Excerpts from an interview with Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, in "Le Monde" on December 13, 2011, on measures to strengthen the Eurozone.

France Nicolas Sarkozy · President of France

13 December 2011

Context
Sarkozy was interviewed by Le Monde on December 13, 2011, following the Brussels EU summit, discussing measures to strengthen and stabilize the eurozone.
Main themes
Eurozone crisis management, Brussels summit agreement, European economic governance, euro stability, European Stability Mechanism, sovereign debt crisis, ECB role, shared sovereignty, European integration, competitiveness and growth, banking and financial interdependence, IMF resources
Duration
~24 min
74th percentile
Words
2,910
74th percentile
Sentences
192
88th percentile
Readability
61
90th percentile
Grade
8.3
6th percentile
Syntax
2.66
10th percentile
Vocabulary
2.20
48th percentile

Translated from French

This is an interview, press conference or exchange with other speakers. It is split into sentences and counted in the corpus, but its sentences are not tagged on the twelve indices.

192 sentences in 67 paragraphs

Q - On Thursday, December 8, at the congress of the European People's Party, you said that the risk of an explosion in Europe has never been so high. After the Brussels summit on Thursday and Friday, is this risk now averted?

R - I wish I could say it is completely averted. However, I will refrain from that. We have done everything that was possible to do. In a perfect, theoretical world, we should do more, but the characteristic of a statesman, of a man of government, is to work with realities. That said, this summit marks a decisive step towards European integration. In this respect, it creates the conditions for a rebound and an exit from the crisis.

The euro is the heart of Europe. If it explodes, Europe will not survive. The crisis of trust and credibility of the euro therefore posed a risk to the sustainability of the European Union.

The truth is that we had to repair the shortcomings of the euro at the time of its creation in the midst of a crisis. Thus, nothing had been planned regarding the convergence of the economic policies of the member countries of the euro. Then, some countries were welcomed into the zone when they were not prepared for it. This had the consequence of weakening the entire system, like a poisoned pill, due to the interdependence of banking and financial networks. These countries had to impose on their peoples sufferings they did not expect.

If you consider that all this took place against the backdrop of an unprecedented debt crisis in the history of the world, I did not seek to dramatize when I said that we were all on the edge of the precipice.

Q - Does the Brussels agreement address these elements of the crisis?

R - It addresses them first by creating genuine economic governance. If the economies of the zone do not converge, they cannot sustainably maintain the same currency. The fact that the responsibility for governance now lies with the heads of state and government marks an undeniable democratic progress compared to the previous situation, where everything was organized around the European Central Bank, the Commission, and the stability pact.

I add that, for the Commission, things will now be clearer. It is responsible for ensuring compliance with the treaties and for the application of sanctions. However, the one who sanctions cannot be the one who administers, at the risk of sanctioning himself. From this point of view, it is irreplaceable. Who else could do it in its place? (...)

The question posed is that of the competitiveness of our continent and the conditions for growth that must absolutely be more sustained. We will therefore have to discuss with our eurozone partners the crucial issues of industry, trade policy, the labor market, research...

Q - And, conversely, they will talk to you about taxation, public service, and pensions in France?

R - Of course. The Union is based on reciprocal compromises, built in the interest of each.

Q - Is this a transfer of sovereignty?

R - No, because we will not delegate our economic sovereignty to others. It will be a shared exercise of sovereignty by democratically elected governments. One strengthens its sovereignty and independence by exercising it with friends, allies, and partners.

I add that not a single new area of competence will be transferred to any supranational authority.

The second element is the strengthening of European solidarity, with the creation of a genuine European monetary fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). This is a fund intended to assist eurozone member countries that do not have sufficient access to the market to finance their debts. This fund will be established as of July 2012 and not in July 2013. It will decide not by unanimity, but by a qualified majority of 85%. This will prevent a small minority from blocking others if they wish to move forward.

This fund will have 80 billion euros in capital, which represents a potential of 500 billion in loans. In March, we will assess whether these resources are sufficient. And, within ten days, we have committed to negotiating with our non-European partners a strengthening of the resources of the International Monetary Fund, which will further increase our firepower in the event of a crisis. The eurozone is ready to provide up to an additional 200 billion. Never have we been so ambitious in terms of solidarity.

Finally, it is the ECB that will be the operational agent of the European fund, thus increasing its credibility and effectiveness. Distrust cannot settle between these two key institutions for our financial stability.

Q - The ECB will lower its rates to 1% over three years so that banks regain margins and buy government debts. Is this moral, when it would be simpler for the ECB to lend directly to states?

R - I do not comment on the actions of the ECB. It is independent and must act within the framework of the treaties.

But the problem today, in many countries of the zone, is the tightening of credit due to fear of risk. This could lead to an economic depression. This prospect would be catastrophic. I am pleased that the ECB is providing liquidity to avoid this "credit crunch." Think of those thousands of businesses whose activity would be dramatically hindered if they did not have access to sufficient credit.

I hope that the action of the ECB, by supporting economic growth, will also help to calm unfounded fears about state debts. I trust the ECB to decide in the future the strength of its intervention.

Q - If that doesn't work, do you plan to make a large loan from individuals, like Belgium and Italy?

R - Belgium has thus raised 5.5 billion euros. The French debt is 1,692 billion euros. Each year, we borrow about 180 billion. You see that the orders of magnitude have nothing to do with what a national loan could bring.

I remind you, moreover, that we no longer have the right to give a tax advantage to state bond issues, as all those granted in the past have cost public finances dearly. Finally, it should be noted that, despite the crisis, France is currently borrowing on the markets at a historically low rate. So why should we change our strategy?

The third element of the agreement is an effort at discipline, with an inverted majority for automatic sanctions. Previously, for the Commission to sanction a defaulting state, a qualified majority in the Council was required to approve it. This will no longer be the case.

On the other hand, we did not wish for these sanctions to apply in the same way, that is to say, to be automatic, in the event of a debt overshoot in a given year. A state may be required to recapitalize a bank or a public enterprise, which will increase its public debt. We cannot hold that against it. Thus, the same causes will no longer produce the same effects. Laxity will no longer be tolerated in Europe.

Q - What is the next step?

R - In the next fifteen days, we will finalize the legal content of our agreement. The goal is to arrive at a treaty by March.

It must be understood that another Europe is being born: that of the eurozone, where the key words will be the convergence of economies, budgetary rules, and taxation. A Europe where we will work together on reforms that will allow all our countries to be more competitive, without renouncing our social model. The stability of our continent is at this price.

Q - Are you not afraid of ratification problems?

R - No, because the procedure chosen is lighter, even if each country remains master of the ratification procedure. In any case, we want to be ready by the summer of 2012. Finally, I repeat, no one will be able to contest the increased role thus given to European governments.

Q - It has been six months where the markets can still attack...

R - If you want to tell me that it is difficult, I confirm: it is difficult. No ideological framework works anymore. It takes a lot of composure not to overreact and the same composure not to underreact. I am aware of the risk of not being understood by the populations who are suffering and who see summits succeeding one another, giving the impression of being disconnected from their daily lives. At the same time, we have no choice. We must hold the course as firmly as possible and exit the spiral of crises.

Q - What do you say to those who say that the choices to stem the euro crisis are imposed by Angela Merkel?

R - To those who complain and reproach me for the Franco-German axis, I ask what they propose as an alternative strategy. Stay alone? Who can think that France alone would have advanced its ideas better? Unless someone proposes another alliance... But which one?

It is true that the Brussels summit is the result of a Franco-German compromise and, since the beginning of this crisis, we have moved towards each other. Who would have thought, two years ago, that our partners would rally to the idea of an economic government, organized around the heads of state and government? That they would subscribe to the creation of a European monetary fund, embodied by the ESM? So many French ideas! The Chancellor, whom I appreciate very much, has moved with pragmatism and intelligence.

As for the word capitulation that I have heard used by some, all this warlike language that smells of old nationalism, let me tell you what I think: I feel French to the core of my being, but my love for France has never led me to accuse our neighbors, our allies, our friends. And those who seek to foster Germanophobia discredit themselves.

Q - A triangle with the British?

R - The United Kingdom is not in the euro. The triptych Berlin-London-Paris would have made sense if we had had a crisis of the European Union, but that is not the case. It is a crisis of the euro.

Does the importance of the agreement with Germany mean that nothing can be done with London? No. We intervened in Libya with the United Kingdom, and Prime Minister David Cameron was courageous. With London, we share a commitment to nuclear energy and strong cooperation in defense, which is essential.

Q - You took time to appreciate the German model...

R - If you mean that the presidency and the confrontation with challenges change a man, that is true. If you want me to say that, after four and a half years at the Élysée, I have learned and evolved in my reasoning, that is true as well.

Between France and Germany, there is first of all history. Seventy years of confrontations followed by seventy years of peace. What should the next cycle be? We do not have the right to diverge from Germany, because divergence leads to confrontation. We must therefore understand each other and seek permanent compromises. (...)

Q - In a speech on repentance in 2006, you said that France had not committed genocide...

R - The Germans have faced their history with courage and lucidity. We have nothing to reproach them for.

Q - In Brussels last week, you put the English outside of Europe...

R - I did not see it that way. We did everything, the Chancellor and I, to ensure that the English were part of the agreement. But there are now clearly two Europes. One that wants more solidarity among its members and regulation. The other that is attached only to the logic of the single market.

Q - How did they end up alone?

R - The repeated assertion of their opposition to any prospect of entering the euro cannot be without consequence. I add that the demands regarding financial services were not acceptable. The crisis came from the deregulation of finance. We could never accept a return to the past. Europe must move towards more regulation.

Q - Is it legitimate now for the United Kingdom to remain in the single market?

R - We need Great Britain! It would be a great impoverishment to see its departure, which, fortunately, is not on the agenda. (...)

Q - Is the French president ready to accept European rules when, in 2007, you went to Luxembourg to request a postponement of France's return to balance and, recently, Prime Minister François Fillon protested against the Commission's growth forecasts?

R - We are not talking about the same time or the same world, even if it is the same president. We are all the more ready for this effort because we started it back in 2007. The implementation of the non-replacement of one civil servant for every two retiring, which earned us so much criticism, is from 2007. The reform of the judicial map is from 2008. The reform of the military map is from 2009. As for the pension reform, if we had not done it, we would be in the unenviable situation of some of our partners.

Q - How do you assess the risk of France being downgraded by financial agencies?

R - One of the three rating agencies has placed France, as well as the entire eurozone, on negative outlook. Why? Because the eurozone is facing a governance problem: this is an issue we are addressing and it is not specific to France. The second concern is the risk to French banks. The good news is that the European Banking Authority estimates the need for recapitalization of French banks at 7.7 billion euros, compared to 13 billion for Germany. Not a single cent of the state budget will therefore go to the recapitalization of banks.

The third element is the outlook for French growth. The government has set a forecast of 1% for 2012. But at the same time, a freeze of 6 billion in credits has been put in place to cope with a situation where growth is limited to 0.5%. The last point raised by the agency is the high level of our spending. But everyone recognizes that we have shown responsiveness in this area in the past.

The great risk is therefore that of the contagion of the European crisis. That is why we are fighting to control it.

Q - Are we threatened with ten years of effort or very slow growth, like Japan?

R - This is a risk that has led me not to choose a policy based on austerity. Austerity means lowering salaries and pensions. I refuse to do that and will continue to refuse. If we were to go in that direction, it would plunge France into recession and deflation. If you reduce your revenues at the same time as you cut your expenditures, you do not solve your deficit problems. That is why we decided, in 2009, on 35 billion euros in favor of future investments. This is the opposite of a policy of austerity and rigor. We need to both reduce our deficit and our debt, free up work, and regain competitiveness.

Q - But the agencies do not do us justice...

R - For now, they have maintained the triple A. If they were to withdraw it from us, we would face this situation with composure and calm. It would be an additional difficulty, but not insurmountable. What matters above all is the credibility of our economic policy and our determined strategy to reduce our expenditures. We will scrupulously respect the commitments we have made.

Q - What flagship measure should be taken to convince investors?

R - If we had not carried out the pension reform, that would be the one to implement. For the rest, there is no key or miracle measure because what matters, just as much as reducing expenditures, is increasing growth. This involves the autonomy of universities, the development of the research tax credit, future investments, and the elimination of the professional tax. Everything that France has begun to do.

Q - The golden rule?

R - The golden rule is an important measure. It is a rule of common sense: budgets must be built over several years with the aim of achieving balance. Who can in good faith contest this objective? I would have liked all French political parties to take inspiration from what the Spaniards and Germans have done by adopting this rule by consensus, without anyone losing their identity. (...)

Q - How do you analyze the growing doubt of the French about the euro?

R - The French associate the euro with their difficulties, but at the same time, they understand the risks of leaving it and isolating themselves. I pay tribute to their lucidity. The French do not contest Europe, but the way certain European policies are conducted. In this regard, trade policy is the very example of what needs to change. We increase the burdens and constraints on our producers, and we allow products made in countries that do not respect any of these constraints to enter our market. This cannot continue. Reciprocity must become the rule. Competition can only be fair; if it is unfair, we will have to draw consequences regarding the opening of our markets. ()