Speech by Chancellor Scholz at the Bundeswehr Conference on September 16, 2022

Germany Olaf Scholz · Member of the Bundestag

16 September 2022 · Bundeswehr Conference

Context
Scholz addressed the annual Bundeswehr Conference on September 16, 2022, outlining Germany's military priorities and security strategy in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Main themes
Bundeswehr modernization and rearmament, German security policy turning point, Russia's war in Ukraine, NATO alliance defense, special fund of 100 billion euros, national and alliance defense as core mission, threat assessment of Putin's Russia, military capabilities and equipment, German strategic priorities, societal responsibility for security
Duration
~23 min
72nd percentile
Words
2,772
72nd percentile
Sentences
146
80th percentile
Readability
48
57th percentile
Grade
11.2
35th percentile
Syntax
2.90
35th percentile
Vocabulary
2.28
68th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 75%68%
  • Economic 10%10%
  • Ceremonial 10%9%
  • Institutional 4%4%
  • Social 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 8%

146 sentences in 46 paragraphs

Dear Minister, dear Christine,

ladies and gentlemen, state secretaries,

esteemed representatives of military chaplaincy,

distinguished General Inspector of the Bundeswehr,

dear participants of the Bundeswehr conference,

you want to hear "plain talk" from me today.

I could take the easy way out and simply quote a sentence from my speech at the Munich Security Conference, which I delivered before the Russian attack on Ukraine in mid-February. At that time, I said: "Aircraft that can fly, ships that can set sail, soldiers who are optimally equipped for their dangerous tasks ‑ that is what a country of our size, which bears special responsibility in Europe, must be able to provide. We owe that to our NATO allies as well." - That was my statement back then.

This claim holds true ‑ today even more so. It is about better equipment and capabilities, about planning and reliability when we talk about the Bundeswehr in this turning point. And therefore, let me say right away: A well-equipped Bundeswehr that can fulfill its mission to protect our country is a matter of course for me. I stand for that as Chancellor, and you can rely on it.

However, better equipment for the Bundeswehr alone is not enough. One of the most persistent misunderstandings of my speech on the turning point is that it was solely about more money, about the special fund of 100 billion euros for the Bundeswehr.

Of course, the agreement on this special fund ‑ secured by a constitutional amendment ‑ is a real paradigm shift, as it lays the foundation for a new Bundeswehr, with capabilities that are up to date. But the head of the European Council on Foreign Relations put it succinctly a few days ago: "Status quo plus special fund is not enough." That is why it is important that we also talk today about what else needs to be added ‑ from the political side, from the Bundeswehr, and ‑ this is important to me ‑ also from our society, to make our country and our alliance safer.

A strategic assessment includes an unvarnished analysis of the starting situation. I have described Russia's war as a turning point because it goes far beyond what we have experienced in terms of wars and conflicts in and around Europe since the end of the Cold War. Here, a heavily armed nuclear power is attempting to redraw borders in Europe by force. If Russia were to succeed, our peace in Europe would be gone for a long time. Only someone who does not listen to or read what President Putin says and writes could doubt that. He wants to establish Russia in Europe as an imperial power ‑ with the maps of the Tsarist Empire or the Soviet Union in mind.

For us, this means: We must prepare for the fact that Putin's Russia will define itself in opposition to us, to NATO, and to the European Union for the foreseeable future, which Putin has never accepted as a significant political actor and has always fought against. This is a sobering analysis, especially when one thinks of Mikhail Gorbachev, who passed away a few days ago, and all the hopes many of us had with the end of the Cold War.

A former German Minister of Defense believed we were "surrounded only by friends." The truth is: Politics, the economy, and large parts of society were all too willing to believe this thesis and drew far-reaching consequences from it ‑ wrong consequences, as we know today, especially when we look at the state of the Bundeswehr.

The clarity about Russia's motives ‑ at least as long as Putin is president ‑ has another consequence: There is no longer any doubt about what we must prepare for. From Putin's Russia ‑ this is what we are preparing for within NATO ‑ the greatest threat to our alliance currently emanates. That is why we must also look very closely at what capabilities and potentials Russia possesses. A sober view of the realities and risks is required.

For a long time, our country ‑ and this explicitly includes politics ‑ has avoided a genuine prioritization of the tasks of the Bundeswehr. Drilling wells, securing humanitarian aid, containing floods, helping with vaccinations during pandemics ‑ all of this can be done by a good army like the Bundeswehr. Our country appreciates this very much, especially recently. However, this is not its core mission.

The core mission of the Bundeswehr is the defense of freedom in Europe ‑ or, to put it less lyrically: national and alliance defense. Everything else derives from this mission. All other tasks must be subordinated to this mission. That is my claim as Chancellor, and I will be held accountable for it.

And because I promised plain talk, I add: At the same time, I hope that this directive also shapes your thinking and actions as military superiors.

Please do not think that the special fund is just an exception and that everything will return to how it was before. In the nearly seven months since Russia's attack on Ukraine, more has happened than in the years before. The special fund is a reality. My statement that we will continuously increase the defense budget to two percent of GDP also stands! You can plan on that.

We have broken with the previous state practice regarding arms deliveries and proven: We do not shy away from change. I am also very grateful that the Bundeswehr has drawn on its limited stocks wherever it was justifiable.

A few weeks ago, I was at the training area in Putlos. There, I observed how the Ukrainian armed forces are being trained on the Gepard anti-aircraft tank. It is impressive how bravely the Ukrainians defend their country, their freedom, and indeed our European values. And we can be proud of the contribution we are making to that.

We have changed our legal foundations to dramatically accelerate procurement and simplify procedures ‑ for which I am very grateful to the Minister ‑ because only in this way will we be able to invest the 100 billion euros quickly and purposefully. And the citizens rightly expect that from us ‑ especially in light of the tense economic and financial situation.

The capability gaps of the Bundeswehr are significant. But we are in the process of closing the most pressing ones very quickly. The priorities are combat aircraft, heavy transport helicopters, Eurofighters, the successor to the Marder infantry fighting vehicle, corvettes 130, and frigates 126. But we will also quickly and effectively strengthen the inventory to finally put an end to a shortage economy that has long been glossed over as "dynamic capability management" ‑ at least that is what I have been told. Ammunition, spare parts, maintenance ‑ the billion-euro dimension of the challenge is very visible. But we are on the right track.

We have also quickly adjusted our alliance. NATO has proven in recent months that it is very much alive. Close coordination with President Biden and his administration has been essential, and I am extremely grateful for that. And I say this very clearly: NATO remains the guarantor of our security.

In my speech on February 27 in the Bundestag, I said: We will defend every square meter of alliance territory. I mean that very seriously ‑ and it is taken seriously. We have authorized the SACEUR to request and deploy troops massively. For the first time ever, NATO had to activate its defense plans on the eastern flank.

The cold start capability is being increased. To this end, we are significantly shortening the readiness of the NATO Response Force, and we are reducing the time for the deployment of the VJTF, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, thereby proving that the name is programmatic: fast, adaptable, ready for action.

And we are consistently moving forward together in the alliance: The new NATO Force Model will make us even more extensive, flexible, and responsive in the alliance starting in 2025. Particularly through the substantial German contribution of 30,000 soldiers, 85 aircraft, and ships, NATO's responsiveness and deterrent effect will be drastically increased.

Germany has played an important role in all of this from the very beginning ‑ that was very important to me. As a result, hundreds of German soldiers are stationed in the Baltic States, Romania, and Slovakia. Our navy and air force are patrolling more intensively in the Baltic Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. This is more than just a reassurance to our eastern allies. It is about our security, which cannot be separated from the security of our alliance partners. And at the same time, we make it clear: Germany is ready to take on responsibility at the forefront for the security of our continent.

As the most populous nation with the largest economic power and a country in the middle of the continent, our army must become the cornerstone of conventional defense in Europe, the best-equipped armed force in Europe. That is the goal ‑ and that our European friends and partners do not perceive this goal as a threat, but rather as a guarantee and promise, should motivate us.

I have just outlined the first steps. More are to come. Next year, Germany will take over the leadership of the VJTF. The times for that could hardly be more challenging. I know what a Herculean task this will be for the Bundeswehr and its soldiers ‑ especially because we are struggling with such deficits in equipment, especially because we are currently trying to get many things back on track simultaneously.

But I also know: The women and men of the Bundeswehr, all of you, will manage this, with the backing of the political leaders. You have proven this in the seven months since the war began, during which you and your comrades have shown the highest responsibility and greatest readiness for action everywhere ‑ whether on the eastern flank, in training Ukrainian soldiers, in increasing readiness, in the provision and procurement of material, in developing new rules and concepts. And I would like to ask you: Please pass on my recognition and thanks for that to the troops!

Ladies and gentlemen, turning point ‑ that means saying goodbye to old certainties. It means rethinking, also strategically. Within NATO, we have done this at the summit in Madrid and with the new Strategic Concept. Our combat power and readiness will be significantly increased. The eastern flank will be strengthened. I have just outlined Germany's readiness to contribute decisively to that.

The European Union has also positioned itself more clearly and cohesively with its Strategic Compass. This results in a division of labor for me, with which we can strengthen Europe's security in the long term. NATO remains responsible for the collective defense of the entire alliance territory, with a focus on Europe. Credible deterrence remains the core element. However, we Europeans must take on significantly more responsibility within NATO. The fact that Finland and Sweden will soon join NATO, both of which have modern and capable armies, is therefore very welcome.

But Europe's future role goes beyond that. I outlined some of my ideas for European defense cooperation a few weeks ago at Charles University in Prague. This includes a European headquarters that can lead operations ‑ whether it is an evacuation of our citizens, as last year in Afghanistan, or a European advisory or training mission like in Iraq, Mali, or Niger. It also includes utilizing the existing possibilities in the EU treaties to entrust operations to a group of member states, a "coalition of the willing."

Perhaps the most pressing problem in Europe, however, is the completely confusing number of weapon systems and armaments and the competition among different arms companies. Only the coordinated growth of European capabilities will lead to a capable Europe. I am particularly concerned about the area of air defense ‑ coordinated at the European level and as a contribution to strengthening the European pillar of NATO.

The challenges are great, and I am aware of the conflicting goals. Nevertheless, existing cooperations show us that joint European armament is possible. There are often hardly any other options for new complex systems. When I mentioned in Prague the organization for the management of joint armament projects, some may have thought: What is he talking about now?

However, I am convinced: This organization has the potential to become the nucleus of European cooperation in armaments, if ‑ and this is the prerequisite ‑ we, the member states, manage to review our national reservations and regulations regarding the use and export of jointly produced systems. Some may be surprised by this ‑ but the federal government is ready for it.

Not only have we strategically repositioned ourselves within NATO and the EU, but we are also working on this at the national level. We had intensive discussions about this at the Cabinet retreat at the end of August in Meseberg. And it is clear: Our National Security Strategy will take into account the lessons of this turning point ‑ national and alliance defense first, so to speak.

It is also clear, however, that the threats of the 21st century go far beyond open military confrontations, such as those currently taking place in Ukraine. We are currently experiencing how much our dependence on Russian energy has also become a security problem. It has cost the federal government many efforts and incredibly far-reaching decisions that we can now say, before winter: We will likely get through. If we had approached this without measures, we would be discussing very different problems now.

I could name further examples: Asymmetric threats such as cyber attacks are among them, the one-sided dependence on important raw materials or on just one trading partner, a lack of our own capabilities when it comes to strategically important high technologies or capabilities in space. In these areas, internal and external security can no longer be clearly separated, but must be thought of together ‑ also in the European context. At the same time, security is also created by stabilizing countries threatened by crises and conflicts ‑ with civilian means and, if necessary, also with a military contribution. In all these areas, the Bundeswehr can and must play a role.

At the same time, this understanding of security goes far beyond the task spectrum of the Bundeswehr or even the tasks of the classic security sectors. We must think of security in the 21st century in a much more comprehensive way. Therefore, the new National Security Strategy will provide an integrated approach to our security policy and hold all actors accountable ‑ both state and private ‑ who can contribute to it.

Ladies and gentlemen, one last point is important to me. Recently, the Süddeutsche Zeitung wrote: “This nation is not capable of defense, not least because it does not feel capable of defense.” We are currently laying the foundation for a new Bundeswehr, and we all know: Facts have normative power. But we also know that something decisive must be added: A changed mindset ‑ at all levels in the Bundeswehr, combined with confidence and a willingness to take risks. Without you, the best material is nothing!

Therefore, I would like to ask you as military and civilian superiors: Carry the spirit of renewal and change into the troops! Live it out! In this turning point, pragmatic thinking and innovative solutions count. This requires the willingness to give up cherished things, to confidently pursue new paths, and to exemplify a tolerance for mistakes that rewards decisiveness. Nothing is set in stone: Discuss openly and courageously ‑ and act when you see a need for improvement! You have my ‑ and I know: also Christine Lambrecht's ‑ political backing for bold decisions.

And what may be even more important for a democratic army like the Bundeswehr: You also have the support of the citizens of our country. Wherever I travel in the country these days: Hardly anyone criticizes the special fund or the new role of the Bundeswehr in alliance defense. What I perceive is a great deal of support and trust in the men and women of the Bundeswehr and at most the question “Why is all this only happening now?”

The Bundeswehr has once again moved to where it belongs: in the center of our country. This is a blessing for our country and for our security.

I hope that was clear enough, at least for the beginning. And if not, I look forward to your questions, your suggestions, and our discussion.

Thank you very much!