Speech at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

9 December 1958 · Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party · Wuhan, China

Context
Mao addressed the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee on December 9, 1958, setting out views on people's communes, lower steel targets and the 'two possibilities', and raising his plan to step down as Chairman of the Republic.
Main themes
People's communes, protecting enthusiasm for labour and treatment of mistaken cadres, 'three years of hard struggle' slogan, lowering the 1959 steel target, ownership by the whole people and communist elements, dialectics and the unity of opposites, study of political economy, possibility of Party split and national destruction, Mao's decision not to serve as Chairman of the Republic, relations with the Soviet Union and the path to communism, international situation and decline of imperialism
Duration
~36 min
88th percentile
Words
4,340
88th percentile
Sentences
300
95th percentile
Readability
62
90th percentile
Grade
8.2
6th percentile
Syntax
2.61
7th percentile
Vocabulary
2.06
20th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 37%33%
  • Institutional 36%32%
  • Geopolitical 16%14%
  • Social 7%7%
  • Environmental 2%2%
  • Ceremonial 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 11%

300 sentences in 17 paragraphs

I will offer some views; they are not conclusions. The resolution is the conclusion of this meeting.

1. The emergence of the people's communes was something neither the Chengdu Conference in April nor the Party Congress in May anticipated. In fact, they had already appeared in Henan in April, but we knew nothing of them in May, June or July; it was only in August that we discovered them, and the Beidaihe Conference adopted a resolution. This is a major event. We have found a form for building socialism that makes it easier to pass from collective ownership to ownership by the whole people, and also easier to pass from socialist ownership by the whole people to communist ownership by the whole people. It makes it easier to combine industry, agriculture, commerce, education and military affairs; it is large in scale, has many people, and makes it easier to do many things. We once said that we should be prepared for inauspicious things to happen, the greatest of which would be war and a split in the Party. But there were also some good things we did not anticipate. The people's communes, for example, we did not anticipate in April, and only in August did we adopt a resolution. In four months the framework was set up across the whole country, and now we are consolidating the organisation.

2. The question of protecting enthusiasm for labour. The cadres who have made mistakes have mainly resorted to coercion and commandism and told lies, reporting more than they had or less than they had. Reporting less than you have is not very dangerous; reporting more than you have is very dangerous. Reporting a hundred jin as fifty is nothing to fear; reporting fifty jin as a hundred is dangerous. The main fault lies in not caring about the people's livelihood and paying attention only to production. How should this be handled? Those who have made mistakes are a minority among the cadres. For more than ninety per cent of those who have made mistakes, we should adopt the method of patient persuasion, once, twice... with no disciplinary action; self-criticism is enough. Let everyone discuss this. My opinion alone cannot be taken as the conclusion. As for cadres who have seriously violated the law and discipline and become divorced from the masses, they make up about one, two, three, four, five per cent of county, district and township cadres, and no more. Conditions differ from place to place, and distinctions should be made. These people should be punished, because they have become divorced from the masses and the masses dislike them intensely. Without a policy of not punishing the more than ninety per cent of cadres who have made mistakes, we cannot protect our cadres. That would dampen the enthusiasm of the cadres, and it would also dampen the enthusiasm of the working people. Without debating the cases of that section who have seriously violated the law and discipline, distinguishing the circumstances, and giving them heavier or lighter punishments accordingly, we would also dampen the enthusiasm of the masses. Some especially serious cases should be handled under criminal law. In short, there must be analysis. Some of them are alien-class elements; others are not alien-class elements, but where the circumstances are vile, such as beating people, cursing people, detaining people or tying people up, they must be punished. Hubei has already dismissed a county Party committee first secretary who, when the drought was severe, did not fight the drought but falsely reported that he had. In short, those punished should be extremely few and those educated extremely many; this is how we can protect the enthusiasm of the cadres, and thereby protect the enthusiasm of the working people as well. The same policy applies to those among the masses who have made mistakes.

3. The question of fundamentally changing the face of the whole country through three years of hard struggle. Is this slogan appropriate? Can it be done in three years or not? This slogan was first put forward by the comrades in Henan. At first we adopted it at the Nanning Conference, and at that time it referred to the countryside. Later, on some day or other, it was broadened into "three years of hard struggle to change the face of the whole country." Zeng Xisheng tried to persuade me, bringing out three maps of river-network construction and saying that the countryside could be fundamentally changed. Perhaps that can be done in the countryside, but as for the whole country, I think it needs further consideration. Within three years we can probably produce thirty to forty million tons of steel. For a great country with a population of six hundred and fifty million, can producing thirty or forty million tons of steel be called a fundamental change of its face? I think this standard is set a little too low; otherwise there will be nothing left to change later. What would five million, sixty million, a hundred million, two hundred million tons count as afterwards? I think the great changes still lie ahead! Therefore we cannot yet say that the face of the whole country will be fundamentally changed within three years. By 1962 we will probably have fifty or sixty million tons of steel. Perhaps then we could say the face of the whole country has been fundamentally changed. By then we will be at the level that Britain and the United States are at today. Or should we still not call it a fundamental change even then? For a country of more than six hundred million people to change its face so quickly, will all the make-up really be done? Just how best to put it is worth discussing, because the newspapers are already giving it great publicity. Or we could say a fundamental change in five years and a thorough change in ten to fifteen years. What is best, please comrades consider. Or we could call overtaking Britain a fundamental change and overtaking the United States a thorough change. Forcing ourselves to overtake and wearing ourselves out to the point of death is not as good as taking things a little more calmly. Suppose it doesn't take that many years, and it is done in three or four years, what then? Achieving it ahead of time is fine too! If we set the time a bit longer and in the end it turns out shorter, I don't think we lose anything. Zeng Xisheng has a way of doing things; at worst he gets to be an "opportunist." Last winter and this spring Anhui began water-conservancy work with a target of eight hundred million cubic metres of earth and stone. Later it was doubled to one billion six hundred million. Eight hundred million was opportunism; one billion six hundred million was Marxism. Within a few days it became three billion two hundred million, and one billion six hundred million was then somewhat "opportunist." Later it was raised to six billion four hundred million. If we set the time for changing the country's face a bit longer, at worst we get to be "opportunists." This kind of opportunism has a lot of flavour to it, and I am willing to be one. Marx appreciates this kind of opportunism; he will not criticise me.

4. Certain disputes inside and outside the Party. These centre on the people's communes. Inside and outside the Party there are all kinds of opinions; probably several hundred thousand or several million cadres are discussing them. There is a whole heap of questions that are not clear: one person, one view; ten people, ten views. No comprehensive analysis, no in-depth analysis has been made. There is also discussion internationally. Broadly there are several views. One view is somewhat impatient. These people have soaring drive and very high revolutionary enthusiasm, which is extremely precious, but they have not made a historical analysis, an analysis of the situation, or an international analysis. Their strong point is high enthusiasm; their shortcoming is that they are too hasty. One after another they declare that they have entered ownership by the whole people and will enter communism in two or three years. The main thrust of this resolution is directed at this tendency. That is to say, don't be too hasty. Being too hasty does no good. With this resolution, through this resolution, over several weeks or several months, they can get things broadly clear in practice and in debate.

5. Studying questions of political economy. Over these few months, read Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism*, the *Textbook of Political Economy* (third edition), and *Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin on Communist Society*. Set aside a few months; each province should organise this. For the sake of our cause, study questions of economic theory in connection with practice. At present this has great theoretical and practical significance. I made this suggestion at the Zhengzhou Conference. I wrote a letter suggesting that everyone study them.

6. Studying questions of dialectics. At the Zhengzhou Conference, I don't know which comrade put forward "a large collective, small freedoms." This formulation is very good.

We must take hold of production and also take hold of livelihood. Walking on two legs is the doctrine of the unity of opposites. These all belong to the category of dialectics. Marx's doctrine of the unity of opposites saw great development in our country in 1958. For example, on the premise of giving priority to heavy industry, developing industry and agriculture simultaneously, heavy industry and light industry simultaneously, central industry and local industry simultaneously, and large, medium and small enterprises simultaneously. Small indigenous clusters and large modern clusters, indigenous methods and modern methods; several things developed simultaneously. Then there is the management system: unified leadership by the Centre and graded management at each local level, from the Centre, the province, the prefecture and the county, to the commune and right down to the production team. Give each a bit of power. Having no power at all is harmful. These ideas have already been established in our Party, which is very good. Small indigenous clusters and large modern clusters are also developed simultaneously, and there are medium modern clusters too; for instance, aren't Tangshan and Huangshigang medium-sized? Are there small modern clusters? There are those too. And there are clusters combining modern and indigenous methods. In short, it is very complicated. In the socialist camp, some countries consider these things illegitimate and impermissible. We permit them; here they are legitimate. Is it better to permit them or not to permit them? We will have to watch for a few years more. But in a country like ours, we have nothing at all, we are terribly poor. Doing some small indigenous clusters is fine! Doing only large ones is too monotonous. In agriculture it is also very complicated: high yields, medium yields and low yields exist side by side. The "three-thirds system" of cultivation is a creation of the masses. The Beidaihe Conference seized on it and put it forward: one third for growing grain, one third left fallow, one third for planting trees. This may be the direction of the agricultural revolution. We also put forward the "Eight-Character Charter": water, fertiliser, soil, seed, close planting, plant protection, tools, field management. People cannot do without drinking. Plants cannot do without drinking either.

As for the socialist system: in the socialist stage, two forms of ownership exist simultaneously. They are opposed and also combined; they are a unity of opposites. Collective ownership contains core elements of socialist ownership by the whole people. Its fundamental nature is collective ownership, and it also contains elements of communist ownership by the whole people. Yudin recently said that China is right to say that collective ownership contains communist elements. He said that in the Soviet Union, collective ownership and ownership by the whole people also contain communist elements. Capitalist society does not permit the organisation of a socialist mode of production. But in countries led by the Communist Party, the growth of communist elements should be permissible too. Stalin did not solve this problem. To make absolutes of the three forms of ownership, namely collective ownership, socialist ownership by the whole people and communist ownership by the whole people, and to separate them sharply, is wrong.

Can all of the above be described as developments of dialectics?

The Zhengzhou Conference put forward "a large collective, small freedoms," and now we have put forward taking hold of revolution and also taking hold of livelihood. These are all extensions of dialectics. The Wuchang Conference also put forward seeking truth from facts: in drawing up plans, be both hot and cold; have great ambition, but also considerable scientific analysis. Of course, it is impossible for this resolution to solve every problem. I think it would be better to publish this resolution a little later. Just issue a communiqué, and publish it at the National People's Congress next March. This accords with our great ambitions while avoiding certain unrealistic ideas produced by the Great Leap Forward of 1958; it is more soundly based and has more scientific analysis. On the question of steel: I too once agreed to producing thirty million tons of steel next year. After coming to Wuchang I felt it was no good. In the past I also thought of reaching a hundred million or a hundred and twenty million tons by 1962, and at that time I only worried about whether it would be needed, worried about who would use all this steel; I had not considered the question of possibility. Later I considered the question of possibility as well. One is possibility, the other is need. This year, producing ten million seven hundred thousand tons has worn us out, so doubts have arisen about possibility. Thirty million tons next year, sixty million tons the year after, a hundred and twenty million tons in 1962: that is a false possibility, not a real possibility. Now we need to compress the atmosphere a bit. Make the plate smaller: eighteen to twenty million tons. Does that mean it cannot be exceeded? We'll see next year; twenty-two or twenty-three million tons would be fine. If we have strength to spare, then exceed it! For now we need to compress things a bit; there is no need to set targets that high. Leave some leeway and let the practice of the masses exceed our plans. This too is a question of dialectics. Practice includes both the efforts of our leading cadres and the practice of the masses. Setting targets low and letting practice raise them is not opportunism. Going from eleven million tons to twenty million tons is nearly a doubling; never since ancient times has the world seen "opportunism" like that. Here we must also connect this with internationalism; we must link it with the Soviet Union and the whole socialist camp, with the international community of the world's working class. On this question we should not rush to be first. Now some counties are always rushing to be first, wanting to enter communism first. In fact, the ones that should enter communism first are Anshan Steel, Fushun, Liaoning, Shanghai and Tianjin. For China to enter communism first, ahead of the Soviet Union, would look unseemly. Whether it is even possible is also in question. The Soviet Union has one and a half million scientists, several million senior intellectuals, half a million engineers, more than the United States. The Soviet Union has fifty-five million tons of steel, while we still have only this little bit. Their accumulated strength is great and they have many cadres; we are only just beginning. So possibility is also in question. The Seven-Year Plan put forward by Khrushchev is still preparing to enter communism; he proposes that the two forms of ownership gradually merge into one. This is a very good thing. One, it should not be done; two, it cannot be done. Even if we could get there first, we should not. The October Revolution was Lenin's undertaking; aren't we all learning from Lenin? What is the point of rushing headlong? At most it would be to go to Marx and ask for a reward. If we did things that way, we might make mistakes on international questions. We must speak of dialectics. We must pay attention to mutual benefit. Dialectics has seen great development, and this touches on that question.

7. The fifteen-year programme drawn up at the Zhengzhou Conference was set aside and not discussed this time. Whether it is possible and whether it is needed both lack grounds; it lacks not only sufficient grounds but even preliminary grounds. The experience of the Soviet Union and the United States cannot prove whether producing that much is possible. And even if it were possible, we could not find buyers. Therefore we will not fix this programme for now; we can bring it out and discuss it once each winter. Next year, the year after and the year after that, we will not make such a long-term plan. Probably by 1962 we can make a long-term plan; any earlier won't do. After the whole Party and the whole people have been running industry for a few years, the questions of possibility and need may become somewhat visible by then. This meeting did not discuss it; it was put away, and some comrades were disappointed.

8. In 1958 military work developed considerably: first, a major rectification; second, officers going down to the companies to serve as soldiers; third, taking part in production; fourth, building up the militia on a large scale. Since the rectification meeting held in Beijing in June, meetings have been held at every level all the way down, and by now they are probably more or less finished. Training must not be dropped either. If everyone goes off to rectification, production, steelmaking, setting up communes and building water-conservancy works, that won't do. An army is always an army, and training is a regular task.

9. On the change in the educational system. Implementing a system combining education with productive labour is also a major event. Of course, some problems have arisen. For example, some students don't want to study; they have developed a taste for labour. If many people don't want to study, that becomes a problem. When it becomes a problem, we hold a meeting, and after the meeting they will study again.

10. The question of two possibilities. A thing always contains two opposing aspects. Our Party also has two possibilities: one is consolidation, the other is a split. In Shanghai, one Central Committee split into two Central Committees; during the Long March there was the split with Zhang Guotao; the Gao Gang–Rao Shushi affair was a partial split. Partial splits are a regular occurrence. Since last year, splits have occurred within the leading groups of half the provinces in the country. The human body sheds hair and skin every day; that is the death of some of its cells. From childhood on, some cells must die, and this is what makes growth possible. If there were no dying, people could not live. If no one had died since Confucius, that would be terrible. Dying has its benefits; you can serve as fertiliser. You may say you won't, but in fact you will. We must be mentally prepared. Partial splits exist every day. There will always be splitting and dying. Without splits, development is hindered. Death as a whole is also a historical inevitability. Speaking of the whole, the Party and the state, as instruments of class struggle, are bound to die out. But until their historical tasks are completed, we must consolidate them; we do not want a split, but we must be prepared for one. Without preparation, there will be a split. With preparation, a big split can be avoided. Large and medium-sized splits are temporary. The Hungarian incident was a large one; the Gao–Rao affair and the Molotov affair were medium-sized. Every branch is undergoing change: some are expelled, some come in, some work very well, some make mistakes. It is impossible never to change. Lenin often said that a state always has two possibilities: either victory or destruction. Our People's Republic of China also has two possibilities: to go on winning, or to be destroyed. Lenin did not conceal the possibility of destruction. Our People's Republic also has two possibilities; we should not deny that possibility. We do not have the atomic bomb in our hands. If war breaks out, of the thirty-six stratagems, running away is the best: they take Beijing, Shanghai and Wuhan, we fight a guerrilla war, go back ten or twenty years, back to the Yan'an period. So on the one hand we must actively prepare: produce steel on a large scale, make machinery, build railways, strive to produce tens of millions of tons of steel within three or four years and establish an industrial foundation, so that we are more consolidated than we are now. At present we have a great reputation in the world, because of a few big events: the shelling of Jinmen, the people's communes, and ten million seven hundred thousand tons of steel. I think our reputation is great but our real strength is not. We are still "poor and blank," without an inch of iron in our hands, having accomplished nothing. Now we merely have an inch of iron. The country is in reality weak. Politically we are a strong country; in military equipment and economically we are a weak country. Therefore our present task is to change from weak to strong. Can three years of hard struggle change this? Three years probably won't do. Three years of hard struggle can change only part of it, not fundamentally change it. With another four years, seven years in all, things will be better, and the name will match the reality. Right now our reputation is great and our strength is small; we must see this clearly. Foreigners are now talking us up hugely, and many newspapers are full of big talk. Don't let foreigners' boasting make us think we're wonderful and get carried away. In fact, this year's good steel is only nine million tons, and rolling it into finished steel products means a further thirty per cent discount, leaving only some six million tons. We must not deceive ourselves. There is quite a lot of grain. After each locality applied discounts, it comes to eight hundred and sixty billion jin. We say seven hundred and thirty billion jin, that is, a little more than a doubling, not counting the other hundred and ten billion jin. If it really exists but we don't count it, we lose nothing; the stuff is still there. What we fear is that it doesn't exist. Whether it exists or not has not been checked; none of you gentlemen here has checked it. Even granting there are eight hundred and sixty billion jin, a quarter of it is tubers. We must take the unpleasant side into account and simply speak plainly. Talk over these unlucky things at meetings in the provinces, prefectures and counties; what's wrong with that? Others don't like to hear it, so I go around everywhere talking about unlucky things. At worst, the public canteens and communes collapse, the Party splits, we become divorced from the masses, we are occupied by the United States, the country is wiped out, and we fight a guerrilla war. We have a Marxist law governing this: no matter what, these unlucky things are always temporary and partial. Our many defeats in history have proved this. The Hungarian incident; the Long March, when three hundred thousand troops became twenty-odd thousand and three hundred thousand Party members became a few tens of thousands: all temporary and partial. The demise of the bourgeoisie and the demise of imperialism, on the other hand, are permanent. The setbacks, defeats and destruction of socialism are temporary, and it will soon recover. Even if it fails completely, that too is temporary; it will always recover. All men die. Individuals will always die, but humanity as a whole will always go on developing. Talking about both possibilities does no harm.

11. On the question of my not serving as Chairman of the Republic. This time a formal resolution should be adopted, and I hope comrades will approve it. I ask that within three days each province hold a telephone conference to notify the prefectures, counties and people's communes, and that the communiqué be published after three days, so that those below don't feel it comes out of nowhere. Things in this world are just that strange: people can go up but cannot come down. I expect that some will approve and some will not. The masses won't understand; they'll say that while everyone's drive is soaring to the skies, you are retreating in the face of battle. It must be explained clearly that this is not so. I am not retreating; I want to strive to overtake America before I go to see Marx!

12. The international situation. This year there has been great development. The enemy's side keeps getting into a mess, day by day more of a mess; our side keeps getting better, day by day better. Every day's newspapers prove this. The ones who are truly dispirited are the imperialists. They are rotten, chaotic, riddled with contradictions, torn apart and divided. Their days are hard; their good days are over. Before they became imperialists, only the age of capitalism was their good time. The present age is the age of the demise of imperialism, and our situation will get better day by day. Of course, we must also reckon that there will still be long, tortuous and complex struggles, and we must reckon with the possibility of war. There are some people who want to take risks; the most reactionary is the monopoly bourgeoisie. Most do not want to fight.