Speech at a Central Work Conference Group Meeting at Beidaihe

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

9 August 1962 · Central Work Conference at Beidaihe (speech to a central group meeting) · Beidaihe, China

Context
Mao addressed a central group meeting of the Central Work Conference at Beidaihe on August 9, 1962, warning of capitalist restoration and revisionism, rejecting individual farming and criticising the economic ministries.
Main themes
Class struggle under socialism, danger of capitalist restoration, opposition to individual farming and output quotas fixed to households, revisionism in the Soviet Union, collective economy tested by difficulties, ideological state of Party members and intellectuals, errors of the Great Leap Forward, re-education and rotation of cadres, central control over policy, failings of economic ministries, Ministry of Commerce policy
Duration
~22 min
69th percentile
Words
2,601
69th percentile
Sentences
142
79th percentile
Readability
48
58th percentile
Grade
11.1
33rd percentile
Syntax
2.88
32nd percentile
Vocabulary
2.23
57th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 46%46%
  • Economic 27%27%
  • Social 17%17%
  • Geopolitical 9%8%
  • Ceremonial 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

142 sentences in 40 paragraphs

Today I will speak only about whether the Communist Party can collapse or not. If the Communist Party collapses, who comes in? Either way there are two big parties: if we collapse, the Kuomintang comes. The Kuomintang ran things for twenty-three years and then fell from power; we still have a few years.

The peasants had already been mobilised, but there is still the problem of a restoration by the bourgeoisie, the rightists, the landlords and the rich peasants. There is also the Yugoslav direction. The localities and the ministries concentrate on those concrete problems, while they do not deal with the most universal and most widespread problem, the problem of direction.

Individual farming will inevitably lead to polarisation; it won't even take two years, within one year there will be polarisation.

Capitalist ideology will exist for decades, for centuries; let's not say millennia, saying it is that long frightens people. Socialism has existed for only a few decades, and it is supposed to have cleaned everything out completely? It has been like this in every era. The Soviet Union, after several decades up to now, still has revisionism, which serves international capitalism and is in reality counter-revolutionary.

In the book *The Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside* there is an editor's note saying that the bourgeoisie has been eliminated and that only the influence of residual capitalist ideology remains. That was wrong and must be corrected.

Difficulties are a test for the collective economy, a great test; in the future it will have to withstand even greater tests. The Soviet Union went through the great test of two world wars and travelled many tortuous roads, and now revisionism has still appeared. Our difficulties are even greater than the Soviet Union's.

Of all the cooperativisation in the world, ours was done best. Because, taking the country as a whole, land reform was fairly thorough, though there were also places with peaceful land reform. Quite a few bad elements and Ma Bufang elements wormed their way into the organs of power. Changing the ownership of the means of production does not mean the reflection in consciousness has been resolved. Socialist transformation eliminated the ownership of the exploiting classes, but that does not mean the struggle on the political and ideological fronts has disappeared. Influence in the realm of ideology and consciousness is long-term. The advanced cooperatives and the socialist transformation of 1956 completed the elimination of bourgeois ownership; in 1957 the ideological and political revolution was put forward, which made up for what was lacking. The bourgeoisie can be newly born; that is exactly the situation in the Soviet Union.

From 1921 to 1928 the Soviet Union had individual farming for nearly ten years, and there was no way out; only then did Stalin put forward collectivisation. Only in 1935 did they abolish all their various ration coupons, and they did not have fewer coupons than we do.

Find a few comrades to compile materials on the Soviet Union's process from difficulty to development. Comrade Kang Sheng will be responsible for this, putting together economic materials.

The wavering elements are resolutely clamouring for individual farming; later, when they see the situation is no good, they will ask to come back. Best not to approve it; let them farm individually for two or three years and then see. If they come back early, they will not play a positive role in the collective economy.

There must be analysis. We should not say everything is bright, nor can we say everything is dark. Since 1960, people no longer say everything is bright; they only say everything is dark, or mostly dark. Thinking is confused, and so a task is put forward: individual farming, entirely or mostly individual farming. Supposedly only this way can grain output be increased, otherwise there is no way for agriculture. Fixing 40 percent of output quotas to households, with individual and collective farming competing side by side: in essence this is called mostly individual farming. The task has been put very clearly: polarisation, embezzlement and theft, speculation and profiteering, taking concubines, usury; one side gets rich, while the families of soldiers, martyrs, workers and cadres, and the five-guarantee households, end up in poverty on the other side.

Even Khrushchev does not dare to openly dissolve the collective farms.

A department head from the Ministry of Internal Affairs went to Fengcheng to promote Anhui's experience of fixing output quotas to households. People sent down by the Centre often cause problems; attention must be paid to this. Cadres sent down by the Centre should be of some help to those below; they must not give reckless advice or casually put forward their personal opinions. Policy can only be made by the Centre; everything should be approved by the Centre; no matter how special the situation, no one may set their own policy.

When there are differences in thinking, the leadership must take a stand, otherwise erroneous things will run rampant. In any case there are three isms: feudalism, capitalism and socialism. Capitalism has the comprador class. American capitalist farms average sixteen households each; one of our production teams has more than twenty households. With output quotas fixed to households, big households will even split up, and parents will have no one to feed them. Seeking welfare for the middle peasants of the whole country.

In Hebei there is someone called Hu Kaiming, "Kaiming" meaning "enlightened," but he is just a "Hu," a reckless enlightened one; he is a vice-governor. When he heard the relayed criticism of the "everything is dark" line of argument, he felt pressure: you've pressed on me for so long, since 1960, talking for over two years, so I can press on you a bit too.

Is there class struggle or not? In Guangzhou someone said that listening to the rumble of the trains, the ones heading south seem to go "toward the light, toward the light," and the ones heading north seem to go "no hope, no hope."

Some people are profiting from the nation's calamity, profiting from the country's difficulties, embezzling and stealing. Within the Party there is a portion of people who are not for communism but for capitalism and feudalism.

Every province has places like that, the so-called later-liberated areas, where in reality the democratic revolution was not thorough.

As for the composition of Party members, there are large numbers of petty bourgeois, a portion of well-to-do peasants and their children, and a batch of intellectuals. There is also a batch of unreformed bad people who are not really Communists at all. In name they are Communists, in reality they are Kuomintang. For these people the democratic revolution has not been thorough; their embezzlement and corruption are obvious, and these people are easy to deal with. Among the intellectuals and the children of landlords and rich peasants, some have become Marxist, some have not changed at all, and some only to a poor degree. These people had no mental preparation for the socialist revolution; we did not have time to educate them. Take off the labels from all the bourgeois intellectuals? The bourgeois intellectuals turn yang, then turn yin again; the ghost has not dispersed; we must analyse this.

In the twenty-eight years of the democratic revolution we propagated anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism among the people; the propaganda effort was fairly concentrated, every woman and child knew it, and it went deep into people's hearts. Socialism has only been ten years; last year we raised the re-education of cadres, which is an important task. The Sixth Congress only said the bourgeoisie was bad, but it made a concrete analysis of the bourgeoisie: what it opposed was the bureaucratic and comprador bourgeoisie, and it did not oppose the other bourgeoisie much. We carried out the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns for a while, and confiscated the property of the Kuomintang, the big capitalists and the imperialists; once in our hands this is socialist in nature, in other people's hands it is capitalist in nature. In 1953 and 1954 we began cooperatives and began socialism. Mutual-aid teams, cooperativisation, elementary cooperatives, advanced cooperatives, it developed all along. The real socialist revolution began in 1953. After that, through many campaigns, socialist construction and socialist transformation unfolded across the whole country. In 1958 some of the spirit was already off; in between there were mistakes in some of the work. The most important were high state procurement, reckless commands, the communist wind, the several "big undertakings," Anhui's "three changes," and irrigation by diverting the Yellow River (which was originally good, but we didn't know about salinisation). Therefore, to the four contradictions add one more contradiction: the contradiction between right and wrong. High targets and high procurement were errors of understanding, not a question of two roads. Good people making mistakes is completely different from taking the capitalist road, and even more different from those who wormed their way in and from feudalism and the like. For example, capital construction took on twenty million extra people; we didn't judge it correctly, so the peasants had nothing to eat and suffered oedema, and now we are cutting people again.

Some comrades waver at the slightest stir in the wind and grass; that is because they had no mental preparation for the socialist revolution, or have no Marxism. Without ideological preparation, without Marxism-Leninism, they cannot hold firm as soon as a wind blows. These people should be allowed to speak, let them speak out; speaking is better than not speaking; the speaker is not to blame. But we must be clear in our own minds; in action the minority must submit to the majority, and there must be leadership. Comrade Shaoqi's report says: "Individual farming must be handled correctly, with disciplinary measures, expulsion from the Party..." I think the ringleaders can be disciplined, but for the vast majority it is a question of education, not disciplinary measures; but that does not exclude disciplinary measures against those who take the lead in creating splits.

Let everyone analyse the causes.

This is a contradiction between the proletariat and the well-to-do peasants. The landlords and rich peasants find it hard to speak up; the well-to-do peasants are different, they dare to come out and speak. The influence on the upper levels must be taken into account. Some prefectural and provincial Party secretaries (such as Zeng Xisheng) want to represent the well-to-do peasants.

We must spend several years educating cadres, do the rotational training of cadres well, run higher Party schools and intermediate Party schools; otherwise we spend a lifetime making revolution and end up making capitalism, making revisionism. How could that do?

This state power of ours took on a great many people wholesale, including a large batch of Kuomintang people; they were all taken on wholesale.

Luo Longji says the methods we are now adopting all treat the symptoms. The way to treat the root is not to wage class struggle. We will wage class struggle for ten thousand years; otherwise, wouldn't we become Kuomintang and revisionists?

Peaceful transition means steady non-transition, never transitioning.

At the plenary meeting I only set out the topic and haven't finished; for some points I only revealed a little of what I meant. In a couple of days it may follow naturally.

Three years of the War of Liberation, vigorous land reform. After land reform, the transformation of the two kinds of capitalism went very smoothly. In some areas the democratic revolution was still not thorough; for example Pan Hannian and Rao Shushi went undiscovered for a long time.

The domestic source of revisionism is the remnants of capitalism; the foreign source is submission to the pressure of imperialism. Those two sentences in the Moscow Declaration were added by me.

In 1957 there was a little stir internationally: "the wind suddenly rises and ruffles a pond of spring water." In June a force-twelve typhoon blew up; they were preparing to take over the government. We launched a counteroffensive and took back all the positions in the schools. After the Anti-Rightist campaign, count 1958 as half a year, then 1959 and 1960 the Great Leap Forward. In 1960 we began working on the Twelve Articles, in 1961 the Seventy Articles on industry and the Sixty Articles on agriculture.

In the past, dividing the land meant peasants fighting landlords; now it is peasants fighting peasants, the strong labourers suppressing the weak labourers.

There is this kind of peasant whom both sides want to win over: the landlords and rich peasants want to win them over, and we want to win them over.

The petty bourgeoisie and the peasants have a dual character; they waver when they meet difficulties. So we must fight for proletarian leadership, that is, leadership by the Communist Party. In rural affairs we rely on the poor peasants and must also win over the middle peasants. We distribute according to labour, but we must take care of the four kinds of dependants and the five-guarantee households.

Twenty million people come when called and go when dismissed. If the Communist Party were not in power, who could do that?

At the first Zhengzhou Conference in November 1958, the commercial policy that was put forward was not carried out, and the policy of distribution according to labour was not carried out either. Instead of promoting the development of agriculture and the collective economy, it had an adverse effect. The Ministry of Commerce should change its name and be called the "Ministry of Sabotage." Comrades aren't happy to hear this; I'm deliberately saying it harshly to draw attention. Commercial policies and methods must be studied from the root. In these few years rabbits, sheep and geese have increased, because these things are not subject to state procurement. Striking at the collective and favouring individual farming: this time we must solve this problem no matter what.

When the Centre has business it always consults the provinces, municipalities and ministries, but some ministries simply do not consult the Centre. Some central departments do well, like the military and foreign affairs; some departments, like the Planning Commission, the Economic Commission, and the Finance and Trade Office and the Agriculture Office and other such sectors, their problems can never be solved. The Centre is supposed to hold power firmly in its hands, but if the situation isn't clear, how can it hold it? People eat their meals in order to make revolution; they don't necessarily have to make revolution in one department. Why can't they go to other departments or go down below to make revolution? I am a Hunanese; I was in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Jiangxi for seven or eight years, and in northern Shaanxi for thirteen. You don't necessarily have to work in one area forever. Exchange cadres between central and local departments. Give it another year's trial and see whether it can be solved; Comrade Chen Boda says no more should be given.

The financial and economic ministries and commissions never make reports; they don't ask for instructions beforehand and don't report afterwards. Independent kingdoms. At the four seasons and eight festivals they force signatures. Above, they don't liaise with the Centre; below, they don't liaise with the masses.

Thank heaven and earth, the Organisation Department has recently sent in a report.

We know all about foreign affairs, we even know what Kennedy is going to do, but who knows what the various ministries in Beijing are doing? I don't know the situation of several of the main economic departments. Without knowing, how can one give direction? I hear the provinces have this problem too.