Summing Up Experience and Educating Cadres

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

12 June 1961

Context
Mao spoke to senior Party cadres at the Beijing conference in June 1961, reviewing mistakes since the Zhengzhou conferences, urging thorough rectification of the five winds, and calling for long-term education of cadres.
Main themes
Summing up experience of socialist construction, educating provincial, prefectural and county cadres, rectifying the five winds, communist wind and egalitarianism, returning and compensating arbitrarily transferred property, rehabilitating wrongly labelled Right opportunists, errors after the Lushan Conference, Yan'an Rectification as a model for cadre education, Sixty Articles as study material, Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, shortening the time needed to learn socialism
Duration
~19 min
63rd percentile
Words
2,257
63rd percentile
Sentences
104
65th percentile
Readability
58
83rd percentile
Grade
10.6
27th percentile
Syntax
3.13
65th percentile
Vocabulary
2.12
31st percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 73%72%
  • Economic 15%14%
  • Geopolitical 9%9%
  • Social 4%4%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Ceremonial 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

104 sentences in 8 paragraphs

The two Zhengzhou conferences were held in a rush. At that time I still did not really understand how socialism in China should be done. The first one simply transplanted Stalin; I gave one talk on his *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*. The second one was held in three batches; the first batch lasted one day, and the last batch a day and a half. How could that solve the problems? Back then what I had in mind was to wrap up the meeting early, because spring ploughing was coming in March. If you want to get problems straight, a day or two is not enough. When time is short, you can only compel people to submit, not persuade them. At that time many comrades came to talk with me; I tried to get it through to you, and it didn't get through. In a day or two, how could it get through? After the Lushan Conference, where did we go wrong? Our mistake was precisely that we should not have relayed the resolution on Peng, Huang, Zhang and Zhou down below the county level. It should have been relayed only as far as the county; below the county they should have kept implementing the "Record of the Zhengzhou Conference" and the eighteen points of the Shanghai Conference, and kept opposing "Left" errors. As soon as we opposed the Right, it created a false picture: wonderful, production is surging ahead! In reality it was not like that. The question of Peng, Huang, Zhang and Zhou could well have been relayed within a small circle of a hundred thousand-odd people; it would have been fine if in the army it had not gone down to the companies, and in the localities not below the communes. Once it went down, a great many "Right opportunists" were churned out. Looking at it now, we made mistakes: good people, people who told the truth, were branded "Right opportunists," even branded "counter-revolutionaries." Of course, the Zhengzhou Conference was basically correct, and the eighteen points put forward at the Shanghai Conference were also still basically correct, but what was said about the question of the mess halls and the question of the supply system was not correct. In April 1959, in Beijing, I called together the members of the Central Standing Committee and some comrades in Beijing attending the People's Congress for a talk, and then wrote those six points to the cadres at six levels. Those six points were as good as a fart, because many among our cadres at all levels did not understand what socialism is, what is meant by distribution according to work, what is meant by exchange of equal values. In the spring of 1960 we could see the "communist wind" blowing again. First, in Guangzhou, I called together comrades from the provinces of the Central-South for a meeting of three hours, that short. Then in Hangzhou I called together comrades from the provinces of East China and the Southwest for a meeting of three or four days. The agenda was not focused; questions like building small blast furnaces, technical innovation and technical revolution, mechanisation and semi-mechanisation, and so on, were all squeezed in, and rectifying "egalitarianism and arbitrary transfers" did not become the central issue. A meeting can only have one central issue; one central issue is good. Issuing a lot of documents at one meeting, without a central issue, is no good. Later, in Tianjin, I called together comrades from the provinces of the Northeast, Northwest and North China for a meeting, and that did not solve the problems either. At that time several "big drives" were being promoted: a big drive for water conservancy, a big drive for county and commune industry, a big drive for pig farms, a big drive for transport, a big drive for culture and education. Once these five "big drives" came along, disaster! Wasn't that the "communist wind" coming back again? At last year's Beidaihe Conference in July and August, seventy or eighty per cent of the time was spent discussing international questions, leaving only a tail end to discuss the grain question and the agriculture question, and there was no criticism of the two kinds of egalitarianism either. The thorough resolution of the problem of "egalitarianism and arbitrary transfers" really began with the twelve-point directive issued in November. In carrying out the twelve-point directive one mistake occurred: only the third-category counties, communes and brigades were dealt with, while the first and second categories were let off and not touched. Henan spent a full half year working on third-category counties, communes and brigades and did not touch the first and second categories; the "communist wind," the wind of commandism, the wind of exaggeration, the wind of blind direction, and the wind of cadre privilege were not rectified across the board. Whenever the "five winds" came up, people said the first and second categories could be trusted; now, on checking, the "five winds" in those places turn out to be fierce. Therefore this year's Central documents stipulate that first-, second- and third-category counties, communes and brigades must all rectify the "five winds" across the board; whoever is fated for it cannot escape. Now some among the cadres seem to have grasped a bit of a "pattern"; they think that rectifying the "five winds" will probably last a year or so, then the "wind" will pass and everything will be fine. We must not do it that way. We should learn the method Han Wengong described in his "Address to the Crocodiles": "If not in three days, then by five days. If not in five days, then by seven days. If not in seven days, it means they are ultimately unwilling to move," and then I will attack them and kill them. We too will do it this way: if three years won't do, then five years; if five years won't do, then seven years; if seven years won't do, then ten years; and if ten years still won't do, it means they are ultimately unwilling to change, and then we will remove them from office and investigate and punish them.

We must do investigation and research well, and we must carry through the mass line. Property and goods taken through arbitrary transfers must be resolutely returned or compensated, but without the attitude of bestowing a favour. One more thing: everyone who has been wronged must be rehabilitated.

The problem now is one of educating cadres. All of you present here are teachers, because we have already educated ourselves. Through the Guangzhou Conference and this Beijing Conference, our own thinking has been straightened out, so we must set an example and educate the cadres, educate the cadres at the provincial level, the prefectural level and the county level; first of all we must educate these three levels of cadres. Once these three levels of cadres are well educated, they will go back and educate the cadres at the commune level, the brigade level and the team level.

During the period of the democratic revolution, educating cadres was also something we carried out over a long time. Chen Duxiu did not understand the democratic revolution; he pursued a Right opportunist line and caused the revolution to fail, and of fifty thousand Party members only ten thousand or so were left. We went up into the mountains to wage guerrilla war, and fought for ten years. Within those ten years we also made three "Left" errors, and the ten-thousand-li Long March educated us. Then came the Yan'an Rectification; we compiled several books such as *Since the Sixth Congress* and *Two Lines*, and from 1942 to the first half of 1945 the rectification went on for three and a half years. That was done like a gentle breeze and mild rain; we put forward the slogan "learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones, cure the sickness to save the patient," and individuals wrote notes, read documents and talked about their own thinking. Before the Seventh Congress convened, we adopted the "Resolution on Certain Questions in Our History." The Seventh Congress became a congress of unity and achieved ideological unity throughout the Party. From the founding of the Party in 1921 until before the Seventh Congress in 1945, for twenty-four years our Party had never been completely united in thinking; first there was Chen Duxiu's Right opportunism, then three bouts of "Left" opportunism. There were many schools, each doing its own thing. There were mainly two factions: one was subjectivism, that is, dogmatism, and the other was non-dogmatism. After the Yan'an Rectification and the Seventh Congress, our Party had a whole unified set of things in politics, in military affairs, in economic policy, in cultural policy and in Party building. Why were no errors made in the three-plus years of the War of Liberation that followed? Why did some people who had opposed certain things in the past now agree with them? In military affairs, for example, in the past some people were afraid of having their pots and jars smashed, wanted to keep the enemy outside the gates of the country, struck with two fists, advocated regular warfare and opposed guerrilla warfare; but in this period they came round on luring the enemy in deep and so on. This was because the cadres had been educated, especially educated by the Yan'an Rectification. In the period of socialist revolution and socialist construction we have not yet carried out such a thorough rectification. I think we should start now and use the Sixty Articles to educate cadres over the long term; without several decades it cannot be done well.

Nobody has ever done socialism before; nobody first learned the specific policies of socialism and only then built socialism. We have been doing socialism for eleven years, and now we must sum up experience. What I am talking about today is summing up experience, and I will talk about it again next time. We are historicists; I am telling you all about history, because only by talking about history can you convince people.

The democratic revolution took twenty-eight years from the founding of the Party to victory. We have been doing socialism for only eleven years; I wonder, adding another eleven years, would twenty-two years do? In a pamphlet I once said: in the democratic revolution we had no experience at first either; we took tumbles, gained experience, and only in the end won victory; could the time needed to gain experience in socialist revolution and socialist construction be shortened somewhat? That is a supposition. As things look now, if all of us have woken up, we can shorten the time. The democratic revolution took twenty-eight years; if socialist revolution and socialist construction take twenty-two years, six years fewer than the democratic revolution, that still means another eleven years. Can it be shortened? The Soviet Union's experience is the Soviet Union's experience; if they ran into snags, it was they who ran into snags, and we still have to run into them ourselves. It is like people falling ill: with some illnesses, once he has had it he has immunity, but I haven't had it, so I have no immunity.

Methods of leadership must not be neglected. As I just said, from the Beidaihe Conference, the first Zhengzhou Conference, the Wuchang Conference, the second Zhengzhou Conference, the Shanghai Conference, the letter to the cadres at six levels, the Lushan Conference, all the way to the Sixty Articles and this conference, none of them solved the problems. If a problem has not been solved, you must not leave it alone and ignore it; you must talk about it. Not solved means not solved, and it still has not been solved now! Of the property and goods taken through arbitrary transfers, has even a third been returned or compensated by now? I doubt it. I once asked: has it reached half? Many comrades said not half; a third would count as good. In any case it is like breaking up "ox-hide toffee": break off a third, then break off another third, and if a third is left, break off that third too; once it is all broken off, won't that be a relief? Resolutely returning and compensating is precisely educating our Party, educating our cadres. I think what we need now is to take things like the Sixty Articles, plus Stalin's book *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, as study material. When was Stalin's book written? It was written only in 1952, after thirty-five years starting from 1917. Stalin wrote that book after they had been at it for thirty-five years. We have only been at it for eleven years; if we were to write such a book now, I don't believe we could write it well. Aren't textbooks being compiled everywhere now? I think even when they are compiled they won't be usable; we will still have to use Stalin's book.

After the Guangzhou Conference in March and this Beijing Conference, the situation this year is very different from before. Now comrades have emancipated their minds; their understanding of socialism, their understanding of how to build socialism, has deepened greatly. Why has this change come about? One objective reason is that we ran into snags in the two years 1959 and 1960. Some say we "ran into them till our heads were broken and bleeding"; I see that nobody's head is actually bleeding. That is just a figure of speech; it simply means we suffered.