On the Ten Major Relationships

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

25 April 1956 · Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Context
Mao addressed a meeting of Chinese Communist Party leaders on April 25, 1956, setting out ten major relationships in socialist construction and urging China to avoid Soviet mistakes and mobilise all positive factors.
Main themes
Ten major relationships in socialist construction, mobilising all positive factors, heavy industry versus agriculture and light industry, coastal and interior industry, economic construction and national defence, interests of state, collective and individual, centre-locality relations, Han and minority nationalities, suppression of counter-revolutionaries, treatment of comrades who made mistakes, learning from other countries, assessment of Stalin
Duration
~76 min
97th percentile
Words
9,077
97th percentile
Sentences
449
98th percentile
Readability
50
62nd percentile
Grade
11.3
37th percentile
Syntax
2.91
35th percentile
Vocabulary
2.13
32nd percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 35%34%
  • Economic 24%23%
  • Geopolitical 20%19%
  • Social 17%16%
  • Ceremonial 3%2%
  • Technological 1%1%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

449 sentences in 89 paragraphs

In recent months, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee has heard work reports from thirty-four departments of the centre, covering industry, agriculture, transport, commerce, finance and so on, and from these reports we have seen a number of problems concerning socialist construction and socialist transformation. Taken together, there are ten problems in all, that is to say, ten major relationships.

All ten of these problems revolve around one basic policy, which is to mobilise all positive factors at home and abroad to serve the cause of socialism. In the past, in order to end the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, and in order to win victory in the people's democratic revolution, we pursued the policy of mobilising all positive factors. Now, in order to carry out the socialist revolution and build a socialist country, we are pursuing the same policy. But there are still some problems in our work that need to be talked over. What deserves particular attention is that the Soviet side has recently exposed some of the shortcomings and mistakes they made in the course of building socialism. Do you still want to take the detours they took? In the past, precisely because we took their experience and lessons as a warning, we avoided some detours, and now of course we must take them as a warning all the more.

What are the positive factors at home and abroad? At home, the workers and peasants are the basic force. The intermediate forces are forces that can be won over. Reactionary forces are a negative factor, but even so we must do our work well and try as far as possible to turn negative factors into positive ones. Internationally, we must unite with all the forces that can be united, those that are not neutral can be won over to neutrality, and even the reactionary ones can be split and made use of. In short, we must mobilise all forces, direct and indirect, and strive to build our country into a powerful socialist state.

Now I shall speak on ten problems.

I. The relationship between heavy industry on the one hand and light industry and agriculture on the other

Heavy industry is the focus of our country's construction. Priority must be given to developing the production of the means of production; this has already been settled. But on no account may we therefore neglect the production of the means of subsistence, and especially grain. Without enough grain and other daily necessities, we could not even feed the workers in the first place, so what would be the point of talking about developing heavy industry? Therefore the relationship between heavy industry on the one hand and light industry and agriculture on the other must be handled well.

In handling the relationship between heavy industry on the one hand and light industry and agriculture on the other, we have not made mistakes of principle. We have done somewhat better than the Soviet Union and some East European countries. Problems such as the Soviet Union's grain output long failing to reach the highest pre-revolutionary level, or the serious problems that have arisen in some East European countries because of an excessive imbalance between the development of light and heavy industry, do not exist here. They lay one-sided stress on heavy industry and neglect agriculture and light industry, and as a result there are not enough goods on the market and the currency is unstable. We have paid comparatively more attention to agriculture and light industry. We have consistently taken agriculture in hand and developed it, and have to a fair degree guaranteed the grain and raw materials needed for developing industry. Our everyday consumer goods are fairly plentiful, and prices and the currency are stable.

Our problem now is that we must still make an appropriate adjustment in the proportion of investment between heavy industry on the one hand and agriculture and light industry on the other, and develop agriculture and light industry more. Does this mean that heavy industry is no longer primary? It is still primary, it is still the focus of investment. But the proportion of investment in agriculture and light industry must be increased somewhat.

What will be the result of the increase? The result will be, first, that the needs of the people's livelihood can be better met, and second, that the accumulation of capital can be increased faster, so that heavy industry can be developed more and better. Heavy industry can accumulate too, but under our present economic conditions, light industry and agriculture accumulate more and faster.

Here a question arises: is your desire to develop heavy industry genuine or feigned, strong or rather weak? If it is feigned, or rather weak, then you will hit agriculture and light industry and invest less in them. If it is genuine, or strong, then you will attach importance to agriculture and light industry, so that there will be more grain and more raw materials for light industry, more accumulation, and in the future more funds to invest in heavy industry.

At present there are two ways for us to develop heavy industry: one is to develop agriculture and light industry less, and the other is to develop agriculture and light industry more. From a long-term point of view, the first way will make heavy industry develop less and more slowly, or at least on a less solid foundation, and when the overall account is drawn up a few decades from now it will not have paid off. The second way will make heavy industry develop more and faster, and since it guarantees the needs of the people's livelihood, it will lay a more solid foundation for its development.

II. The relationship between industry in the coastal regions and industry in the interior

In the past our country's industry was concentrated in the coastal regions. By the coastal regions we mean Liaoning, Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin, eastern Henan, Shandong, Anhui, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong and Guangxi. About seventy per cent of all our light and heavy industry is in the coastal regions and only thirty per cent in the interior. This is an irrational state of affairs left over from history. The industrial base in the coastal regions must be fully utilised, but in order to balance the distribution of industrial development, industry in the interior must be vigorously developed. On the relationship between the two, we have not made any major mistakes either, except that in the last few years we have somewhat underestimated coastal industry and have not paid such great attention to its development. This must be changed.

In the past the war in Korea was still going on and the international situation was still very tense, and this could not but affect our view of coastal industry. Now it seems that a new war of aggression against China or a new world war will not break out in the short term, and there may be a period of peace of ten years or a bit longer. That being so, it would be wrong if we still failed to make full use of the plant capacity and technical forces of coastal industry. Even if we have only five years rather than ten, we should still run industry well in the coastal regions for four years, and move house when war breaks out in the fifth. From the available material it appears that light-industry factories are generally very quick to build and to accumulate; once they are fully in operation, within four years they can not only recover the investment in the factory itself but earn enough to build three more factories, or two, or one, or at least half a factory. Why not do such a good thing? The view that the atom bomb is already over our heads and about to fall in a matter of seconds is an assessment of the situation that does not accord with the facts, and to adopt a negative attitude towards coastal industry on that account is wrong.

This does not mean that new factories should all be built in the coastal regions. There is no doubt that the greater part of new industry should be located in the interior, so that the distribution of industry gradually becomes balanced, which also helps prepare for war. But some new factories and mines can also be built in the coastal regions, and some of them can be large ones. As for the expansion and reconstruction of the existing light and heavy industry in the coastal regions, some has already been done, and in future it must be greatly developed.

Making good use of and developing the old industrial base in the coastal regions will put us in a stronger position to develop and support industry in the interior. Adopting a negative attitude would hamper the rapid development of industry in the interior. So this, too, is a question of whether your desire to develop industry in the interior is genuine or feigned. If it is genuine and not feigned, you must make more use of and develop coastal industry, especially light industry.

III. The relationship between economic construction and national defence construction

National defence is indispensable. We now have a certain amount of defence strength. As a result of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea and several years of training and consolidation, our army has grown stronger, stronger than the Soviet Red Army was before the Second World War, and its equipment has also improved. Our defence industry is being built up. Ever since Pangu separated heaven and earth, we never knew how to make aeroplanes or motor cars, and now we are beginning to be able to make them.

We do not yet have the atom bomb. But in the past we had no aeroplanes or artillery either, and we defeated Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek with millet plus rifles. We are already stronger than before and will be stronger still in the future. We will have not only more aeroplanes and artillery but the atom bomb as well. In today's world, if we do not want to be bullied by others, we cannot do without this thing. What is to be done, then? The reliable way is to cut military and administrative expenditure down to an appropriate proportion and increase expenditure on economic construction. Only with faster growth in economic construction can there be greater progress in national defence construction.

In 1950, at the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party, we already raised the question of streamlining the state apparatus and reducing military and administrative expenditure, and regarded this as one of the three conditions for achieving a fundamental turn for the better in our country's financial and economic situation. During the period of the First Five-Year Plan, military and administrative expenditure accounted for thirty per cent of total expenditure in the state budget. This proportion is much too high. During the period of the Second Five-Year Plan we must bring it down to around twenty per cent, so as to release more funds to open more factories and make more machines. After a while, we shall have not only lots of aeroplanes and artillery but probably our own atom bomb as well.

Here too the same kind of question arises: do you genuinely want the atom bomb, want it very much, or do you only want it a little and not very much? If you genuinely want it, want it very much, then you will reduce the proportion of military and administrative expenditure and do more economic construction. If you do not genuinely want it, do not want it very much, then you will go on in the old way. This is a question of strategic policy, and I hope the Military Commission will discuss it.

Would it be a good idea for us now to demobilise all our troops? No, it would not. Because there are still enemies, and we are still being bullied and encircled by them! We must strengthen national defence, and for that reason we must first strengthen economic construction.

IV. The relationship between the state, the units of production and the individual producers

The relationship between the state on the one hand and the factories and cooperatives on the other, and the relationship between the factories and cooperatives on the one hand and the individual producers on the other, must both be handled well. To this end, we must not attend to one side only, but must take into account the interests of all three, the state, the collective and the individual, which is what we used to call "taking into account both the army and the people" and "taking into account both public and private interests." In the light of the experience of the Soviet Union as well as our own, we must make sure from now on that this problem is solved better.

Take the workers. As the workers' labour productivity rises, their working conditions and collective welfare need to be gradually improved. We have always advocated hard struggle and opposed putting personal material interests above everything else, and at the same time we have always advocated concern for the lives of the masses and opposed the bureaucratism that is indifferent to their well-being. As the national economy as a whole develops, wages also need to be suitably adjusted. On wages, it has recently been decided to raise them somewhat, mainly at the lower levels, for the workers, so as to narrow the gap between the upper and lower levels. Our wages are generally still not high, but because more people are employed, because prices are low and stable, and because of various other conditions, the workers' lives have still improved greatly compared with the past. Under proletarian state power, the workers' political consciousness and enthusiasm for labour have always been high. At the end of last year, when the Central Committee called for opposing Right conservatism, the masses of workers warmly supported it, and by fighting hard for three months they overfulfilled the plan for the first quarter of this year, something without precedent. We need to promote this spirit of hard struggle vigorously, and we also need to pay more attention to solving the pressing problems in their work and lives.

Here I must also say something about the independence of factories under unified leadership. It is probably not right to concentrate everything in the hands of the centre or the provinces and municipalities, leaving the factories no power at all, no room at all for flexibility, no benefits at all. We do not have much experience of how much power and how many benefits should properly go to the centre, to the provinces and municipalities, and to the factories respectively, and this still has to be studied. In principle, unity and independence are a unity of opposites; there must be unity and there must also be independence. For example, our holding this meeting now is unity; after the meeting some people go for a walk, some read, some eat, and that is independence. If we did not give everyone independence after the meeting but kept the meeting going endlessly, wouldn't everyone end up dead? What is true of individuals is also true of factories and other units of production. Every unit of production must have an independence linked with unity, and then it will develop with greater vitality.

Now the peasants. Our relations with the peasants have always been good, but we once made a mistake on the question of grain. In 1954 output fell in parts of our country because of floods, and yet we purchased seven billion jin more grain. With output down and purchases up, last spring in many places almost everyone was talking about grain and every household about state marketing. The peasants were dissatisfied, and there was a lot of criticism both inside and outside the Party. Although many people deliberately exaggerated and seized the chance to attack us, it cannot be said that we had no shortcomings. Insufficient investigation, not getting to the bottom of the situation, buying seven billion jin too much: that was a shortcoming. Having discovered the shortcoming, in 1955 we purchased seven billion jin less and also introduced the "three fixes," that is, fixed quotas for production, purchase and sale; together with a good harvest, purchases down and output up, this left the peasants with over twenty billion jin more grain in their hands. As a result, even peasants who had complained before said, "The Communist Party is really good." The whole Party must remember this lesson.

The Soviet Union's methods have squeezed the peasants very hard. They have taken away too much of what the peasants produce, through the so-called system of compulsory deliveries and other measures, and paid them extremely low prices. Accumulating capital in this way has seriously dampened the peasants' enthusiasm for production. You want the hen to lay more eggs and yet you don't give it any grain to eat; you want the horse to run well and yet you don't let it eat any grass. Where in the world is there such logic!

Our policy towards the peasants is not the Soviet kind of policy; it takes into account the interests of both the state and the peasants. Our agricultural tax has always been relatively light. In the exchange of industrial and agricultural products, we follow a policy of narrowing the price scissors, of exchanging equal values or nearly equal values. We make state purchases of farm products at normal prices; the peasants do not lose out, and the purchase prices have even been rising gradually. In supplying industrial goods to the peasants, we follow a policy of small profits and quick turnover and of keeping prices stable or reducing them where appropriate; in supplying grain to peasants in grain-deficient areas, we generally subsidise them a little. But even so, mistakes of one kind or another will still be made if we are careless. In view of the serious mistakes the Soviet Union has made on this question, we must pay more attention to handling the relationship between the state and the peasants well.

The relationship between the cooperatives and the peasants must also be handled well. How much of a cooperative's income should go to the state, how much to the cooperative and how much to the peasants, and in what form, must all be properly fixed. The part that goes to the cooperative is all used directly in the service of the peasants. Production costs go without saying; management expenses are also necessary; the accumulation fund is for expanded reproduction; and the public welfare fund is for the peasants' welfare. But the share each of these takes should be worked out with the peasants in a reasonable proportion. Every effort must be made to economise on production costs and management expenses. The accumulation fund and the public welfare fund must also be kept under control; we cannot expect to get all the good things done in a single year.

Except in the event of exceptionally severe natural disasters, we must, on the basis of increased agricultural production, strive to ensure that ninety per cent of cooperative members get a higher income each year than the year before, and that the remaining ten per cent see their income neither rise nor fall; if their income does fall, ways must be found to solve the problem as early as possible.

In short, the state and the factories, the state and the workers, the factories and the workers, the state and the cooperatives, the state and the peasants, the cooperatives and the peasants: all must be taken into account, and we must not attend to one side only. Attending to only one side, whichever it is, is harmful to socialism and harmful to the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is a big question affecting six hundred million people, and education on it must be carried out repeatedly throughout the Party and among the people of the whole country.

V. The relationship between the centre and the localities

The relationship between the centre and the localities is also a contradiction. In resolving this contradiction, what we must pay attention to at present is that, on the premise of consolidating the unified leadership of the centre, we should expand the powers of the localities somewhat, give them more independence, and let them do more things. This will be more favourable to our building a powerful socialist country. Our country is so large, its population so big and its conditions so complex that having initiative from both the centre and the localities is much better than having initiative from only one source. We must not follow the Soviet Union in concentrating everything in the hands of the centre and keeping the localities on so tight a rein that they have no room for flexibility at all.

The centre wants to develop industry, and so do the localities. Even industries directly under the centre still need the help of the localities. As for agriculture and commerce, they depend on the localities even more. In short, if we want to develop socialist construction, we must bring the initiative of the localities into play. If the centre wants to be strong, it must pay attention to the interests of the localities.

At present dozens of hands are meddling in the affairs of the localities, making things hard for them to manage. As soon as a ministry is set up it wants to make revolution, and to make revolution it issues orders. Since the ministries do not find it convenient to give orders to provincial Party committees and provincial people's councils, they link up directly with the departments and bureaus of the provinces and municipalities and give them orders every day. Although these orders are not known to the Party Central Committee or to the State Council, they are all said to come from the centre, and this puts great pressure on the localities. Forms and reports have multiplied to the point of a disaster. This state of affairs must be corrected.

We must promote the practice of consulting the localities in handling affairs. When the Party Central Committee does things, it always consults the localities; it has never rashly issued orders without consulting them. In this respect, I hope the central ministries will pay close attention: on all matters that concern the localities, they must first consult the localities, and issue orders only after agreement has been reached.

The central departments can be divided into two categories. In one category, their leadership can extend right down to the enterprises, and their administrative bodies and enterprises in the localities are supervised by the localities. In the other category, their task is to put forward guiding principles and draw up work plans, while the actual work depends on the localities and is handled by them.

Handling the relationship between the centre and the localities well is a very important question for a big country and a big party like ours. Some capitalist countries also pay great attention to this question. Their system is fundamentally different from ours, but the experience of their development is still worth our study. As for our own experience, the system of big administrative regions we adopted in the early days of the founding of the People's Republic was necessary at the time, but it also had shortcomings, which the Gao Gang–Rao Shushi anti-Party alliance later exploited to some extent. It was correct to decide later on to abolish the big regions and put the provinces directly under the centre. But going from there to abolishing the necessary independence of the localities did not produce such good results either. Our Constitution stipulates that legislative power is concentrated in the centre. But provided they do not go against the policies of the centre, the localities may, according to circumstances and the needs of their work, draw up rules, regulations and measures; the Constitution places no restriction on this. We need unity, and we also need particularity. In order to build a powerful socialist country, we must have strong and unified leadership by the centre, and we must have unified planning and unified discipline throughout the country; disrupting this necessary unity is impermissible. At the same time, we must give full play to the initiative of the localities, and each locality must have the particularity suited to its own conditions. This particularity is not the Gao Gang kind of particularity, but the particularity that is necessary for the interests of the whole and for strengthening national unity.

There is also the question of relations between localities, and what I mean here is mainly relations between higher and lower levels of the localities. The provinces and municipalities have complaints about the central departments; do the prefectures, counties, districts and townships have no complaints about the provinces and municipalities? The centre must take care to bring the initiative of the provinces and municipalities into play, and the provinces and municipalities in turn must take care to bring the initiative of the prefectures, counties, districts and townships into play; in neither case should the lower levels be boxed in too tightly. Of course, comrades at the lower levels must also be told which things must be unified and must not be done arbitrarily. In short, what can and should be unified must be unified, and what cannot and should not be unified must not be forcibly unified. The provinces, municipalities, prefectures, counties, districts and townships should all have proper independence and proper rights, and should all fight for them. This kind of fighting for power, which proceeds from the interests of the nation as a whole and not from departmental interests, cannot be called localism and cannot be called asserting independence.

Relations between one province or municipality and another are also a kind of relation between localities, and they too must be handled well. Our consistent principle has been to advocate taking the overall situation into account, mutual help and mutual accommodation.

In resolving the questions of the relationship between the centre and the localities and between one locality and another, our experience is still limited and immature, and I hope you will study and discuss them carefully, and sum up your experience at regular intervals, building on achievements and overcoming shortcomings.

VI. The relationship between the Han nationality and the minority nationalities

On the relationship between the Han nationality and the minority nationalities, our policy is fairly sound and has fairly well won the approval of the minority nationalities. We put the emphasis on opposing Han chauvinism. Local nationalism must also be opposed, but generally that is not the main thing.

The minority nationalities in our country are small in number but occupy large areas. In terms of population, the Han make up ninety-four per cent, an overwhelming majority. If the Han practised Han chauvinism and discriminated against the minority nationalities, that would be very bad. And who has more land? The minority nationalities have more land, occupying fifty to sixty per cent. We say China is a country vast in territory, rich in resources and large in population, but in fact it is the Han nationality that is "large in population" and the minority nationalities that are "vast in territory and rich in resources"; at the very least, in terms of underground resources, it is quite likely the minority nationalities that are "rich."

All the minority nationalities have contributed to the history of China. The large Han population itself was formed by the intermingling of many nationalities over a long period. The reactionary rulers in history, chiefly the reactionary rulers of Han nationality, created all sorts of estrangement among our various nationalities and bullied the minority nationalities. The effects of this cannot easily be eliminated quickly, even among the working people. So we must carry out education in the proletarian nationality policy extensively and persistently among both cadres and the masses, and we must keep the relationship between the Han nationality and the minority nationalities under regular review. A review was made a couple of years ago, and another should be made now. If relations are found to be abnormal, they must be dealt with seriously and not just talked about.

In the minority nationality areas, we must make a careful study of what system of economic management and what financial system would really be suitable.

We must sincerely and actively help the minority nationalities develop their economic and cultural construction. In the Soviet Union, the relationship between the Russian nation and the minority nationalities is very abnormal, and we should learn from this lesson. The air in the sky, the forests on the earth and the treasures beneath it are all important factors needed for building socialism, but all material factors can be developed and utilised only through the human factor. We must foster good relations between the Han nationality and the minority nationalities and consolidate the unity of all nationalities, so that together we may strive to build our great socialist motherland.

VII. The relationship between the Party and non-Party people

Is it better to have one party or several? As things look now, it is probably better to have several. This has been so in the past, and it may well be so in the future too: long-term coexistence and mutual supervision.

In our country, the many democratic parties, made up mainly of the national bourgeoisie and its intellectuals, which took shape during the struggle against Japan and against Chiang, still continue to exist. In this respect we differ from the Soviet Union. We have deliberately kept the democratic parties, giving them the opportunity to express their views, and adopting towards them a policy of both unity and struggle. We must unite with all democratic personages who offer us criticism in good faith. We should continue to bring into play the initiative of patriotic Kuomintang military and political personnel such as Wei Lihuang and Weng Wenhao. Even those who abuse us, such as Long Yun, Liang Shuming and Peng Yihu, we should keep and feed, and let them abuse us; where their abuse is unreasonable, we refute it, and where it is reasonable, we accept it. This is more advantageous to the Party, to the people and to socialism.

Since there are still classes and class struggle in China today, there are bound to be oppositions of various forms. Although all the democratic parties and democratic personages without party affiliation have declared that they accept the leadership of the Communist Party of China, many of them are in fact oppositions to varying degrees. On such questions as "carrying the revolution through to the end," resisting US aggression and aiding Korea, and land reform, they both opposed and did not oppose. They still have objections to the suppression of counter-revolutionaries even now. They said the Common Programme was wonderful and did not want a socialist-type constitution, but when the Constitution was drafted, they all raised their hands in favour. Things often turn into their opposites, and this is also true of the attitude of the democratic parties on many questions. They are an opposition and also not an opposition, often moving from opposing to not opposing.

The Communist Party and the democratic parties are both products of history. Whatever arises in history will perish in history. Therefore the Communist Party will one day perish, and so will the democratic parties. Is perishing so unpleasant? I think it will be very pleasant. The day when we no longer need the Communist Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat, I think, will be really good. Our task is to hasten their perishing. We have explained this point many times before.

But at present the proletarian party and the dictatorship of the proletariat are absolutely indispensable, and they must continue to be strengthened. Otherwise we could not suppress the counter-revolutionaries, resist imperialism or build socialism, and even if we built it, it could not be consolidated. Lenin's theory of the proletarian party and the dictatorship of the proletariat is by no means "outdated," as some people say. The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot do without a great deal of coercion. But we must oppose bureaucratism and oppose an overstaffed apparatus. On condition that no one dies and no work is left undone, I propose that the Party and government apparatus be thoroughly streamlined and cut by two-thirds.

That said, streamlining the Party and government apparatus does not mean doing away with the democratic parties. I hope you will take united front work in hand, so that their relations with us improve and their initiative is mobilised as far as possible in the service of socialism.

VIII. The relationship between revolution and counter-revolution

What kind of factor is counter-revolution? It is a negative factor, a destructive factor, a force opposed to the positive factors. Can counter-revolutionaries be transformed? Of course, some die-hard counter-revolutionaries will not be transformed. But under the conditions of our country, the majority of them will eventually be transformed to varying degrees. Because we have adopted correct policies, quite a number of counter-revolutionaries have already been remoulded into non-counter-revolutionaries, and some have even done useful things.

There are several points that should be affirmed:

First, it should be affirmed that the suppression of counter-revolutionaries in 1951 and 1952 was necessary. There is a view that this suppression of counter-revolutionaries could have been dispensed with. This view is wrong.

The ways of dealing with counter-revolutionaries are: execution, imprisonment, supervision and release. Everybody knows what execution is. Imprisonment means locking them up and reforming them through labour. Supervision means leaving them in society to be reformed under the supervision of the masses. Release means that those whose arrest is optional are generally not arrested, or that those who have been arrested and behave well are let go. It is necessary to deal with counter-revolutionaries differently according to their different circumstances.

Now I shall speak only of execution. In that campaign to suppress counter-revolutionaries, a number of people were executed. What sort of people were they? They were counter-revolutionaries with heavy blood debts whom the common people hated intensely. In a great revolution of six hundred million people, the people could not have risen up without killing those "local tyrants of the east" and "local tyrants of the west." Had there been no such suppression then, the common people would not approve of the policy of leniency we are adopting today. Now that some people have heard that Stalin wrongly killed some people, they say that the counter-revolutionaries we killed were also wrongly killed. That is not right. To affirm that the killings of the past were basically right has practical significance at present.

Second, it should be affirmed that there are still counter-revolutionaries, but their number has greatly decreased. After the Hu Feng affair came to light, it was necessary to ferret out counter-revolutionaries. Those who have not yet been ferreted out must continue to be ferreted out. It must be affirmed that there is still a small number of counter-revolutionaries who are still carrying out all kinds of counter-revolutionary sabotage, such as killing cattle, burning grain, wrecking factories, stealing intelligence, putting up reactionary posters, and so on. So it is wrong to say that the counter-revolutionaries have been wiped out and that we can sleep soundly. As long as there is class struggle in China and in the world, we must never relax our vigilance. But it is also wrong to say that there are still a great many counter-revolutionaries now.

Third, from now on, in the suppression of counter-revolution in society, there should be fewer arrests and fewer executions. Because the counter-revolutionaries in society are the direct enemies of the common people, who hate them bitterly, a few still have to be executed. Most of them should be handed over to the agricultural cooperatives to be put under control in production and reformed through labour. But we still cannot announce that none will be executed, and we cannot abolish the death penalty.

Fourth, in ferreting out counter-revolutionaries in government offices, schools and army units, we must adhere to the rule that began in Yan'an: execute none and arrest most not. Counter-revolutionaries against whom there is conclusive evidence are investigated by their own organisations, but the public security bureaus do not arrest them, the procuratorates do not prosecute them and the courts do not try them. Out of a hundred counter-revolutionaries, ninety-odd are dealt with in this way. This is what we mean by arresting most not. As for execution, it is execute none.

What kind of people are not to be executed? People like Hu Feng, Pan Hannian and Rao Shushi are not to be executed, and even captured war criminals like the Xuantong Emperor and Kang Ze are not to be executed. Not executing them does not mean that they have committed no crimes deserving death, but that executing them would be disadvantageous. If one such person were executed, a second and a third would be compared with him, and many heads would roll. That is the first reason. The second reason is that we might execute the wrong people. History has proved that once a head falls it cannot be put back on, nor does it grow again like chives after being cut; if you cut the wrong one, there is no way to correct the mistake even if you want to. The third reason is that it would destroy evidence. Suppressing counter-revolutionaries requires evidence. One counter-revolutionary is often living evidence against another, and when a case comes up you can consult him. If you get rid of him, you may never find the evidence again. That would benefit only the counter-revolution, not the revolution. The fourth reason is that executing them would not, first, increase production, second, raise the level of science, third, help eliminate the four pests, fourth, strengthen national defence, or fifth, recover Taiwan. If you execute them, you will get a reputation for killing prisoners, and killing prisoners has always had a bad name. There is one more reason: counter-revolutionaries in government offices are different from counter-revolutionaries in society. The counter-revolutionaries in society ride on the backs of the people, while those in government offices are further removed from the people; they have plenty of general enemies but few direct enemies. What harm is there in executing none of these people? Those who can be reformed through labour should be reformed through labour, and those who cannot should be kept and fed. Counter-revolutionaries are rubbish, they are vermin, but once we have them in our hands, we can make them do some service for the people.

But should we pass a law stating that none of the counter-revolutionaries in government offices will be executed? This is our internal policy; there is no need to announce it, it is enough to carry it out as far as possible in practice. If someone threw a bomb and killed everyone in this room, or half of us, or a third of us, would you say he should be executed or not? Then he must be executed.

Adopting the policy of executing none in the campaign against counter-revolutionaries in government offices does not prevent us from taking a serious attitude towards counter-revolutionaries. But it can ensure that we do not make irretrievable mistakes, and that if we do make mistakes there is a chance to correct them; it can reassure many people and prevent mutual distrust among comrades in the Party. If we do not cut off their heads, we must give them food to eat. All counter-revolutionaries should be given a means of livelihood so that they have a chance to turn over a new leaf. Doing so benefits both the people's cause and our international image.

Suppressing counter-revolution still requires arduous work, and none of us may slacken. From now on, besides continuing to suppress counter-revolutionaries in society, we must continue to ferret out all the counter-revolutionaries hidden in government offices, schools and army units. We must draw a clear line between ourselves and the enemy. Everybody is well aware of how grave a danger it would pose to the cause of socialism and to the dictatorship of the proletariat if the enemy were allowed to infiltrate our ranks, or even our leading bodies.

IX. The relationship between right and wrong

A clear distinction must be drawn between right and wrong, both inside and outside the Party. How to treat people who have made mistakes is an important question. The correct attitude towards comrades who have made mistakes should be to adopt the policy of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient," helping them correct their mistakes and allowing them to go on taking part in the revolution. In the past, when the dogmatists headed by Wang Ming were in power, our Party made mistakes on this question, learning the bad side of Stalin's style of work. In society they would have nothing to do with the intermediate forces, and in the Party they did not allow people to correct their mistakes and did not allow them to make revolution.

*The True Story of Ah Q* is a good story. I advise comrades who have read it to read it again, and those who have not to read it carefully. In this story Lu Xun writes mainly about a backward peasant lacking in political awareness. He devotes a whole chapter, "Not Allowed to Make Revolution," to describing how the Fake Foreign Devil would not allow Ah Q to make revolution. In fact, Ah Q's idea of revolution at the time was nothing more than grabbing a few things like everyone else. Yet even this kind of revolution the Fake Foreign Devil would not allow. It seems to me that in this respect some people are rather like the Fake Foreign Devil. They will not allow people who have made mistakes to make revolution, they draw no line between making mistakes and being counter-revolutionary, and they have even gone so far as to kill some people who made mistakes. We must remember this lesson. Whether it is refusing to let people make revolution in society or refusing to let comrades who have made mistakes correct them in the Party, either is bad.

As for comrades who have made mistakes, some say we should wait and see whether they correct them. I say just waiting and seeing is not enough; we must also help them correct them. That is to say, first we see, and second we help. People need help; people who have not made mistakes need help, and people who have made mistakes need it all the more. There is probably no one who does not make mistakes; everyone makes mistakes to a greater or lesser degree, and when they do they need help. Just watching is passive; we must create all kinds of conditions to help them change. Right and wrong must be made clear, for disputes over principle within the Party are a reflection within the Party of the class struggle in society, and no ambiguity is permissible. According to the circumstances, it is normal to make well-judged and realistic criticism of comrades who have made mistakes, and even to wage necessary struggle against them, so as to help them correct their mistakes. To give comrades who have made mistakes no help and instead to gloat over their misfortune is sectarianism.

For the revolution, it is always better to have more people. Apart from a very few who persist in their mistakes and refuse to mend their ways after repeated education, the majority of those who have made mistakes can correct them. Just as people who have had typhoid become immune, people who have made mistakes can make fewer mistakes provided they are good at learning from them. On the contrary, it is those who have never made mistakes who are prone to make them, because they easily get cocky. We must be careful: going too far in dealing with people who have made mistakes often backfires on oneself. Gao Gang meant to pick up a stone to hit others, but ended up knocking himself down. Treating people who have made mistakes with good will can win people's hearts and unite people. Whether one adopts a helpful or a hostile attitude towards comrades who have made mistakes is one criterion for telling whether a person's intentions are good or bad.

The policy of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient" is the policy for uniting the whole Party, and we must adhere to it.

X. The relationship between China and other countries

We have put forward the slogan of learning from other countries, and I think it was right to do so. Now the leaders of some countries are unwilling, or even afraid, to put forward this slogan. This takes a bit of courage; it means dropping the airs one puts on on the stage.

It must be admitted that every nation has its strong points; otherwise how could it survive? How could it develop? At the same time, every nation also has its weak points. Some people think that socialism is just marvellous and has no defects at all. How can that be? It must be admitted that there are always two points, strengths and shortcomings. The secretaries of our Party branches and the company and platoon leaders in the army all know to write in their little notebooks that today's summing-up of experience has two points: one is strengths and the other is shortcomings. They all know there are two points, so why do we mention only one? There will be two points ten thousand years from now. The future will have the future's two points, the present has the present's two points, and each person has his own two points. In a word, there are two points and not just one. To say there is only one is to know the one but not the other.

Our policy is to learn from the strong points of all nations and all countries, to learn everything that is genuinely good in politics, economics, science, technology, literature and art. But we must learn analytically and critically, not blindly; we must not copy everything indiscriminately or transplant things mechanically. Their weak points and defects, of course, we should not learn.

We should adopt the same attitude towards the experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In the past some of us were not clear about this and even learned other people's weak points. Just when they were feeling pleased with what they had learned, the others had already discarded it, and as a result they took a tumble, somersaulting like the Monkey King. For example, in the past some people said that we had made a mistake of principle because the Soviet Union had a Ministry of Cinematography and a Bureau of Culture while we had a Ministry of Culture and a Bureau of Cinematography. They did not foresee that before long the Soviet Union would also set up a Ministry of Culture, just like us. Some people do not analyse anything at all and simply follow the "wind." Today the north wind blows, and they belong to the north-wind faction; tomorrow the west wind blows, and they belong to the west-wind faction; then the north wind blows again, and they belong to the north-wind faction again. They have no views of their own at all and often swing from one extreme to the other.

In the Soviet Union, those who once extolled Stalin ten thousand zhang high have now in one stroke cast him nine thousand zhang underground. Some people in our country have followed suit. The Central Committee holds that Stalin's record is three parts mistakes and seven parts achievements, and that on the whole he was still a great Marxist; it was in line with this assessment that we wrote "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." This assessment of three to seven is fairly appropriate. Stalin did some wrong things to China. The "Left" adventurism of Wang Ming in the latter part of the Second Revolutionary Civil War and his Right opportunism in the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japan both came from Stalin. During the War of Liberation, first he would not allow us to make revolution, saying that if civil war broke out the Chinese nation would be in danger of destruction. When the fighting started, he half believed and half doubted us. When we won, he suspected that ours was a Tito-type victory, and in 1949 and 1950 he put great pressure on us. Even so, we still hold that his record is three parts mistakes and seven parts achievements. This is fair.

In the social sciences and in Marxism-Leninism, we must continue to study diligently what Stalin said correctly. What we must learn is what belongs to universal truth, and learning must be integrated with China's actual conditions. If every sentence, including Marx's, had to be copied mechanically, it would be terrible. Our theory is the integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. Some people in the Party engaged in dogmatism for a time, and we criticised it then. But it still exists now. There is still dogmatism both in academic circles and in economic circles.

In the natural sciences we are rather backward, and here we must make a special effort to learn from other countries. But we must learn critically, not blindly. In technology, I think most things should be done as they do them at first, because we do not have them yet and do not understand them, and it is more advantageous to learn them. But in the areas we already understand clearly, we should not follow them in everything.

We must firmly reject and criticise all the decadent systems, ideas and ways of the foreign bourgeoisie. But this does not prevent us from learning the advanced science and technology of capitalist countries and whatever is scientific in their methods of enterprise management. Enterprises in industrially developed countries employ few people, are highly efficient and know how to do business; all these things we should learn well, on principle, so as to improve our work. Nowadays, those who have studied English no longer study it further, and academic papers are no longer translated into English, French, German or Japanese for exchange with others. This too is a kind of blind faith. To reject foreign science, technology and culture wholesale without analysis, like the wholesale, unanalysed copying of foreign things mentioned earlier, is not a Marxist attitude, and both are harmful to our cause.

In my view, China has two weak points, which are at the same time two strong points.

First, our country was formerly a colony and semi-colony, not an imperialist power, and was always bullied by others. Our industry and agriculture are undeveloped and our scientific and technological level is low; apart from being vast in territory, rich in resources and large in population, having a long history, and having *A Dream of Red Mansions* in literature and so on, we are inferior to others in many respects and have nothing to be proud of. But some people have been slaves so long that they feel inferior in everything and cannot straighten their backs in the presence of foreigners. They are like Jia Gui in *The Famen Temple*, who, when invited to sit down, said he was used to standing and did not want to sit. Here we need to boost our spirits, raise our national self-confidence, and develop the spirit of "despising US imperialism" that was promoted during the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.

Second, our revolution came late. Although the Revolution of 1911, which overthrew the emperor, came earlier than the Russian revolution, there was no Communist Party at that time and that revolution failed. The victory of the people's revolution came in 1949, more than thirty years after the October Revolution in the Soviet Union. In this respect too, it is not our turn to be proud. The Soviet Union is different from us: first, tsarist Russia was an imperialist power, and second, it later had the October Revolution. So many Soviet people are very proud and very cocky.

These two weak points of ours are also strong points. I once said that we are, first, "poor" and, second, "blank." "Poor" means that we do not have much industry and our agriculture is undeveloped. "Blank" means that we are like a blank sheet of paper, and our cultural and scientific levels are not high. From the point of view of development, this is not a bad thing. The poor want revolution, whereas it is difficult for the rich to make revolution. Countries with a high scientific and technological level are very conceited. We are a blank sheet of paper, which is just right for writing on.

So both these points are to our advantage. In the future, when our country is prosperous and strong, we must still hold to the revolutionary stand, remain modest and prudent, keep learning from others, and not get cocky. We must learn from others not only during the First Five-Year Plan but also after dozens of five-year plans. We must keep learning even ten thousand years from now! What is wrong with that?

I have spoken on ten points in all. These ten relationships are all contradictions. The world is made up of contradictions. Without contradictions there would be no world. Our task is to handle these contradictions correctly. As to whether these contradictions can be handled entirely well in practice, we must be prepared for both possibilities; moreover, in the course of handling them we are bound to run into new contradictions and new problems. But, as we often say, the road is always tortuous and the future is always bright. We must strive to mobilise all positive factors, inside and outside the Party, at home and abroad, direct and indirect, and build our country into a powerful socialist state.