Speeches and Comments at the Lushan Conference
Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
- Context
- Mao addressed the Lushan Conference and the Central Committee plenum in a series of speeches between July 10 and August 16, 1959, admitting responsibility for Great Leap errors while attacking critics as right opportunists and wavering middle-of-the-roaders.
- Main themes
- Unity of the Party, admission of mistakes in the Great Leap Forward, the General Line, 'nine fingers and one finger' assessment, people's communes and the communist wind, public canteens, the 10.7 million tonne steel campaign, criticism of right opportunists and middle-of-the-roaders, planning failures and overall balance, Li Yunzhong's letter, Peng Dehuai and the Gao-Rao precedent, policy of unity-criticism-unity
- Duration
- ~78 min
- Words
- 9,404
- Sentences
- 577
- Readability
- 64
- Grade
- 8.4
- Syntax
- 2.74
- Vocabulary
- 2.15
Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other577 sentences in 48 paragraphs
10 July 1959
I. Unify Understanding, Achieve Unity, Admit Mistakes
The question of unity.
If our understanding of the situation is not consistent, there can be no unity. If we want unity within the Party, we must first get the issues clear and unify our thinking. Some comrades lack an all-round analysis of the situation; we must help them see what has been gained and what has been lost.
We must get the issues clear. Some people say the General Line is fundamentally wrong. But what is the so-called General Line? It is nothing more than "more, faster, better, more economically," and "more, faster, better, more economically" cannot possibly be wrong.
If we explain the reasoning clearly and lay the problems out in the open, we can always get seventy percent of the people to stand under the General Line.
We must admit our shortcomings and mistakes. Taking one particular area, taking one particular problem, it may be ten fingers, nine fingers, seven fingers, or three fingers, two fingers. But taking the situation as a whole, it is only a matter of one finger. That is how the overall situation stands: nine fingers and one finger.
I always tell foreign comrades: please come back in ten years and see whether we were right. Because whether a line is correct or not is a question of practice; it takes time, and it must be proven by the results of practice. We should say that we still have no experience in construction, and will need at least another ten years. In the meetings of this past year, we have always analysed problems, resolved problems, upheld the truth and corrected mistakes. Some comrades in the Party do not understand the situation as a whole, and it must be explained to them: in terms of certain specific facts, there really have been cases where the losses outweighed the gains, but taken overall, one cannot say the losses outweighed the gains. Gaining experience always means paying tuition.
23 July 1959
II. Oppose Two Tendencies, Safeguard the Unity of the Party
You have said so much; allow me to say a little, may I? I took sleeping pills three times and still couldn't sleep.
I want to put forward some views. I have read the comrades' minutes, speeches and documents, and talked with some of the comrades. I feel there are two tendencies, and I will talk about them here.
One is that people cannot be touched; at the slightest touch they explode. Wu Zhihui said: touch Sun Ke and he jumps. So some comrades feel under pressure, that is, they do not want people to say bad things, they only want people to say good things, and do not want to hear bad things. I urge these comrades to listen. There are three kinds of talk, and the mouth has two uses. A person has one mouth: its first function is eating, its second is the duty of speaking. You have a pair of ears, so you must listen. If he wants to talk, what can you do about it? Some comrades just don't like hearing bad things. Good words and bad words are all words, and you must listen to them all. There are three kinds of talk: first, the correct; second, the basically correct or not entirely correct; third, the basically incorrect or incorrect. The two ends are opposites. Correct and incorrect are opposites.
Now we are being attacked from both inside and outside the Party. The rightists say: why did the First Emperor of Qin fall? Because he built the Great Wall. Now we are building Tiananmen and we are going to collapse—that is what the rightists say. Within the Party some views have not yet been fully expressed; they are concentrated in the reactions at the Jiangxi Party School, and they exist everywhere. All the rightist talk has come out, represented by Long Yun, Chen Mingshu, Luo Longji and Zhang Bojun. The Jiangxi Party School represents it within the Party; some of those people are rightists, vacillating elements. They do not see the whole picture; with a bit of work they can be brought round. Some people have problems in their history, have been criticised, and also think everything is an utter mess, as in the material from the Guangzhou Military Region. All these remarks were made outside the meeting. We combine what is inside the meeting with what is outside. It's a pity Lushan is too small to invite them all. People like those of the Jiangxi Party School, Luo Longji, Chen Mingshu—this is the responsibility of the Jiangxi people; the houses are too small!
Whatever the talk, it all comes down to saying things are an utter mess. That is very good; the more they say it is an utter mess, the better, and the more we must listen. During the Rectification we coined the phrase "brace yourself and hold out." I have said to some comrades: hold out, brace yourself and hold out. For how long? One month, three months, half a year, a year, three years, five years, ten years, eight years. Some of our comrades say "protracted war," and I very much agree. Comrades of this kind are the majority.
Gentlemen present, you all have ears—so listen! It is unpleasant to hear, but welcome it! Once you think about it that way, it won't sound so unpleasant! Why should we let people speak? The reason is that the Divine Land will not sink and the sky will not fall. Because we have done some good things, our backs are straight. Most of our comrades should stiffen their backs. Why aren't they stiff? It is nothing more than that for a period there were too few vegetables, too few hairpins, no soap, proportions out of balance, a tight market, so that people became tense. I don't see anything to be tense about. I'm tense too; it would be a lie to say I'm not. In the first half of the night you're tense, and in the second half of the night you take a sleeping pill and you're not tense anymore.
They say we have become divorced from the masses, but in fact the masses still support us. I think the difficulties are temporary—three months, that's all. Around the Spring Festival, I think the masses and we were very closely bound together. There is a little petty-bourgeois fanaticism, but not all that much. I agree with the comrades' views; the problem is the commune movement. I went to Suiping and talked in detail for over two hours. The Party secretary of the Chayashan Commune told me that in July, August and September, an average of three thousand people a day came to visit—thirty thousand in ten days, three hundred thousand in three months. I've heard that Xushui and Qiliying also had as many visitors; people came from everywhere except Tibet. Like the monk Xuanzang going to fetch the scriptures. These people were all county, commune and brigade cadres, with some prefectural cadres too. Their idea was: the people of Henan and Hebei have created experience and broken Roosevelt's "freedom" from want. This enthusiasm for building communism—how should we view it? Is it petty-bourgeois fanaticism? I don't think it can be put that way; they wanted a bit more, that's all—they just wanted a bit more. Is this analysis appropriate? In three months, three hundred thousand people making pilgrimages—a mass movement this broad, you cannot pour cold water on it. You can only persuade: "Comrades, your hearts are in the right place, but the thing is hard to accomplish; you can't be impatient, you must go step by step. You can only eat meat one bite at a time; trying to become fat in one bite won't work." Lin Biao eats a jin of meat a day and still isn't fat, and wouldn't be in ten years. The Commander-in-Chief's and my fatness did not come in a day. These cadres lead several hundred million people. At least thirty percent are activists; thirty percent are negative elements, together with landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, bureaucrats, middle peasants and some poor peasants; forty percent go with the tide. How many people is thirty percent? A hundred-and-something million. They demanded communes, demanded canteens, wanted large-scale cooperation; they were extremely enthusiastic. They wanted to do it—can you call this petty-bourgeois fanaticism? This is not the petty bourgeoisie; these are poor peasants and lower-middle peasants, proletarians and semi-proletarians. Those going with the tide were also willing; those unwilling were the thirty percent. In short, thirty percent plus forty percent makes seventy percent—three hundred and fifty million people were fervent for a period; they wanted to do it. For two-odd months around the Spring Festival they became unhappy; they changed. When cadres went down to the countryside, people no longer talked to them; they served sweet potatoes and thin gruel with no smile on their faces. This is called [the consequence of] blowing the "communist wind." The "communist wind" also has to be analysed; there was petty-bourgeois fanaticism in it. Who were these people? The "communist wind" was mainly blown by cadres at the county and commune levels, especially some commune cadres, who blew a "communist wind" against the production brigades and small teams. That was bad, and the masses did not welcome it. We firmly corrected it and persuaded them; in a month's effort, in March and April, we suppressed the wind. What should be returned was returned, and the accounts between communes and brigades were settled. This month of account-settling education was beneficial; in a very short time it made them understand that egalitarianism won't do, that "first equalising, second requisitioning, third withdrawing funds" won't do. I hear that now most people have come round, and only some are still nostalgic for the "communist wind" and can't let go. Where else could you find such a great school, such a short training course, that educates several hundred million people and several million cadres? Things must be handed back; you can't say what's yours is mine and just pick it up and walk off. Since ancient times there has been no such rule, and ten thousand years from now you still won't be able to just pick things up and walk off. The only ones who do are the Green and Red Gangs—the Green ones steal, the Red ones rob, openly with torches and weapons, exploiting other people's labour without paying, destroying exchange of equal value. Song Jiang's government was called the "Hall of Loyalty and Righteousness"; they robbed the rich to help the poor, with full justification, and could pick things up and walk off, because what they took belonged to local tyrants and evil gentry. That charter, I think, is acceptable. What Song Jiang robbed was the "birthday convoy"; likewise what we seized when we struck down the local tyrants was ill-gotten wealth—"no harm in robbing it"; it was scraped from the peasants and returned to the peasants. We stopped striking down local tyrants long ago. Striking down local tyrants, dividing up the land, turning things over to the public—that too was fine, because that too was ill-gotten wealth. When we blew the communist wind and took the wealth of production brigades and small teams, picking up fat pigs and cabbages and walking off, that was wrong. Even toward imperialist property we have three methods: requisition purchase, buying out, squeezing out. How could we exploit the property of the labouring people? Why did this wind die down in just over a month? It proves our Party is great, glorious and correct. In March, April and May, several million cadres and several hundred million peasants were educated; things were explained clearly and they came round. Mainly it was the cadres: they didn't understand whether this wealth was rightfully gotten, couldn't distinguish the boundaries, hadn't studied political economy well, hadn't grasped the law of value, exchange of equal value, distribution according to work. In a few months they were persuaded and stopped doing it.
Those who fully understand may not exist; there are those who partly understand, who understand seventy or eighty percent. They haven't understood the textbook yet, so tell them to read it; at the commune level you can't manage without knowing some political economy. If they can't read, it can be explained to them. If they understand partly, they needn't read books; they can be educated with facts. Emperor Wu of Liang had a minister, Chen Fazhi, who couldn't read a single character. Forced to compose a poem, he recited it and had someone else write it down. He said some scholars are not even as good as this old man who learns with his ears. Of course I'm not against eliminating illiteracy. Old Ke says the whole people should go to university, and I agree too, but the fifteen years will have to be extended. Then in the Northern and Southern Dynasties there was a general surnamed Cao who wanted to compose a poem after a battle: "When the army set out, sons and daughters grieved; on return, the reed pipes and drums resound. May I ask the passer-by: how does this compare with Huo Qubing?" And in the Northern Dynasties there was Hulü Jin's "Song of the Chile": "The Chile river, beneath the Yin mountains; the sky like a domed yurt, covering the plains on all sides. The sky so blue, the wilds so vast; the wind blows, the grass bends, and cattle and sheep appear." He too couldn't read a single character. If a person who can't read a single character can be a chief minister, why can't our commune cadres and peasants listen to political economy? I think everyone can learn it; explain it to them. Political economy can be explained to people who can't read; explain it and they'll understand. They understand it more easily than intellectuals. I myself haven't read the textbook; I've only read a bit of it, which is what gives me the right to speak. We must squeeze out the time and have a study movement for the whole Party.
We don't know how many self-criticisms we have made. Since the Zhengzhou Conference last year we have made them over and over; there were six-level conferences and five-level conferences, and all made self-criticisms. When people from Beijing went on and on, they just wouldn't listen. We've made self-criticism many times—haven't you heard? I urge those comrades: people have mouths! Let them speak! Listen to people's opinions. I think some problems won't be resolved at this meeting; some people won't give up their views. So we'll just drag it out! One year, two years, three years, five years. It won't do if you can't stand to hear grumbling; you must make it a habit. I say: brace yourself and hold out! At worst they curse your ancestors to the third generation. This is hard too. When I was young, in middle-school days, I too would fill up with anger whenever I heard bad things said. "If others do not offend me, I will not offend them; if others offend me, I will certainly offend them; others offend first, I strike back after"—I haven't abandoned this principle even now. Now I've learned to listen, to brace myself and hold out, to listen for a week or two, and then counter-attack. I urge comrades to listen; whether you agree or not is your business. If you don't agree, and if I'm wrong, I'll make a self-criticism.
Second, I urge another group of comrades not to waver at such a critical juncture. As far as I can observe, some comrades are wavering. They too say the Great Leap Forward, the General Line and the people's communes are all correct, but we must see which side the thinking of their speeches stands on, in which direction they are speaking. These people are the second kind, the "basically correct, partly incorrect" kind, but they are somewhat wavering. Some people waver at critical moments; in every great storm they have not been firm. Historically there have been four lines: the Chen Duxiu line, the Li Lisan line, the Wang Ming line, the Gao-Rao line. Now there is one General Line. In great storms some comrades can't stand firm and dance the yangge. Doesn't the Chiang gang call us the yangge dynasty? These comrades dance the yangge. They are burning with anxiety and want to do well by the country; that is good. What class is this? Bourgeois or petty-bourgeois? I won't say now. At the Nanning conference, the Chengdu conference and the Party Congress, I spoke about the wavering in 1956 and 1957; we didn't put tall hats on anyone, we treated it as a question of method of thinking. If one speaks of petty-bourgeois fanaticism, then turning it around, the opposition to rash advance back then was bourgeois cold, cheerless, sad and dejected defeatism and pessimism. We didn't put tall hats on them, because these comrades are different from the rightists; they also want socialism, they just lacked experience, and at the slightest stir of wind in the grass they couldn't keep their footing and opposed rash advance. Those who opposed rash advance last time have stood firm this time. Comrade Enlai, for instance, has great drive; he learned the lesson of that time. I believe Comrade Chen Yun will also stand firm. It is precisely some of those who criticised Comrade Enlai that time who have this time taken their place. They don't talk about rash advance, but there is the flavour of opposing rash advance. For example, "there are losses and there are gains." Putting "gains" after was carefully weighed. If we were to put tall hats on, this would be bourgeois wavering, or, one grade lower, petty-bourgeois wavering. Because the rightist character is often under bourgeois influence; under the pressure of imperialism and the bourgeoisie they turn right.
One mistake per production brigade—over seven hundred thousand production brigades, over seven hundred thousand mistakes, all published, printed all year round—could you finish printing them or not? And then there's the length of the articles; I think it would take at least a year. What would the result be? Our country would collapse. Then even if the imperialists didn't come, the people at home would rise up and overthrow us all. If you run a newspaper that prints bad things every day, people will have no heart for work; never mind a year, we'd perish within a week. Printing seven hundred thousand items, printing only bad things—that would no longer be proletarian; that would be a bourgeois state, that would be the bourgeois Zhang Bojun's "design institute." Of course no one present advocates this; I'm exaggerating. If we do ten things and nine are bad, and they're all printed in the papers, we will certainly perish and we ought to perish. Then I will go, go to the countryside and lead the peasants to overthrow the government. If you, the Liberation Army, won't follow me, I'll go and find the Red Army. But I think the Liberation Army will follow me.
I urge some comrades to pay attention to the direction of what they say. The content of what they say, though, is basically correct and partly inappropriate. If you want others to be firm, first be firm yourself; if you want others not to waver, first don't waver yourself. This is another lesson. These comrades, as I see it, are not rightists; they are middle-of-the-roaders, not leftists (leftists without quotation marks). The reason I speak of direction is that some people have run into some snags, their heads are broken and bleeding, they are burning with anxiety, they can't keep their footing, they have wavered and moved to the middle. Whether exactly they are left of centre or right of centre still has to be analysed. They are repeating the road of the comrades who made mistakes in the second half of 1956 and the first half of 1957. They are not rightists, but they have thrown themselves to the edge of the rightists, still thirty kilometres from the rightists, because the rightists very much welcome this line of argument. With the line some comrades are taking now, it would be strange if the rightists didn't welcome it. Comrades like these are pursuing brinkmanship, which is quite dangerous. If you don't believe it, wait and see. These words are said in front of a large crowd and are somewhat hurtful, but not saying them now would be bad for these comrades.
I'm adding one topic to the topics I set: the question of unity. It should still be written as a separate section, holding up the banner of unity: the unity of the people, the unity of the nationalities, the unity of the Party. If I don't speak, would it be beneficial or harmful to these comrades? Harmful! So I must still speak. We are a Marxist party. The people on the first side must listen to others, and the people on the second side must also listen to others. People on both sides must listen to others. Do I say I should still speak? One thing is to speak, the other is to listen to others. I was in no hurry to speak; I braced myself and held out. Why am I no longer bracing myself and holding out now? I held out for over twenty days, the meeting is almost over—might as well run it to the end of the month. Marshall went up Lushan eight times, Chiang Kai-shek three times; why can't we go up Lushan once? We have the right.
On the canteen question: canteens are a good thing and beyond reproach. I am in favour of actively running them well. Voluntary participation, grain distributed to households, savings kept by the individual. If a third are kept nationwide, I'll be satisfied. The moment I say this, Wu Zhipu gets tense. Don't be afraid; in Henan and some other provinces fifty percent of canteens are still there. You can try it and see; don't get rid of them. I'm speaking of the country as a whole. If a third of the peasants, a hundred and fifty million, keep it up, that would be tremendous. My second hope is about half, two hundred and fifty million—a few more places like Henan, Sichuan, Hunan, Yunnan, Shanghai and so on. Gain experience; some have broken up and will have to be restored. Canteens were not our invention; they were created by the masses. In Hebei some were run in 1956, before communisation; in 1958 they spread very fast. Zeng Xisheng said canteens save labour. I think there's another point: saving materials. Without that latter point they can't last. Can it be done? It can be done. I suggest the Henan comrades set up a full set of mechanisation, for example running water, something so water doesn't have to be carried. That way you can save labour and save materials. Having about half of them break up now is beneficial. Commander-in-Chief, I agree with what you said, but my view also differs from yours. They must break up some, but they must not all break up. I'm a middle-of-the-roader; Henan, Sichuan, Hubei and others are leftists. But a rightist has appeared: the Academy of Sciences' Changli investigation team says canteens have no good points at all. They attack one point and ignore the rest, using the method of the "Rhapsody on the Lechery of Master Dengtu." Dengtu attacked Song Yu on three counts: handsome, lecherous, eloquent—he must not go into the inner palace, it's very dangerous. Song Yu retorted: "Handsomeness was given by my parents, eloquence was taught by my teachers, and lechery—there is no such thing. Of the beauties under heaven, none surpass those of Chu; of the beauties of Chu, none surpass those of my village; of the beauties of my village, none surpass the daughter of my eastern neighbour. Add a fraction and she would be too tall; take away a fraction and she would be too short..." Dengtu was a grandee; a grandee is today's minister, of a big ministry, like the minister of metallurgy, the minister of coal, and what's more the minister of agriculture. The Academy of Sciences investigation team attacks one point and ignores the rest. The method of attacking one point is nothing more than pork and hairpins [being scarce]. How can canteens be without shortcomings? Everyone, whoever they are, has shortcomings. Even Confucius made mistakes. I've seen Lenin's manuscripts, revised all over the place—if there were no mistakes, why revise? We can have somewhat more canteens; try again and see, try them for a year or two. I estimate they can succeed. Will the people's communes collapse? Not one has collapsed so far. We're prepared for half to collapse, seventy percent to collapse—there will still be thirty percent. If they're going to collapse, let them collapse; if they're run badly, they're bound to collapse. The Communist Party wants to run things well: run the communes well, run all undertakings well, run agriculture well, run industry well, run transport well, run commerce well, run culture and education well.
Many things we simply didn't foresee. Didn't we say before that the Party wasn't managing the Party? Now the planning organs are not managing planning—at least for a period they did not manage planning. Planning organs include not just the State Planning Commission but other ministries and the localities too; for a period they did not manage overall balance. The localities can be forgiven, but the Planning Commission and the central ministries, after ten years, suddenly stopped managing after the Beidaihe conference. They call it planning targets, but it amounted to having no plan. What I mean by not managing planning is having no overall balance, simply not calculating how much coal was needed, how much iron, how much transport. Coal and iron can't walk by themselves; they need vehicles to carry them. We didn't foresee this. People like me, people like Shaoqi and the Premier, simply didn't manage it, or managed it only slightly. I'm not making excuses, and yet I am making excuses, because I'm not the head of the Planning Commission. Before August last year, my main energy was devoted to revolution; I was a complete outsider in construction and understood nothing about industrial planning. In the West Building [West Building in Zhongnanhai] I once said not to write "wise leadership"—I didn't even manage it, so what's this talk of wisdom? But comrades, for 1958 and 1959 the main responsibility lies with me. In the past the responsibility was others'; in the past you said the Premier, Chen Yun; now you should say me. There really was a great heap of things I didn't manage. Who holds the patent on the mass steel campaign, Ke Qingshi or me? I say it's me. I had a talk with Ke Qingshi; he said he wanted to do six million tonnes [the whole East China Economic Cooperation Region]. Afterwards I gathered people for talks; Wang Heshou also felt it was feasible. In June I spoke of 10.7 million tonnes, and then it was carried out. Bo Yibo suggested putting it in the Beidaihe communiqué; I thought it was feasible. From then on we brought on a great disaster: ninety million people went into battle, a subsidy of four billion, small native groups, small modern groups. The talk of "losses outweigh gains," "losses and gains equal," and so on, comes from this.
I've read many of the discussions. Everyone says we can still do it [the small native groups], iron can still be smelted; we must raise quality, lower costs, lower the sulphur content, and struggle to produce genuinely good iron. As long as we grab hold of it, it's possible. The Communist Party has a method called grabbing hold. The Communist Party and Chiang Kai-shek both have two hands; the Communist Party's hands are communists' hands, and when they grab hold, things get done. Steel must be grabbed hold of; grain, oil, cotton, hemp, silk and ramie, sugar, medicine, plus tobacco, fruit and salt—agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline occupations and fisheries, twelve items to be grabbed hold of. There must be overall balance. Each place is different; not every county can be cast in the same mould. Some places don't grow tea, don't grow sugar cane; we must suit measures to local conditions. Didn't the Soviet Union raise pigs in Muslim areas? What nonsense! An article was written about industrial planning, and it was rather well written. As for the Party not managing the Party, the planning organs not managing planning, not doing overall balance—what were they doing? The Premier was anxious, but they weren't anxious at all. If people aren't anxious, they have no spirit; without enthusiasm you can't do things well.
Some people criticise Li Fuchun of the Planning Commission: "his feet would advance but falter, his mouth would speak but stammers." Don't be like Li Kui either—being too hasty won't do. Lenin's boundless enthusiasm was truly good, and the masses really welcomed it. "His mouth would speak but stammers"—that's nothing but all sorts of misgivings. I think this has to change; if you have something to say, say it. In the first half of the month there were many misgivings; now things have opened up and people have spoken out. The minutes are the proof; spoken words leave no evidence, so let this be put on record. If you have something to say, say it! Just say it! If you've got something on me, then go after me. At the Chengdu conference I said don't be afraid of being made to wear tight shoes—what does it matter if you are? I said several other things too, even saying don't be afraid of being jailed, don't be afraid of being beheaded, don't be afraid of being expelled from the Party. A Communist Party member, a high-ranking cadre, with so many misgivings! Some people are just afraid of being punished for saying something inappropriate. This is called "wisely protecting oneself"! Illness enters through the mouth; disaster leaves through the mouth. Today I'm going to cause trouble; two kinds of people will be unhappy with me: one kind that can't be touched and can't bear to hear bad things, and one kind whose direction has some problems. If you don't agree with me, refute me. To say that the Chairman can't be refuted—I think that's wrong. In fact many are already refuting me, only without naming names. Some of the opinions at the Jiangxi Party School and the Central Party School are refutations, saying, "He who first made the burial figurines, shall he not be without posterity?" One is the 10.7 million tonnes of steel. The 10.7 million tonnes of steel was my proposal, my decision; the result was ninety million people going into battle, four billion yuan, "losses outweigh gains." The second is the people's communes. I have no claim to having invented the people's communes, but I have a claim to having proposed them. The Beidaihe resolution was written on my proposal; at the time I treated the Chayashan charter as a found treasure. You say I have petty-bourgeois fanaticism; there's a bit of that too, otherwise why treat it as a found treasure? Why put it in Red Flag magazine? When I was in Shandong a journalist asked me, "Are the people's communes good?" I said "Good," and he published it in the paper. That doesn't matter—print it or not—at Beidaihe I proposed making a resolution. There's a bit of petty-bourgeois fanaticism; from now on journalists should keep away [at a distance].
I have two crimes. One is called 10.7 million tonnes, the mass steel campaign. If you agreed with it you can take a share off me, but I am the one who first made the burial figurines, I can't push it off; the main responsibility is mine. The people's communes—the whole world opposes them, the Soviet Union opposes them too. Then there's the General Line, whether it is empty or substantial—you take a share; it is put into action in industry and agriculture. As for some other big cannons, others must share a bit too. You fired quite a lot of big cannons yourselves, inaccurately, on impulse, carelessly; communising too fast. Starting with what was said in Henan, the minutes from Jiangsu and Zhejiang spread fast; people spoke carelessly, without much certainty. You must be more careful. The strong point is the drive, the willingness to take responsibility. That's better than all that dreariness and dejection, but on major questions firing big cannons calls for caution. I too fired three big cannons: the communes, steel-making, the General Line. Peng Dehuai says he's coarse without any fineness; I'm Zhang Fei, coarse with a little fineness. On the people's communes I said collective ownership. I said that for the process from collective ownership to communist ownership by the whole people, two Five-Year Plans is a bit too short; it may take twenty Five-Year Plans.
On wanting things fast—Marx also made quite a few mistakes. I bring out Marx to give comrades a bit of comfort. This Marx thought every day about revolution coming fast. As soon as he saw the situation coming, he said European revolution has come, proletarian revolution has come, and then it didn't come; after a while he said it was about to come, and again it didn't come. In short, back and forth. Marx had been dead many years before it came, in Lenin's time. Wasn't that impatience? Petty-bourgeois fanaticism? Marx had it too! When the Paris Commune uprising broke out, Marx supported it, though he estimated it would fail. He saw that it was the first dictatorship of the proletariat, and that even if it lasted only three months it would be worthwhile. If you talk in terms of economic accounting, it wasn't worth it. We too had the Guangzhou Commune, the defeat of the Great Revolution in 1927, and so on. Will our present economic work fail like 1927? Like the Long March of ten thousand li, when most of the base areas were lost and the Red Army and the Party shrank to a tenth, or even less? I don't think it can be put that way, and everyone shares this view. The comrades attending the Lushan conference all, without exception, say there have been gains, that it has not been a complete failure. Has most of it failed? I don't think that can be said either. Most of it has not failed; part of it has failed. It's what is called paying a higher price, using some more labour, paying some more money, blowing a "communist wind" once—but the people of the whole country have been educated and have sobered up.
Now we must study political economy. In the past who read the political economy textbook? I didn't. Stalin's book [i.e. Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR]—I read it once and found it utterly tasteless. At that time we were making revolution; what socialist economy? Ah, as soon as I got to Zhengzhou, I read it twice and started lecturing; I was qualified to lecture, though I'd only just read it twice on the train. I lectured on two chapters—I'm not making that up! Now it's not enough; now we must study it in depth, otherwise our cause cannot develop, cannot be consolidated, cannot advance.
If we're talking about responsibility, Li Fuchun and Wang Heshou bear some responsibility. Boss Tan of agriculture bears some responsibility. The first responsibility is mine. Old Ke, does your patent carry responsibility? (Old Ke: Yes.) Is it relatively light? Yours is a question of ideology. Mine is the 10.7 million tonnes of steel, ninety million people going into battle—that made a big mess, and I'll take responsibility myself. Comrades should all analyse their own responsibility. If you've got shit, let it out; if you've got a fart, let it go; then your belly will feel comfortable.
26 July 1959
III. Unify Understanding, Unite Comrades, Improve Work
I have received a letter, a representative document. The writer has gathered some material on our economic work, material exclusively concerning shortcomings. The writer is interested only in material of this kind; in material of the other kind, material on achievements, it can be said he takes no interest at all. He believes that since the fourth quarter of 1958, shortcomings and mistakes have been the main current in the Party's work. He therefore concludes that the Party has committed the errors of "left adventurism" and "opportunism," and that their root lies in the failure of the 1957 Rectification and anti-rightist struggle to oppose "at the same time" the danger of left adventurism. The writer, Comrade Li Yunzhong (a deputy bureau chief in the State Planning Commission, recently transferred to be head of the general group of the general office of the Northeast Cooperation Region Committee), is wrong in his basic viewpoint. He negates almost everything. He holds that the tens of millions of people who went into battle to make steel caused huge losses with no benefit whatsoever; the people's communes, too, were a mistake; he is extremely pessimistic about capital construction; on agriculture he mentions water conservancy, holding that the Party's "left adventurism and opportunism" errors were caused by the water conservancy work; he has no good word for the several hundred million peasants who, under the Party's leadership, carried out water conservancy on a large scale in the winter before last and last spring. He is a "losses outweigh gains" theorist, and in some places practically a "losses without gains" theorist. The writer's conclusive views are placed in the first section and take up little space. This comrade's merit is that he has laid out his thinking in full. He is very different from some other comrades we have seen, who basically are not pleased but dissatisfied with the work of the Party and the people, greatly underestimate achievements and overestimate shortcomings, are frightened by present difficulties, deflate rather than encourage cadres, lack confidence in the future or even lose confidence, but are unwilling to say what they think and how they see things, or say a little and hold some back, adopting an evasive attitude: "the feet would advance but falter, the mouth would open but stammers."
Comrade Li Yunzhong is different from these people. He does not conceal his political views; with great enthusiasm he wrote to comrades of the Centre, hoping the Centre would take steps to overcome the present difficulties. He believes the difficulties can be overcome, though it will take longer; these views are correct. The writer's criticism of shortcomings in planning work takes up most of the letter, and I find it very much to the point. In ten years there has not been one comrade willing and daring to expose to the Centre, pointedly, analytically and systematically, the shortcomings of our planning work, so as to get them corrected. I have not seen a single such person. I know such people exist; they just don't dare to go over their superiors' heads. I therefore propose that this letter be circulated among Party organisations at two levels, the central level and the local level (provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions), especially in the planning organs, and that debate be launched on it, correctly analysing the strengths and weaknesses, the advantages and disadvantages, the gains and losses of their own work in 1958 and 1959, so as to unify understanding, unite comrades, improve work, go all out and advance bravely, and strive for new great victories in economic work and other work (political work, military work, cultural, educational and health work, the leadership work of Party organisations at all levels, and work among workers, youth and women). Since the first Zhengzhou conference last November and up to this Lushan conference, the Party Centre has conducted serious criticism of the errors and shortcomings in the various major tasks under its leadership, on the condition of adequately assessing achievements (achievements are primary, shortcomings secondary); this criticism has now gone on for nine months. It must be recognised that this criticism was entirely necessary, and has taken effect both quickly and gradually. It must also be recognised that such serious and earnest criticism was bound to bring, and has brought, certain side effects, namely deflating some comrades. Mistakes must be criticised; deflation must be prevented. Spirit can be pumped up and must not be let out. "A man without spirit—I do not know what he is good for." We must uphold what was said in the minutes of the second Zhengzhou conference this March: in a spirit of wholeheartedly protecting cadres, guide those who have made mistakes in their work and those with shortcomings to criticise and correct their shortcomings and mistakes. Mistakes are not frightening; what is to be feared is refusing to criticise, refusing to correct, and losing spirit because of criticism. Both correcting mistakes and boosting morale must be attended to. It must be recognised that although criticism and rectification have gone on for several months, all unfinished work must still be persistently completed, leaving no loose ends.
But now a new thing has appeared inside and outside the Party: rightist sentiment, rightist thinking and rightist activity have increased, and there is every sign of a frenzied attack. This is shown in many of the materials distributed to comrades at this meeting. The situation has not yet reached the level of the frenzied attack by rightists inside and outside the Party in 1957, but the signs and trends are already very clear; they have already appeared on the horizon. This situation is bourgeois in character. Another situation is of an ideological character within the proletariat. These people, like us, want socialism and do not want capitalism; this is the basic point we have in common with these comrades. But these comrades' views diverge from ours. Their mood is somewhat abnormal; they somewhat overestimate the Party's mistakes and somewhat underestimate the great achievements created by several hundred million people under the Party's leadership; they have drawn inappropriate conclusions; they lack confidence in overcoming the present difficulties. They have unconsciously placed themselves in an inappropriate position, between the left and the right. They are typical middle-of-the-roaders. They are "losses and gains are equal" theorists. At critical moments they are not firm; they sway back and forth. We do not fear a frenzied attack by the rightists, but we do fear the swaying of these comrades, because this swaying is not conducive to the unity of the Party and the people, nor to the whole Party going all out together, overcoming difficulties and winning victory. We believe these comrades' attitude can change. Our task is to unite with them and win them over to changing their attitude. To achieve this goal, we must make a necessary assessment of this trend within the Party. We must not overestimate it, thinking they have the strength to capsize the great ship of the Party and the people in the storm. They do not have such great strength. They are a relative minority, while we are the great majority. We are united with the majority of the people (workers, poor peasants, lower-middle peasants, part of the upper-middle peasants, and intellectuals). The Party's General Line and the guidelines, policies and working methods embodying it are welcomed by the broad mass of Party members, the broad mass of cadres and the broad masses of the people. But neither must we underestimate their strength; there are a fair number of them. Until their mistaken views have been criticised, until they accept criticism and correct their attitude, they will not readily give up their views; this must be recognised. When major problems arise within the Party and there are disputes expressing different views, that some people sway temporarily and stand in the middle, and that some move to the right, is a normal phenomenon and no cause for alarm. In the final analysis, mistaken views and even mistaken lines will certainly be overcome, and the great majority of people, including those who sway temporarily and even those who commit errors of line, will certainly unite on a new basis. That is how our Party's thirty-eight-year history has gone. Opposing the right inevitably produces "left," and opposing "left" inevitably produces right; this is inevitable. Speak when the time is right. Now is the time to speak of this. Not speaking would harm unity, harm the Party and harm individuals. This present dispute may prove to be a dispute of great significance, like each of the major disputes during our revolutionary period. In the new historical period, the period of socialist construction, it is impossible that there be no disputes, that all be calm and quiet. The Lushan conference may prove to be a conference of great significance. "Unity—criticism—unity," "learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones, cure the sickness to save the patient"—these are the correct and effective methods, proven by history, for resolving contradictions within the Party, and we must uphold these methods.
These views of mine were largely expressed at the plenary meeting on 23 July, but some were not finished, so I have written these words as a supplement to that speech.
2 August 1959
IV. The Unity of the Central Committee Plenum Concerns the Fate of Chinese Socialism
Of the 191 members and alternate members of the Central Committee, 147 are present, with 15 attending as observers, 165 in total. The agenda of the meeting:
The question of revising targets: the Sixth Plenum in Wuhan decided this year's targets. At the Seventh Plenum in Shanghai, some advocated revising the targets, but most disagreed. It seems revision can't be done thoroughly either. There are still five months left; once revised, it must go through the NPC Standing Committee. The high targets were set by ourselves; we set up a bodhisattva and worshipped it ourselves. Now we still have to smash it—smash the targets that don't fit reality, for steel, coal, grain, cotton and so on.
The question of the line: some comrades have doubts—is it right or not? Before we came up Lushan this was not clear. After we came up Lushan, some people demanded democracy, demanded freedom, said they didn't dare to speak, that there was pressure. At the time we couldn't make head or tail of it, didn't know what this talk of no democracy was for. The first half-month was a meeting of immortals; there was no tense atmosphere. When they say there is no freedom, it is that they want to attack the General Line, to undermine the General Line. The freedom they want is the freedom to undermine the General Line, the freedom of speech to criticise the General Line. They want a tense situation. Mainly they criticise last year, but they also criticise this year's work. They say last year's work was done badly. Since the first Zhengzhou conference last November, we have corrected the "communist wind," corrected "first equalising, second requisitioning, third withdrawing funds" and other "left" tendencies. They don't see the work of these nine months, they are dissatisfied, and they demand it be discussed all over again; otherwise they consider democracy suppressed. They find the enlarged Politburo meeting not satisfying enough, say there was too little democracy. Now we're holding a plenum, with more democracy, and we're preparing to hold a Party congress next year. Depending on the situation, if needed, it could be held this September or October. In 1957 didn't they demand great democracy, great blooming, great contending, great debate? The Lushan conference has been going on for a month. Newly arrived comrades don't know what's going on; first hold small meetings for a few days, then a big meeting, and finally make a resolution.
The method of the meeting: use a method everyone agrees with, starting from the desire for unity. The unity of the Central Committee plenum concerns the fate of Chinese socialism. As we see it, we should unite; now there is a tendency toward splitting. Last year at the Eighth Congress I said the dangers were nothing more than: first, a world war; second, a split in the Party. At the time there were no obvious signs; now there are such signs. The method of unity: start from the desire for unity, go through criticism and self-criticism, and achieve a new unity on a new basis. Toward comrades who have made mistakes, adopt the policy of learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones, curing the sickness to save the patient; give comrades who have made mistakes a way out, allow them to correct their mistakes and continue the revolution. Don't be like Squire Zhao in "The True Story of Ah Q," who wouldn't allow Ah Q to join the revolution. Toward comrades who have made mistakes, first observe, second help. Just observing without helping, doing no work, is not good. We oppose mistakes; poison must not be eaten; we do not relish the stink of mistakes. Criticising and struggling against them is to bring them a bit closer to us, and to keep shortcomings and mistakes as far from us as possible. Comrades who have made mistakes must be analysed; there are only two possibilities: one, they can change; two, they cannot change. Observing means seeing whether they can change; helping means helping them change. Some comrades followed over to the other side for a time; through criticism and persuasion, together with changes in objective circumstances, many comrades changed and broke away from those people again. The Li Lisan line and the Wang Ming line were corrected at the Zunyi conference; after that it took ten years up to the Seventh Congress, passing through the Rectification in between. The ten years were necessary. For a person to correct mistakes takes several processes. Forcing it won't work. Marx said: "It is only through thousands upon thousands of exchanges that the dual character of the commodity is recognised." Luo Fu at first did not admit his errors of line; at the Seventh Congress, after struggle, Luo Fu admitted his errors of line. In that struggle Wang Ming did not change, and Luo Fu did not change either; the old illness has relapsed—he is still having bouts of malaria, and at the first opportunity it comes out. Most comrades corrected themselves. As for errors of line, historical facts prove they can be changed; we must have this confidence. Those who cannot change are isolated individuals. So the policy of curing the sickness to save the patient is effective; we must have good intentions in helping them. Be warm toward people, be merciless toward wrong things—they are poison, and we must have an attitude of utter loathing—but not use the methods of Wu Song, Lu Zhishen and Li Kui. They were very resolute and could join the Communist Party; their shortcoming was that they were not very tactical and couldn't do political work. We must use the method of presenting facts and reasoning things out: great debate, big-character posters, medium-character posters, the bulletins of the Lushan conference.
16 August 1959
V. The Right Opportunists Have Provoked the Struggle
The comrades who committed right-opportunist errors did not raise their views at the Zhengzhou conference last November, still less did they raise views about the high targets at the Beidaihe conference; nor did they raise views at the Wuchang conference last December, nor at the Shanghai conference at the end of March and beginning of April; instead they raised their views at this Lushan conference.
Why didn't these comrades raise them at those times? Because their set of ideas could not be put forward then. If they had a set of correct views, wiser than ours, they should have raised them at Beidaihe! They waited until the Centre had solved the problems, or most of them, and only then raised them, thinking that if they didn't raise them now it would be hard to do so. Because they felt that if they didn't raise them now, in a few more months the situation would improve, the moment would pass, and it would be even worse, so they were in a hurry to launch it.
Struggle within the Party reflects class struggle in society; this is not in the least surprising. It would be inconceivable if there were no such struggle. This truth was not explained thoroughly in the past, and many comrades did not understand it. As soon as a problem arose, for example the Gao-Rao problem in 1953, or the present problem of Peng, Huang, Zhou and Zhang, many people were astonished. This astonishment is understandable, because social contradictions go from hidden to manifest. People's understanding of class struggle in the socialist era can deepen only gradually through their own struggle and practice. In particular, some inner-Party struggles, such as the struggles with Gao, Rao, Peng and Huang, have a tortuous and complex character. Yesterday a "hero of merit," today the chief culprit: "What happened? Was there some mistake?" People do not know of their historical changes, do not know the complexity and tortuousness of their history—isn't that quite natural? The complex and tortuous character of this should be explained to comrades gradually and correctly. Furthermore, in handling such cases, we must not use simple methods; we must not handle them as contradictions between ourselves and the enemy, but must handle them as contradictions among the people. We must adopt the policies of "unity—criticism—unity," "learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones, cure the sickness to save the patient," "be strict in criticism, lenient in handling," "first observe, second help." We must keep them not only in the Party, but also in the provincial committees and the Central Committee, and individual comrades should be kept in the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. Is there danger in this? There may be. As long as we adopt correct policies, it may be avoided. With their mistakes there are only two possibilities: first, they correct them; second, they don't. The conditions for correction are ample. First, they have a dual nature: on one side revolutionary, on the other counter-revolutionary. Up to now they are distinct from the traitors Chen Duxiu, Luo Zhanglong, Zhang Guotao and Gao Gang: one is a contradiction among the people, the other a contradiction between ourselves and the enemy. Contradictions among the people can turn into contradictions between ourselves and the enemy if the attitudes and policies adopted by both sides are inappropriate; they may not turn into contradictions between ourselves and the enemy, but be treated throughout as contradictions among the people and thoroughly resolved, if we can resolve these contradictions promptly and appropriately. The following conditions are important. The supervision of the whole Party and the whole people; the political level of the majority of cadres at the central and local levels has risen greatly compared with the time of the Gao-Rao affair in 1953; they understand things. Isn't this successful struggle at the Lushan conference the proof? Further, our attitude and policies toward them must be Marxist attitudes and policies that fit the situation, and we already have such attitudes and policies. The possibility of not correcting also exists. Then it's nothing more than continuing to make trouble and bringing about their own destruction. That too is nothing terrible. Adding a few members to the ranks of Chen Duxiu, Luo Zhanglong, Zhang Guotao and Gao Gang—what harm would that do to our great Party and our great nation? But we believe that all comrades who have made mistakes, except for a very few of the Chen, Luo, Zhang and Gao type, can always change under certain conditions, given time. On this we must have firm confidence. Our Party's thirty-eight-year history provides ample evidence of this, as everyone knows. To help comrades who have made mistakes correct them, we must still treat them as comrades, treat them as brothers, give them warm help, give them time to correct their mistakes and a way to continue revolutionary work. We must leave room for manoeuvre. There must be warmth, there must be spring; one cannot go on living in winter forever. I believe all of this is extremely important.
The original Chinese. The tags above are read on the English translation's sentences.
一九五九年七月十日
一、统一认识,搞好团结,承认错误
团结问题。
对形势的认识不一致,就不能团结,要党内团结,首先要把问题搞清楚,要思想统一。有些同志对形势缺乏全面分析,要帮助他们认识,得的是什么,失的是什么。
要把问题搞清楚,有人说总路线根本不对,所谓总路线,无非是多快好省,多快好省根本不会错。
我们把道理讲清楚,把问题摆开,总可以有百分之七十的人在总路线下面。
要承认缺点错误,从一个局部来讲,从一个问题来讲,可能是十个指头,九个指头,七个指头,或者三个指头、两个指头,但是从全局来讲,只是一个指头的问题,从总的形势来讲,就是这样,九个指头和一个指头。
我总是同外国同志说,请他们隔十年时间再来看看我们是否正确。因为路线的正确与否,是实践的问题,要有时间,从实践的结果来证明,我们对建设说应该还没有经验,至少还要十年。这一年来的会议,我们总是把问题加以分析,加以解决,坚持真理,修正错误。党内有些同志不了解整个形势,要向他们说明:从某些具体事实说来,确实有得不偿失的,但总的来说,不能说得不偿失。取得经验总是要付学费的。
一九五九年 七月二十三日
二、反对两种倾向,维护党的团结
你们讲了那么多,允许我讲点吧,可以不可以?吃了三次安眠药,睡不着。
讲点这样的意见。我看了同志们的记录、发言、文件,并和一部分同志们谈了话。我感觉到有两种倾向,这里讲一讲。
一种是触不得,大有一触即发之势。吴稚晖说:孙科一触即跳。因此有部分同志感到有压力,即是不愿人家讲坏话,只愿人家讲好话,不愿听坏话。我劝这些同志要听。话有三种,嘴有两用。人有一个嘴巴:一曰吃饭,二曰讲话之义务。长一对耳朵就要听。他要讲,你有什么办法?有一部分同志就是不爱听坏话。好话坏话都是话,都要听。话有三种,一是正确的,二是基本正确的或不甚正确的,三是基本不正确或不正确的。两头是对立的。正确与不正确是对立的。
现在党内外夹攻我们。右派讲:秦始皇为什么倒台?就是因为修长城。现在我们修天安门,要垮台了,这是右派讲的。党内一部分意见还没有讲完,集中表现在江西党校的反映,各地都有。所有右派的言论都拿出来了,龙云、陈铭枢、罗隆基、章伯钧为代表。江西党校是党内的代表,有些人就是右派、动摇分子。他们看得不完全,做点工作可以转变过来。有些人历史上有问题,挨过批评,也认为一塌糊涂,如广州军区的材料。这些话都是会外的讲话。我们是会内外结合。可惜庐山地方太小,不能把他们都请来。像江西党校(的人),罗隆基,陈铭枢,这是江西人的责任,房子太小吆!
不分什么话,无非是讲得一塌糊涂。这很好,越讲得一塌糊涂越好,越要听。我们在整风中创造了“硬着头皮顶住”这样一个名词。我和有些同志讲过,要顶住,硬着头皮顶住。顶多久?一个月、三个月,半年、一年、三年、五年、十年、八年,我们有的同志说“持久战”,我很赞成。这种同志占多数。
在座诸公,你们都有耳朵,听嘛!难听是难听,欢迎!你这么一想就不难听了!为什么要让人家讲呢?其原因,神州不会陆沉,天不会塌下来。因为我们做了些好事,腰杆子硬。我们多数同志腰杆子要硬起来。为什么不硬?无非是一个时期蔬菜太少,头发卡子太少,没有肥皂,比例失调,市场紧张,以致搞得人心紧张。我看没有什么紧张的。我也紧张,说不紧张是假的。上半夜你紧张紧张,下半夜安眠药一吃就不紧张了。
说我们脱离了群众,其实群众还是拥护我们的。我看困难是暂时的,就是三个月。春节前后,我看群众和我们结合得很好。小资产阶级狂热性有那么一点,但是并不那么多。我同意同志们的意见,问题是公社运动,我到遂平详细地谈了两个多钟头,嵖岈山公社党委书记告诉我,七、八、九三个月,平均每天三千人参观,十天三万人才,三个月三十万人。徐水、七里营听说也有这么多人参观,除了西藏都来看了。唐僧取经嘛。这些人都是县、社、队干部,也有地专干部。他们的想法是:河南人河北人创造了经验,打破了罗斯福免于贫困的“自由”。搞共产主义,这股热情,怎么看法?小资产阶级狂热性吗?我看不能那么说,要想多一点,无非是想多一点。这种分析是否恰当?三个月当中,三十万朝山进香,这种广泛的群众运动,不能泼冷水,只能劝说:“同志们,你们的心是好的,事情难以办到,不能性急,要有步骤。吃肉只能一口一口地吃,要一口吃成个胖子不行”。林彪一天吃一斤肉还不胖,十年也不行。总司令和我的胖并非一朝一夕之功。这些干部率领几亿人民,至少百分之三十是积极分子,百分之三十是消积分子及地、富、反、坏、官僚、中农和部分贫农,百分之四十随大流。百分之三十是多少人,一亿几千万人。他们要求办公社,办食堂,搞大协作,非常积极。他们愿搞,你能说这是小资产阶级狂热性吗?这不是小资产阶级,是贫农、下中农、无产阶级,半无产阶级。随大流者也可以,不愿搞的百分之三十,总之百分之三十加百分之四十为百分之七十,三亿五千万人在一个时期有狂热性,他们要搞。到春节前后有两个多月,他们不高兴了,变了,干部下乡都不讲话了,请吃地瓜、稀饭,面无笑容,这叫刮“共产风”(造成的后果)。对刮“共产风”也要分析,其中有小资产阶级狂热性,这是什么人?“共产风”主要是县社两级干部,特别是公社一部分干部,刮生产队和小队的“共产风”,这是不好的,群众不欢迎。坚决纠正,说服他们,用一个月的功夫,三、四月间把风压下去,该退的退,社与队的账清了。这一个月的算账教育是有好处的,极短的时间使他懂得平均主义不行,“一平二调三提款”是不行的。听说现在大多数人转过来了,只有一部分人还留恋“共产风”还舍不得。哪里找这样一个大学校,短期训练班,使几亿人几百万干部受到教育。东西要交回,不能说你的就是我的,拿起就走了。从古以来,没有这个规矩,一万年以后也不能拿起就走。有,只有青红帮,青偷红劫,明火执仗,无代价地削剥人家劳动,破坏等价交换。宋江的政府叫“忠义堂”,劫富济贫,理直气壮,可以拿起就走,拿的是土豪劣绅的,那个章程,我看可以的。宋江劫的是“生辰纲”,就是我们打土豪劫的是不义之财,“劫之无碍”,刮自农民,归到农民。我们已长期不打土豪了,打土豪,分田地归公,那也可以,因为那也是不义之财。我们刮共产风,取生产队、小队之财,肥猪、大白菜拿起就走,这样是错误的。我们对帝国主义财产还有三种办法:征购、购买、挤垮,怎么能剥削劳动人民的财产呢?为什么一个多月就熄下这股风呢?证明我们的党是伟大的,光荣的、正确的。三、四月份和五月有几百万干部和几亿农民受到教育,讲清了,他们想通了。主要是干部,不懂得这个财是义财,分不清界线,没有读好政治经济学,未搞通价值法则,等价交换,按劳分配,几个月就说通了,不办了。
十分搞通的,未必有,几分通,七、八分通,教科书还没懂,叫他们读,公社一级不懂点政治经济学是不行的。不识字,可以讲。通几分,可以不读书,用事实来教育。梁武帝有个宰相陈发之,一字不识,强迫他作诗,他口念叫别人写,他说有些读书人,还不如老夫的用耳学。当然我不反对扫文盲,柯老说全民进大学,我也赞成,不过十五年得延长。还有南北朝有个姓曹的将军,打了仗以后要作诗:“出师儿女悲,归来笳鼓霓,借问过路人,何为霍去病”。还有北朝斛律金敕勒歌“敕勒川,阴山下,天似穷庐,笼盖四野。天苍苍,野茫茫,风吹草低见牛羊”。这也是一字不识的人。一字不识的人可以当宰相,为什么我们的公社干部,农民不可以听政治经济学呢?我看大家可以学,讲讲,政治经济学不识字可以讲,讲讲就懂了。他们比知识分子容易懂。教科书我就没有看,略为看了一点,才有发言权,要挤出时间,全党来个学习运动。
我们不晓得作了多少次检查了。从去年郑州会议以来,大作特作,有六级会议、五级会议,都要作检查。北京来的人哇啦哇啦,他们就听不进去,我们检讨多次,你们就没有听到?我就劝这些同志,人家有嘴巴么!要人家讲么!要听听人家的意见。我看这次会议有些问题不解决,有些人不会放弃他们的观点,无非拖着么!一年、二年、三年、五年,听不得怪话不行,要养成习惯。我说就是硬着头皮顶住呵!无非是骂祖宗三代。这也难,我少年、中学时代,也是一听到坏话就一肚子气,人不犯我,我不犯人,人若犯我,我必犯人,人先犯我,我后犯人,这个原则,现在也不放弃。现在学会了听,硬着头皮顶住,听他一个、两个星期,再反击。劝同志们要听,你们赞成不赞成是你们的事,不赞成,如我错,我作自我批评。
第二方面,我劝另外一部分同志,在这样的紧急关头,不要动摇,据我观察,有一部分同志是动摇的。他们也说大跃进、总路线、人民公社都是正确的,但要看讲话的思想方面站在那一边?向那方面讲,这部分人是第二种人,“基本正确,部分不正确”的这一类人,但有些动摇。有些人在关键时就是动摇的,在历次大风大浪中就是不坚决的。历史上有四条路线,陈独秀路线、立三路线、王明路线、高饶路线,现在是一条总路线,在大风浪时,有些同志站不稳,扭秧歌。蒋帮不是叫我们做秧歌王朝吗?这部分同志扭秧歌,他们忧心如焚,想把国家搞好,这是好的。这叫什么阶级呢?资产阶级还是小资产阶级?我现在不讲。在南宁会议,成都会议,党代大会讲过,一九五六年、一九五七年的动摇,不戴高帽子,讲成思想方法问题。如果讲小资产阶级的狂热性,反过来讲,那时的反冒进,就是资产阶级的冷冷清清,惨惨戚戚的泄气性,悲观性。我们不戴高帽子,因为这些同志和右派不同,他们也搞社会主义,只不过是没有经验,一有风吹草动就站不住脚,就反冒进。那次反冒进的人这次站住脚了。如恩来同志劲很大,受过那次教训,相信陈云同志也会站住脚的。恰恰是那次批判恩来同志的,他们那一部分人这次取他们的地位而代之。不讲冒进了,可是有反冒进的味道。比如说:“有失有得”。“得”放往后面是经过斟酌了的,如果戴高帽子,这是资产阶级动摇性,或降一等是小资产阶级动摇性。因为右的性质,往往受资产阶级的影响,在帝国主义、资产阶级压力下右起来了。
一个生产队一条错误,七十几万个生产队七十几万条错误都登出来,一年登到头,登得完登不完?还有文章长短,我看至少要一年,这样结果如何?我们的国家就垮台了,那时候帝国主义不来,国内人民也会起来把我们统统打倒。你办那个报纸天天登坏事,无心工作,不要说一年,就是一个星期也要灭亡的。登七十万条,专登坏事,那就不是无产阶级了,那就是资产阶级国家了,就是资产阶级的章伯均的设计院了,当然在座没有人这样主张,我是用夸大说法。假如办十件事,九件是坏的,都登在报刊上,一定灭亡,应当灭亡,那我就走,到农村去,率领农民推翻政府,你解放军不跟我走,我就找红军去。我看解放军会跟我走的。
我劝一部分同志讲话的方向要注意,不过讲话的内容基本正确,部分不妥。要别人坚定,首先自己坚定,要别人不动摇,首先自己不动摇。这又是一次教训。这些同志据我看不是右派是中间派,不是左派(不加引号的左派)。我所谓方向,是因为一些人碰了一些钉子了,头破血流,忧心如焚,站不住脚,动摇了,站到中间去了,究竟中间偏左偏右,还要分析。重复五六年下半年、五七上半年犯错误同志的道路,他们不是右派,可是自己把自己抛到右派边缘去了,距右派还有三十公里,因为右派很欢迎这个论凋,现在有些同志的论调,右派不欢迎才怪。这种同志采取边缘政策,相当危险,不相信,将来看。这些话是在大庭广众当中讲的,有些伤人,现在不讲,对这些同志不利。
我出的题目中加一个题目,团结问题。还是单独写一段,拿着团结的旗帜,人民的团结,民族的团结,党的团结。我不讲对这些同志是有益是有害?有害!所以还是要讲。我们是马克思主义政党。第一方面的人要听人家讲,第二方面的人也要听人家讲。两方面的人都要听人家讲,我说还是要讲吗?一条是要讲,一条是要听人家讲。我不忙讲,硬着头皮顶住,我为什么现在不硬着头皮顶了呢?顶了二十多天,快散会了,索性开到月底。马歇尔八上庐山,蒋介石三上庐山,我们一上庐山,为什么不可以?有此权利。
食堂问题,食堂是个好东西,无可厚非,我赞成积极办好。自愿参加,粮食到户,节约归己。我看在全国保持三分之一我就满意了,一讲这个,吴芝圃就紧张了,不要怕,河南等省有百分之五十的食堂还在,那也可以试试看,不要搞掉,我是就全国范围来讲的。三分之一农民,一亿五千万坚持下去就了不起了。第二个希望,一半左右,二亿五千万,多几个河南、四川、湖南、云南、上海等等。取得经验,有些散了,还得恢复,食堂并不是我们发明的,是群众创造的,河北一九五六年公社化以前就有办的,一九五八年办得很快,曾希圣说:食堂节省劳动力,我看还有一条,节省物质,如果没有后面这一条,就不能持久。可否办到?可以办到。我建议河南同志把一套机械化搞起来,比如自来水,搞个东西不用挑,这样一来可以节省劳力,可以省物质,现在散掉一半左右有好处。总司令我赞同你的说法,但又和你的说法有区别。不可不散,不可全散。我是个中间派,河南、四川、湖北等是左派,可是有个右派出来了,科学院昌黎调查组说食堂没有一点好处,攻其一点,不及其余,学“登徒子好色赋”的办法。登徒子攻宋玉三条:漂亮,好色、会说话,不能到后宫去,很危险。宋玉反驳说:“漂亮是父母所生,会说话是先生所教,好色无此事。天下佳人不如楚,楚国出丽者,莫若臣里,臣里之美者,莫若臣东家之子,增一分过长,减一分过短。……”登徒子是大夫,大夫就是今天的部长,是大部,如冶金部长,煤炭部长,还有什么农业部长,科学院调查组是攻其一点,不及其余,攻其一点的办法,无非是猪肉、头发卡子(少了)。食堂哪能没有缺点?无论什么人都有缺点,孔夫子也有错误,我也看过列宁的手稿,改得一塌糊涂,没有错误,为什么要改?食堂可以多一点,再试试看,试它一年、二年,估计可以办成。人民公社会不会垮台?现在没有垮一个,准备垮一半、垮七分,还有三分,要垮就垮,办得不好,一定要垮。共产党就是要办好,办好公社,办好一切事业,办好农业,办好工业,办好交通运输,办好商业,办好文化教育。
许多事情根本料不到,以前不是说党不管党吗?现在计划机关不管计划,至少是一个时期不管计划。计划机关不只是计委,还有其它各部,还有地方,一个时期不管综合平衡。地方可以原谅,计委同中央各部十年了,忽然在北戴河会议后开始不管了,名曰计划指标,等于不要计划,所谓不管计划,就是不要综合平衡,根本不去算要多少煤,要多少铁,要多少交通,煤铁不能自己走路,要车马运,这点没料到。我这样的人,少奇、总理这样的人,根本没有管,或者略略一管。我不是开脱也是开脱,因为我不是计委主任,去年八月以前,主要精力放在革命方面,对建设根本外行,对工业计划一点不懂,在西楼(中南海西楼)时曾经说过不要写“英明领导”,管都没管还说什么英明?但是,同志们,一九五八、一九五九主要责任在我身上,过去责任在别人,过去说总理、陈云,现在应该说我,实在有一大堆事没管。大办钢铁的发明权是柯庆施还是我?我说是我,我和柯庆施谈过一次话,你说要搞六百万吨(整个华东经济协作区)。以后我找大家谈话,有王鹤寿也觉得可行,我六月讲一〇七〇万吨,后来去做,薄一波建议搞在北戴河公报上,我觉得可行,从此闯下大祸,九千万人上阵,补贴四十亿,搞小土群、小洋群,“得不偿失”,“得失相当”等等说法,即由此而来。
看了很多讨论,大家讲还可以搞(小土群),铁还可以炼,要提高质量,降低成本,降低硫的成分,要为出真正好铁而努力奋斗。只要抓,也有可能。共产党有个方法叫抓,共产党和蒋介石都有两只手,共产党的手是共产主义者的手,一抓就抓起来了。钢铁要抓,粮油、棉、麻、丝麻、糖、药,还有烟果盐,农、林、牧、付、渔有十二项要抓,要综合平衡,各地不同,不能每县都一个模子。有些地方不长茶,不长甘庶,要因地制宜。苏联不是搞过回民地区养猪么,岂有此理?工业计划搞了一篇文章,写得还好。至于党不管党,计划机关不管计划,不搞综合平衡,搞什么去了?总理着急他们却根本不急。人不着急就没有一股神气,没有一股热情就办不好事情。
有人批评计委李富春是“足将进而趑趄,口将言而嗫嚅”也,不要像李逵,太急了也不行,列宁热情磅礴实在好,群众很欢迎。口将言而嗫嚅,无非有各种顾虑,这个我看要改,有话就要讲,上半月顾虑甚多,现在展开了,有话讲出来了,记录为证,口说无凭,立此存照。你们有话讲出来嘛!有话就讲出来嘛,你们抓住,就整我嘛。成都会议上我说过不要怕穿小鞋,穿小鞋有什么要紧。还讲过几条,甚至说不要怕坐班房,不要怕杀头,不要怕开除党籍,一个共产党员,高级干部,那么多的顾虑,有些人就是怕讲得不妥挨整,这叫“明哲保身”啊!病从口入,祸从口出,我今天要闯祸,两种人都不高兴我,一种是触不得听不得坏话的,一种是方向有点问题的。如果你们不赞成,你们就驳,说主席不能驳,我看不对,事实上已经纷纷在驳,不过不指名,江西党校,中央党校一些意见就是驳,说“始作俑者,其无后乎”。一个是一〇七〇万吨钢。一〇七〇万吨钢是我建议,我下的决心,其结果是九千万人上阵,四十亿人民币,“得不偿失”。第二个是人民公社,人民公社我无发明之权,有建议之权。北戴河决议是我建议写的,当时嵖岈山章程如获至宝。你讲我是小资产阶级狂热性,也是有一点,不然为什么如获至宝呢?要上《红旗》杂志呢?我在山东,一个记者问我,“人民公社好不好?”我说“好”,他就登了报。这个没关系,你登也好,不登也好,到北戴河我提议要作决议的。小资产阶级狂热性有一点,以后新闻记者要离开(远点)。
我有两条罪状,一条叫一〇七〇万吨,大炼钢铁,你们赞成也可以给我分一点,但是始作俑者是我,推不掉,主要责任是我,人民公社,全世界反对,苏联也反对,还有总路线是虚的实的,你们分一点,见之于行动是工业、农业。至于其他一些大炮,别人也要分担一点,你们那大炮也相当多,放的不准心血来潮,不谨慎,共产共的快。在河南讲起,江苏、浙江的记录传得快,说话不谨慎,把握不大,要谨慎一点。长处是一股干劲,肯负责任。比那凄凄惨惨戚戚要好,但放大炮在重大问题要慎重,我也放了三大炮,公社,炼钢,总路线。彭德怀说他粗中无细,我是张飞粗中有点细。人民公社我说集体所有制。我说集体所有制到共产主义全民所有制的过程,两个五年计划太短了一些,也许要二十个五年计划。
要快之事,马克思也犯过不少错误。我搬出马克思来,使同志们得到一点安慰。这个马克思,天天想革命快,一见形势来了就说欧洲革命来了,无产阶级革命来了,后头又没有来;过一阵又说要来,又没有来。总之,反反复复。马克思死了好多年,列宁时代才来,那还不是急性病?小资产阶级狂热性?马克思也有呵!巴黎公社起义爆发之后,马克思就赞成了,但他估计会失败。他看出这是第一个无产阶级专政,哪怕只存在三个月也好。要讲经济核算的话,划不来。我们还有广州公社,一九二七年大革命失败,等等。我们现在的经济工作,是否会像一九二七年那样失败?像万里长征那样,大部分根据地丧失,红军和党都缩小到十分之一,或者还不到?我看不能这样讲,大家也是这么个意见,参加庐山会议的同志都豪无例外地说有所得,没有完全失败。是否大部分失败了?我看也不能讲。大部分没有失败,一部分失败了。就是所谓多付了代价、多用点劳力、多付一点钱、刮了一次“共产风”,可是全国人民受了教育,清醒了。
现在要研究政治经济学,过去谁人去读政治经济学教科书?我就不读。斯大林的书(按指《苏联社会主义经济问题》),我读了一遍,根本没有味道。那个时候搞革命,搞什么社会主义经济。唉,一到郑州,我就读了两遍,我就讲学,就有资格讲学了,不过刚刚在火车上读了两遍,我讲了两章,没有造谣吧!现在不够,现在要深入研究,不然我们的事业不能发展、不能够巩固、不能够前进。
如讲责任,李富春、王鹤寿有点责任。农业部谭老板有点责任,第一个责任是我。柯老,你的发明权有没有责任?(柯老:有)是否比较轻?你那是意识形态问题。我是一个一〇七〇万吨钢,九千万人上阵,这个乱子就闹大了,自己负责。同志们自己的责任都要分析一下,有屎拉出来,有屁放出来,肚子就舒服了。
一九五九年七月二十六
三、统一认识,团结同志,改善工作
收到一封信,是一个有代表性的文件。信的作者在我们的经济工作搜集了一些材料,这些材料专门属于缺点方面的。作者只对这一方面的材料有兴趣;而对另一方面的材料,成绩方面的材料,可以说根本不发生兴趣。他认为,从一九五八年第四季度以来,党的工作中缺点错误是主流。因此做出结论说,党犯了“左倾冒险主义”,“机会主义”的错误,而其根源在于一九五七年整风反右斗争没有“同时”反对左倾冒险主义的危险。作者李云仲同志(他是国家计委一个副局长,不久前调任东北协作区委员会办公厅综合组组长)的基本观点是错误的。他几乎否定一切。他认为几千万人上阵大炼钢铁损失极大而毫无效益,人民公社也是错误的,对基本建设极为悲观,对农业他提到水利,认为党的“左倾冒险主义、机会主义”错误是办水利引起的,他对前冬去春几亿农民在党的领导下大办水利没有好评。他是一个“得不偿失”论者,某些地方简直是“有失无得”论者。作者的这些结论性的观点放在第一段,篇幅不多。这个同志的好处是把自己的思想和盘托出。他跟我们看见的另一些同志,他们对党和人民的工作基本上不是高兴,而是不满,对成绩估计很不足,对缺点估计过高,为现在的困难所吓倒、对干部不是鼓劲而是泄气,对前途信心不足,甚至丧失信心,但是不愿意讲出自己的想法和看法,或者讲一点,留一点,而采取“足将进而趔趄,口将开而嗫嚅”,躲躲闪闪的态度大不相同。
李云仲同志和这些人不同,他不隐瞒自己的政治观点,他满腔热情地写信给中央同志,希望中央采取步骤克服现在的困难。他认为困难是可以克服的,不过时间要长些,这些看法是正确的。信的作者对计划工作中缺点的批评占了大部分篇幅,我认为很中肯。十年来还没有一个愿意和敢于向中央中肯地有分析地系统地揭露我们计划工作的缺点,因而求得改正的同志。我就没有看见这样一个人。我知道这种人是有的,他们就是不敢越衙上告。因此我建议,将此信在中央一级和地方一级(省、市、自治区)共两级的党组织中,特别是计划机关中,予以传阅并且展开辩论,将一九五八年、一九五九年两年自己所做的工作的长短,利害得失,加以正确的分析,以利统一认识,团结同志,改善工作,鼓足干劲,奋勇前进,争取经济工作及其他工作(政治工作、军事工作、文教卫生工作、党的各级组织的领导工作,工、青,妇工作)的新的伟大胜利。党中央从去年十一月第一次郑州会议以来至此次庐山会议,对于在自己领导下的各项重大工作中的错误缺点在足够地估计成绩(成绩是主要的,缺点是第二位的)的条件下,进行了严肃的批判,这次批判工作已经有九个月了。必须看到,这种批判是完全必要的,而且是迅速地见效和逐步地见效的,又必须看到,这种严肃的认真的批判,必定而且已经带来了一定的付作用,就是对于某些同志有泄气。错误必须批判,泄气必须防止。气可鼓而不可泄。人而无气,不知其可也。我们必须坚持今年三月第二次郑州会议纪录上所说的,在满腔热情地保护干部的精神下,引导那些在工作中犯有错误者,存在缺点者,批判和改正自己的缺点错误。错误并不可怕,就怕不肯批评,不肯改正,就怕因批评而泄了气,必须顾到改错和鼓劲两方面,必须看到批评整改虽然已经几个月了、一切未完工作还必须坚持做完,不可留尾巴。
但是现在党内外出现了一种新的事物,就是右倾情绪、右倾思潮、右倾活动已经增加,大有猖狂进攻之势,这表现在此次会议印发各同志的许多材料上。这种情况还没有达到一九五七年党内外右派猖狂进攻那种程度,但是苗头和趋势已经很清楚,已经出现在地平线上了,这种情况是资产阶级性质的,另一种情况是无产阶级内部的思想性质的,他们和我们一样都要社会主义,不要资本主义,这是我们和这些同志的基本相同点。但是这些同志的观点和我们的观点是有分歧的。他们的情绪有些不正常,他们把党的错误估计得过大了一些,而对几亿人民在党的领导下所创造出来的伟大成绩估计得过小了些,他们做出了不适当的结论,他们对于克服当前的困难信心很不足。他们把他们的位置不自觉地摆得不恰当,摆在左派和右派的中间。他们是典型的中间派。他们是“得失相当”论者。他们在紧要关头不坚定,摇摇摆摆。我们不怕右派猖狂进攻,却怕这些同志的摇摆。因为这种摇摆不利党和人民的团结,不利于全党一致鼓足干劲,克服困难,争取胜利。我们相信,这些同志的态度是可能改变的。我们的任务是团结他们,争取他们改变态度。为要达到此目的,必须对此种党内的动态作必要的估计。不可估计太高,认为他们有力量可以把党和人民的大船在风浪中摇翻。他们没有这样大的力量。他们占相对的少数,而我们则占大多数。我们和人民中的大多数(工人、贫农、下中农、一部分上中农和知识分子)是团结一致的。党的总路线和体现总路线的方针、政策、工作方法,是受到广大党员、广大干部和广大人民群众的欢迎的。但也不可把他们的力量估计过低,他们有相当一些人。他们的错误观点在受到批判、接受批判、端正态度以前,是不会轻易放弃自己的观点的,这一点必须看到。党内遇到大问题有争论表现不同的观点,有些人暂时摇摆,站在中间,有些人站到右边去,是正常的现象,无须大惊小怪。归根结底,错误观点乃至错误路线一定会被克服,大多数的人,包括暂时摇摆,甚至犯路线错误的人,一定会在新的基础上团结起来。我们党三十八年的历史就是这样走过来来的。反右必出“左”,反“左”必出右,这是必然的。时然若言。现在是讲这一点的时候了,不讲对团结不利,于党于个人都不利。现在这一次争论,可能会被证明是一次意义重大的争论,如同我们在革命时期,各次重大争论一样,在新的历史时期——社会主义建设时期,不可能没有争论的,风平浪静的。庐山会议可能被证明是一次意义重大的会议。“团结——批评——团结”,“惩前毖后,治病救人”,是我们解决党内矛盾的正确的已被历史证明的有效方法,我们一定要坚持这种方法。
我的这些意见,大体已在七月二十三日的全体会议上讲了,但有些未讲完,作为那次讲话的补充,又写了这些话。
一九五九年八月二日
四、中央全会的团结,关系到中国社会主义的命运
中委、候补中委一百九十一人,到会一百四十七人,列席十五人,共一百六十五人,会议议程:
改指标问题:武汉六中全会决定了今年的指标,上海七中全会有人主张改指标,多数不同意,看来改也改不彻底,现在还有五个月,改了好经过人大常委会,高指标是自己定的,自己立了个菩萨自己拜,现在还得打破,打破了不符合实际的指标,钢、煤、粮、棉等。
路线问题:有些同志发生怀疑,究竟对不对?上庐山前不清楚,上庐山后有部分人要求民主,要求自由,说不敢讲话,有压力,当时摸不着头脑,不知所说的不民主是为的什么?前半个月是神仙会议,没有紧张局势。他们说没有自由,就是要攻击总路线,破坏总路线,他们要自由,就是破坏总路线的自由,要批评总路线的言论自由,他们要求紧张的局势。以批评去年为主,也批评今年的工作。说去年的工作做坏了,自去年十一月第一次郑州会议以来,纠正了“刮共产风”,纠正了“一平二调三提款”等一些“左”的倾向。他们对于九个月来的工作,看不到,不满意,要求重新议论,否则就认为压制民主。他们对政治局扩大会议嫌不过瘾,说民主少了,现在开全会,民主大些,准备明年开党代表大会。看形势,如需要,今年九、十月开也可以。五七年不是要求大民主,大鸣、大放、大辩论吗?庐山会议已经开了一个月了,新来的同志不知道怎么一回事,先开几天小会,再开大会,最后作决议。
开会的方法,用大家所赞成的方法,从团结的愿望出发。中央全会的团结,关系到中国社会主义的命运。在我们看来,我们应该团结,现在有一种分裂的倾向。去年八大我说过,危险无非是:一、世界大战,二、党分裂,当时还没有显着的迹象,现在有这种迹象了。团结的方法,从团结的愿望出发,经过批评与自我批评,在新的基础上达到新的团结的目的。对犯错误的同志,采取惩前毖后,治病救人的方针,给犯错误的同志一条出路,允许犯错误的同志改正错误,继续革命,不要像“阿Q正传”上的赵太爷,不许阿Q革命。对犯错误的同志要一看二帮,只看不帮,不作工作是不好的。我们反对错误,毒药吃不得,我们不是欣赏错误的臭味。批评斗争他们是使他们离我们近一点,使缺点错误离我们越远越好。对于犯错误的同志要有分析,无非是两种可能,一个是能改,一个是不能改。所谓看,就是看能不能改,所谓帮,就是帮助他改。有些同志一时跟到那边去,经过批评说服,加上客观情况的改变,许多同志改变过来了,又脱离了那些人。立三路线、王明路线,遵义会议上纠正了,以后经过十年时间,一直到七大,中间经过了整风,经过十年是必要的。一个人要改正错误要有几个过程。你强迫一下改正不行。马克思说:“商品是经过千百次交换才认识其两重性的。”洛甫开始不承认路线错误,七大经过斗争,洛甫承认了路线错误。那场斗争,王明没有改,洛甫也没有改,又旧病复发,他还在发疟疾,一有机会出来了。大多数同志改好了。从路线错误来说,历史事实证明是可以改变的,要有这种信心。不能改的是个别的。可见釆取治病救人的方针是见效的,要有好心帮助他们。对人有情,对错误的东西应当无情的,那是毒药,要有深恶痛绝的态度,但不用武松、鲁智深、李逵的方法。他们很坚决。可以参加共产党,他们的缺点是不大策略,不会作政治工作。要釆取摆事实讲道理的方法,大辩论,大字报,中字报,庐山会议的简报。
一九五九八月十六日年
五、右倾机会主义者挑起了斗争
犯右倾机会主义错误的同志,不在去年十一月郑州会议上提出意见,更不在北戴河会议上对高指标提出意见,也不在去年十二月武昌会议上提出意见,也不在三月底四月初上海会议上提出意见,而在这庐山会议上提出意见。
这些同志为什么不在那个时候提?因为他们的一套,那时提不出,如果他们有一套正确的见解,比我们高明,在北戴河就提嘛!他们等到中央把问题解决了,或者大部分解决了,才来提,认为这时不提就不好提了,因为他们感觉现在不提,再等几个月后,形势要好转,时间过了,就更不好了,故急于发动。
党内斗争反映了社会上的阶级斗争,这是毫不足怪的,没有这种斗争才是不可思议。这个道理过去没有讲透,很多同志不明白,一旦出了问题,例如一九五三年高饶问题,现在的彭、黄、周、张问题,就有许多人感到惊奇,这种惊奇,是可以理解的。因为社会矛盾是由隐到显的。人们对于社会主义时代的阶级斗争的理解,是要通过自己的斗争和实践才会逐步深入的。特别是一些党内斗争,例如高、饶、彭、黄这一类斗争具有曲折复杂的性质。昨日还是“功臣”,今日变成祸首,“怎么搞的,是不是弄错了?”人们不知道他们的历史变化,不知道他们历史的复杂和曲折,这不是很自然的吗?应当逐步地、正确地向同志们说清楚这种复杂和曲折的性质。再则,处理这类事件,不可用简单的方法,不可以把它当作敌我矛盾去处理,而必须把它当作人民内部矛盾去处理。必须采取“团结——批评——团结”,“惩前毖后,治病救人”,“批判从严,处理从宽”,“一曰看,二曰帮”的政策。不但要把他们留在党内,而且要把他们留在省委员会内、中央委员会内,个别同志还应当留在中央政治局内。这样,是否有危险呢?可能有。只要我们采取正确的政策,可能避免。他们的错误,无非是两个可能:第一,改过来;第二,改不过来。改过来的条件是充分的。首先,他们有两面性,一面,革命性,一面,反革命性。直到现在,他们与叛徒陈独秀、罗章龙、张国焘、高岗是有区别的,一是人民内部矛盾,一是敌我矛盾。人民内部矛盾可能转化为敌我矛盾,如果双方采取的态度和政策不适当的话;可能不转化为敌我矛盾,而始终当作人民内部矛盾,予以彻底解决,如果我们能够把这种矛盾及时适当地加以解决的话。下面的这些条件是重要的。全党全民的监督,中央和地方的大多数干部的政治水平,比较一九五三年高、饶事件时期大为提高了,懂事了。庐山会议上这一场成功的斗争,不就是证据吗?还有,我们对待他们的态度和政策,一定要是符合情况的马克思主义的态度和政策,而我们已经有了这样的态度和政策。改不过来的可能性也是存在的。无非是继续捣乱,自取灭亡。那也没有什么不得了。向陈独秀、罗章龙、张国焘、高岗队伍里增加几个成员,何损于我们伟大的党和我们伟大的民族呢?但是,我们相信,一切犯错误的同志,除陈、罗、张、高一类极少数人以外,在一定的条件下,积以时日,总是可以改变的。这一点,我们必须有坚定的信心。我党三十八年的历史提供了充分的证据,这是大家所知道的。为了帮助犯错误的同志改正错误,就要仍然把他们当同志看待,当作兄弟一样看待,给以热忱的帮助,给他们以改正错误的时间和继续从事革命工作的出路。必须留有余地。必须有温暖,必须有春天,不能老留在冬天过日子。我认为,这些都是极为重要的。