Government statement by Chancellor Olaf Scholz to the European Council on December 14/15, 2023, before the German Bundestag on December 13, 2023, in Berlin:

Germany Olaf Scholz · Member of the Bundestag

13 December 2023 · Government statement to the European Council (German Bundestag session) · German Bundestag, Berlin, Germany

Context
Scholz addressed the Bundestag on December 13, 2023, ahead of the European Council meeting, focusing on Ukraine support and German-Polish relations.
Main themes
Support for Ukraine, Russian war of aggression, EU financial framework, German-Polish relations, European Council, EU eastern enlargement, air defense assistance, Weimar Triangle, irregular migration, Ukrainian military resilience, Hungary's veto, multiannual financial framework
Duration
~24 min
74th percentile
Words
2,895
74th percentile
Sentences
164
84th percentile
Readability
45
49th percentile
Grade
11.3
37th percentile
Syntax
2.88
31st percentile
Vocabulary
2.10
27th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 55%54%
  • Institutional 21%21%
  • Economic 17%16%
  • Ceremonial 6%5%
  • Social 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

164 sentences in 50 paragraphs

Madam President!

Dear colleagues!

This morning, Donald Tusk was sworn in as the Polish Prime Minister. Before I have the opportunity to meet him personally in Brussels in the coming days, I would like to say from here: Congratulations, Mr. Prime Minister, and I look forward to our cooperation!

Donald Tusk has announced that he will lead Poland back to the heart of the European Union. And that is exactly where Poland belongs: in the center of Europe as an indispensable part of our European Union. Poland's role in and for Europe is greater today than ever. Poland's security policy contribution is significant in light of the Russian war of aggression in the east of our continent. Our two countries, Germany and Poland, have taken in more refugees from Ukraine than all other EU member states combined. We want to and we will work even more closely together to control irregular migration. The booming Polish economy is closely intertwined with the German one. Last but not least, Germany and Poland have a particular interest in making the expansion of the European Union towards the east and southeast a reality. Therefore, I look forward to advancing the European Union and the German-Polish relations side by side with Poland, and of course also together with France in the format of the Weimar Triangle.

We will now quickly deepen our working contacts with our Polish friends at all levels. We share the goal of continuing to support Ukraine: in reconstruction, in matters of security and defense, and on the path to the European Union.

Germany is ready to further shape civil society and cross-border cooperation and to set a memorial political sign with the German-Polish House. Our intensive economic and scientific relations, especially in the border regions, play an important role in this. Of course, I look forward to welcoming the newly elected Polish Prime Minister here in Berlin in the coming weeks.

Not only in our cooperation with Poland, but also at the upcoming European Council, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine is in focus. Because this war, which has now lasted for almost two years, remains the central security policy challenge for our continent.

I am deeply impressed every day by what the Ukrainian soldiers are achieving. Since Russia invaded the entire Ukraine in February 2022, they have liberated more than half of the territories that were occupied in the meantime.

Russia's Black Sea Fleet has lost its control over the western part of the Black Sea in recent months. So far, around 200 cargo ships have been able to transport wheat, corn, sunflower oil, and other Ukrainian products around the world, despite Russia's infamous termination of the United Nations grain agreement.

And one more thing is different today than it was last winter: The Ukrainian air defense is significantly better able to defend itself against ever new swarms of Russian drones and missiles. Germany is making a significant contribution with the Gepard anti-aircraft tanks, the IRIS-T system, and the Patriot air defense system.

I am grateful to the Federal Minister of Defense for promising further support on the ground in Kyiv, especially in air defense: additional IRIS-T systems, Hunter drones, and drone sensors, exactly what Ukraine urgently needs. The second Patriot system from Germany will be deployed in Ukraine later this year.

In addition, there will be armored vehicles, ammunition, and winter clothing for the Ukrainian armed forces, as well as power generators to bridge energy shortages. All of this is urgently needed. Because Russia has now fully committed its economy to this war.

Russian arms production is running at full speed. Hundreds of thousands of new recruits have been called up by the Russian leadership; further recruitments are planned. We are talking about tens of thousands of mostly young Russians whom Putin sends to the front without regard for losses. Observers and soldiers call what is happening in some front sections a "meat grinder."

All of this indicates: Putin remains firmly determined to force Ukraine into submission militarily. He is counting on international support for Ukraine to wane. The danger that this calculation could succeed is unfortunately not to be dismissed. In the United States, President Biden is struggling to secure approval for new financial resources to support Ukraine; no solution is in sight yet.

In the European Union, almost all member states agree that we must stabilize Ukraine's budget with a total of 50 billion euros in the coming years. But there is still no consensus on how to do this. Especially Hungary has not yet agreed.

At the same time, such a decision is closely linked to the negotiations on the adjustment of the European Union's Multiannual Financial Framework until 2027. We will discuss this tomorrow and the day after. I will advocate for sustainable, reliable financial support for Ukraine for the coming years. Because it is about the security of Europe.

This is a priority for Germany. At the same time, this means: We must remain realistic about the many other wishes and expectations regarding the EU budget. Also in light of the budget situation in many member states and the many billions that have not yet been spent, the focus must first and foremost be on making sensible use of these funds and prioritizing them. Germany is contributing to the financing of the European fiscal capacity for Ukraine proportionately, and we are advocating for the continuation of the European Peace Facility for the benefit of Ukraine, with a mechanism that also recognizes the significant bilateral arms deliveries.

In light of the risks just described, and given the expected prolonged war, Germany's support for Ukraine is crucial. Russia's attack on Ukraine is not just any war somewhere in the world. It is about whether Putin will succeed with his imperialist plans, which he continues to pursue openly. It is about whether borders in Europe will be secure in the future or whether land grabbing and occupation will become European normality again. This question is fundamental to the security of Europe and to the security of Germany. It is also being decided in Ukraine.

Following the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court regarding the Climate and Transformation Fund, the Federal Minister of Economics, the Federal Minister of Finance, and I have reached an agreement on proposals for the federal budget 2024. One element of these proposals is to secure our support for Ukraine as planned and for as long as necessary. This includes eight billion euros for arms deliveries, financial aid for the Ukrainian budget, directly or through the European Union, and likely over six billion euros to support Ukrainian refugees here in Germany.

It is also clear, however: If the situation worsens due to Russia's war against Ukraine, for example, if the situation at the front deteriorates, if other supporters reduce their aid to Ukraine, or if the threat to Germany and Europe increases further, then we will have to respond. Today, of course, no one knows whether this will happen. However, to consider such a development and to be prepared for it, we have already agreed to propose a budgetary breach resolution to the Bundestag in such a situation, as Article 115 of the Basic Law allows in emergencies.

Our national efforts are embedded in what our partners are doing. On the sidelines of the NATO summit in Vilnius, we reached an agreement in the G7 circle on security assurances for Ukraine. Meanwhile, 31 countries have joined our initiative.

At its core, it is about jointly expanding Ukraine's defense capabilities so that Russia never again dares to attack the country. Germany has therefore taken the lead in the area of air defense together with France. The British are taking the lead regarding maritime capabilities. Americans, Dutch, and Danes are working to equip Ukraine for air combat, including with F-16 fighter jets. Others are taking care of armored vehicles. Germany also plays a central role in this, with the artillery tanks and vehicles we supply, for which we always provide ammunition and spare parts. The associated signal to the Russian leadership is clear: You cannot wait out this war.

At the same time, we are increasingly cutting Russia off from the necessary resources for its warfare with our sanctions. This is represented by the twelfth sanctions package.

In addition to our reliable, internationally coordinated support for Ukraine, the EU's enlargement policy is also part of our strategy in the struggle for peace in Europe. The European Commission recommends that we open accession negotiations with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. The Federal Government explicitly supports this. It is, of course, also about leaving no doubt about the direction in which these two countries are heading: as free European nations into a free united Europe.

This also applies to Georgia, which is to receive candidate status, and of course to the countries of the Western Balkans. This evening, we will meet with them at the EU-Western Balkans summit. Albania, North Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina have been waiting for their EU accession for over 20 years now. It is high time that everyone sees the big picture, both the candidate countries and the EU members.

This big picture is the historic opportunity to anchor the region firmly in Europe once and for all and to let the conflicts of the past remain just that: the past. The region benefits from this, but a geopolitical European Union does as well. That is why I advocate for us to be able to make more decisions by qualified majority, even within the accession process.

Why can we not decide on certain stages of this years-long process by qualified majority? The national parliaments would still decide whether to open accession negotiations. But no longer could every single decision, such as opening and closing negotiation clusters, be blocked by any single member state.

When countries have made far-reaching reforms, as is the case in Albania, for example, this must be recognized. Otherwise, there is a risk of damage to the accession process as a whole. We must not allow that.

In North Macedonia, the government and opposition have indicated a constitutional amendment. Now they must actually implement it, in the interest of their own country. I would be grateful to you, dear colleagues of the Union faction, if you could also use your influence to ensure that your sister party in North Macedonia constructively contributes to a solution.

At the same time, I continue to work towards closer cooperation in the region today. That is why we have agreed within the framework of the Berlin Process that the countries of the region will allow travel with identity cards and recognize each other's academic and professional qualifications. At our meeting in October in Tirana, we expanded these rules once again, and I am pleased that the next meeting of the Berlin Process will take place in the fall of 2024 here in Berlin again. Of course, this is not a substitute for EU accession. The known admission conditions remain in place, and we will not make any compromises on that.

Anyone who expects reforms from candidate countries should not shy away from this task themselves. The European Union needs reforms that keep pace with the enlargement process. I made proposals on this last year at Charles University in Prague. Since then, a discussion among the member states has begun. We will deepen this debate at the upcoming European Council.

My goal is for us to agree on a clear roadmap for the reform process by next summer so that we can quickly move from theoretical discussions to practical reforms after the European elections. For this, we need a solid basis, so also the input of the European Commission. Concerns about a possible change to the European treaties should not deter us; for most, if not all, necessary changes, the existing treaties are flexible enough.

I have already spoken about majority decisions in the Council. They will play a central role. This goes beyond the already mentioned enlargement policy and concerns, for example, foreign policy and tax matters. We also need to talk about how the European Commission can remain operational after an EU enlargement. We will discuss these and other questions at the European Council. Such reforms have also not been pursued with the necessary urgency by the German side for a long time. We have now made significant progress in this regard.

How difficult it can be to reach a European consensus on key foreign policy issues has been demonstrated by the discussions regarding the European Union's stance on the terrorist attack by Hamas on Israel. Only after long, difficult negotiations were we able to agree on a common line at the last European Council: Israel has the right to defend itself against this terrible terrorist attack. Hamas must immediately release all hostages. We are continuing to work tirelessly for this. At the same time, humanitarian pauses, which have now also occurred, are essential to provide the population in Gaza with the necessities. This humanitarian aid for the suffering civilian population is necessary, and it must flow reliably.

However, the discussion at the European level must not stop there. We must already look ahead to the time after, to the time when the guns fall silent. Then it will be about what a sustainable security order can look like. I believe that Europe should engage in this discussion, not just as a donor for reconstruction or humanitarian aid. Especially after the horrors of October 7, it is clear that any order following this conflict must provide reliable protection for the citizens of Israel. Such an order should also involve the countries of the region, particularly those that have established normalization agreements with Israel or are considering doing so.

Then it will be about who takes on practical responsibility in the Gaza Strip. There is no way around strengthening the political responsibility of the Palestinian Authority also for Gaza, while we must address its obvious deficiencies in this regard.

Reconstruction and economic prospects can contribute to stability in such a phase. The European Union can play a role in this. But the countries of the region and the Gulf states should also take responsibility. However, this will only succeed if there is also a political solution approach. And this solution approach is and remains a two-state solution, which must be approached step by step.

A resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would allow Israel to focus on its most significant strategic threat: Iran and its regional supporters. As the federal government, we are engaging in international discussions about such post-conflict scenarios. We should also prepare for such a process within the European Union today. I will advocate for this in the coming days.

Six months before the European elections, the next two days will also be about what tasks we still need to accomplish by then. Three things are central in my view:

First.

We want to reduce bureaucracy. That is why it is good that the Commission has included this topic in its work program for 2024. We want to see ambitious proposals here, as we have agreed together with France.

Second.

We need an agreement with the European Parliament on the Common European Asylum System. This is a high priority for Germany, as is closer cooperation with countries of origin and transit. This also includes revitalizing the EU-Turkey statement.

Third.

We need to reach an understanding on the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. The goal is to reduce excessive national debt in a binding manner while also enabling necessary investments in the transformation. After the European finance ministers have worked intensively on this dossier, I am confident that we will soon achieve a comprehensive agreement.

We have just completed four weeks of intense negotiations regarding the consequences of the Federal Constitutional Court's ruling on the Climate and Transformation Fund for public finances in Germany. We had to make difficult trade-offs. After all, behind every budget item are tangible and understandable interests. We have agreed to prioritize expenditures without jeopardizing social security in our country or the transformation. This has always also been about the consequences of the turning point in times and how we ensure Germany's and Europe's security in turbulent times.

In particular, with regard to the credit authorizations in the Climate and Transformation Fund that can no longer be used, we propose to the budget legislator to reprioritize expenditures in the Climate and Transformation Fund, to make reallocations, and also to forgo certain projects. In the core budget, we will generate 17 billion euros, also through the abolition of climate-damaging subsidies, through the reduction of expenditures in individual departments, through better integration of refugees into the labor market, and through the reduction of federal grants.

The Federal Ministry of Finance will now swiftly implement this political agreement and provide the Bundestag with the corresponding drafting aids. Then the Budget Committee can conduct its reconciliation meeting, and the Bundestag can finally discuss the budget for 2024 in its first session of the new year.

I would therefore like to sincerely thank the Minister of Economics, the Minister of Finance, and everyone who contributed to the compromise that has now been reached. It was hard but constructive work. In the end, we have a good, truly democratic compromise.

Thank you very much.