Speeches at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

1 March 1955 · National Conference of the Communist Party of China

Context
Mao addressed delegates to the National Conference of the Communist Party of China in March 1955, opening and closing the conference, denouncing the Gao Gang–Rao Shushi alliance and announcing the Eighth Party Congress for 1956.
Main themes
Gao Gang–Rao Shushi anti-Party alliance, First Five-Year Plan, general line for the transition period, socialist industrialization and transformation, Central Control Commission, collective leadership, danger of conceit and complacency, criticism and self-criticism, Eighth National Congress, Great Han chauvinism, preparedness against imperialism and sudden events, dialectical materialism and theorists
Duration
~58 min
95th percentile
Words
6,973
95th percentile
Sentences
348
96th percentile
Readability
57
81st percentile
Grade
10.3
24th percentile
Syntax
2.97
44th percentile
Vocabulary
2.15
38th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 55%52%
  • Social 22%21%
  • Geopolitical 9%8%
  • Ceremonial 6%6%
  • Economic 6%6%
  • Technological 1%1%
  • Environmental 1%1%
  • Not in focus 5%

348 sentences in 57 paragraphs

March 21, 1955

Opening Speech

Comrade Delegates to the National Conference of the Communist Party of China:

Our National Conference has three items on its agenda: first, the First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy and the report on that plan; second, the report on the Gao Gang–Rao Shushi anti-Party alliance; third, the establishment of the Central Control Commission.

Basing itself on Lenin's theory of the transition period, and summing up the experience gained since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Central Committee put forward the Party's general line for the transition period in 1952, as the rehabilitation stage of our national economy was drawing to a close. This general line is to bring about, step by step, over a period of roughly three five-year plans, the socialist industrialization of the country, and at the same time to carry out, step by step, the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce, so as to achieve the goal of building a socialist society in our country. The Party's general line, and the various important policies and measures the Party has adopted to carry it out, have been proved correct by the facts. Relying on the efforts of all the comrades in the Party and the people of the whole country, we have achieved great successes in our work. But we have also had shortcomings and made mistakes in our work. It is impossible for many of our measures to be laid down appropriately in every respect, and they should be supplemented and revised in the course of implementation in the light of new experience.

The First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy is a major step towards carrying out the Party's general line. This National Conference of the Party should earnestly discuss the draft plan on the basis of practical experience, so that its contents can be made fairly sound and it can become a practical and feasible plan.

In a large country like ours the situation is complex, and the national economy was originally very backward, so building a socialist society is no easy matter. We may be able to build a socialist society in the course of three five-year plans, but to build a powerful, highly industrialized socialist country will require several decades of arduous effort, say fifty years, that is, the entire second half of this century. Our task requires that we handle well the relations among our people, especially the relationship between the working class and the peasantry, and that we handle well the relations among the various nationalities of our country; at the same time, we must continue to develop our close cooperation with the great and advanced socialist country, the Soviet Union, and with the People's Democracies, and must also develop cooperation with all peace-loving countries and peoples of the capitalist world.

We often say that we must not become conceited and complacent because we have achieved successes in our work, that we should remain modest, learn from the advanced countries, learn from the masses, and learn from one another as comrades, so as to make fewer mistakes. At this Party Conference I feel it is still necessary to repeat these words once again. In view of the anti-Party affair of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi, conceit and complacency do indeed exist within our Party, and in some comrades these feelings are still serious. If they are not overcome, they will hinder the accomplishment of the great task of building a socialist society.

As comrades all know, the emergence of the Gao Gang–Rao Shushi anti-Party alliance was no accident; it was a sharp expression of the intense class struggle at the present stage in our country. The criminal aim of this anti-Party alliance was to split our Party, to seize supreme power in the Party and the state by conspiratorial means, and thereby to open the way for a counter-revolutionary restoration. Under the united leadership of the Central Committee, the whole Party has thoroughly smashed this anti-Party alliance, and as a result our Party has become more united and consolidated. This is a major victory in our struggle for the cause of socialism.

For our Party, the Gao Gang–Rao Shushi affair is an important lesson. The whole Party should take it as a warning and make sure that no such affair recurs within the Party. Gao Gang and Rao Shushi engaged in intrigues within the Party, carried out secret activities and sowed discord behind comrades' backs, while in public they disguised their activities. Such activities of theirs are entirely of the ugly kind that the landlord class and the bourgeoisie have often resorted to in history. Marx and Engels said in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*: "The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims." We are Communists, and above all we are senior cadres of the Party; in politics we must all be open and aboveboard, should state our political views openly at all times, and should declare ourselves either for or against every major political question. We must never resort to intrigue as Gao Gang and Rao Shushi did.

For the purpose of building a socialist society, the Central Committee considers it necessary at this time to establish, in accordance with the Party Constitution, the Central Control Commission to replace the former Discipline Inspection Commission, in order to strengthen Party discipline in a new period of intense class struggle, to intensify the struggle against all kinds of violations of law and discipline, and in particular to prevent the recurrence of affairs like that of the Gao–Rao anti-Party alliance, which gravely harm the interests of the Party.

In view of various historical lessons, and in view of the fact that individual wisdom must be combined with collective wisdom in order to play a better role and enable us to make fewer mistakes in our work, the Central Committee and Party committees at all levels must adhere to the principle of collective leadership and continue to oppose the two deviations of individual dictatorship and decentralism. It must be understood that collective leadership and individual responsibility are not opposed to each other but are combined with each other. And individual responsibility and individual dictatorship, which violates the principle of collective leadership, are two entirely different things.

The present international conditions are favourable to our cause of socialist construction. The socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union is powerful and internally united, whereas the imperialist camp is weak and beset by insurmountable contradictions and crises. Even so, we should understand that imperialist forces still encircle us, and we must be prepared to deal with possible sudden events. If the imperialists launch a war in the future, they will very likely make a surprise attack, as during the Second World War. Therefore we must be prepared both spiritually and materially, so that we will not be caught off guard when a sudden event occurs. That is one aspect. The other aspect is that the remnant counter-revolutionary forces in the country are still very rampant, and we must, in a planned, analytical and practical way, deal them several more blows, so that the hidden counter-revolutionary forces are further weakened, thereby ensuring the security of our country's socialist construction. If we take appropriate measures in both these respects, we may be able to avoid serious harm being done to us by the enemy; otherwise we may make mistakes.

Comrades! We are now in a new historical period. When an Eastern country with a population of six hundred million carries out a socialist revolution, sets out to change the course of history and the face of the country, to basically industrialize the country within about three five-year plans, to complete the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce, and to catch up with or surpass the most powerful capitalist countries in the world within several decades, it cannot possibly avoid running into difficulties, just as we ran into many difficulties during the period of the democratic revolution, and perhaps it will run into even greater difficulties than in the past. But, comrades, we Communists are known for not fearing difficulties. Tactically, we must take every difficulty seriously. We must take a serious attitude toward each specific difficulty, create the necessary conditions, work out the methods of dealing with it, and overcome them one by one and batch by batch. According to our experience of several decades, every difficulty we have met has indeed been overcome. When difficulties of every kind run up against Communists, they have no choice but to retreat; truly, "the high mountains must bow their heads and the rivers must make way." From this we draw a lesson which tells us that we can despise difficulties. This refers to the strategic aspect, to the overall aspect. No matter how great the difficulty, we can see through to its bottom at a glance. So-called difficulties are nothing but those posed to us by the enemies of society and by nature. We know that imperialism, the counter-revolutionaries at home, their agents within our Party and so on are all nothing but dying forces, whereas we are the newborn force, and the truth is on our side. Against them we have always been invincible. You need only think about our own history to understand this. When we had just founded the Party in 1921, we had only a few dozen people, so tiny, and later we grew and actually overthrew the powerful enemies within the country. There are also ways to subdue that enemy, nature. Whether in nature or in society, all newborn forces are, by their very nature, invincible. And all old forces, no matter how huge their numbers, are bound to be wiped out. Therefore we can and must despise any great difficulty we meet in the world and treat it as something "not worth mentioning." This is our optimism. This optimism has a scientific basis. So long as we understand more of Marxism-Leninism, more of natural science, in a word, more of the laws of the objective world, and make fewer subjectivist mistakes, our revolutionary work and our work of construction will certainly achieve their aims.

March 31, 1955

Concluding Speech

Comrades:

Everyone has finished speaking. I will say a few words on the following questions: the assessment of this conference, the five-year plan, the Gao–Rao question, the current situation, and the Eighth Congress.

I. On the Assessment of This Conference

The overwhelming majority of comrades think that this conference has gone very well; it has been another rectification meeting since the Yan'an Rectification, it has promoted democracy, developed criticism and self-criticism, enabled us to understand one another better, unified our thinking further and given us a common understanding. We did have a common understanding to begin with, but on a number of questions there were still differing opinions among us, and this conference has unified our understanding. On this basis, on the basis of this common understanding in ideology, in politics and in many policies, our Party can be better united. As Comrade Enlai said, if the Party's Seventh Congress, together with the ideological and political rectification of the whole Party in the period before it, laid the foundation for unifying the thinking of our Party, on which we won victory in the democratic revolution against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, then this conference will enable us to win victory for socialism.

This conference has shown that the level of our Party has risen greatly; it has made a big advance not only compared with the time of the Seventh Congress ten years ago, but also compared with the time of the Second Plenary Session in 1949 and the Third Plenary Session in 1950. This situation is good; this conference shows that we have made progress.

We have entered a period, a new historical period, in which what we are now engaged in, thinking about and delving into is socialist industrialization, socialist transformation and modern national defence, and we are beginning to delve into atomic energy. Comrades throughout the Party have delved into these things to varying depths, and so have the comrades present here. It is like doctors: some can operate and some cannot. Some can give intravenous injections, and others cannot and can only give subcutaneous ones. Some doctors don't even dare to go under the skin and just stay on the surface. Although some comrades have not got into it, the majority are delving, and it looks as though many have got in, that is, they have acquired something of the expert's touch. We can see this at this conference too. This is an extremely good thing. Because what we face now are new problems: socialist industrialization, socialist transformation, new national defence, and new work in other fields. To adapt to these new circumstances, delve into them and become experts—this is our task. Therefore we must educate those who cannot get into things and stay floating on the surface, so that they all become experts.

The struggle against the Gao Gang–Rao Shushi anti-Party alliance will spur our Party to make a big advance.

We are going to propagate dialectical materialism among the five million intellectuals and cadres at all levels, inside and outside the Party, so that they acquire it and oppose idealism. We will form a powerful contingent of theorists, which we badly need, and this is another very good thing.

We must draw up a plan to form such a powerful contingent of theorists, with several million people studying the theoretical foundation of Marxism, namely dialectical materialism and historical materialism, and opposing all kinds of idealism and mechanical materialism. We now have many cadres doing theoretical work, but we have not yet formed a contingent of theorists, and especially not a powerful one. And without such a contingent, it will not do for the cause of our whole Party, for our country's socialist industrialization, socialist transformation, modern national defence and atomic energy research; problems cannot be solved. Therefore I advise comrades to study philosophy. Quite a lot of people have no interest in philosophy; they have no habit of studying it. They can begin by reading pamphlets and short articles to arouse their interest, then read things of seventy or eighty thousand characters, and then read books of several hundred thousand characters. Marxism comprises several branches of learning: Marxist philosophy, Marxist economics, and Marxist socialism—the theory of class struggle—but the foundation is Marxist philosophy. If we have not mastered this, we will have no common language and no common method, and we will argue endlessly without getting things clear. With dialectical materialist thinking, we will save a great deal of trouble and make many fewer mistakes.

II. On the First Five-Year Plan

Comrades think that in the discussion of the five-year plan most comrades' speeches were very good, and everyone is satisfied. Some of the speeches were particularly good; they got to the heart of the problems and had something of the expert about them. However, some of the content in the speeches from central departments was rather poor, with insufficient analysis and criticism; some of the speeches by comrades from the localities were also rather poor, with insufficient analysis and criticism. There was another situation: in some comrades' speeches, serious waste and other mistakes were merely exposed as they stand, without explaining how they would be dealt with. Some comrades were dissatisfied with these speeches. I think this dissatisfaction is justified.

I hope that all secretaries of provincial, municipal and prefectural Party committees and the leading comrades of the central departments will exert themselves and, on the basis of raising their level of Marxism-Leninism, make themselves experts well versed in both political work and economic work. On the one hand we must do political and ideological work well; on the other, we must do economic construction well. As for economic construction, we must really learn it thoroughly.

At this conference, the localities have asked the Centre to resolve many problems. Where the Centre already has regulations, these problems should be actively resolved. As for other problems, the Secretariat, together with the comrades who raised them, will study ways to resolve them and report to the Centre for handling.

The central departments also have many requests for cooperation from the localities. For the undertakings run by central departments in the various localities, local Party committees are asked to supervise and help them, especially in political and ideological work. Local Party committees have a responsibility to help the undertakings the Centre runs in their localities to fulfil their tasks. So it is not only the localities that make demands on the Centre; the Centre also makes demands on the localities. Only if the central departments and the local Party committees work together with one heart, dividing the work and cooperating, can the First Five-Year Plan be fully realized.

III. On the Gao Gang–Rao Shushi Anti-Party Alliance

First, some people ask: did this alliance really exist? Or was it not an alliance but two independent states, two individual households? Some comrades say they haven't seen any documents; if they were an alliance there must have been an agreement, and an agreement must be in writing. A written agreement, it is true, does not exist; none can be found. We say that Gao Gang and Rao Shushi did have an alliance. From what can this be seen? One, from the joint activities of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi during the Conference on Financial and Economic Work. Two, from Rao Shushi's coordination with Zhang Xiushan in anti-Party activities during the Conference on Organizational Work. Three, from Rao Shushi's own words. Rao Shushi said, "From now on the Central Organization Department will take Guo Feng as its core." Rao Shushi was head of the Organization Department, and Gao Gang's trusted follower Guo Feng was to be its core. Very nice! Very closely united! Four, from the fact that Gao Gang and Rao Shushi spread everywhere a list of Political Bureau members privately drawn up by An Ziwen. An Ziwen was given a disciplinary warning for this. Gao Gang, Rao Shushi and others distributed this list to everyone attending the Conference on Organizational Work, and even spread it to the southern provinces, spreading it everywhere like this—what were they up to? Five, from the fact that Gao Gang twice expressed to me his wish to protect Rao Shushi, while Rao Shushi still wanted to protect Gao Gang right up to the end. Gao Gang said Rao Shushi was now in a terrible fix and asked me to get him out of it. I said, why are you speaking on behalf of Rao Shushi? I am in Beijing, and Rao Shushi is in Beijing too; why does he want you to represent him instead of coming to see me directly? Even from Tibet he could send a telegram—he's right here in Beijing, he has feet. The second time was on the day before Gao Gang was exposed; Gao Gang was still expressing his wish to protect Rao Shushi. Rao Shushi wanted to protect Gao Gang right up to the end; he wanted to clear Gao Gang's name. At the meeting of the Centre at which Gao Gang was exposed, I said that there were two headquarters in Beijing: one was the headquarters headed by me, which stirred up an open wind and lit an open fire; the other was a headquarters with someone else as commander, which stirred up a sinister wind and lit a sinister fire, an underground current. Is government to come from a single source or from many sources? Judging from the many things above, they had an anti-Party alliance; they were not two unrelated independent states and individual households.

As for the fact that, because there was no explicit agreement, some comrades have had doubts and say that perhaps it was not an alliance—this equates an anti-Party alliance formed by conspirators with ordinary open and formal political and economic alliances, treating them as the same thing. They were engaged in conspiracy! When you conspire, do you sign a written agreement? If having no written agreement means there is no alliance, then what about inside the two anti-Party cliques of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi? Gao Gang and Zhang Xiushan, Zhang Mingyuan, Zhao Dezun, Ma Hong and Guo Feng didn't sign a treaty either! We haven't seen their written agreement either! Then that anti-Party clique of theirs would be denied as well! And between Rao Shushi and Xiang Ming and Yang Fan, we haven't seen any treaty either! So the view that without an explicit agreement it cannot be considered an alliance is incorrect.

Second, what attitude should comrades who were influenced by Gao and Rao and comrades who were not influenced by them respectively adopt? Those influenced were influenced to varying depths. Some were influenced in a general way, brushed by their wing; a few comrades were influenced more deeply, discussed many questions with them, carried out some activities below and spread things for them. There is a difference between the two. But of all these people, whether influenced deeply or slightly, most have already stated their positions at this conference. Some did so very well and were welcomed by the whole hall. Some did so fairly well and were welcomed by most comrades, but with shortcomings. Some did not do so fully enough and supplemented it today. Some spoke fairly well overall but with certain parts that were inappropriate. In any case, these several kinds of people have all stated their positions to some extent, and we should welcome them all without exception—after all, they have stated their positions! There are also a few comrades who asked to speak but there was no time; they can write a report to the Centre. Those who have not spoken have no serious problems; they are the ones brushed by the wing, who knew some things but did not speak. As for those who have already spoken, are there some who still left a tail? Well, we have now decided that, whether on the five-year plan or on the Gao–Rao anti-Party alliance, all speeches and reports can be taken back and revised, weighing every word and phrase, and within five days whatever was not said completely or was said inappropriately can be revised further. We do not want to seize on someone's pigtail because he did not get it right at this conference, and make it impossible for him to get out of it later. You can still revise it, and your final revised draft will be what counts.

Toward these comrades we should adopt this attitude: we hope they will correct their mistakes, and we should not only watch them but also help them. That is to say, not only watch whether they correct themselves, but help them correct themselves. People need help. However fine the lotus flower, it needs the support of green leaves. A fence needs three stakes, and a hero needs three helpers. Going it alone is no good; one always needs help, and especially on a question like this. Watching is necessary—watching whether they correct themselves—but merely watching is passive; we must also help them. As for those who were influenced, whether deeply or slightly, we welcome all of them to correct themselves, and we should not only watch but also help. This is the positive attitude toward comrades who have made mistakes.

Comrades who were not influenced should not be conceited and should guard against falling ill. This point is extremely important. Of the comrades I spoke of earlier, some may have been taken in and some may have been drawn in rather deeply; having made mistakes, they may become vigilant and not make such mistakes again. Having had the illness once, they have acquired immunity. Having been vaccinated once against smallpox, they are protected. But that is no guarantee either; they may still catch smallpox. So it is best to be revaccinated every three to five years, that is, to hold meetings like ours. Other comrades should not be conceited and should guard against making mistakes. Why didn't Gao Gang and Rao Shushi provoke these people? There are several situations: first, those they regarded as their enemies, to whom of course they did not spread things; second, those they looked down on and considered of no consequence, to whom there was no need to spread things now, since when "the realm was settled" those people would naturally come over; third, those they did not dare to provoke—those people probably had relatively strong immunity and would see at a glance that something was wrong; although these comrades were not regarded as their enemies, nor as of no consequence, they did not dare to provoke them; fourth, there simply was not enough time. Spreading this plague also takes time; had it gone unexposed for another year, some people could not have been vouched for. So do not play the hero: look, didn't you get a bit of a stink on you, while I'm perfectly clean! Had it gone unexposed for another year, I guarantee that quite a few people would have been influenced by them.

I think the above are the points to which the two groups of comrades, those influenced by Gao and Rao and those not influenced, should pay attention.

Third, on questions of principle, among comrades, we should always take care to keep a distance from words and deeds that violate the Party's principles. Those words and deeds of theirs do not conform to the Party's principles and we cannot stand them; on this part of the issues, in this part of the circumstances, we should not merge with them. On other questions, those that conform to the Party's principles, such as the five-year plan, the resolution and report on the Gao–Rao anti-Party alliance, and all correct policies and correct Party regulations—such words and deeds we should of course actively support and merge with. Toward what does not conform to the Party's principles we should keep a distance, that is to say, draw a clear line and push it back immediately. We must not abandon this distance because someone is an old friend, an old superior, an old subordinate, an old colleague, a schoolmate, a fellow townsman and so on. In this Gao–Rao anti-Party affair, as well as in past line struggles in the Party, there has been much experience of this kind: as soon as you think the relationship is too old and too deep to speak out, and you do not keep a distance, do not push back, do not draw a clear line, you sink deeper and deeper, and that "ghost" of theirs will cling to you. So you should state your position and adhere to principle.

Fourth, some comrades say, "We knew some of the bad things Gao and Rao did, but we did not see their conspiracy." I say there are two situations. One is where they heard Gao Gang and Rao Shushi say many things that did not conform to the Party's principles, or where Gao Gang and Rao Shushi even discussed some anti-Party activities with them; then they should have seen it. The other is where they generally knew some of their bad deeds but did not see the conspiracy; this is understandable, for it was very hard to see. The Centre itself only discovered their anti-Party conspiracy in 1953. Through the Conference on Financial and Economic Work, the Conference on Organizational Work, and various problems before the Conference on Financial and Economic Work, we saw that they were abnormal. During the Conference on Financial and Economic Work we discovered their abnormal activities and pushed them back each time. So afterwards they went completely underground. We only discovered this conspiracy, these conspirators, this conspiratorial clique, in the autumn and winter of 1953. For a long time we did not see that Gao Gang and Rao Shushi were bad people. Such things have happened before. During the Jinggangshan period there were several traitors, and we never imagined they would betray us. I'm afraid all of you have had this kind of experience.

We should draw a lesson from this, namely not to be deceived by false appearances. Some of our comrades are easily deceived by false appearances. In all things there is a contradiction between appearance and essence. People must analyse and study appearances before they can understand the essence of things; that is why science is needed. Otherwise, if one could see the essence at a glance by intuition, what would we need science for? What would we need research for? We need research precisely because there is a contradiction between appearance and essence. But false appearances differ from ordinary appearances, because they are false. So the lesson to draw is to avoid, as far as possible, being deceived by false appearances.

Fifth, the danger of conceit. Do not play the hero. Work is done by the many; the role of the few is limited. The role of the few, that is, of leaders and cadres, should be acknowledged, but it is nothing extraordinary; it is the masses whose role is extraordinary. The correct relationship between cadres and masses is this: it won't do without cadres, but things are done by the broad masses, with cadres playing a leading role, and this role of cadres must not be exaggerated. Is it the end of the world without you? History proves, and all kinds of facts prove, that things go on all right without you. For example, is it the end of the world without Gao Gang and Rao Shushi? Aren't things still all right? Without Trotsky, without Zhang Guotao, without Chen Duxiu, aren't things still all right? These are all bad people. As for good people, things can go on without you too. Without you, would the earth stop turning? The earth goes on turning just the same, the work goes on just the same, perhaps even better. Confucius has long been gone; now that China has a Communist Party, it is surely somewhat wiser than Confucius, so evidently things are done somewhat better without Confucius!

There are two kinds of people: one kind are veterans—quite a few of those present have very long standing; the other kind are the newborn force, the young people. Which of these two kinds has more promise? Comrade Enlai also spoke about this today; of course the newborn force has more promise. Some comrades become conceited because they are old revolutionaries; this is quite wrong. Comparatively speaking, if any conceit were to be allowed, it is the young who might have reason to be a little proud. People over forty or fifty, the older they are and the more experience they have, should be more modest. Let the young people see that we really do have experience: "These elders really do have some experience; don't look down on them; see how modest they are." For people of forty or fifty to become conceited because they have gained a lot of experience—wouldn't that be unseemly? The young people would remark: "All that experience of yours amounts to nothing; you're just like children." For children to be a bit conceited is more reasonable. For older people, with so much experience, still to be conceited and stick their tails up so high—there is no need for that. The saying goes: "Live with your tail tucked in." People have no tails to begin with, so why should they tuck their tails in? It's like a dog: there are times when it sticks its tail up and times when it tucks it in. Probably when it has been beaten a few times it tucks its tail in, and probably when it has scored a few successes its tail goes up. I hope that all our comrades, and first of all the veteran comrades, will not stick their tails up but keep them tucked in, guard against conceit and impetuosity, and always maintain a modest and enterprising spirit.

Sixth, guard against "Left" and guard against Right. Some people say, "'Left' is better than Right," and many comrades say so. In fact, many people also say in their hearts, "Right is better than 'Left,'" but do not say it aloud; only honest people say it aloud. There are these two views. What is "Left"? Going beyond the times, going beyond the present circumstances, rash advance in principles and policies and in action, struggling indiscriminately on questions of struggle and on disputed questions—this is "Left," and it is not good. Lagging behind the times, lagging behind the present circumstances, lacking a fighting spirit—this is Right, and it is not good either. In our Party there are not only those who like "Left," but also quite a few who like Right, or are middle-leaning-right; all are bad. We must wage a struggle on two fronts, opposing both "Left" and Right.

On the question of the Gao Gang–Rao Shushi anti-Party alliance, these are the points I wish to make.

IV. On the Current Situation

The international situation, the domestic situation and the situation within the Party—what are these three situations like? Does the bright side predominate, or the dark side? It should be affirmed that in the international, domestic and intra-Party situations alike, the bright side predominates and the dark side is secondary. It is the same in this conference hall. Don't think things are dark just because many people have made self-criticisms. These comrades stressed their shortcomings and mistakes and did not talk about their strengths—in what year they joined the revolution, where they won battles, where they achieved results in their work—they did not say any of that. If you look only at their self-examinations, then things look dark. In fact, that is one side, and in many comrades it is the secondary side. This is different from Gao Gang, Rao Shushi and the five tiger generals Zhang, Zhang, Zhao, Ma and Guo; this assessment—that the bright side predominates—does not apply to them. What bright side predominates in Gao Gang? He is all darkness, heaven and earth dark, sun and moon without light. As for our comrades, it is different; there is a little darkness, and it can be washed clean—wash it a few more times with soap.

Why did we raise the need to be prepared for sudden events, to be prepared for a counter-revolutionary restoration, and to be prepared for a recurrence of the Gao–Rao affair? It means that if we think in terms of the worst possibility, we will never lose out. In any work, we must think and make arrangements on the basis of the worst possibility. These terribly bad things amount to no more than this: the imperialists launch a new world war, Chiang Kai-shek comes back to sit in Beijing, affairs like the Gao–Rao anti-Party alliance happen again, and not just one but ten, a hundred. Even if there are that many, if we have prepared for them in advance, we have nothing to fear. If you have ten, that's only five pairs, nothing extraordinary; we have taken them all into account. The atom bombs and hydrogen bombs with which the imperialists try to frighten us are nothing to be afraid of either. In the affairs of the world, there is always one thing that overcomes another; when something attacks, there is something that subdues it. Read *The Investiture of the Gods* and you will see: what "magic weapon" was there that could not be broken? So many "magic weapons" were all broken. We believe that so long as we rely on the people, there is no "magic weapon" in the world that cannot be broken.

V. Strive for the Successful Convening of the Party's Eighth National Congress

The Central Committee has decided to convene the Party's Eighth National Congress in the second half of 1956. There will be three items on the agenda: (1) the work report of the Central Committee; (2) revision of the Party Constitution; (3) election of a new Central Committee. The election of delegates and the preparation of documents must be completed before July next year. It is required that within this period of a little more than a year, work in every field—economic, cultural and educational, military, Party affairs, political and ideological work, mass organizations, the united front, and work among the minority nationalities—make a big advance.

Let me say a word in passing about work among the minority nationalities. We must oppose Great Han chauvinism. Do not think that only the Han have helped the minority nationalities; the minority nationalities have also greatly helped the Han. Some comrades are always bragging, we have certainly helped you, without seeing that it won't do without the minority nationalities. Who lives in fifty to sixty per cent of our country's territory? Is it the Han, or who? Fifty to sixty per cent of the territory is inhabited by minority nationalities. Those areas are rich in natural resources and have many treasures. At present we help the minority nationalities very little, and in some places not at all, whereas the minority nationalities have helped the Han. Some minority nationalities need us to help them first before they can help us. Politically, the minority nationalities have greatly helped the Han; by joining the great family of the Chinese nation, they have helped the Han politically. The minority nationalities and the Han are united, and the people of the whole country are happy. So the minority nationalities have been of great help to the whole country and the whole Chinese nation politically, economically and in national defence. The view that only the Han have helped the minority nationalities and the minority nationalities have not helped the Han, and the view of those who, having given the minority nationalities a little help, think themselves terribly important, are wrong.

When we say that work in every field must make a big advance this year, we mean that the shortcomings and mistakes that have been exposed must be corrected. Don't make vows at this conference and then, when the Eighth Congress convenes next year, still have just as many shortcomings and mistakes, completely untouched. The reason for striving for the convening of the Eighth Congress is to correct shortcomings and mistakes—for example, extravagance and waste, big roofs and such things—and to correct them earnestly and responsibly. Don't make vows here and then, once you get back, stretch out your legs and go to sleep.

Someone has suggested holding a conference like this once a year or once every two years, so that comrades can supervise one another. I think this can be considered. Who supervises us? Mutual supervision is a good method and can promote the rapid progress of the cause of the Party and the state. Rapid progress, not slow progress. The Party Congress has not been held for ten years. Of course it should not have been held in the first five years, because of the turmoil of war, and the Seventh Congress had been held; in the latter five years it could have been held but was not. Not holding it also had its advantages: we hold it after the Gao–Rao question has been cleared up; otherwise they would have exploited the Eighth Congress to make a big fuss. At the same time, our five-year plan is on track, the general line for the transition period has been put forward, and through this conference everyone has become more unified in thinking, which has prepared the conditions for convening the Party's Eighth Congress. At the Party's Eighth Congress, not everyone needs to make a self-examination, but we must still make open criticism and self-criticism of the shortcomings and mistakes in our work. It won't do not to practise this tenet of Marxism.

Criticism must be sharp. Some of the criticism this time, I feel, was not so sharp; it always seemed afraid of offending people. If you are not that sharp and don't really jab someone, he won't feel the pain and won't pay attention. Names must be named, and the department must be pointed out. You haven't done a good job, I'm dissatisfied, and if that offends you, so be it. Fear of offending people is nothing but fear of losing votes, and fear of not getting along at work. If you don't vote for me, will I have nothing to eat? No such thing. In fact, if you speak out and put the problem sharply on the table, it actually becomes easier to get along. Don't wear down your edges. Why does an ox grow two horns? An ox grows two horns because it needs to fight—first for defence, second for attack. I often say to comrades, have you grown "horns" on your head? All of you comrades can feel for yourselves. I think some comrades have grown "horns," some have grown "horns" but not very sharp ones, and some have not grown "horns" at all. I think it is better to grow two "horns," because that is in keeping with Marxism. Marxism has a tenet called criticism and self-criticism.

So, convening conferences regularly and conducting criticism and self-criticism is a good method of mutual supervision among comrades that promotes the rapid progress of the cause of the Party and the state. I suggest that the comrades of the provincial and municipal Party committees consider whether you can do this too. Don't you learn from the Centre? I think this is something you can learn.

Finally, I ask comrades to note, and ask the comrades of the whole Party to note:

Strive for the successful convening of the Party's Eighth National Congress in 1956!

Strive for the successful fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan!