The Great Victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea and the Tasks Ahead

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China

12 September 1953

Context
Mao addressed an audience of listeners, apparently in China, on or around September 12, 1953, assessing the victory in the Korean War, its significance, and the priority of heavy industry over immediate improvements in livelihood.
Main themes
Victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, people's war and mass initiative, reasons the US agreed to make peace, Chinese military experience against US forces, postponement of a new imperialist war, minor versus major benevolent government, heavy industry construction, agricultural tax burden, cost of the Korean War, criticism of those who stress peasants' immediate interests, Yan'an precedent of 1941 public grain levy
Duration
~18 min
61st percentile
Words
2,172
61st percentile
Sentences
128
74th percentile
Readability
57
80th percentile
Grade
9.5
16th percentile
Syntax
2.73
15th percentile
Vocabulary
2.03
14th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 58%58%
  • Economic 20%20%
  • Institutional 13%13%
  • Social 6%6%
  • Ceremonial 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

128 sentences in 29 paragraphs

The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea has, after three years, won a great victory, and it has now come to a close.

What did the victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea depend on? Just now several of you gentlemen said it was due to correct leadership. Leadership is one factor; without correct leadership, things cannot be done well. But the main reason is that our war was a people's war, supported by the people of the whole country, with the peoples of China and Korea fighting shoulder to shoulder.

We fought an enemy like US imperialism, whose weapons are many times stronger than ours, and yet we were able to win and force them to come to terms. Why were they willing to make peace?

First, militarily, the American aggressors were in an unfavourable position, a position of taking a beating. If they had not made peace, their whole front would have been broken, and Seoul might have fallen into the hands of the Korean people. This situation could already be seen beginning last summer.

Both sides in the fighting called their own front line a wall of bronze and iron. On our side, it truly was a wall of bronze and iron. Our fighters and cadres were resourceful, brave and unafraid of death. The American aggressor troops, however, were afraid of death, and their officers were rather rigid, not so flexible. Their front was not solid; it was no wall of bronze and iron.

The problems that arose on our side were, at first, whether we could fight; later, whether we could hold our positions; then, whether we could guarantee supplies; and finally, whether we could defeat germ warfare. These four problems, one after another, were all solved. Our army grew stronger the more it fought. This summer, we were already able to break through enemy positions twenty-one kilometres wide on the front within one hour, to concentrate fire of several hundred thousand shells, and to drive in eighteen kilometres. If we had kept fighting like this, hitting them two, three, four more times, the enemy's entire front would have been broken.

Second, politically, the enemy had many contradictions within its own camp that it could not resolve, and the people of the whole world demanded peace.

Third, economically, the enemy spent a great deal of money on the war of aggression against Korea, and its budget was out of balance.

These several reasons combined forced the enemy to make peace. And the first reason was the main one; without it, it would not have been easy to make peace with them. The US imperialists are very arrogant; wherever they can refuse to be reasonable, they will certainly refuse, and if they are a little reasonable, it is because they have been forced into it and have no other choice.

In the Korean War the enemy suffered 1,090,000 casualties. Of course, we paid a price as well. But our casualties were far fewer than originally expected, and after we had tunnels, our casualties were even fewer. The more we fought, the stronger we became. The Americans could not take our positions; on the contrary, they were always being eaten up by us.

Just now everyone spoke of the factor of leadership. I say leadership is one factor, but the most important factor is the masses finding ways. Our cadres and fighters came up with all kinds of methods of fighting. Let me give an example. In the first month of the war, our losses of motor vehicles were very heavy. What were we to do? Apart from the leadership finding ways, we relied mainly on the masses to find ways. More than ten thousand people were posted as sentries along both sides of the roads; when planes came, they fired signal flares, and when the drivers heard them they steered clear, or found a place to hide their vehicles. At the same time, the roads were widened and many new roads were built, so that vehicles could drive back and forth without obstruction. In this way, vehicle losses fell from forty per cent at the start to a fraction of one per cent. Later, underground warehouses were built, and underground auditoriums were built too; the enemy dropped bombs above, and we held big meetings below. Some of us living in Beijing feel that the Korean battlefield must be quite dangerous whenever we think of it. Of course there was danger, but as long as everyone found ways, it was not such a big deal.

Our experience is this: by relying on the people, plus a fairly correct leadership, we can defeat an enemy with superior equipment using our inferior equipment.

The victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea is a great one and of very important significance.

First, together with the Korean people, we fought our way back to the 38th parallel and held the 38th parallel. This is very important. If we had not fought back to the 38th parallel and the front line were still at the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, the people of places like Shenyang, Anshan and Fushun could not have carried on production with peace of mind.

Second, we gained military experience. The army, air force and navy of our Chinese People's Volunteers, the infantry, artillery, engineers, tank troops, railway troops, anti-aircraft troops and signal troops, as well as the medical units, logistics units and so on, gained experience of actual combat against the American aggressor forces. This time, we got the measure of the American army. If you have no contact with the American army, you will be afraid of it. We fought it for thirty-three months and came to know its measure thoroughly. US imperialism is nothing to be afraid of; that's all there is to it. We gained this experience, and it is a tremendous experience.

Third, the political consciousness of the people of the whole country was raised.

Because of the above three points, a fourth arose: a new imperialist war of aggression against China has been postponed, and a third world war has been postponed.

The imperialist aggressors should understand: the Chinese people are now organized and are not to be trifled with. If they are provoked, things will not be easy to handle.

In future the enemy may still fight; and even if it does not, it will certainly use all kinds of methods to make trouble, for example sending in spies to carry out sabotage. They have huge spy organizations in places like Taiwan, Hong Kong and Japan. But we have gained experience in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea: as long as we mobilize the masses and rely on the people, we have ways of dealing with them.

Our situation now is different from that of the winter of 1950. At that time, were the American aggressors on the other side of the 38th parallel? No, they were on the other side of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. Did we have experience of fighting the American aggressors? No. Were we familiar with the American army? No. Now all of this has changed. If US imperialism does not postpone a new war of aggression, if it says, I want to fight! then we will deal with it using the first three points. If it says, I won't fight! then we have the fourth point. This also proves the superiority of our people's democratic dictatorship.

Are we going to commit aggression against others? We will not commit aggression anywhere. But if others come to commit aggression against us, we will certainly fight, and fight to the end.

The Chinese people have this principle: we are in favour of peace, and we are not afraid of war; we can do either. We have the support of the people. During the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, people eagerly signed up to join the army. Those who signed up were selected very strictly, one out of a hundred; people said it was stricter than choosing a son-in-law. If US imperialism wants to fight again, we will fight it again.

Fighting a war takes money. But the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea did not cost all that much money. Fighting these few years used up less than one year's industrial and commercial taxes. Of course, it would be even better if we could avoid fighting and not spend this money, because construction needs money now, and the peasants' lives are still hard. The agricultural tax collected last year and the year before was a bit heavy, so some of our friends spoke up. They demanded that we "practise benevolent government", as if they represented the interests of the peasants. Do we agree with this view? We do not. At that time, every effort had to be made to win victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. For the peasants, for the people of the whole country, which was in their interest: to put up with a little temporary hardship in their lives and win victory, or not to resist US aggression and aid Korea and not spend this bit of money? Of course, winning victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea was in their interest. Last year and the year before, we collected a bit more agricultural tax precisely because the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea needed money. This year is different; the agricultural tax has not been increased, and we have stabilized the amount.

As for "practising benevolent government", we do want to practise benevolent government. But what is the greatest benevolent government? It is resisting US aggression and aiding Korea. To practise this greatest benevolent government, there must be sacrifice, money must be spent, and more agricultural tax must be collected. When a bit more agricultural tax is collected, some people squawk and say that they represent the interests of the peasants. I do not agree with this view.

Resisting US aggression and aiding Korea is practising benevolent government, and developing industrial construction now is also practising benevolent government.

There are two kinds of so-called benevolent government: one is for the people's immediate interests, the other for the people's long-term interests, for example resisting US aggression and aiding Korea, and building heavy industry. The former is minor benevolent government, the latter is major benevolent government. Both must be taken into account; failing to take both into account is wrong. Then where should the emphasis be placed? The emphasis should be placed on major benevolent government. At present, the emphasis of our benevolent government should be on building heavy industry. Construction requires capital. Therefore, although the people's livelihood must be improved, it cannot be improved very much for the time being. That is to say, the people's livelihood must not go unimproved, but cannot be improved too much; it must not be neglected, but cannot be attended to too much. Attending to minor benevolent government to the detriment of major benevolent government is a deviation in practising benevolent government.

Some friends now one-sidedly stress minor benevolent government; in fact, what they want is for the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea to stop and for the construction of heavy industry not to go ahead. We must criticize this erroneous thinking. This thinking exists within the Communist Party as well; we ran into it in Yan'an. In 1941, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region levied 200,000 dan of public grain, and some people squawked, saying the Communist Party was not considerate of the peasants. Individual leading cadres of the Communist Party also raised the so-called question of practising benevolent government. At that time I criticized this thinking. What was the greatest benevolent government then? It was defeating Japanese imperialism. If less public grain had been levied, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army would have had to be reduced, which would have benefited Japanese imperialism. So this view in fact represented Japanese imperialism and helped Japanese imperialism.

Now the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea has come to a close, but if America still wants to fight, we will still fight. To fight, we must levy grain, we must do work among the peasants and persuade them to contribute something. This is truly representing the interests of the peasants. Squawking in fact represents US imperialism.

Among principles there are major principles and minor principles. The living standard of the people of the whole country should rise a step each year, but it cannot be raised too high. If it were raised too much, the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea could not have been fought, or could not have been fought so earnestly. We fought thoroughly, earnestly and with all our strength; as long as we had it, whatever the Korean front needed, we gave. These past few years, that is exactly what we have done.