; take away a fraction and she would be too short..." Dengtu was a grandee; a grandee is today's minister, of a big ministry, like the minister of metallurgy, the minister of coal, and what's more the minister of agriculture. The Academy of Sciences investigation team attacks one point and ignores the rest. The method of attacking one point is nothing more than pork and hairpins [being scarce]. How can canteens be without shortcomings? Everyone, whoever they are, has shortcomings. Even Confucius made mistakes. I've seen Lenin's manuscripts, revised all over the place—if there were no mistakes, why revise? We can have somewhat more canteens; try again and see, try them for a year or two. I estimate they can succeed. Will the people's communes collapse? Not one has collapsed so far. We're prepared for half to collapse, seventy percent to collapse—there will still be thirty percent. If they're going to collapse, let them collapse; if they're run badly, they're bound to collapse. The Communist Party wants to run things well: run the communes well, run all undertakings well, run agriculture well, run industry well, run transport well, run commerce well, run culture and education well.

Many things we simply didn't foresee. Didn't we say before that the Party wasn't managing the Party? Now the planning organs are not managing planning—at least for a period they did not manage planning. Planning organs include not just the State Planning Commission but other ministries and the localities too; for a period they did not manage overall balance. The localities can be forgiven, but the Planning Commission and the central ministries, after ten years, suddenly stopped managing after the Beidaihe conference. They call it planning targets, but it amounted to having no plan. What I mean by not managing planning is having no overall balance, simply not calculating how much coal was needed, how much iron, how much transport. Coal and iron can't walk by themselves; they need vehicles to carry them. We didn't foresee this. People like me, people like Shaoqi and the Premier, simply didn't manage it, or managed it only slightly. I'm not making excuses, and yet I am making excuses, because I'm not the head of the Planning Commission. Before August last year, my main energy was devoted to revolution; I was a complete outsider in construction and understood nothing about industrial planning. In the West Building [West Building in Zhongnanhai] I once said not to write "wise leadership"—I didn't even manage it, so what's this talk of wisdom? But comrades, for 1958 and 1959 the main responsibility lies with me. In the past the responsibility was others'; in the past you said the Premier, Chen Yun; now you should say me. There really was a great heap of things I didn't manage. Who holds the patent on the mass steel campaign, Ke Qingshi or me? I say it's me. I had a talk with Ke Qingshi; he said he wanted to do six million tonnes [the whole East China Economic Cooperation Region]. Afterwards I gathered people for talks; Wang Heshou also felt it was feasible. In June I spoke of 10.7 million tonnes, and then it was carried out. Bo Yibo suggested putting it in the Beidaihe communiqué; I thought it was feasible. From then on we brought on a great disaster: ninety million people went into battle, a subsidy of four billion, small native groups, small modern groups. The talk of "losses outweigh gains," "losses and gains equal," and so on, comes from this.

I've read many of the discussions. Everyone says we can still do it [the small native groups], iron can still be smelted; we must raise quality, lower costs, lower the sulphur content, and struggle to produce genuinely good iron. As long as we grab hold of it, it's possible. The Communist Party has a method called grabbing hold. The Communist Party and Chiang Kai-shek both have two hands; the Communist Party's hands are communists' hands, and when they grab hold, things get done. Steel must be grabbed hold of; grain, oil, cotton, hemp, silk and ramie, sugar, medicine, plus tobacco, fruit and salt—agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline occupations and fisheries, twelve items to be grabbed hold of. There must be overall balance. Each place is different; not every county can be cast in the same mould. Some places don't grow tea, don't grow sugar cane; we must suit measures to local conditions. Didn't the Soviet Union raise pigs in Muslim areas? What nonsense! An article was written about industrial planning, and it was rather well written. As for the Party not managing the Party, the planning organs not managing planning, not doing overall balance—what were they doing? The Premier was anxious, but they weren't anxious at all. If people aren't anxious, they have no spirit; without enthusiasm you can't do things well.

Some people criticise Li Fuchun of the Planning Commission: "his feet would advance but falter, his mouth would speak but stammers." Don't be like Li Kui either—being too hasty won't do. Lenin's boundless enthusiasm was truly good, and the masses really welcomed it. "His mouth would speak but stammers"—that's nothing but all sorts of misgivings. I think this has to change; if you have something to say, say it. In the first half of the month there were many misgivings; now things have opened up and people have spoken out. The minutes are the proof; spoken words leave no evidence, so let this be put on record. If you have something to say, say it! Just say it! If you've got something on me, then go after me. At the Chengdu conference I said don't be afraid of being made to wear tight shoes—what does it matter if you are? I said several other things too, even saying don't be afraid of being jailed, don't be afraid of being beheaded, don't be afraid of being expelled from the Party. A Communist Party member, a high-ranking cadre, with so many misgivings! Some people are just afraid of being punished for saying something inappropriate. This is called "wisely protecting oneself"! Illness enters through the mouth; disaster leaves through the mouth. Today I'm going to cause trouble; two kinds of people will be unhappy with me: one kind that can't be touched and can't bear to hear bad things, and one kind whose direction has some problems. If you don't agree with me, refute me. To say that the Chairman can't be refuted—I think that's wrong. In fact many are already refuting me, only without naming names. Some of the opinions at the Jiangxi Party School and the Central Party School are refutations, saying, "He who first made the burial figurines, shall he not be without posterity?" One is the 10.7 million tonnes of steel. The 10.7 million tonnes of steel was my proposal, my decision; the result was ninety million people going into battle, four billion yuan, "losses outweigh gains." The second is the people's communes. I have no claim to having invented the people's communes, but I have a claim to having proposed them. The Beidaihe resolution was written on my proposal; at the time I treated the Chayashan charter as a found treasure. You say I have petty-bourgeois fanaticism; there's a bit of that too, otherwise why treat it as a found treasure? Why put it in Red Flag magazine? When I was in Shandong a journalist asked me, "Are the people's communes good?" I said "Good," and he published it in the paper. That doesn't matter—print it or not—at Beidaihe I proposed making a resolution. There's a bit of petty-bourgeois fanaticism; from now on journalists should keep away [at a distance].

I have two crimes. One is called 10.7 million tonnes, the mass steel campaign. If you agreed with it you can take a share off me, but I am the one who first made the burial figurines, I can't push it off; the main responsibility is mine. The people's communes—the whole world opposes them, the Soviet Union opposes them too. Then there's the General Line, whether it is empty or substantial—you take a share; it is put into action in industry and agriculture. As for some other big cannons, others must share a bit too. You fired quite a lot of big cannons yourselves, inaccurately, on impulse, carelessly; communising too fast. Starting with what was said in Henan, the minutes from Jiangsu and Zhejiang spread fast; people spoke carelessly, without much certainty. You must be more careful. The strong point is the drive, the willingness to take responsibility. That's better than all that dreariness and dejection, but on major questions firing big cannons calls for caution. I too fired three big cannons: the communes, steel-making, the General Line. Peng Dehuai says he's coarse without any fineness; I'm Zhang Fei, coarse with a little fineness. On the people's communes I said collective ownership. I said that for the process from collective ownership to communist ownership by the whole people, two Five-Year Plans is a bit too short; it may take twenty Five-Year Plans.

On wanting things fast—Marx also made quite a few mistakes. I bring out Marx to give comrades a bit of comfort. This Marx thought every day about revolution coming fast. As soon as he saw the situation coming, he said European revolution has come, proletarian revolution has come, and then it didn't come; after a while he said it was about to come, and again it didn't come. In short, back and forth. Marx had been dead many years before it came, in Lenin's time. Wasn't that impatience? Petty-bourgeois fanaticism? Marx had it too! When the Paris Commune uprising broke out, Marx supported it, though he estimated it would fail. He saw that it was the first dictatorship of the proletariat, and that even if it lasted only three months it would be worthwhile. If you talk in terms of economic accounting, it wasn't worth it. We too had the Guangzhou Commune, the defeat of the Great Revolution in 1927, and so on. Will our present economic work fail like 1927? Like the Long March of ten thousand li, when most of the base areas were lost and the Red Army and the Party shrank to a tenth, or even less? I don't think it can be put that way, and everyone shares this view. The comrades attending the Lushan conference all, without exception, say there have been gains, that it has not been a complete failure. Has most of it failed? I don't think that can be said either. Most of it has not failed; part of it has failed. It's what is called paying a higher price, using some more labour, paying some more money, blowing a "communist wind" once—but the people of the whole country have been educated and have sobered up.

Now we must study political economy. In the past who read the political economy textbook? I didn't. Stalin's book [i.e. Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR]—I read it once and found it utterly tasteless. At that time we were making revolution; what socialist economy? Ah, as soon as I got to Zhengzhou, I read it twice and started lecturing; I was qualified to lecture, though I'd only just read it twice on the train. I lectured on two chapters—I'm not making that up! Now it's not enough; now we must study it in depth, otherwise our cause cannot develop, cannot be consolidated, cannot advance.

If we're talking about responsibility, Li Fuchun and Wang Heshou bear some responsibility. Boss Tan of agriculture bears some responsibility. The first responsibility is mine. Old Ke, does your patent carry responsibility? (Old Ke: Yes.) Is it relatively light? Yours is a question of ideology. Mine is the 10.7 million tonnes of steel, ninety million people going into battle—that made a big mess, and I'll take responsibility myself. Comrades should all analyse their own responsibility. If you've got shit, let it out; if you've got a fart, let it go; then your belly will feel comfortable.

26 July 1959

III. Unify Understanding, Unite Comrades, Improve Work

I have received a letter, a representative document. The writer has gathered some material on our economic work, material exclusively concerning shortcomings. The writer is interested only in material of this kind; in material of the other kind, material on achievements, it can be said he takes no interest at all. He believes that since the fourth quarter of 1958, shortcomings and mistakes have been the main current in the Party's work. He therefore concludes that the Party has committed the errors of "left adventurism" and "opportunism," and that their root lies in the failure of the 1957 Rectification and anti-rightist struggle to oppose "at the same time" the danger of left adventurism. The writer, Comrade Li Yunzhong (a deputy bureau chief in the State Planning Commission, recently transferred to be head of the general group of the general office of the Northeast Cooperation Region Committee), is wrong in his basic viewpoint. He negates almost everything. He holds that the tens of millions of people who went into battle to make steel caused huge losses with no benefit whatsoever; the people's communes, too, were a mistake; he is extremely pessimistic about capital construction; on agriculture he mentions water conservancy, holding that the Party's "left adventurism and opportunism" errors were caused by the water conservancy work; he has no good word for the several hundred million peasants who, under the Party's leadership, carried out water conservancy on a large scale in the winter before last and last spring. He is a "losses outweigh gains" theorist, and in some places practically a "losses without gains" theorist. The writer's conclusive views are placed in the first section and take up little space. This comrade's merit is that he has laid out his thinking in full. He is very different from some other comrades we have seen, who basically are not pleased but dissatisfied with the work of the Party and the people, greatly underestimate achievements and overestimate shortcomings, are frightened by present difficulties, deflate rather than encourage cadres, lack confidence in the future or even lose confidence, but are unwilling to say what they think and how they see things, or say a little and hold some back, adopting an evasive attitude: "the feet would advance but falter, the mouth would open but stammers."

Comrade Li Yunzhong is different from these people. He does not conceal his political views; with great enthusiasm he wrote to comrades of the Centre, hoping the Centre would take steps to overcome the present difficulties. He believes the difficulties can be overcome, though it will take longer; these views are correct. The writer's criticism of shortcomings in planning work takes up most of the letter, and I find it very much to the point. In ten years there has not been one comrade willing and daring to expose to the Centre, pointedly, analytically and systematically, the shortcomings of our planning work, so as to get them corrected. I have not seen a single such person. I know such people exist; they just don't dare to go over their superiors' heads. I therefore propose that this letter be circulated among Party organisations at two levels, the central level and the local level (provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions), especially in the planning organs, and that debate be launched on it, correctly analysing the strengths and weaknesses, the advantages and disadvantages, the gains and losses of their own work in 1958 and 1959, so as to unify understanding, unite comrades, improve work, go all out and advance bravely, and strive for new great victories in economic work and other work (political work, military work, cultural, educational and health work, the leadership work of Party organisations at all levels, and work among workers, youth and women). Since the first Zhengzhou conference last November and up to this Lushan conference, the Party Centre has conducted serious criticism of the errors and shortcomings in the various major tasks under its leadership, on the condition of adequately assessing achievements (achievements are primary, shortcomings secondary); this criticism has now gone on for nine months. It must be recognised that this criticism was entirely necessary, and has taken effect both quickly and gradually. It must also be recognised that such serious and earnest criticism was bound to bring, and has brought, certain side effects, namely deflating some comrades. Mistakes must be criticised; deflation must be prevented. Spirit can be pumped up and must not be let out. "A man without spirit—I do not know what he is good for." We must uphold what was said in the minutes of the second Zhengzhou conference this March: in a spirit of wholeheartedly protecting cadres, guide those who have made mistakes in their work and those with shortcomings to criticise and correct their shortcomings and mistakes. Mistakes are not frightening; what is to be feared is refusing to criticise, refusing to correct, and losing spirit because of criticism. Both correcting mistakes and boosting morale must be attended to. It must be recognised that although criticism and rectification have gone on for several months, all unfinished work must still be persistently completed, leaving no loose ends.

But now a new thing has appeared inside and outside the Party: rightist sentiment, rightist thinking and rightist activity have increased, and there is every sign of a frenzied attack. This is shown in many of the materials distributed to comrades at this meeting. The situation has not yet reached the level of the frenzied attack by rightists inside and outside the Party in 1957, but the signs and trends are already very clear; they have already appeared on the horizon. This situation is bourgeois in character. Another situation is of an ideological character within the proletariat. These people, like us, want socialism and do not want capitalism; this is the basic point we have in common with these comrades. But these comrades' views diverge from ours. Their mood is somewhat abnormal; they somewhat overestimate the Party's mistakes and somewhat underestimate the great achievements created by several hundred million people under the Party's leadership; they have drawn inappropriate conclusions; they lack confidence in overcoming the present difficulties. They have unconsciously placed themselves in an inappropriate position, between the left and the right. They are typical middle-of-the-roaders. They are "losses and gains are equal" theorists. At critical moments they are not firm; they sway back and forth. We do not fear a frenzied attack by the rightists, but we do fear the swaying of these comrades, because this swaying is not conducive to the unity of the Party and the people, nor to the whole Party going all out together, overcoming difficulties and winning victory. We believe these comrades' attitude can change. Our task is to unite with them and win them over to changing their attitude. To achieve this goal, we must make a necessary assessment of this trend within the Party. We must not overestimate it, thinking they have the strength to capsize the great ship of the Party and the people in the storm. They do not have such great strength. They are a relative minority, while we are the great majority. We are united with the majority of the people (workers, poor peasants, lower-middle peasants, part of the upper-middle peasants, and intellectuals). The Party's General Line and the guidelines, policies and working methods embodying it are welcomed by the broad mass of Party members, the broad mass of cadres and the broad masses of the people. But neither must we underestimate their strength; there are a fair number of them. Until their mistaken views have been criticised, until they accept criticism and correct their attitude, they will not readily give up their views; this must be recognised. When major problems arise within the Party and there are disputes expressing different views, that some people sway temporarily and stand in the middle, and that some move to the right, is a normal phenomenon and no cause for alarm. In the final analysis, mistaken views and even mistaken lines will certainly be overcome, and the great majority of people, including those who sway temporarily and even those who commit errors of line, will certainly unite on a new basis. That is how our Party's thirty-eight-year history has gone. Opposing the right inevitably produces "left," and opposing "left" inevitably produces right; this is inevitable. Speak when the time is right. Now is the time to speak of this. Not speaking would harm unity, harm the Party and harm individuals. This present dispute may prove to be a dispute of great significance, like each of the major disputes during our revolutionary period. In the new historical period, the period of socialist construction, it is impossible that there be no disputes, that all be calm and quiet. The Lushan conference may prove to be a conference of great significance. "Unity—criticism—unity," "learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones, cure the sickness to save the patient"—these are the correct and effective methods, proven by history, for resolving contradictions within the Party, and we must uphold these methods.

These views of mine were largely expressed at the plenary meeting on 23 July, but some were not finished, so I have written these words as a supplement to that speech.

2 August 1959

IV. The Unity of the Central Committee Plenum Concerns the Fate of Chinese Socialism

Of the 191 members and alternate members of the Central Committee, 147 are present, with 15 attending as observers, 165 in total. The agenda of the meeting:

The question of revising targets: the Sixth Plenum in Wuhan decided this year's targets. At the Seventh Plenum in Shanghai, some advocated revising the targets, but most disagreed. It seems revision can't be done thoroughly either. There are still five months left; once revised, it must go through the NPC Standing Committee. The high targets were set by ourselves; we set up a bodhisattva and worshipped it ourselves. Now we still have to smash it—smash the targets that don't fit reality, for steel, coal, grain, cotton and so on.

The question of the line: some comrades have doubts—is it right or not? Before we came up Lushan this was not clear. After we came up Lushan, some people demanded democracy, demanded freedom, said they didn't dare to speak, that there was pressure. At the time we couldn't make head or tail of it, didn't know what this talk of no democracy was for. The first half-month was a meeting of immortals; there was no tense atmosphere. When they say there is no freedom, it is that they want to attack the General Line, to undermine the General Line. The freedom they want is the freedom to undermine the General Line, the freedom of speech to criticise the General Line. They want a tense situation. Mainly they criticise last year, but they also criticise this year's work. They say last year's work was done badly. Since the first Zhengzhou conference last November, we have corrected the "communist wind," corrected "first equalising, second requisitioning, third withdrawing funds" and other "left" tendencies. They don't see the work of these nine months, they are dissatisfied, and they demand it be discussed all over again; otherwise they consider democracy suppressed. They find the enlarged Politburo meeting not satisfying enough, say there was too little democracy. Now we're holding a plenum, with more democracy, and we're preparing to hold a Party congress next year. Depending on the situation, if needed, it could be held this September or October. In 1957 didn't they demand great democracy, great blooming, great contending, great debate? The Lushan conference has been going on for a month. Newly arrived comrades don't know what's going on; first hold small meetings for a few days, then a big meeting, and finally make a resolution.

The method of the meeting: use a method everyone agrees with, starting from the desire for unity. The unity of the Central Committee plenum concerns the fate of Chinese socialism. As we see it, we should unite; now there is a tendency toward splitting. Last year at the Eighth Congress I said the dangers were nothing more than: first, a world war; second, a split in the Party. At the time there were no obvious signs; now there are such signs. The method of unity: start from the desire for unity, go through criticism and self-criticism, and achieve a new unity on a new basis. Toward comrades who have made mistakes, adopt the policy of learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones, curing the sickness to save the patient; give comrades who have made mistakes a way out, allow them to correct their mistakes and continue the revolution. Don't be like Squire Zhao in "The True Story of Ah Q," who wouldn't allow Ah Q to join the revolution. Toward comrades who have made mistakes, first observe, second help. Just observing without helping, doing no work, is not good. We oppose mistakes; poison must not be eaten; we do not relish the stink of mistakes. Criticising and struggling against them is to bring them a bit closer to us, and to keep shortcomings and mistakes as far from us as possible. Comrades who have made mistakes must be analysed; there are only two possibilities: one, they can change; two, they cannot change. Observing means seeing whether they can change; helping means helping them change. Some comrades followed over to the other side for a time; through criticism and persuasion, together with changes in objective circumstances, many comrades changed and broke away from those people again. The Li Lisan line and the Wang Ming line were corrected at the Zunyi conference; after that it took ten years up to the Seventh Congress, passing through the Rectification in between. The ten years were necessary. For a person to correct mistakes takes several processes. Forcing it won't work. Marx said: "It is only through thousands upon thousands of exchanges that the dual character of the commodity is recognised." Luo Fu at first did not admit his errors of line; at the Seventh Congress, after struggle, Luo Fu admitted his errors of line. In that struggle Wang Ming did not change, and Luo Fu did not change either; the old illness has relapsed—he is still having bouts of malaria, and at the first opportunity it comes out. Most comrades corrected themselves. As for errors of line, historical facts prove they can be changed; we must have this confidence. Those who cannot change are isolated individuals. So the policy of curing the sickness to save the patient is effective; we must have good intentions in helping them. Be warm toward people, be merciless toward wrong things—they are poison, and we must have an attitude of utter loathing—but not use the methods of Wu Song, Lu Zhishen and Li Kui. They were very resolute and could join the Communist Party; their shortcoming was that they were not very tactical and couldn't do political work. We must use the method of presenting facts and reasoning things out: great debate, big-character posters, medium-character posters, the bulletins of the Lushan conference.

16 August 1959

V. The Right Opportunists Have Provoked the Struggle

The comrades who committed right-opportunist errors did not raise their views at the Zhengzhou conference last November, still less did they raise views about the high targets at the Beidaihe conference; nor did they raise views at the Wuchang conference last December, nor at the Shanghai conference at the end of March and beginning of April; instead they raised their views at this Lushan conference.

Why didn't these comrades raise them at those times? Because their set of ideas could not be put forward then. If they had a set of correct views, wiser than ours, they should have raised them at Beidaihe! They waited until the Centre had solved the problems, or most of them, and only then raised them, thinking that if they didn't raise them now it would be hard to do so. Because they felt that if they didn't raise them now, in a few more months the situation would improve, the moment would pass, and it would be even worse, so they were in a hurry to launch it.

Struggle within the Party reflects class struggle in society; this is not in the least surprising. It would be inconceivable if there were no such struggle. This truth was not explained thoroughly in the past, and many comrades did not understand it. As soon as a problem arose, for example the Gao-Rao problem in 1953, or the present problem of Peng, Huang, Zhou and Zhang, many people were astonished. This astonishment is understandable, because social contradictions go from hidden to manifest. People's understanding of class struggle in the socialist era can deepen only gradually through their own struggle and practice. In particular, some inner-Party struggles, such as the struggles with Gao, Rao, Peng and Huang, have a tortuous and complex character. Yesterday a "hero of merit," today the chief culprit: "What happened? Was there some mistake?" People do not know of their historical changes, do not know the complexity and tortuousness of their history—isn't that quite natural? The complex and tortuous character of this should be explained to comrades gradually and correctly. Furthermore, in handling such cases, we must not use simple methods; we must not handle them as contradictions between ourselves and the enemy, but must handle them as contradictions among the people. We must adopt the policies of "unity—criticism—unity," "learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones, cure the sickness to save the patient," "be strict in criticism, lenient in handling," "first observe, second help." We must keep them not only in the Party, but also in the provincial committees and the Central Committee, and individual comrades should be kept in the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. Is there danger in this? There may be. As long as we adopt correct policies, it may be avoided. With their mistakes there are only two possibilities: first, they correct them; second, they don't. The conditions for correction are ample. First, they have a dual nature: on one side revolutionary, on the other counter-revolutionary. Up to now they are distinct from the traitors Chen Duxiu, Luo Zhanglong, Zhang Guotao and Gao Gang: one is a contradiction among the people, the other a contradiction between ourselves and the enemy. Contradictions among the people can turn into contradictions between ourselves and the enemy if the attitudes and policies adopted by both sides are inappropriate; they may not turn into contradictions between ourselves and the enemy, but be treated throughout as contradictions among the people and thoroughly resolved, if we can resolve these contradictions promptly and appropriately. The following conditions are important. The supervision of the whole Party and the whole people; the political level of the majority of cadres at the central and local levels has risen greatly compared with the time of the Gao-Rao affair in 1953; they understand things. Isn't this successful struggle at the Lushan conference the proof? Further, our attitude and policies toward them must be Marxist attitudes and policies that fit the situation, and we already have such attitudes and policies. The possibility of not correcting also exists. Then it's nothing more than continuing to make trouble and bringing about their own destruction. That too is nothing terrible. Adding a few members to the ranks of Chen Duxiu, Luo Zhanglong, Zhang Guotao and Gao Gang—what harm would that do to our great Party and our great nation? But we believe that all comrades who have made mistakes, except for a very few of the Chen, Luo, Zhang and Gao type, can always change under certain conditions, given time. On this we must have firm confidence. Our Party's thirty-eight-year history provides ample evidence of this, as everyone knows. To help comrades who have made mistakes correct them, we must still treat them as comrades, treat them as brothers, give them warm help, give them time to correct their mistakes and a way to continue revolutionary work. We must leave room for manoeuvre. There must be warmth, there must be spring; one cannot go on living in winter forever. I believe all of this is extremely important.