Strengthen the Unity of the Party and Carry On Its Traditions

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

30 August 1956 · Preparatory Meeting for the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China

Context
Mao addressed the preparatory meeting of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on August 30, 1956, urging Party unity, continuation of Party traditions and the re-election of Wang Ming and Li Lisan to the Central Committee.
Main themes
Unity of the Party and of all forces at home and abroad, building a great socialist China, catching up with the United States in steel output, subjectivism and sectarianism, assessment of Stalin's mistakes, relations with the Soviet Union, size and election of the Eighth Central Committee, electing Wang Ming and Li Lisan, petty bourgeoisie and vacillating intellectuals in the Party, summing up experience since the Seventh Congress
Duration
~42 min
91st percentile
Words
5,005
91st percentile
Sentences
249
93rd percentile
Readability
59
85th percentile
Grade
10.0
21st percentile
Syntax
2.99
46th percentile
Vocabulary
2.06
19th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 48%48%
  • Geopolitical 20%20%
  • Social 16%16%
  • Economic 12%12%
  • Ceremonial 3%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 0%

249 sentences in 21 paragraphs

Today we are opening the preparatory meeting of the Eighth National Congress. The preparatory meeting will last a little over ten days, and the main things to be done are, first, to prepare the documents of the Congress; second, to carry out the preliminary election of the Central Committee; and third, to prepare the speeches to be delivered at the Congress.

Now I will make a few points.

The first point concerns the aim and purpose of the Congress. What problems is this Congress to solve, and what aims is it to achieve? Generally speaking, it is to sum up the experience gained since the Seventh Congress, to unite the whole Party, to unite all forces at home and abroad that can be united, and to strive to build a great socialist China.

As for summing up experience, our experience is very rich, but we cannot list a great many things; rather, we must grasp the key points, proceed from reality, and sum them up from the Marxist point of view. Summing up in this way will give our whole Party an impetus and enable us to do our work somewhat better than in the past.

Our Party is a great, glorious and correct party; this is recognized by the whole world. In the past some foreign comrades had doubts: what on earth are you people up to? Many did not understand our policy towards the national bourgeoisie, nor did they quite understand our rectification movement. Now, I think, more people understand; one can say that in general they do understand. Of course, there will still be some who do not. At home, even inside the Party, there will still be some who do not understand and who think that the line since the Seventh Congress is not necessarily all that correct. But the facts are there before us: we have carried out two revolutions. One was the bourgeois-democratic revolution, in which we seized state power throughout the country; the other is the proletarian socialist revolution, in which we are carrying out socialist transformation and building a socialist state. In the eleven years since the Seventh Congress our achievements have been very great; the whole country recognizes them, the whole world recognizes them, and even the foreign bourgeoisie has had to recognize them. The two revolutions prove that from the Seventh Congress to the present the line of the Party Central Committee has been correct.

The October Revolution overthrew the bourgeoisie, and this was something new in the world. The international bourgeoisie, without caring about the rights and wrongs of it, heaped abuse on that revolution and always said it was bad. The Russian bourgeoisie was a counter-revolutionary class. At that time it would have nothing to do with state capitalism and all that; it went on strike, it sabotaged, it took up arms and fought. The Russian proletariat had no other way out but to finish it off. This enraged the bourgeoisie of every country, and they hurled abuse. Here we have treated the national bourgeoisie somewhat more gently, so it is somewhat more comfortable and feels there are still some advantages in it. Now Eisenhower and Dulles will not let American journalists come to China; in fact this amounts to admitting that our policy has this advantage. If things here were in a terrible mess, they would let those people come, since in any case they would write articles denouncing us. What they are afraid of is that the articles would not be pure abuse but would say some good things too, and then things would be awkward.

In the past China was called the "decrepit old empire" and the "sick man of East Asia." Its economy was backward, its culture was backward too, it paid no attention to hygiene, it was no good at ball games, no good at swimming, the women had bound feet, the men wore pigtails, there were even eunuchs, and China's moon was not so very good either; the foreign moon was always rather clearer. In short, there was plenty that was bad. But after these six years of reform we have changed the face of China. No one can deny our achievements.

The core leading our revolutionary cause is our Party. In summing up experience, this Congress must first of all make the whole Party more united. As of June our Party had 10,730,000 members. Among these more than ten million members we must carry out extensive work of education, persuasion and unity, so that they play their role as the core among the people even better. The Party alone is not enough; the Party is a core, and it must have the masses. In all our concrete work, including industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, ninety per cent is done not by Party members but by non-Party people. Therefore we must unite well with the masses and work together with all who can be united. In the past we had many shortcomings in uniting the whole Party and in uniting with people outside the Party. We must carry out propaganda and education at this Congress and after it, and improve our work in this respect properly.

Internationally, we must unite all forces in the world that can be united: first of all unite with the Soviet Union, unite with the fraternal parties, the fraternal countries and peoples, and also unite with all peace-loving countries and peoples, making use of every useful force. This time representatives of the Communist Parties of more than fifty countries have come to attend our Congress; this is a very good thing. In the past we had not won state power throughout the country, we had not won victory in two revolutions, we had no achievements in construction; now it is different. Foreign comrades treat us with considerable respect.

We are uniting all forces that can be united, inside and outside the Party, at home and abroad. What is the purpose? It is to build a great socialist country. For a country like ours we can and should use the word "great." Our Party is a great party, our people are a great people, our revolution is a great revolution, our construction is a great cause of construction. There is only one country on earth with a population of six hundred million, and that is ours. In the past people looked down on us, and they had reason to. Because you had made no contribution: your steel output was only a few hundred thousand tons a year, and that was in the hands of the Japanese. In twenty-two years of dictatorship, the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek managed only a few tens of thousands of tons a year. We still do not have much now, but we have begun to produce some: this year it is over four million tons, next year it will exceed five million tons, in the Second Five-Year Plan it is to exceed ten million tons, and in the Third Five-Year Plan it may exceed twenty million tons. We must strive to reach this goal. Although there are nearly a hundred countries in the world, only a few produce more than twenty million tons of steel. So when our country is built up, it will be a great socialist country; it will completely change the situation of the past hundred years and more, a situation of backwardness, of being looked down upon, of ill fortune, and it will catch up with the most powerful capitalist country in the world, the United States. The United States has a population of only one hundred and seventy million; our population is several times larger, our resources are rich, and our climatic conditions are much like theirs, so catching up is possible. Ought we to catch up? Absolutely. What are your six hundred million people doing? Sleeping? Is it right to sleep, or right to work? If it is right to work, then when they, with one hundred and seventy million people, have a hundred million tons of steel, can't you, with six hundred million people, produce two hundred million or three hundred million tons? If you can't catch up, then you have no excuse, you are not so glorious, and you are not so very great either. The United States has existed as a nation for only one hundred and eighty years, and sixty years ago its steel output was also only four million tons; we are sixty years behind it. If we have another fifty or sixty years, we certainly ought to overtake it. This is a responsibility. You have so many people, you have such a vast territory, such rich resources, and on top of that it's said you are building socialism, which supposedly has superiority; if after fifty or sixty years of effort you still cannot surpass the United States, what a sorry figure you would cut! You would deserve to be expelled from the globe! Therefore, to surpass the United States is not only possible but absolutely necessary, absolutely obligatory. If we fail, then we, the Chinese nation, will have let down all the nations of the world, and our contribution to mankind will not be great.

The second point concerns carrying on the Party's traditions. This Congress should continue to develop our Party's fine traditions in thinking and in style of work, and really combat these two things, subjectivism and sectarianism; in addition, we must also combat bureaucratism. I will not speak about bureaucratism today, only about subjectivism and sectarianism. These two things, once swept away, crop up again, and once they crop up they have to be swept away again.

What is meant by making a mistake is that the subjective goes wrong, that the thinking is off course. In many of the articles we have seen criticizing Stalin's mistakes, this question is simply not mentioned, or mentioned very little. Why did Stalin make mistakes? Because on some questions his subjective thinking did not correspond to objective reality. There are still many such things in our work now. Subjectivism means not proceeding from objective reality, not proceeding from real possibilities, but proceeding from subjective wishes. What the documents of this Congress lay down and say must conform to, and come as close as possible to, the actual conditions of China. At the same time, on the basis of our past experience, we must criticize those views that do not conform to reality, criticize this subjectivism, strike at this subjectivism. We began to put forward this task several years ago. What we are now opposing is subjectivism in the socialist revolution and socialist construction. In the past, during the democratic revolution, we suffered from subjectivism for a very long time and were severely punished for it: the base areas were lost almost entirely, more than ninety per cent of the revolutionary forces were lost, and only then did we begin to wake up. Only through the Yan'an rectification, with its emphasis on investigation and study and on proceeding from reality, was this question cleared up. The universal truth of Marxism must be integrated with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution; without that integration it will not work. That is to say, theory and practice must be unified. The unity of theory and practice is one of the most fundamental principles of Marxism. According to dialectical materialism, thinking must reflect objective reality and be tested in objective practice; only when it is proved to be truth there does it count as truth, otherwise it does not. Our work in these few years has had its achievements, but the malady of subjectivism is everywhere. It exists not only now; it will exist in the future too. There will always be subjectivism, for ten thousand years, for a hundred million years, as long as mankind is not destroyed. And where there is subjectivism, mistakes will always be made.

There is another thing, called sectarianism. A locality has the interests of the whole locality, a country has the interests of the whole country, the earth has the interests of the whole earth. For now we will not talk about anything beyond the earth, because the transport routes have not yet been opened. If people are discovered on Mars or Venus, we will negotiate at that time about uniting with them and forming a united front. For now we are talking about unity within the Party, within the country and throughout the world. Our principle is that whoever you are, a foreign party or foreign non-Party people, as long as you are of some use to world peace and the cause of human progress, we should unite with you. First of all we must unite with the several dozen Communist Parties and unite with the Soviet Union. Because the Soviet Union has made some mistakes, there has been a great deal of talk and a great deal of noise about this, as if those mistakes were simply terrible; this view is not appropriate. No nation can avoid making mistakes; all the more so since the Soviet Union is the first socialist country in the world and has had such a long history, it would be impossible for it not to make mistakes. What is the place of the mistakes made in the Soviet Union, such as Stalin's mistakes? They are partial in nature and temporary in nature. Although we hear that some of these things went on for twenty years, they are still temporary and partial, and they can be corrected. The main current in the Soviet Union, its principal aspect, the great majority, is correct. Russia produced Leninism, and through the October Revolution became the first socialist country. It built socialism, defeated fascism, and became a powerful industrial country. There are many things in it from which we can learn. Of course, we should learn from advanced experience, not from backward experience. Our slogan has always been to learn from the advanced experience of the Soviet Union; who asked you to learn from backward experience? Some people, without regard to the rights and wrongs of things, think even the farts of the Soviets are fragrant; that too is subjectivism. The Soviets themselves say they stink! So we must analyse. We have said that Stalin should be assessed seventy-thirty. Their main, bulk of things are good and useful; part of what they did is wrong. We too have some things that are not good; we should throw them away ourselves, and still less should we want other countries to learn these bad things. But bad things are also a kind of experience and also have a great use. We had people like Chen Duxiu, Li Lisan, Wang Ming, Zhang Guotao, Gao Gang and Rao Shushi; they were our teachers. Besides them, we have had other teachers. At home, the best teacher was Chiang Kai-shek. People we could not persuade were persuaded once Chiang Kai-shek taught them. What method did Chiang Kai-shek use to teach? He taught with machine guns, artillery and aircraft. There was also the teacher called imperialism, which educated our six hundred million people. For more than a hundred years several imperialist powers oppressed us and educated us. So bad things have an educational role; they serve as a lesson.

In combating sectarianism, what is particularly worth discussing is the need to unite with those who have fought against us. He fought with you, knocked you to the ground; you suffered, you lost face, and though you were not really so bad, he conferred an "official title" on you, calling you an opportunist. As for cases where the attack was right, then you should have been attacked; if you really were an opportunist, why shouldn't you be attacked? I am talking here about cases where the attack was wrong, where the struggle was wrong. If those people later change their attitude and admit that they were wrong to attack you, that it was inappropriate to crown you king of the kingdom of opportunism, that alone is enough. If a few individuals still won't admit it, can we wait? Yes, we can wait. Unity means uniting with that section of people who differ with us in opinion, who look down on us, who do not respect us, who have been at odds with us, who have fought against us, at whose hands we have suffered. As for those who already share our views, they are already united, and the question of unity does not arise. The problem lies with those not yet united. Those not yet united are those whose views differ or who have big shortcomings. For instance, in our Party now there are many people who have joined the Party organizationally but not yet ideologically. Although they have not fought with you or crossed swords with you, because they have not yet joined the Party ideologically, the things they do are bound to be not quite proper; they have some shortcomings, or they do some bad things. We must unite with this section of people, educate them and help them. I have said before that with anyone who has shortcomings or has made mistakes, we must not only watch whether he corrects them but also help him correct them: first, watch; second, help. If you only watch, standing there without moving, seeing how he gets on, if he does well, fine, and if he does badly, serve him right if he comes to grief, that is a passive attitude, not an active one. Marxists should adopt an active attitude; they should not only watch but also help.

The third point concerns the election of the Central Committee. Comrade Xiaoping has just said that the number of members of the Eighth Central Committee will be 150 to 170. The Seventh Central Committee had 77 members; this time the number is a bit more than doubled, and that is probably fairly appropriate. Waiting a few years, say five years, and enlarging it then, would probably be more advantageous. At present many very useful people were trained during the War of Resistance Against Japan; these are the so-called "1938-type" cadres. They are a very important foundation of our present work; we could not do without them. But these cadres are very numerous, and if we were to make room for them, the membership of this Central Committee would have to be increased to several hundred. So this time we will not consider making room for them. Whether the figure of 150 to 170 proposed by the Centre is really appropriate, and what number would be best, comrades, please consider.

It should be affirmed that the previous Central Committee did its work and did not fail the trust placed in it by the Seventh Congress. In eleven years it correctly led China's democratic revolution and correctly led the socialist revolution and socialist construction, without making any big blunders; it struggled against all sorts of opportunist things and wrong things, and overcame all kinds of factors unfavourable to the revolution and to construction. It has its achievements, and this includes some comrades who made mistakes. This refers to the Central Committee as a whole. As for individual comrades, they cannot be assessed in this way. Wang Ming in particular: at the time of the Seventh Congress, in order to get by, he wrote a written statement acknowledging that the line of the Central Committee was correct, accepting the political report of the Seventh Congress and expressing his willingness to abide by the decisions of the Congress. But later, when I talked with him, he went back on it; he had forgotten all about that thing. He went home, thought it over, and the next day said: I did write something in which I admitted my mistakes. I said, you admitted it at that time; if you no longer admit it now, you can withdraw it. But he would not withdraw it either. Later, at the Second Plenary Session, we hoped he would talk about his own mistakes, but he talked about other things, only about how good we people were, how good. We said, you need not say these things; tell us what mistakes you, Wang Ming, have made. He would not. He promised to write a self-examination after the Second Plenary Session. But later he said he was ill and could not use his brain; as soon as he set pen to paper his illness came on. Perhaps he was doing it on purpose; that's hard to say. He has been ill all along and cannot attend this Congress either. Should we elect him or not? And should Comrade Li Lisan be elected or not? More people are forgiving of Li Lisan; fewer are forgiving of Wang Ming. As Comrade Xiaoping has said, if we elect them, the significance will be the same as when the Seventh Congress elected them. At the Seventh Congress there were many delegates who did not want to elect them (not only Wang Ming, but quite a few other comrades as well). At that time we said that if we adopted that policy, we would be making a mistake. Why would not electing people who had made mistakes be called making a mistake? Because that would be acting according to their methods. Their method was that, whether you had really made mistakes or not, once you were declared an opportunist, you were thrown out. If we did the same, we would be following their line, following the Wang Ming line or the Li Lisan line. We will not do such a thing; to make us follow the Wang Ming line or the Li Lisan line, we will not do it. The inner-Party relations they created were of just that kind: those who had made mistakes, or who had fought against them, or who had called them opportunists, they would have none of. They proclaimed themselves one-hundred-per-cent Bolsheviks; later, on examination, they turned out to be one-hundred-per-cent opportunists, while we whom they had dubbed "opportunists" turned out to have a bit of Marxism after all.

Here the most basic reason is that they are not isolated individuals but represent a fairly large section of the petty bourgeoisie. China is a country with a vast petty-bourgeois mass. A fairly large section of the petty bourgeoisie is vacillating. Take the well-to-do middle peasants, for example: as everyone has seen, in every revolution they are always vacillating and unsteady; when elated they can go wild, and when pessimistic they can hang their heads in dejection. What their eyes are always fixed on is their bit of property, nothing more than one or two head of livestock, a cart, a dozen or so mu of land. They worry about gains and losses, terrified of losing these things. Such people are different from the poor peasants. China's poor peasants make up fifty per cent in the north and seventy per cent in the south. In terms of composition, our Party is made up basically of workers and poor peasants, that is, of the proletariat and the semi-proletariat. The semi-proletariat is also petty bourgeois, but its steadfastness is much greater than that of the middle peasants. Our Party has also absorbed a number of intellectuals; among the more than ten million Party members, high, middle and low-level intellectuals number about one million. As for these one million intellectuals, it would be hard to say that they represent imperialism, hard to say they represent the landlord class, hard to say they represent the bureaucrat-bourgeoisie, and hard to say they represent the national bourgeoisie either; it is more appropriate to place them in the category of the petty bourgeoisie. Which part of the petty-bourgeois category do they mainly represent? That part in town and country which owns relatively more means of production, such as the well-to-do middle peasants. These intellectual Party members fear the dragon in front and the tiger behind; they often vacillate, they have the most subjectivism and no small amount of sectarianism. What does our electing these two representative figures of the Wang Ming line and the Li Lisan line signify? It signifies that our treatment of such people, who have made ideological mistakes, is different from our treatment of counter-revolutionaries and splitters (people like Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao, Gao Gang and Rao Shushi). They practised subjectivism and sectarianism openly, brazenly, with gongs and drums, bringing out their own political programmes to win others over. Wang Ming had a political programme, and Li Lisan had a political programme too. Of course, Chen Duxiu also had a political programme, but he went in for Trotskyism, engaged in splitting, and carried on anti-Party activities outside the Party. Zhang Guotao engaged in conspiracy, engaged in splitting, and ran over to the Kuomintang. Therefore, the problem of Wang Ming and Li Lisan is not merely a personal problem; what is important is that it has social causes. The reflection of these social causes within our Party is that a fairly large number of people in the Party vacillate when it comes to a critical juncture. This vacillation is opportunism. What is called opportunism means doing this thing when it is profitable here and doing that thing when it is profitable there, without definite principles, without definite rules, without a definite direction; one way today, another way tomorrow. Wang Ming, for example, was like that: formerly he was terribly "Left," later terribly Right.

At the time of the Seventh Congress we persuaded those comrades and elected Wang Ming and Li Lisan. Well then, in the eleven years since the Seventh Congress, have we suffered any loss? None whatsoever. Our revolution did not fail to win, or win a few months later, because we elected Wang Ming and Li Lisan.

By electing them, have we rewarded those who made mistakes? If people who made mistakes become members of the Central Committee, then let's all make mistakes together, since there's a chance of becoming a Central Committee member anyway; will it turn out like that? No, it won't. Look, our seventy-odd Central Committee members have not deliberately made a few mistakes in order to become Central Committee members again. Will those who are not Central Committee members, whether pre-1938, 1938-type or post-1938, learn from Wang Ming and Li Lisan and also produce two lines, turning them into four lines, in order to strive to become Central Committee members? No, nobody does that; rather, taking warning from their mistakes, they become more careful themselves.

Further, there used to be a saying, "Better to join the revolution late than early, better not to join it at all than to join it." So, if we elect them, will a problem arise in the Party of it being better to be wrong than right, better to make big mistakes than small ones? Wang Ming and Li Lisan committed errors of line, and if we elect them to the Central Committee, then those who were right or who made only small mistakes have to vacate two places to let them take the stage. Is such an arrangement the most unjust in the world? From this angle, it is very unjust: look, those who were right or who made small mistakes have to give up their places to those who made big mistakes; this is obviously unjust, there is no justice in it at all. If we compare things this way, we must admit that it is a case of being better to be wrong than right, better to make big mistakes than small ones. But from another angle, it is not so. Their errors of line are famous throughout the country and throughout the world, and the reason for electing them is precisely that they are famous. What can you do about it? They are famous, and you who made no mistakes or small mistakes are not as well known as they are. In our country, with its vast petty bourgeoisie, they are banners. If we elect them, many people will say: the Communist Party is still waiting for them; it would rather give up two places to them so that they can correct their mistakes. Whether they correct them or not is another question, and that question is very small; it concerns only the two of them. The question is that our society has so many petty bourgeois, our Party has so many vacillating petty-bourgeois elements, there are so many vacillating people among the intellectuals, and they will be looking at this example. When they see that these two banners are still standing, they will feel at ease, they will be able to sleep, they will be happy. If you knock these two banners down, they will panic. So it is not a question of whether Wang Ming and Li Lisan correct themselves; whether they do or not matters little. What matters a great deal is that the millions of easily vacillating elements of petty-bourgeois origin in the Party, especially the intellectuals, are watching to see what attitude we take towards Wang Ming and Li Lisan. Just as in the land reform with the rich peasants: we did not touch the rich peasants, and the middle peasants felt reassured. If at the Eighth Congress we take the same attitude towards these two as at the Seventh Congress, then our Party will gain a benefit, an advantage, namely that it will be somewhat easier to remould the vast petty bourgeoisie of the whole country. This also has an influence throughout the world. Abroad, very few take this attitude of ours towards people who have made mistakes; one could say none do.

The preparatory meeting of our Congress, counting from today, has only a little over ten days, but if it is well arranged, we can certainly do the preparatory work well. We believe that this Congress can be a success, and the level of the delegates can guarantee that it will be. But we must be conscientious and careful, and everyone must make an effort.