Government statement by Chancellor Olaf Scholz to the European Council on June 29/30, 2023, before the German Bundestag on June 22, 2023, in Berlin:

Germany Olaf Scholz · Member of the Bundestag

22 June 2023 · Government statement to the German Bundestag ahead of the European Council · German Bundestag, Berlin, Germany

Context
Scholz addressed the German Bundestag on June 22, 2023, delivering a government statement ahead of the European Council summit in Brussels on June 29–30, 2023.
Main themes
Russian aggression against Ukraine, European security, NATO alliance, German National Security Strategy, support for Ukraine, European defense cooperation, Bundeswehr strengthening, European Council agenda, air defense initiatives, economic resilience, Germany's international responsibility
Duration
~25 min
76th percentile
Words
3,050
76th percentile
Sentences
159
83rd percentile
Readability
41
38th percentile
Grade
12.3
48th percentile
Syntax
2.92
37th percentile
Vocabulary
2.15
38th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 68%66%
  • Economic 15%15%
  • Institutional 6%6%
  • Ceremonial 5%4%
  • Social 4%4%
  • Environmental 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 3%

159 sentences in 39 paragraphs

Madam President!

Dear colleagues!

Ladies and gentlemen!

The most important task of every state, every society, is to ensure the safety of its citizens; for without security, there can be no freedom and no prosperity. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine brings this connection to light in a particularly cruel way.

We have responded and made far-reaching strategic decisions. We support Ukraine in its defense struggle with all our strength and, above all, for as long as necessary. We are taking a significantly more active role in protecting our alliance territory and our friends in NATO. We are laying the foundations for a geopolitically capable Europe. And: We are doing everything necessary to protect the security of our country against any threat.

We have anchored this priority in Germany's National Security Strategy last week. It is the first of its kind in the history of the Federal Republic. We decided together at the end of 2021 to adopt such a strategy – even before the turning point, before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, before the shutdown of gas supplies by Russia, before the explosion of the Nord Stream pipelines. These events have fundamentally changed the security policy environment for our country in less than 16 months. They underscore how necessary, indeed overdue, it is to place the protection of our citizens against all conceivable threats at the center of political action. We have been doing this from the very first day of this government.

At the same time, the National Security Strategy signals to our European and international friends and allies: Germany can be relied upon. We act in a coordinated European and international manner. In this context, we are taking on more responsibility for the security of Europe: specifically, for example, on NATO's eastern flank, in building a European defense cooperation, or by engaging in conflict resolution in our neighborhood, as we recently did between Kosovo and Serbia, which remains an urgent task.

Both the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance have emerged united and strengthened from the past 16 months. Our resolute response to the turning point, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, has contributed significantly to this. And I am pleased that we will experience this unity again when we come together for the NATO summit in Vilnius on July 11-12 and already next week at the European Council in Brussels.

The European Council will address Europe's security in multiple respects. We will, of course, discuss our further support for Ukraine, the economic resilience of Europe, stable external relations, and Europe's defense capabilities.

Strengthening Europe's role in NATO means, for me, above all, that we pool our defense efforts in Europe, give the defense industry in Europe a long-term perspective, and accelerate its production. We offer partner nations the opportunity to join our procurement initiatives. Major projects, such as the European Sky Shield Initiative initiated by Germany to strengthen European air defense within NATO, are progressing, also because Germany is taking the lead here.

The fact that the Budget Committee approved the procurement of the air defense systems Arrow 3 and IRIS-T last week sent two important messages to our partners: First. We rely on European cooperation for central projects concerning the security of Europe. And second: We are determined that Europe will fulfill its responsibilities within NATO. I am very grateful to all members of this house who have supported these initiatives.

At the European Council, we will, of course, also address the current situation in Ukraine. As the European Union, we leave no doubt that we will continue to support Ukraine in the long term. Since the beginning of the war, Germany's civilian and military aid amounts to 16.8 billion euros. This makes us the second-largest supporter of Ukraine after the USA. The recent support package of 2.7 billion euros, which we put together ahead of President Zelensky's visit, clearly shows: We stand firmly by Ukraine's side. In consultation with Kyiv and our other partners, we are focusing our arms deliveries on armored combat vehicles, air defense systems, artillery, and necessary ammunition. This is exactly what Ukraine urgently needs in its ongoing offensive to liberate its territories. Thus, Germany meets the expectations that our partners rightly have of us as the most populous and economically strong country in the heart of Europe.

However, it is not only about the expectations of others towards us. It is in our own interest to defend our security and thus our freedom and prosperity even in times that are so challenging. The measure is the threats directed against us and our allies. National defense is alliance defense and vice versa. The National Security Strategy sets concrete goals for this: first, to strengthen the Bundeswehr so that it becomes a guarantor of conventional defense in Europe; second, to promote military future capabilities; and third, to expand the security and defense technological base in Europe.

At the same time, we are ensuring that the Bundeswehr finally receives the equipment it needs, through effective procurement from the special fund, but also by spending two percent of our gross domestic product on defense for the first time in decades, starting next year.

With this, we underscore what I said here in the Bundestag on February 27, 2022: Our promise of mutual assistance in NATO is unconditional. With this unwavering commitment, we enter the discussions at the NATO summit in Vilnius. This summit will send a strong signal of transatlantic cooperation and determination to stand together for our security. All allies have a great interest in this.

We will make a number of decisions to adapt our military planning, for example, to improve the protection of our infrastructure underwater. We have undertaken this initiative together with Norway, and I am very grateful to my colleague Prime Minister Støre for that.

I am firmly convinced that, alongside Finland, Sweden should also sit at the summit table as a new ally. I appeal to the re-elected Turkish President Erdogan to clear the way for this, as we all agreed last year in Madrid.

An important role will be played by the question of what the future relationship between NATO and Ukraine looks like. Our practical and concrete support, closely coordinated, remains of crucial, indeed vital importance for Ukraine. At the same time, we should look soberly at the current situation. The Ukrainian government itself has stated that NATO membership is not an option while Russia is waging war against Ukraine. Therefore, I advocate that we focus in Vilnius on what is now of absolute priority, namely strengthening Ukraine's actual combat power.

At the same time, we are working with our G7 and EU partners and Ukraine on effective and long-term security guarantees. Our goal is twofold: to sustainably support Ukraine militarily, including with modern Western weapons, and at the same time to strengthen Ukraine's economic resilience in its defense against Russian aggression.

With our National Security Strategy, we are responding not only to a completely changed security situation in Europe but also to a changed geopolitical environment. The war in the east of our continent is just one of the causes. The world of the 21st century is characterized by the emergence of very different centers of power, alongside the USA, Europe, and China, also in other parts of Asia, Africa, and South America. Our goal is for Europe to remain one of these centers of power, with Germany as a strong, open, and democratic country in the center. For this, we need friends and allies in Europe and in the world.

In recent months, we have strengthened existing partnerships and built new ones. Central to this remains our friendship with France. President Macron and I share the goal of a geopolitical Europe. We have made this very clear in our numerous meetings, most recently in Potsdam and Paris. The fact that we succeeded in reviving the Weimar Triangle at the level of heads of state and government after a long pause during our meetings in Paris and previously in February in Munich is of particular value given the war in Eastern Europe.

Our cooperation with the United States and President Biden is also closer and more trusting than ever before. We will continue the close coordination between Washington and Berlin and stay the course by supporting Ukraine while ensuring that the war does not escalate into a confrontation between Russia and NATO. It is not, and it will not be.

Together with France, Poland, the USA, and other allies in Europe and the G7, we will ensure that the Euro-Atlantic area remains a region of peace, freedom, and stability. At the same time, we must prevent imperialist thinking and actions from experiencing a renaissance worldwide. In other words: We have a great interest in as many states as possible rallying behind the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. I am advocating for this very intensively. That is why the entire federal government has intensified its exchange with countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In November, I will invite important partners to Berlin for the "G20 Compact with Africa" so that we can strengthen economic cooperation with our neighboring continent.

I am pleased that in mid-July we will come together for a summit of the European Union with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean for the first time in eight years. We will prepare for this meeting intensively at the European Council next week, considering not only what we expect from these countries but also what we have to offer them to bind them closer to us, particularly on issues such as trade and fair raw material agreements.

Of course, many of these countries view the conflict in Ukraine from a different perspective than we do, not least because it is far away for many of them. But we agree on the fundamental principles that we all want to uphold: the inviolability of borders, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, and the prohibition of violence.

We are also having an exchange about these principles with China. It was important to me that we as the G7 agree on a common approach to dealing with China. We succeeded in this in Hiroshima. On the one hand, we stated that we want constructive relations with China, that none of us wants to hinder China's economic development; President Biden has stated this loudly and publicly. After all, China plays a crucial role, for example, when it comes to global food security, assistance for heavily indebted countries, investments in future technologies, the fight against poverty, or the fight against climate change.

At the same time, we have clearly called on China to adhere to international rules. No country is the backyard of another. This applies in Europe just as it does around the world. We firmly reject all unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas by force or coercion. This applies particularly to Taiwan.

We are also watching the human rights situation and the state of the rule of law in China with concern. I emphasized this message the day before yesterday during the German-Chinese government consultations.

In advance, I exchanged views with many of my colleagues in the European Council. At our meeting next week in Brussels, I will report on the results of the government consultations; for our relations with China are embedded in the EU-China policy, which we will discuss next week.

We have taken the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine very seriously in our discussions with Chinese counterparts. Already at the Security Conference in Munich, China committed to a peace solution that respects Ukraine's territorial integrity. However, this means – and this must be made clear – that Russia must withdraw its troops. I pointed this out and called on China to use its influence in Moscow accordingly. Simply freezing the conflict will not bring peace. A comprehensive, just, and lasting peace will only be achieved if it respects territorial integrity and the principles of the UN Charter.

Another important aspect that has played a significant role in our discussions with and about China in recent months is the question of how we can prevent unilateral economic dependencies. On this issue, we as the G7 have also found a common line. We are not decoupling from China. Our goal is smart diversification, a targeted de-risking. Our companies are working to broaden their supply relationships. We support them in this, for example, through incentives for strategic stockpiling of critical raw materials. During my travels in recent months, I have advocated for closer economic relations, for new trade agreements, and for closer cooperation on energy issues and the exploration of natural resources. It is important to me that value creation, sustainable development, and growth also take place locally in these countries, that we do not engage in extractivism or exploitation in other parts of the world. In this way, Europe can offer our partners a new quality of cooperation that has not existed before with these countries.

At the European Council next week, we will also discuss the topic of economic security and resilience. The be-all and end-all is, of course, to strengthen Europe's competitiveness. Work is underway on this. We are in the process of further developing our common fiscal rules. In addition, we are jointly advocating with the Commission for further flexibility in the EU state aid rules. This week, the Commission presented a European Economic Security Strategy. In it, it makes proposals on how we can reduce risks to our economy in critical areas and strengthen the resilience of our companies. Central to this is that we continue to diversify both our suppliers and our markets. The motto is not less trade, less exchange, but more trade and even broader relationships.

This comprehensive understanding of security, which includes economic security, runs like a red thread through our National Security Strategy. Security is far more than national and alliance defense, as central as this aspect is. It includes the protection of our free democratic basic order at home, but also a secure energy and raw material supply, proactive diplomacy, poverty reduction and food security, protection against health crises, cybersecurity, and last but not least, a determined fight against man-made climate change. Only if we contain the climate crisis and its consequences will we be able to secure our livelihoods in the long term. Fortunately, this insight is now largely shared here in Germany and Europe. Therefore, we have firmly anchored the issue of sustainability in our National Security Strategy.

Another aspect is necessary when we talk about a comprehensive concept of security. I already addressed this in my speech at Charles University in Prague last year. We must resolve the open questions that have divided and weakened us in the European Union for years. The perhaps biggest source of division in recent years has been our handling of the issue of refugee migration. After years of tough negotiations, our interior ministers reached an agreement on core components of the reform of the European asylum system two weeks ago. This is a historic agreement because it shows that the EU can overcome its differences even on the most controversial issues. I know that here in this house, the agreement is not undisputed; everyone had to make compromises, including Germany, and we will ensure that the regulation improves even further before it is finally adopted. But this was right in the interest of the unity and capacity for action of Europe. It was right because our previous system is completely dysfunctional. Recently, the overwhelming majority of those who arrived in Germany had not been registered in any other EU member state beforehand. Although Germany is surrounded by Schengen countries, many refugees register here for the first time. Returns to the first countries of arrival under the Dublin system have not worked. At the same time, the countries at the external borders felt abandoned by others with the problem of increasing arrival numbers. We will replace this system with an agreement that combines responsibility at the external border with solidarity from all.

We want to clarify more quickly who is entitled to protection as a war refugee or politically persecuted person and who is not. This is better than years of uncertainty, even for newcomers. Those with very little chance of being recognized as refugees will in the future undergo a fast asylum and return procedure directly at the external borders. Those who have good chances of protection in Europe because they come from a war zone or are politically persecuted will be registered and can then continue their procedure in Europe. Germany will also be relieved by such a new and fair system; until now, we have been the main target for largely uncontrolled internal migration within the Schengen area. Member states that do not participate in this solidarity reception of refugees must instead make a financial contribution to migration management. This is only fair; after all, all member states benefit from secure external borders and open borders within the Union.

However, one cannot have one without the other in the long term. That is why the compromise reached in Brussels is so important. I will therefore defend it at the European Council next week with conviction and advocate that we reach an agreement with the European Parliament before the European elections next year and, as I said, further develop it. I will advocate that we jointly limit irregular migration in Europe while simultaneously strengthening legal immigration into the labor market, as we are doing here in Germany with our migration partnerships and the Skilled Workers Immigration Act.

Ensuring security is a task that requires all parts of the federal government, federal states, and municipalities, as well as all members of parliament. It requires our entire country, and I say without any doubt: Germany has the strength to do this. We will give the security of our country the importance it deserves in these challenging times.

We are a stable democracy with a vibrant civil society and a strong economy. We have old and new friends, partners, and allies in the world who share our values and interests. In this lies our great strength, and it gives us all reason for optimism.

Thank you.