The Great Victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea and the Tasks Ahead
Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China
- Context
- Mao addressed an audience of listeners, apparently in China, on or around September 12, 1953, assessing the victory in the Korean War, its significance, and the priority of heavy industry over immediate improvements in livelihood.
- Main themes
- Victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, people's war and mass initiative, reasons the US agreed to make peace, Chinese military experience against US forces, postponement of a new imperialist war, minor versus major benevolent government, heavy industry construction, agricultural tax burden, cost of the Korean War, criticism of those who stress peasants' immediate interests, Yan'an precedent of 1941 public grain levy
- Duration
- ~18 min
- Words
- 2,172
- Sentences
- 128
- Readability
- 57
- Grade
- 9.5
- Syntax
- 2.73
- Vocabulary
- 2.03
Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other128 sentences in 29 paragraphs
The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea has, after three years, won a great victory, and it has now come to a close.
What did the victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea depend on? Just now several of you gentlemen said it was due to correct leadership. Leadership is one factor; without correct leadership, things cannot be done well. But the main reason is that our war was a people's war, supported by the people of the whole country, with the peoples of China and Korea fighting shoulder to shoulder.
We fought an enemy like US imperialism, whose weapons are many times stronger than ours, and yet we were able to win and force them to come to terms. Why were they willing to make peace?
First, militarily, the American aggressors were in an unfavourable position, a position of taking a beating. If they had not made peace, their whole front would have been broken, and Seoul might have fallen into the hands of the Korean people. This situation could already be seen beginning last summer.
Both sides in the fighting called their own front line a wall of bronze and iron. On our side, it truly was a wall of bronze and iron. Our fighters and cadres were resourceful, brave and unafraid of death. The American aggressor troops, however, were afraid of death, and their officers were rather rigid, not so flexible. Their front was not solid; it was no wall of bronze and iron.
The problems that arose on our side were, at first, whether we could fight; later, whether we could hold our positions; then, whether we could guarantee supplies; and finally, whether we could defeat germ warfare. These four problems, one after another, were all solved. Our army grew stronger the more it fought. This summer, we were already able to break through enemy positions twenty-one kilometres wide on the front within one hour, to concentrate fire of several hundred thousand shells, and to drive in eighteen kilometres. If we had kept fighting like this, hitting them two, three, four more times, the enemy's entire front would have been broken.
Second, politically, the enemy had many contradictions within its own camp that it could not resolve, and the people of the whole world demanded peace.
Third, economically, the enemy spent a great deal of money on the war of aggression against Korea, and its budget was out of balance.
These several reasons combined forced the enemy to make peace. And the first reason was the main one; without it, it would not have been easy to make peace with them. The US imperialists are very arrogant; wherever they can refuse to be reasonable, they will certainly refuse, and if they are a little reasonable, it is because they have been forced into it and have no other choice.
In the Korean War the enemy suffered 1,090,000 casualties. Of course, we paid a price as well. But our casualties were far fewer than originally expected, and after we had tunnels, our casualties were even fewer. The more we fought, the stronger we became. The Americans could not take our positions; on the contrary, they were always being eaten up by us.
Just now everyone spoke of the factor of leadership. I say leadership is one factor, but the most important factor is the masses finding ways. Our cadres and fighters came up with all kinds of methods of fighting. Let me give an example. In the first month of the war, our losses of motor vehicles were very heavy. What were we to do? Apart from the leadership finding ways, we relied mainly on the masses to find ways. More than ten thousand people were posted as sentries along both sides of the roads; when planes came, they fired signal flares, and when the drivers heard them they steered clear, or found a place to hide their vehicles. At the same time, the roads were widened and many new roads were built, so that vehicles could drive back and forth without obstruction. In this way, vehicle losses fell from forty per cent at the start to a fraction of one per cent. Later, underground warehouses were built, and underground auditoriums were built too; the enemy dropped bombs above, and we held big meetings below. Some of us living in Beijing feel that the Korean battlefield must be quite dangerous whenever we think of it. Of course there was danger, but as long as everyone found ways, it was not such a big deal.
Our experience is this: by relying on the people, plus a fairly correct leadership, we can defeat an enemy with superior equipment using our inferior equipment.
The victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea is a great one and of very important significance.
First, together with the Korean people, we fought our way back to the 38th parallel and held the 38th parallel. This is very important. If we had not fought back to the 38th parallel and the front line were still at the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, the people of places like Shenyang, Anshan and Fushun could not have carried on production with peace of mind.
Second, we gained military experience. The army, air force and navy of our Chinese People's Volunteers, the infantry, artillery, engineers, tank troops, railway troops, anti-aircraft troops and signal troops, as well as the medical units, logistics units and so on, gained experience of actual combat against the American aggressor forces. This time, we got the measure of the American army. If you have no contact with the American army, you will be afraid of it. We fought it for thirty-three months and came to know its measure thoroughly. US imperialism is nothing to be afraid of; that's all there is to it. We gained this experience, and it is a tremendous experience.
Third, the political consciousness of the people of the whole country was raised.
Because of the above three points, a fourth arose: a new imperialist war of aggression against China has been postponed, and a third world war has been postponed.
The imperialist aggressors should understand: the Chinese people are now organized and are not to be trifled with. If they are provoked, things will not be easy to handle.
In future the enemy may still fight; and even if it does not, it will certainly use all kinds of methods to make trouble, for example sending in spies to carry out sabotage. They have huge spy organizations in places like Taiwan, Hong Kong and Japan. But we have gained experience in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea: as long as we mobilize the masses and rely on the people, we have ways of dealing with them.
Our situation now is different from that of the winter of 1950. At that time, were the American aggressors on the other side of the 38th parallel? No, they were on the other side of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. Did we have experience of fighting the American aggressors? No. Were we familiar with the American army? No. Now all of this has changed. If US imperialism does not postpone a new war of aggression, if it says, I want to fight! then we will deal with it using the first three points. If it says, I won't fight! then we have the fourth point. This also proves the superiority of our people's democratic dictatorship.
Are we going to commit aggression against others? We will not commit aggression anywhere. But if others come to commit aggression against us, we will certainly fight, and fight to the end.
The Chinese people have this principle: we are in favour of peace, and we are not afraid of war; we can do either. We have the support of the people. During the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, people eagerly signed up to join the army. Those who signed up were selected very strictly, one out of a hundred; people said it was stricter than choosing a son-in-law. If US imperialism wants to fight again, we will fight it again.
Fighting a war takes money. But the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea did not cost all that much money. Fighting these few years used up less than one year's industrial and commercial taxes. Of course, it would be even better if we could avoid fighting and not spend this money, because construction needs money now, and the peasants' lives are still hard. The agricultural tax collected last year and the year before was a bit heavy, so some of our friends spoke up. They demanded that we "practise benevolent government", as if they represented the interests of the peasants. Do we agree with this view? We do not. At that time, every effort had to be made to win victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. For the peasants, for the people of the whole country, which was in their interest: to put up with a little temporary hardship in their lives and win victory, or not to resist US aggression and aid Korea and not spend this bit of money? Of course, winning victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea was in their interest. Last year and the year before, we collected a bit more agricultural tax precisely because the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea needed money. This year is different; the agricultural tax has not been increased, and we have stabilized the amount.
As for "practising benevolent government", we do want to practise benevolent government. But what is the greatest benevolent government? It is resisting US aggression and aiding Korea. To practise this greatest benevolent government, there must be sacrifice, money must be spent, and more agricultural tax must be collected. When a bit more agricultural tax is collected, some people squawk and say that they represent the interests of the peasants. I do not agree with this view.
Resisting US aggression and aiding Korea is practising benevolent government, and developing industrial construction now is also practising benevolent government.
There are two kinds of so-called benevolent government: one is for the people's immediate interests, the other for the people's long-term interests, for example resisting US aggression and aiding Korea, and building heavy industry. The former is minor benevolent government, the latter is major benevolent government. Both must be taken into account; failing to take both into account is wrong. Then where should the emphasis be placed? The emphasis should be placed on major benevolent government. At present, the emphasis of our benevolent government should be on building heavy industry. Construction requires capital. Therefore, although the people's livelihood must be improved, it cannot be improved very much for the time being. That is to say, the people's livelihood must not go unimproved, but cannot be improved too much; it must not be neglected, but cannot be attended to too much. Attending to minor benevolent government to the detriment of major benevolent government is a deviation in practising benevolent government.
Some friends now one-sidedly stress minor benevolent government; in fact, what they want is for the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea to stop and for the construction of heavy industry not to go ahead. We must criticize this erroneous thinking. This thinking exists within the Communist Party as well; we ran into it in Yan'an. In 1941, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region levied 200,000 dan of public grain, and some people squawked, saying the Communist Party was not considerate of the peasants. Individual leading cadres of the Communist Party also raised the so-called question of practising benevolent government. At that time I criticized this thinking. What was the greatest benevolent government then? It was defeating Japanese imperialism. If less public grain had been levied, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army would have had to be reduced, which would have benefited Japanese imperialism. So this view in fact represented Japanese imperialism and helped Japanese imperialism.
Now the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea has come to a close, but if America still wants to fight, we will still fight. To fight, we must levy grain, we must do work among the peasants and persuade them to contribute something. This is truly representing the interests of the peasants. Squawking in fact represents US imperialism.
Among principles there are major principles and minor principles. The living standard of the people of the whole country should rise a step each year, but it cannot be raised too high. If it were raised too much, the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea could not have been fought, or could not have been fought so earnestly. We fought thoroughly, earnestly and with all our strength; as long as we had it, whatever the Korean front needed, we gave. These past few years, that is exactly what we have done.
The original Chinese. The tags above are read on the English translation's sentences.
抗美援朝,经过三年,取得了伟大胜利,现在已经告一个段落。
抗美援朝的胜利是靠什么得来的呢?刚才各位先生说,是由于领导的正确。领导是一个因素,没有正确的领导,事情是做不好的。但主要是因为我们的战争是人民战争,全国人民支援,中朝两国人民并肩战斗。
我们同美帝国主义这样的敌人作战,他们的武器比我们强许多倍,而我们能够打胜,迫使他们不能不和下来。为什么能够和下来呢?
第一,军事方面,美国侵略者处于不利状态,挨打状态。如果不和,它的整个战线就要被打破,汉城就可能落入朝鲜人民之手。这种形势,去年夏季就已经开始看出来了。
作战的双方,都把自己的战线称为铜墙铁壁。在我们这方面,确实是铜墙铁壁。我们的战士和干部机智,勇敢,不怕死。而美国侵略军却怕死,他们的军官也比较呆板,不那么灵活。他们的战线不巩固,并不是铜墙铁壁。
我们方面发生的问题,最初是能不能打,后来是能不能守,再后是能不能保证给养,最后是能不能打破细菌战。这四个问题,一个接着一个,都解决了。我们的军队是越战越强。今年夏天,我们已经能够在一小时内打破敌人正面二十一公里的阵地,能够集中发射几十万发炮弹,能够打进去十八公里。如果照这样打下去,再打它两次、三次、四次,敌人的整个战线就会被打破。
第二,政治方面,敌人内部有许多不能解决的矛盾,全世界人民要求和下来。
第三,经济方面,敌人在侵朝战争中用钱很多,它的预算收支不平衡。
这几个原因合起来,使敌人不得不和。而第一个原因是主要的原因,没有这一条,同他们讲和是不容易的。美帝国主义者很傲慢,凡是可以不讲理的地方就一定不讲理,要是讲一点理的话,那是被逼得不得已了。
在朝鲜战争中,敌人伤亡了一百零九万人。当然,我们也付了代价。但是我们的伤亡比原来预料的要少得多,有了坑道以后,伤亡就更少了。我们越打越强。美国人攻不动我们的阵地,相反,他们总是被我们吃掉。
刚才大家讲到领导这个因素,我说领导是一个因素,而最主要的因素是群众想办法。我们的干部和战士想出了各种打仗的办法。我讲一个例子。战争的头一个月,我们的汽车损失很大。怎么办呢?除了领导想办法以外,主要是靠群众想办法。在汽车路两旁用一万多人站岗,飞机来了就打信号枪,司机听到就躲着走,或者找个地方把汽车藏起来。同时,把汽车路加宽,又修了许多新汽车路,汽车开过来开过去,畅行无阻。这样,汽车的损失就由开始时的百分之四十,减少到百分之零点几。后来,地下仓库修起来了,地下礼堂也修起来了,敌人在上面丢炸弹,我们在下面开大会。我们住在北京的一些人,一想到朝鲜战场,就感到相当危险。当然,危险是有的,但只要大家想办法,并不是那么了不起。
我们的经验是:依靠人民,再加上一个比较正确的领导,就可以用我们的劣势装备战胜优势装备的敌人。
抗美援朝战争的胜利是伟大的,是有很重要意义的。
第一,和朝鲜人民一起,打回到三八线,守住了三八线。这是很重要的。如果不打回三八线,前线仍在鸭绿江和图们江,沈阳、鞍山、抚顺这些地方的人民就不能安心生产。
第二,取得了军事经验。我们中国人民志愿军的陆军、空军、海军,步兵、炮兵、工兵、坦克兵、铁道兵、防空兵、通信兵,还有卫生部队、后勤部队等等,取得了对美国侵略军队实际作战的经验。这一次,我们摸了一下美国军队的底。对美国军队,如果不接触它,就会怕它。我们跟它打了三十三个月,把它的底摸熟了。美帝国主义并不可怕,就是那么一回事。我们取得了这一条经验,这是一条了不起的经验。
第三,提高了全国人民的政治觉悟。
由于以上三条,就产生了第四条:推迟了帝国主义新的侵华战争,推迟了第三次世界大战。
帝国主义侵略者应当懂得:现在中国人民已经组织起来了,是惹不得的。如果惹翻了,是不好办的。
今后,敌人还可能打,就是不打,也一定要用各种办法来捣乱,比如派遣特务进行破坏。他们在台湾、香港和日本这些地方,都设有庞大的特务机构。可是,我们在抗美援朝中得到了经验,只要发动群众,依靠人民,我们是有办法来对付他们的。
我们现在的情况,同一九五〇年冬季的情况不同了。那时候,美国侵略者是不是在三八线那边呢?不是,他们是在鸭绿江、图们江那边。我们有没有对美国侵略者作战的经验呢?没有。对于美国军队熟悉不熟悉呢?不熟悉。现在这些情况都变了。如果美帝国主义不推迟新的侵略战争,他说,我要打!我们就用前三条对付他。如果他说,我不打了!那末我们就有了第四条。这也证明我们人民民主专政的优越性。
我们是不是去侵略别人呢?任何地方我们都不去侵略。但是,人家侵略来了,我们就一定要打,而且要打到底。
中国人民有这么一条:和平是赞成的,战争也不怕,两样都可以干。我们有人民的支持。在抗美援朝战争中,人民踊跃报名参军。对报名参军的人挑得很严,百里挑一,人们说比挑女婿还严。如果美帝国主义要再打,我们就跟它再打下去。
打仗要用钱。可是,抗美援朝战争用的钱也不十分多。打了这几年,用了还不到一年的工商业税。当然,能够不打仗,不用这些钱,那就更好。因为现在建设方面要用钱,农民的生活也还有困难。去年、前年收的农业税重了一点,于是有一部分朋友就说话了。他们要求“施仁政”,好象他们代表农民利益似的。我们赞成不赞成这种意见呢?我们是不赞成的。当时,必须尽一切努力来争取抗美援朝的胜利。对农民说来,对全国人民说来,是生活暂时困难一点,争取胜利对他们有利,还是不抗美援朝,不用这几个钱对他们有利呢?当然,争取抗美援朝的胜利对他们有利。去年和前年,我们多收了一点农业税,就是因为抗美援朝要用钱。今年就不同了,农业税没有增加,我们把税额稳定下来了。
说到“施仁政”,我们是要施仁政的。但是,什么是最大的仁政呢?是抗美援朝。要施这个最大的仁政,就要有牺牲,就要用钱,就要多收些农业税。多收一些农业税,有些人就哇哇叫,还说什么他们是代表农民利益。我就不赞成这种意见。
抗美援朝是施仁政,现在发展工业建设也是施仁政。
所谓仁政有两种:一种是为人民的当前利益,另一种是为人民的长远利益,例如抗美援朝,建设重工业。前一种是小仁政,后一种是大仁政。两者必须兼顾,不兼顾是错误的。那末重点放在什么地方呢?重点应当放在大仁政上。现在,我们施仁政的重点应当放在建设重工业上。要建设,就要资金。所以,人民的生活虽然要改善,但一时又不能改善很多。就是说,人民生活不可不改善,不可多改善;不可不照顾,不可多照顾。照顾小仁政,妨碍大仁政,这是施仁政的偏向。
有的朋友现在片面强调小仁政,其实就是要抗美援朝战争别打了,重工业建设别干了。我们必须批评这种错误思想。这种思想共产党里边也有,在延安就碰到过。一九四一年,陕甘宁边区征了二十万石公粮,一些人就哇哇叫,说共产党不体贴农民。共产党的个别领导干部也提出所谓施仁政问题。那时我就批评了这种思想。当时最大的仁政是什么呢?是打倒日本帝国主义。如果少征公粮,就要缩小八路军、新四军,那是对日本帝国主义有利的。所以,这种意见,实际上是代表日本帝国主义、帮日本帝国主义忙的。
现在,抗美援朝已经告一段落,如果美国还要打,我们还是打。要打就要征粮,就要在农民中做工作,说服农民出点东西。这才是真正代表农民的利益。哇哇叫,实际上是代表美帝国主义。
道理有大道理,有小道理。全国人民的生活水平每年应当提高一步,但是不能提得太高。如果提得过多,抗美援朝战争就不能打了,或者不能那样认真地打。我们是彻底地认真地全力地打,只要我们有,朝鲜前线要什么就给什么。这几年,我们就是这样干的。