Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen's response in the Folketing to inquiry F34 regarding the Faroe Islands banking case.

Denmark Poul Nyrup Rasmussen · Prime Minister of Denmark

27 January 1998 · Response in the Folketing to inquiry F34 on the Faroe Islands banking case · Folketing, Denmark

Context
Rasmussen addressed the Folketing on January 27, 1998, responding to an inquiry about the investigation commission's findings on Denmark's intervention in the 1990s Faroese banking crisis.
Main themes
Faroese banking crisis investigation, investigation commission findings, political accountability, Denmark-Faroe Islands relations, accusations and political discourse, government response to economic crisis, Faroese economic mismanagement, Danish financial intervention, political irrationality, parliamentary inquiry
Duration
~29 min
82nd percentile
Words
3,520
82nd percentile
Sentences
204
89th percentile
Readability
39
34th percentile
Grade
10.9
31st percentile
Syntax
2.72
14th percentile
Vocabulary
2.20
50th percentile

Translated from Danish

Content
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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 51%46%
  • Economic 38%34%
  • Ceremonial 5%5%
  • Geopolitical 3%3%
  • Social 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 10%

204 sentences in 117 paragraphs

After nearly three years of work, the investigation commission on the Faroese banking case has now presented its findings. A comprehensive report in five volumes and over 2,260 pages.

The entire purpose of initiating the investigation was to obtain an objective description of the overall sequence of events during those years - from 1992 onwards - when Denmark helped the Faroe Islands out of the economic crisis and saved the two banks from financial collapse.

We have now received such an objective description. The investigation commission has done its work thoroughly. 'Every stone has been turned.' Just as we all wished. The commission has fulfilled its task.

* * *

Now we must take a political stand. Therefore, we must, from a political standpoint, of course, base our position on this objective description and respond politically to it.

I will do that. The government and the governing parties will do that. And I will also simultaneously urge all other parties to do the same!

The political situation

When such a call is made, it is connected to my experience in recent weeks of how the political reasonableness and sensible political dialogue that normally characterize political work have been pushed aside. Replaced by political irrationality and unreasonable political dialogue.

It is sad - it is doubly sad.

When we look at the objective content of the extensive commission work and the conclusions of the investigation commission, the political conclusions are just as clear. I must first and foremost state that the many accusations directed at the government while the commission was working - accusations of conspiracies and secret alliances - did not have any basis in reality!

Nevertheless, we have experienced in recent weeks - also in the days following the publication of the investigation commission's report - that certain political parties - especially one particular party - have attempted to engage in suspicion and personal persecution against the government and some of its members.

We have seen claims of conspiracies, secret alliances, and malicious intent, and diabolical ministers who only wished harm for the Faroese people.

Unfortunately, certain parties - or rather one specific party - have, as I have experienced it, consciously chosen to ignore the objective reality as it is illuminated in the Faroebank report. Instead, they have attempted to interpret the text entirely differently to fit another kind of reality - because the commission's work evidently does not fit into that party's tactics.

If we are to address the Faroebank case realistically and seriously today, it must not be done on such a distorted basis, but precisely on the objective basis that is available today in the form of the thorough commission investigation.

* * *

When this government took over in 1993, it did not only take over the leadership of a Denmark with significant economic problems and high unemployment - the government also took on a task in relation to the Faroese society, which was in a deep crisis.

In Denmark, we had to start correcting things to establish a foundation for the progress that today characterizes Danish society.

* * *

In relation to the Faroese crisis, there must be no doubt in Denmark or the Faroe Islands about who bore the main responsibility for the economic development in the Faroe Islands.

The economic crisis in the Faroe Islands was not imposed on the Faroese from the outside. A large number of reports from expert committees already pointed out in the 1980s a series of mistakes, massive overconsumption through the economic policy in the Faroe Islands, and an excessively high level of debt. Year after year, the warnings became increasingly stronger - in the reports. But unfortunately only there. I can today regret that there was not already then a greater emphasis from the official Danish side - and also much earlier in the 80s from the Danish government - on the deeply serious development in the Faroe Islands.

Had that happened, much would likely have been easier to handle later.

Only when the economic crisis hit the banking sector - only when the first bank, according to the Financial Supervisory Authority, faced bankruptcy in October 1992, did the then Danish government react - after a request from the Faroese government.

A government that in October 1992 had only limited opportunities to prepare for negotiations with the government regarding the acute crisis. Because the then government only informed the Faroese government at a late stage. This is evident from the conclusions of the investigation commission.

[Page 458]

The crisis was at that time under strong development. Production in the Faroe Islands had already fallen drastically - without any initiatives being taken from the Danish side to help the Faroese out of their problems.

* * *

When the current government leadership took over the problems at the end of January 1993, the economic development in the Faroe Islands was on the verge of total collapse. In reality, it was the most extensive economic crisis any Western society has experienced in recent times. The situation in the Faroe Islands was alarming:

direct decline in production and income,

constantly rising unemployment to catastrophic levels,

the foreign debt had increased throughout the 1980s and now reached 8 billion DKK.

At the same time, we began to collaborate with a government that was poorly prepared to handle such a crisis, and which until the turn of 1992-93 would not acknowledge that there could be significant losses in the banks.

The then government in October 1992, in collaboration with the Faroese government, established the Financing Fund of 1992. This initiative was supported by a broad majority in the Folketing and laid the groundwork for later solutions. With the agreement of October 6, 1992, on the first bank reconstruction, the solution model was practically also established for the subsequent bank rescues of Sjóvinnubankin and - in October 1993 - of Føroya Banki.

* * *

This did not prevent the next banking crisis from breaking out almost simultaneously with the change of government on January 25, 1993.

Despite the time pressure that the newly appointed government was under, the agreement of February 1, 1993, between the government and the Faroese government became a turning point in the effort to halt the crisis and reverse the development.

From the outset in the new government, we realized that a wide range of business policy initiatives, new caution in fishing, and savings in economic policy were necessary. To prevent new crises in the banking sector, a long-term effort was required. - For the crisis did not arise as a result of the banking case. The opposite was true!

Our agreement of February 11, 1993, was forward-looking. It was interventions that the newly appointed Prime Minister supported. It was interventions that worked.

I am today in no doubt that the agreement of February 1 was crucial for the Faroe Islands to get back on the right track. Politically, the newly appointed Prime Minister later paid a high price for his courageous and forward-looking decision to participate in the new agreement. Historically, we must acknowledge that the interventions and the tough conditions in economic policy worked. I am in no doubt that this is a key reason why the Faroe Islands today - after just a few years - are on their way out of the economic crisis, provided the course is maintained.

The agreement of February 1, 1993, had indeed broader perspectives. The agreement included, among other things, quite strong demands for savings in the national budget in accordance with the IMF's guidelines, a halt to capital investments, and new strict initiatives to ensure a future sustainable fishery - after the massive overfishing in the 80s, which was an independent contributing cause of the crisis.

* * *

The economic lending that the Danish state provided to the Faroe Islands in 1993 solved the very serious, acute problems in the Faroese economy. The medicine worked. And the demands we made created a better foundation for the development of the Faroese economy in the long term.

Firstly,

our efforts contributed to maintaining the Faroese banking system. The alternative would have created unmanageable consequences for the Faroese population. We avoided a collapse of the economy. We all agreed that that was the outlook if just one of the banks went down. All responsible parties also agreed on this in the Folketing!

Secondly,

the support enabled the Faroese government to repay its loans to foreign creditors in a planned manner.

Without a solution to these two problems, the consequences of the economic crisis would have been even more severe - also for the individual Faroese.

* * *

The overall picture is that the interventions worked. It was right that we from the Danish side placed decisive emphasis on ensuring that our efforts were based on help-to-self-help for the Faroe Islands. The main effort, which was based on a new, arduous effort from the Faroese people - and extensive economic lending from Denmark - combined with a number of conditions - worked. It still does - if the course in the Faroe Islands is indeed maintained.

* * *

It surprises me that this effort from the Danish state, and this economic injection from the Danish population - which itself was in a difficult situation - has seemingly been forgotten in this entire process. Have the Faroese and certain Danish opposition politicians really forgotten it??

We have not forgotten it. That this effort may have been forgotten is connected to another of the investigation commission's conclusions, namely the one stating that something went wrong in connection with the so-called share swap.

On March 10, 1993, a proposal for a share swap between the Financing Fund and Den Danske Bank was placed on the government's table - incidentally just after the Faroese government had been presented with the proposal. But before this proposal was presented, the very terms of the transaction had already been established between the two parties, the Financing Fund of 1992 and Den Danske Bank - with assistance from the Financial Supervisory Authority.

In this context, it is important to distinguish between technique and politics.

Technically,

both the government and the Faroese government had to assume that Den Danske Bank, the Financing Fund, and the Financial Supervisory Authority had reached a reasonable and fair exchange ratio between the shares. And when, moreover, the parties involved gave the impression that it was commercially acceptable, what basis did the government have to doubt this?

What the government had to consider was whether it was politically a good idea. - We in the government agreed on a yes! It was because the share swap was part of the effort to get the Faroese business community back on its feet. Through the coordination of the two banks' business practices, conditions were created for a coordinated banking effort that could contribute to the much-needed structural adjustment of the Faroese business community, especially in the fishing industry.

I would like to say in connection with the work of the Financing Fund in general that I do not find that the criticism raised by the investigation commission against the then chairman touches upon the Financing Fund itself as a construction.

* * *

It is evident, when looking back, that the communication between the government and the Faroese government has not been satisfactory. We have become a bit wiser when we look back at the process. The consequence of this has been that the Faroese government has had limited time to consider the various proposals, ask questions, and assess the answers. However, the process must also be evaluated in light of the difficulties associated with discussing a bank's problems with liquidity, solidity, and ownership outside of a very narrow circle, as is also mentioned in the report.

That said, the government is ready to acknowledge and take responsibility for the fact that the communication was not good enough - that can rightly be criticized now.

* * *

The government acknowledges its responsibility

It is a united government that acknowledges its overall political responsibility for the handling of the Faroese crisis in 1993.

It is important to emphasize that the decision-making basis was the same for the Danish government and the Faroese government.

In a situation of extremely high unemployment and budget deficits in Denmark, we wanted just as little as our predecessors in government to place burdens from the Faroese crisis on Danish taxpayers. That is still the Danish government's position.

Therefore, our assistance to the Faroe Islands had to be based on help-to-self-help.

Therefore, in the spring of 1993, there was massive support here in Christiansborg for a solution where Denmark's role was to provide loans that would enable the Faroe Islands to solve the crisis themselves.

It was not the Danish population that had spent the money. Our viewpoint was and is the simple one that it was money that had been spent and lost in the Faroe Islands!

* * *

But increasingly grim reports kept coming in.

We had - we thought - reason to fear that the crisis awareness had not developed enough in the Faroe Islands.

But it must also be strongly emphasized that no one could naturally know how deep the crisis would become. No one knew where it would end. No one promised anyone a specific limit to the size of the disaster.

Everything we did in the government, even after the share swap was agreed upon, had one single purpose: To keep the Faroese banking system alive, not to contribute to unrest and further, self-reinforcing crisis sentiment.

In some places, it has been portrayed as if the government had better knowledge than the Faroese government about how deep the crisis would become.

The facts are that the entire process leading up to the autumn of 1993 is the story of one long crisis worsening:

More unemployed, more business closures, capital flight from the banks, emigration, total stagnation in the real estate market.

As anyone can hear and, not least, resolve in the report, there has been absolutely no basis for the accusations we have heard from certain politicians here in the parliament and in the Faroe Islands. Accusations of conspiracies, secret alliances, ill will, and diabolical ministers. The report thoroughly punctures these myths. It is also the goodwill that has characterized the Danish state and government's efforts in this matter, just as it is the goodwill that has characterized the actions of my ministers.

That said, it must also be stated that we must learn from the experiences we have had in this case. There are things that can be criticized in hindsight, certainly - and things that can be done better.

Compensation - legal responsibility

First point.

The government will take the initiative to start discussions with the government of the Faroe Islands as soon as possible after today's debate. Now we need to conclude this matter in a dignified manner and move forward in the development of the relationship between Denmark and the Faroe Islands.

It is evident from the report that neither the government of the Faroe Islands nor the Danish government was aware that the information underlying the share swap was not based on thorough investigations. The commission assumes that the Danish Bank's response was not representative of the actual situation that Føroya Banki found itself in.

According to the report, the chairman of the Financing Fund and the Financial Supervisory Authority share responsibility for not providing a comprehensive picture of Føroya Banki's situation.

* * *

In this context, the government will soon contact the government of the Faroe Islands to discuss the procedure for establishing appropriate compensation to the government, including the steps that should be taken regarding the Danish Bank.

* * *

The government has not yet concluded its considerations regarding the legal questions that the case raises.

I can inform you that the government has requested the Attorney General to assess the case for these considerations.

* * *

Now the Danish Bank has opened up for a discussion on the issue of compensation. That is, in itself, quite interesting.

* * *

The government acknowledges its responsibility. Therefore, we must now initiate negotiations with the government of the Faroe Islands regarding the repayment of the debt, which has already been anticipated.

As a result of the crisis in 1992-93 and as a remedy for its consequences, the government has provided state loans to the government of the Faroe Islands amounting to approximately 5.6 billion DKK. The loans have been granted according to agreements between the government and the government of the Faroe Islands, and the agreements have been approved by the Folketing and the Lagting. The most recent agreement was made on November 3, 1995.

This agreement includes, among other things, that the government and the government of the Faroe Islands will discuss the repayment of state loans during 1997.

These negotiations have not yet commenced, partly because we have been awaiting the report from the Investigation Commission. Now we have it, and now the negotiations must begin.

The Danish government is prepared to negotiate the overall debt settlement so that it occurs in a reasonable relation to the economic sustainability of the Faroe Islands.

Improvement of cooperation relations with the Faroe Islands

The second point is a strengthening of cooperation with the Faroese government and Lagting. The process was initiated during my recent visit to the Faroe Islands, where I agreed with the Løgmaður that we will improve contacts both politically and at the civil servant level. In this connection, the government will establish a working group chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office, which will propose how the contact between us and the home rule governments can be improved.

In this context, I would like to point out that there is also a task for the Folketing. After my visit to the Faroe Islands, I have reached out to the Speaker of the Folketing, in which I encourage strengthening the contact between the parliaments as well.

Improvement of rules and administrative procedures

The third point I want to mention is the issue of improving procedures and rules.

It is absolutely crucial that the work being done at the civil servant level is precisely anchored at the political level. In this case, we must now acknowledge that the ordinary information and communication procedures that a newly appointed government might assume were in place subsequently turned out not to be in order. There has been insufficient information along the way. Such things must not happen. It is an experience that the government will take to heart. It will be corrected.

The government will also assess whether there is a basis for criticism of the civil servants' execution of their duties. Steps have been taken in this regard.

Regarding the Financing Fund of 1992, it was established by agreement between the government and the Faroese government. In the discussions that are now to take place, we will discuss with the Faroe Islands whether there is a need for clarification of the statutes of the Financing Fund and a clarification of the competencies and tasks for the fund.

The Minister of Finance will elaborate on the issue of measures concerning the Financial Supervisory Authority in his statement.

* * *

Conclusion

Let me conclude - as I started - with a few comments of a more general nature.

The report of the Investigation Commission is now on the table. The Investigation Commission has delivered a particularly solid piece of work. The task assigned to the commission has been accomplished. Last Wednesday, we had a very long and detailed meeting in the Folketing's Political-Economic Committee. And since then, 38 questions have been raised. The case must therefore be said to be well illuminated.

The government acknowledges its political responsibility - all the way through. I would like to emphasize this - along the way, I have asked the Minister of Finance to take on important negotiation tasks. He has done so - on behalf of the entire government!

Therefore, I must today distance myself from the suspicion and personal attacks on individuals in the government. It is completely unreasonable.

We collectively acknowledge the political responsibility. But we also maintain that the main purpose of our efforts - to bring the Faroe Islands out of the crisis - has been successful!

Therefore, it seems, to say the least, rather hectic when one of the parties in the Folketing now begins to talk about impeachment trials, independent legal investigations, and what have you.

I see the strategy well. The government is to be discredited and given as many scratches and dents as possible.

I think it is unwise. First and foremost for the sake of the realm community. It is fine to conduct active domestic politics. But it is not acceptable to involve anything in the domestic political game. And certainly not the realm community.

Now we must get started with the negotiations with the government of the Faroe Islands and, in this context, clarify the legal questions.

And then we must look ahead.