Joint statement by Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, and Mrs. Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, in "Le Monde" and "Süddeutsche Zeitung" on February 4, 2009, on the necessity of a concerted security policy, titled "Security, Our Common Mission."

France Nicolas Sarkozy · President of France

4 February 2009

Context
Sarkozy and Merkel published a joint op-ed ahead of the Munich Security Conference on February 7, 2009, outlining a shared European and transatlantic security vision.
Main themes
Franco-German cooperation, transatlantic security partnership, European security policy, NATO 60th anniversary summit, collective defense, EU common foreign and security policy, military cooperation, global crises and instability, comprehensive security approach, Iran nuclear crisis, climate change and economic crisis, energy and migration security
Duration
~19 min
63rd percentile
Words
2,268
63rd percentile
Sentences
123
73rd percentile
Readability
34
23rd percentile
Grade
13.1
58th percentile
Syntax
2.94
39th percentile
Vocabulary
2.30
73rd percentile

Translated from French

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 89%88%
  • Institutional 5%5%
  • Ceremonial 5%5%
  • Economic 1%1%
  • Social 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

123 sentences in 33 paragraphs

In the face of the uncertainties of the world, a concerted policy is essential.

Almost three centuries ago, Leibniz and Voltaire, a German and a Frenchman, reflected on what the "best of all worlds" might be. Today, the Security Conference, which we will attend together in Germany on Saturday, February 7, will give us the opportunity to present our ideas on the conditions of our collective security and in view of the summit marking the 60th anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance. We will host it together in Strasbourg and Kehl (Germany).

The events of recent months raise concerns. An atmosphere of insecurity is developing. The war in the Caucasus was the first military conflict of this century in Europe. At the beginning of this year, the clashes between Israel and Hamas reminded us of the instability in the Middle East. There is still no progress in resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis. Terrorist attacks continue, as does the violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or the clashes in Africa, in Congo and Sudan. And in the background, we are facing the turmoil generated by the financial market crisis and the global economic crisis, as well as the challenge of climate change.

A concerted security policy is absolutely necessary. For us, it is clear that our security policy must be defined more broadly. In addition to purely military issues, it must take into account the international financial situation, energy supplies, and migration issues. We must adapt our concepts: to respond to crises and conflicts, we need a comprehensive approach, increasingly strong and stable partnerships, and flexible tools. No country today is capable of solving the world's problems alone. Alliances based on common values, such as the European Union and NATO, are becoming increasingly important. Our security will be better guaranteed, and our chances of success in the face of crises will be greater, as the network of our partnerships expands and our capacities for action—political, economic, development aid, and military—are pooled.

This conviction is the basis of our security policy, which we are developing through ever-closer Franco-German cooperation and within the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. These three dimensions reinforce each other. We are convinced that it is in our interest to make European construction and the Atlantic partnership two sides of the same security policy.

Over the past ten years, considerable progress has been made by the European Union, which has developed its common foreign and security policy. We emphasize that these advances strengthen the transatlantic security partnership and the Atlantic Alliance. Our American partners understand this better and better. For Germany and France, in the face of current challenges, Europe needs the United States just as the United States needs a strong European partner.

Western Europe has enjoyed sixty years of peace and freedom—and this is now the case in almost all of Europe. We owe this, of course, to our determination, but also to the United States. An America that has stood by our side and committed itself to a free and democratic Europe. In the face of the risks of the 21st century, it is necessary to strengthen the transatlantic security and defense partnership and adapt it to new challenges. This involves analyzing situations together, making joint decisions, and implementing them in a spirit of partnership. Indeed, unilateral decision-making would be contradictory to this new spirit of our relations.

And we, Europeans, must speak more with a strong and united voice, which requires a high degree of cohesion among member states within the framework of the common foreign and security policy. Likewise, we must increase and pool our military and civilian capabilities, in service of a forward-looking policy for the security of Europe. The synergy of the two is a hallmark of European security policy. During the French Presidency of the European Union, major advances were made, notably thanks to the momentum provided by Germany and France. The European Union will be a stronger partner for the United States in the future.

We have also decided on a new advance in our bilateral military cooperation. The Franco-German brigade, which has been engaged with our partners in the Balkans and Afghanistan, will now be stationed in our two countries: France will permanently host a German unit of this brigade on its soil. After the tragedies of our shared history, everyone will understand the historical significance of this new step in Franco-German friendship.

For the first time in the history of the Atlantic Alliance, it is two countries, our two countries, that are inviting their allies to a summit, the 60th anniversary summit, on April 3 and 4. This is a strong symbol of Franco-German friendship in the service of peace and security. It is also a symbol of a Europe that is now united and free.

We want this Alliance summit to be an opportunity for strategic discussions and to translate them into political choices. It is not about reinventing the fundamental principles of the Alliance, those of the Washington Treaty, and the community of values and solidarity that unite us. It is about, as we have successfully done in the past, debating without blinders to provide new directions and credibly transform the Alliance. This is what we did in 1991 and 1999, by redefining our strategic concepts.

It is necessary to review the way we approach new threats, our partnerships, and our structures. Germany and France expect the Strasbourg/Kehl summit to launch work on a new "strategic concept."

To meet the demands of the future, we believe it is necessary to make progress in several key areas.

* NATO-EU Cooperation

To our great regret, the "strategic partnership" between NATO and the European Union is not living up to our expectations, due to ongoing disagreements among certain nations. We believe this must evolve. We must move towards genuine cooperation, based on a necessary complementarity.

* The Alliance's Missions

Today, for our common security, the Alliance is engaged in several operations outside its territory, notably in the Balkans—in Bosnia and Kosovo—as well as in Afghanistan.

Sixty years after the founding of NATO, the commitment to assist an ally under attack, which stems from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, still represents the very essence of the Alliance today. We drew an additional consequence from the terrorist attacks of September 11. In order to combat terrorism, we committed ourselves with our allies in Afghanistan. For this is one of the new threats of the 21st century.

Our soldiers are exposed to the greatest risks in these operations, particularly in Afghanistan. Other young women and men, who participate in reconstruction efforts, are also victims of a terrorism that despises human dignity. In any case, we expect the Strasbourg/Kehl summit to send the signal that the Alliance will remain committed to its security and its values. Our goal remains to establish a level of security that allows for the reconstruction of the country, in accordance with the wishes of the Afghans, so that global terrorism can no longer develop its bases there. We also know that the strengthening of democracy must accompany the military effort. Political approaches must also be discussed with our partners in the Alliance.

* Russia, Rebuilding a Partnership

The war in Georgia in the summer of 2008 marked a rupture. The European Union was able to stop the spiral of violence and create the conditions for a resolution process. But the use of military force, as well as the unilateral and unlawful recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, has created a trust problem with Russia.

Russia remains our neighbor and a very important partner. We have not returned to the Cold War era. Those who claim so are mistaken because the USSR no longer exists. We intend to restore and develop trusting and fruitful relations with Russia. Our alliance is a defensive alliance, whose sole ambition is our common security in the face of the threats of the world. But we are also entitled to expect Russia to demonstrate its respect for the norms and rules to which it contributed to establish, through the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter in 1990: territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, respect, and equality within the Euro-Atlantic space.

It is on the basis of this acquis that the vast majority of nations in Europe wished to join NATO and the European Union. This enlargement is a central element of the security and stability of the continent. Without euphoria, Russia has long accompanied this process in a constructive manner.

The Strasbourg/Kehl summit will give us the opportunity to discuss this again. Wanting to join NATO is the free choice of European countries, independent and free democracies. This desire reflects a trust that we must not disappoint. But we remind that to become a member of the Alliance, there are criteria; this first involves being capable of assuming the heavy responsibilities, making a real contribution to the security of allies, and sharing their values. Likewise, enlargement must contribute to the stability and security of the continent, which also benefits Russia. In this context, cooperation within the NATO-Russia Council plays an essential role.

In the summer of 2008, President Dmitry Medvedev made proposals on European security. We are ready to conduct a debate on these issues, with our allies and with our European partners, and to take into account the views of all. In addressing this, we will reaffirm our confidence and attachment to the European Union, NATO, and the OSCE, to the proven European norms that underpin our security, to the arms control and disarmament regime, and to transatlantic cooperation. But we call for extending a hand to Russia and reviving our cooperation within the NATO-Russia Council and between the European Union and Russia, if it so wishes. We want a closer political and security dialogue between the European Union and Russia, which allows for greater involvement in the Euro-Atlantic security space. We hope that a constructive spirit will preside over these discussions. The re-engagement of the American-Russian strategic dialogue, which we welcome, should also contribute to this.

* Military Capabilities, Disarmament, Arms Control

The military nature of the Atlantic Alliance requires its members to ensure that their military capabilities precisely correspond to the imperatives of their security and the missions they assign themselves. The Strasbourg/Kehl summit will also be an opportunity to discuss this. We need, particularly in Europe, more modern, effective, and interoperable military capabilities.

Furthermore, we will discuss issues related to the deployment of missile defenses against limited ballistic threats from the Middle East. We therefore believe that Russia should be associated with these reflections in a spirit of cooperation and transparency, as the United States has proposed. This dialogue should also continue within the NATO-Russia Council.

We are both advocates of arms control. As members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Germany and France support global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. In 2008, the European Union adopted ambitious plans to combat proliferation and promote global nuclear disarmament at our initiative, in accordance with the NPT. However, we are convinced that a responsible security policy, which takes into account future risks, must retain nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future. Its main objective is strictly defensive and remains the prevention of war. It is no longer necessary today to maintain enormous arsenals, and the goal should be a level of strict sufficiency.

We support the revival of discussions between the United States and Russia on the treaty for the reduction of their strategic nuclear arsenals (START). Germany and France hope that concrete results will be achieved in the coming months. Likewise, we welcome the American commitment to the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to the launch of negotiations on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

We support, finally, the efforts made to safeguard the regime of conventional force limitations in Europe. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) remains a pillar of European security. We wish to create, through our dialogue with Russia, the conditions for the ratification of the amended CFE treaty. A quick solution could, for example, be found to the issue of Transnistria, in order to create a different atmosphere. This would represent a significant step towards the entry into force of a regime, guaranteed by the Alliance, for the limitation of conventional arms in Europe, a regime that would bring greater security to all, to Russia as well as to us.

We finally call for a strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. It is currently facing the greatest challenge in its history: the Iranian nuclear program. Tehran is openly counting on the absence of international reaction to its actions. We will not allow Iran access to nuclear weapons, as this would be a serious threat to global peace. We are counting on a diplomatic solution. And, to respond to this major challenge, we are ready for dialogue, reinforced by the commitment of the United States, as well as for new, very firm sanctions.

Two weeks ago, the 44th President of the United States took office. Barack Obama's presidency is already marked by new accents in foreign and security policy. Many Europeans have high expectations of this change; Barack Obama certainly expects as much from us. We look forward to cooperating with him, and we are convinced that the Euro-Atlantic security partnership will allow us to face together the risks and threats to which we are exposed. It is by working in a spirit of trust, with determination and cohesion, that we will build, if not the "best of all worlds," a world where peace and security will progress for all.