Viktor Orbán's speech at the XX session of the Hungarian Permanent Conference.

Hungary Viktor Orbán · Prime Minister of Hungary

18 November 2022 · XX session of the Hungarian Permanent Conference

Context
Orbán addressed the XX session of the Hungarian Permanent Conference in November 2022, presenting a situational report on Hungarian diaspora communities and regional affairs.
Main themes
Hungarian diaspora communities in neighboring states, ethnic representation vs. mixed representation, Hungarian Permanent Conference, Hungarian communities in Slovakia, Romania, Serbia, Central European economic growth, coalition unity, Fidesz-KDNP coalition, situational assessment of Hungarian national policy
Duration
~101 min
98th percentile
Words
12,075
98th percentile
Sentences
477
98th percentile
Readability
51
65th percentile
Grade
12.4
50th percentile
Syntax
3.17
69th percentile
Vocabulary
2.00
11th percentile

Translated from Hungarian

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 38%38%
  • Geopolitical 31%30%
  • Social 14%13%
  • Institutional 9%8%
  • Ceremonial 8%8%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 3%

477 sentences in 54 paragraphs

Good afternoon, esteemed Ladies and Gentlemen!

Every time, including three years ago, I asked Mr. State Secretary to correct me: I do not want to give any speech, as this is not the forum for that, but rather something akin to a situational report or a discussion starter, so we need to designate a different genre here. The speech will be delivered by Zsolt, as he is the best at that within the Hungarian governing coalition; I prefer to excel in the area of presentations.

I respectfully greet everyone! The last time we saw each other in person was in 2019, around a table like this. It feels good that we are all here. It feels good that not only are we here, but we are all stronger than when we last saw each other. First of all, I would like to add a remark regarding the five-minute earlier start — not for the sake of a joke, but to invoke the memory of our dear brother Laci Varga, to whom we all owe a great deal, who was the eternal president of the KDNP, having returned from America, and from whom we learned, even when we were young, that there are two cases when it is not worth calling a taxi: for a Fidesz event and for a Spanish airplane. In these cases, it is considered wasted money, our dear brother Laci said. Now we have contradicted that, as for the first time in the history of the coalition, we started a meeting earlier, not later.

Esteemed Ladies and Gentlemen!

I prepared to take out what I said at our meeting held in 2019. I will highlight a few elements from that, and then I will talk about what has happened since. The most important conclusion from our previous meeting was — as there was still a stake in this question at that time — whether we are allowed to step away from the foundation of ethnically homogeneous Hungarian representation towards ethnically mixed Hungarian representation. This is an ongoing problem everywhere. There are always proposals from the majority nation — let us allow that these are well-meaning proposals — regarding how we, Hungarians, could better represent our interests in the neighboring countries, and why we should insist on organizing political communities on an ethnic basis when we could do so on a mixed basis, and Hungarians could also assert their interests more strongly through mixed parties. This offer, temptation, and temptation is constantly present in Hungarian national policy. And there have been periods when we were not united in how to respond to this question. 2019 was one of those more confusing years. Now the situation seems much clearer, as it appears that every Hungarian community in the neighboring states clearly answers this question by stating that there is a greater chance of representing our interests and values in a politically structured framework organized on ethnically homogeneous foundations, therefore today we more clearly reject those — I say again, I allow — well-meaning proposals that suggest we switch to a system of ethnically mixed Hungarian representation. This is, therefore, a significant strengthening and improvement compared to 2019.

Here, I congratulate our friends from Slovakia, who are moving along the path of either unity or separation like a hidden spring, and it seems that they have now chosen the path of unity. And if I understand the numbers correctly, although we should listen to them more in this regard, it seems to me that in the language of numbers, it is clear that unity has made us stronger in Slovakia.

We are not surprised by the significant influence of the RMDSZ. In Budapest, there is a political joke that goes, what is the Romanian election about? The Romanian election is about deciding who will be the coalition partner of the RMDSZ. Now it seems to me that we have returned to this practice. I congratulate and wish much success to the leaders of the RMDSZ!

And we must also mention István Pásztor and the Hungarian community in Vojvodina, considering that we are at an important phase of a long strategic relationship-building effort, the essence of which is that the Serbs should not see us as enemies, but rather as allies, and this should not only be the case in the diplomatic relations between the two countries, but should also be established between the two ethnic groups. I believe that the Serbs are valued members of the Hungarian community here in Hungary, and I think that we, Hungarians living in Serbia, are increasingly becoming valued members of the Serbian state. So I congratulate you on the successful steps leading to this, as the VMSZ has had several such successes since 2019.

The second statement I made in 2019 was roughly that observing the development of the European economy, we can conclude that Central Europe will be the economic engine of Europe. The past three years have confirmed this. In 2021, which we consider the last closed year, Central Europe grew by 1.5 percent more than Western Europe, with Central Europe emerging from the pandemic with a growth of 6.7 percent, and our decline was also smaller than when the pandemic broke out. So I see that the assertion that it is worth Hungary investing resources and energy into building the Central European economic space is confirmed by events. This is part of the investment program in which we try to provide economic assistance in areas inhabited by Hungarian communities beyond the borders. This is the best investment that Hungary can achieve today.

We also talked three years ago about the fact that the key to European security in the future will be the Balkans. This seems to be overwritten by the Ukrainian-Russian war, but perhaps this assertion will still hold, as we clearly see a power rivalry in the Balkans: the European Union cannot exert sufficient influence, the Russians are increasingly present, and the Turks are also becoming more significant. If we look at the recent elections in the Balkans, we can clearly see signs of this. Therefore, Hungary's interest is that the countries in the Balkans, especially Serbia, which is considered a key country, should become part of the European Union as soon as possible in order to create a secure zone, an area from which neither rivalry nor challenge threatens Europe.

And three years ago, we emphasized the importance of the V4. I need to make a few remarks about this now. The V4 is still important today, but the dynamics of the entire V4 have changed significantly. There have always been efforts to weaken the V4's ability to assert its interests in Brussels, as the ability to assert interests, according to the rules of the Hungarian language, means that I am able to assert my interests against someone, and Central Europeans have realized that if they do this together, they will be more successful than if they do it separately. Fundamentally, the V4 is an organization focused on Brussels, a tool for Central European interest assertion within European structures. Obviously, those who, after the exit of the British, think that the European Union is a structure stretched exclusively along a German-French axis and do not want a third player, as we would like, a V4 Central European player to evolve into a structural defining factor, are not interested in this V4 functioning in this way. And uncertainties have also arisen from the Czech and Slovak sides, and opinions have emerged that have relegated the importance of the V4 in their own foreign policy.

Cooperation with the Poles is also not simple, because while there is still agreement on the fundamental goals of the V4, the Russian-Ukrainian war has transformed this relationship, making it more complicated, despite the fact that the goals of the Poles and Hungarians — if I understand the situation correctly — are the same, as we are both interested in ensuring that Russia does not pose a threat to the region, and we are interested in having a sovereign state between Russia and Central Europe, which for simplicity's sake we can now call Ukraine. Therefore, the establishment of a Ukraine that is untouched in its sovereign integrity and a Russia that does not pose a threat to us are two goals in which we agree with the Poles. The problem is that we see the means differently. We believe that war tools and war escalation are unsuitable for achieving this goal, and in fact will yield the opposite result, which is why we would have been, and still are, much more supporters of a ceasefire, peace negotiations, and a European security arrangement that designates a place for Russia, a place that is not disadvantageous or dangerous for us. This geopolitical divergence is also felt in the cooperation of the V4, which has made the entire V4 operation more complicated.

Just yesterday or the day before, it seemed that the Czechs had canceled the speaker meeting, and there is a prime ministerial summit planned for sometime at the end of November in Košice, but whether this will be realized, in light of what happened yesterday at the speaker-level meeting, is highly questionable. We are ready for negotiations; we will see what comes out of this. Perhaps it is not worth adding more comments to this.

Perhaps I can still allow myself the gloomy remark that the strategic thinking that with the proper organization of Central Europe we could enable the Central European peoples to represent a serious European factor by their own weight, and that their place and influence in Central Europe should not be defined by relations with other states, larger than them, this dream or plan, which has some historical precedents of a few hundred years, is today further from reality than it was three years ago. It is worth noting that only we, Hungarians, speak about the Central European situation in its own logic; everyone else formulates what is worth doing in Central Europe in the dimension of their relations with the Germans, Americans, or Russians, and does not walk the path of Central European self-construction. In this respect, the past three years have unfortunately brought rather unfavorable developments in the dimension of the V4.

Since Hungary has a self-declared national Christian government, it is significant what type of governments operate in the countries of our potential partners. This determines the possibility of cooperation of an intellectual nature and designates the place of intellectual conflicts. This has some significance in state life; it would not be right if this were the only dimension, but its significance is undeniable, which is why it is always easier for the Hungarian government, and through the Hungarian government, Hungary's task is also easier, and the task of Hungarians beyond the borders is also easier, when there are similar national Christian-based governments in the majority, or when there are still some existing in Europe besides us.

Now, the recent political developments have helped us. Such a government has formed in Sweden, in Israel, which, although not part of the European Union, is clearly connected to it in an intellectual sense, the same has happened, and this has also occurred in Italy, and our American partners, the Republicans, have also regained control of the House of Representatives. Overall, I must say that today we have more friends and more allies in the international arena than we had before.

Moreover, we are also building new networks of relationships — in unusual dimensions and frameworks. I recently returned, yesterday or the day before, from Belgrade, where we were just finalizing an Austrian-Hungarian-Serbian cooperation aimed at building a lasting structure, fundamentally starting from migration, but discussing broader contexts as well, as migration cannot be separated from security issues, and security issues cannot be separated from war and the European Union's responses to it. So I hope that an Austrian-Serbian-Hungarian cooperation will also find lasting structures.

Esteemed Ladies and Gentlemen!

Of course, I must say a few words about the war. The war can be viewed in several ways. It can be viewed in its brutality, where tens of thousands of people are dying, and we must look at it through this lens. It can be viewed in economic contexts, as a country is being destroyed, and this does not leave our economic systems, nor the European economic system, untouched. And of course, it can be viewed from a third dimension, as part of a larger, global reorganization, if the premise I consider true is correct, that we are actually talking about a process that is one of the stages of transforming the entire world's power system. Therefore, this war is not only a development that has serious consequences for us in itself, but it also fits into a larger trend.

I would remind everyone that both the financial crisis and the migration crisis were important milestones in this larger reorganization, which can be articulated in numerous dimensions. I will only venture to the depth where I say that there are changes in the world where the goods, resources, and profits generated by the world economy are being distributed in a different ratio compared to what was previously customary. Statisticians express this complicated matter simply by stating which power center in the world produces what percentage of the world's gross national product or GDP, and in what ratio it participates in the profits generated. If we look at this, we see in the dimension of the past ten years that Europe's share of the world economy, which was around twenty-five percent, has slipped to somewhere around eighteen percent, while the Chinese are rising like groundwater and are slowly moving ahead of Europe. The Americans, who were around twenty-five percent, are fighting with tremendous force to maintain that ratio. And if the goods and profits generated in the world are being distributed differently than before, there are consequences. Although this is never a zero-sum game, because there is always absolute growth in a sense, there are distributional consequences: those who previously received more now receive less, and those who previously received less now receive more. And this has consequences because nations— as Zsolt rightly said—must also live by bread. And this brings all kinds of consequences, putting pressure, especially on the political systems of the countries that are falling behind, while in those countries that are winners of the process, resources are created where economic resources accumulate to satisfy all kinds of national ambitions.

Ladies and gentlemen!

The big question, which is the great question of the era, is whether this process— which is usually slow, as such a reorganization often has a horizon of decades, sometimes even centuries— is now taking place in a very short time. It is much more intense than at any other time in world history. The question is whether the great powers can manage this, whether this kind of reorganization can take place without wars, or whether it necessarily brings conflicts with it. I think one element of this logic, one element of this process is what we now see as the Russian-Ukrainian war in the world.

The question then is how this war affects us. First of all, we must start from our most basic instincts. If there is a war in your neighbor's country, then you are not safe either. And although, thank God, so far there have been no military actions in the Ukrainian territories inhabited by Hungarians, that is, in Transcarpathia, as far as I can see, no rockets or bombs have fallen there, no facilities have been destroyed, and if I am not mistaken, we are perhaps talking about the only such region in all of Ukraine, because every other region has already suffered some military strike. So despite the fact that Transcarpathia can currently be considered relatively safe, we are not safe. The events in Poland three days ago illustrate this perfectly: if there is a war in your neighbor's country, you yourself are not safe, and no matter how cleverly you try to defend yourself, the war can demand lives from you as well, not to mention its economic consequences. One thing is certain: the later peace comes, the more expensive the price of peace will be, the higher the price of peace will be. In 2014, when the Crimean conflict broke out, because we are actually in the second phase of the same conflict now, in the mid-2010s, we Europeans were still able to limit a Russian-Ukrainian conflict to a local conflict. This war, which is now taking place, could have broken out in 2014-2015 as well, since at that time, in an international legal sense, the Russians occupied Ukrainian territories by military force, and afterwards, just like now, they tried to legitimize it through a referendum. All the conditions were in place then for a war to break out. It did not break out because the Europeans were able to control the process. It did not break out because the Franco-German axis was able to put together a settlement plan in no time, which later became known as the Minsk Agreement; they quickly assembled a negotiation framework involving Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, and French, which placed the process under European supervision and had clearly defined goals for both parties involved in the conflict. I think we did that well. The leaders of the great European states at that time deserve praise for being able to localize that conflict. This has not succeeded now. So in 2022, instead of this conflict becoming localized thanks to similar European actions, it has become globalized. In no time, it has expanded internationally, and those actors who would have been interested in localizing the conflict— Hungary is among these actors— were not strong enough to enforce this aspect. The actors who were stronger were those interested in broadening the conflict internationally. Today, it seems a bit distant, not a little, but very distant, and in terms of content, bizarre, the debate that took place in Europe in March 2022, which was just now, about whether if Europe, or the countries of the European Union, supply weapons, can they be lethal weapons. This is where we started, if you remember. To which the Ukrainians, outraged, responded that they should not send pillows, but send weapons. But this is where we started. So Europe did not want to participate, or many of us in Europe did not want Europe to become deeply involved in this conflict, and even in sending weapons, we tried to proceed as cautiously as possible. Where are we now compared to that? Now it is no longer a question of whether we are supplying lethal weapons from the West, but rather what strength and how much we are supplying. We have now reached the point where the armed forces are being trained on the territory of European states, which will then return to Ukraine and participate in the war. And we are now at the point where we will slowly also ensure the financing of the entire state operation of warring Ukraine. We are indeed slowly reaching a state that I thought was delusional in mid-December 2021, when the Ukrainian president visited NATO headquarters, and there, together with the NATO Secretary General, held a press conference, and to my greatest astonishment— which at that time no one considered, as I see it, an important moment— he said that if there is a conflict, Ukraine will be the crown jewel of NATO's united armed forces. Now we are slowly arriving at this state, this was said back in December 2021. Now we are slowly here. So the situation is quite difficult.

The question is how Hungary should behave, what strategy it should follow in this situation? The first and most important thing is to try to do everything possible to prevent any fatal escalation from occurring, and to do everything possible to ensure that what happened in Poland is a unique, exceptional case, and does not become part of everyday experience that the Ukrainian-Russian war also demands lives from us first in the border zone, and then in more internal areas. Therefore, although it is not a grateful role that, as the only one among European states— I do not mention the Vatican here— Hungary is essentially the only one talking about a ceasefire, Hungary is the only one talking about peace negotiations, and this tone and approach are applied exclusively by us. But Hungary's strategic interest in avoiding escalation is so great that I think it is worth enduring every political conflict, even humiliating comments and reactions, and we must steadfastly stand by our most important national interest, which is peace.

The second question that Hungary must address is the economic impact of the war. The plan was to dig a big hole for the Russians, and they would fall into it, and this hole was called sanctions. This was still during the period when there was still a debate about whether it was even permissible to supply weapons to Ukraine, and if so, what kind of weapons, so at that time it was still about helping the Ukrainians defend themselves with indirect means, or striking at the Russians, because there are countries whose strategic goals do not end with helping Ukraine, they see the current situation as a good opportunity to strike a weakening blow at Russia. And we came up with the idea of implementing economic measures that would weaken the Russian economy to such an extent that it undermines its ability to wage war, and with this, we take steps, indeed deploy our most important tool in the interest of peace and the end of the war. Now we see, in light of the events in Poland, that the situation has never been as sharp and escalated as it is at this moment. So everything we have done so far has not led to the end of the war, nor to the victory of the Ukrainians, but rather to the prolongation of the war. Therefore, Hungary is distrustful of the sanctions. We see that the sanctions are ill-considered, although the Germans also participated in their conception, and we still live under the impression that precision and engineering knowledge are a German trait, but observing the sanctions, we are no longer convinced of this, because the sanctions do not have their effect where the design says they should, and they do not hurt where we actually aimed. So these sanctions are poorly designed sanctions, they definitely require a review, at least a review, they need to be rethought. Instead of racing against each other to see who can make bigger and more powerful proposals for new sanction packages— we are currently at number nine— we should stop now, rethink what we have done so far, and consider which elements of the sanctions policy can be continued and which should be abandoned.

The whole thing, of course, focuses most obviously on the economy regarding energy issues. Everyone can see that energy prices are sky-high, compared to the pre-war situation, we have to pay multiple electricity and gas prices, which we call a sanction surcharge in Hungary. We have to pay five to six times the price. To help you understand what this means for the Hungarian economy, it is worth keeping the following thumb rules in mind. So, I am recalling from memory, so if there is any inaccuracy around the numbers, please forgive me. So in 2021— there are various calculation methods, but overall I can say that— Hungary's energy imports cost 7 billion euros. So for the Hungarian economy to function, especially since we have an energy-intensive, manufacturing industry, we need to import energy from abroad. Therefore, we have to pay, it was around 7 billion euros. I say again: there are different calculations, but now for the sake of illustrating the proportions, let’s accept this number. This year, in 2022, this number will be 17 billion instead of 7 billion. According to optimists, it will stop at 15.5 billion, but I see that it will rather be 17 billion. And if we project this to the next year, then if the situation does not worsen, it will again be 17 billion, but if the situation worsens, it could even go up to 27 billion. Now let’s leave the future aside, let’s just look at this year. This means that we are paying 17 billion for the same amount of energy as before instead of 7. This means that 10 billion euros is missing from the Hungarian economy. So the Hungarian economy has to pay 10 billion euros more for energy in order to function, for households to function, and for the Hungarian economy to function. And this 10 billion has to be found from somewhere. This is not a simple task. Partly, the growth of GDP, that is, the national product, may provide some source for this, but such a rate of growth that would offset this is unimaginable. This creates burdens that need to be distributed. What I see now is— no one can see the year-end numbers for sure yet, but it will look something like this— that out of the 10 billion euros, the economy will have to swallow 6 billion euros, and about 4 billion euros will remain in the budget. We call this the utility protection fund, and so on; we have built an entire institutional system here to address this problem. 4 billion euros in the case of the budget: that means 1,600 billion forints! So 1,600 billion goes out of the budget in a way that it could be going to you, for example. We could allocate it to the economic development program for Hungarian territories beyond the borders or to the education development program, or we could initiate family policy programs beyond the borders that are also known in Hungary. 1,600 billion forints could solve it. But, for example, if we were not thinking of you, but rather of the Hungarian education system or the transformation of the Hungarian energy system or the expansion of the family support system in Hungary or salary increases for public employees or tax cuts. So 1,600 billion forints can be spent very nicely and well in an economy the size of Hungary, with obvious, visible results. But this is not the case now. This is going out.

And of course, in the longer term, we will also be burdened by the fact that in the meantime, the interest rates on the loans necessary for the financing of the country have also increased, and when they expire, they will obligate us to pay higher interest than, say, in the previous one or two years. So it is clear that this entire sanctions policy, which drives energy prices through the roof, is not a philosophical question, not a theoretical question. The failed European sanctions policy costs the Hungarian economy 10 billion euros every year and diverts 1.600 billion forints from social goals and from its budget. This is the situation we have to face. From this perspective, the rhetoric with which Hungary demands an immediate review of the sanctions may not seem exaggerated, hoping that if the sanctions policy changes, then the price of energy in the world could also change, perhaps even halving. Even if it does not return to where it was, it could return to a reasonable range, and at that moment we would not be losing 10 billion in a year, but only five, and then 1.600 billion would not be going out of the budget, but only, say, 800, half, and so on, and so forth. Every sanctions policy, every revision of the sanctions policy that steers our behavior towards a reasonable approach brings measurable benefits in billions for Hungary. So I say again: in connection with the sanctions, we are not engaging in geopolitical or philosophical debates, but we are fighting for bread against those who do not see the consequences of the sanctions, or who are so rich that they can afford to let their national economies deal with such consequences.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

Like every war, this one also has its winners and losers. We must be very careful here with conspiracy theories. The intention itself is problematic if one likes to put such things together, but what we must be most careful about is not to confuse the consequences with the goals. It often happens that the consequences of a conflict were pre-planned, intended goals, but there are also cases when they were not. So obviously, there are many of us who like to deal with history, and we could mention numerous examples that certain things did not happen because someone thought them out in advance, but because processes were set in motion, to which everyone attached their own interests, changing the direction of the processes, and we ended up somewhere completely different at the end of a given conflict than where we wanted to get with the help of the conflict. We can recall many such examples from Hungarian history and world history as well. Therefore, it is not certain that those who are ultimately the beneficiaries of this war now, or will be, were also behind the outbreak of the war. So let us allow ourselves this – how should I put it? – intellectual uncertainty. But it is also a fact that there are winners in the war, whether they wanted to be winners or not. Whether they were among the instigators or not, whether they had a plan for it or not, but the fact is that as a result of this entire conflict, in eight months, with a few exceptions of Central European countries, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, whose right to exception we fought for, all of Europe has replaced Russian energy with American energy. This is the situation. And the price we pay today to the Americans for the energy coming from America is about four times that of what Americans pay at home for the same energy. And even if I take into account the distance and transportation, this is still a brutal number. So brutal that even the French president has noticed this number, which I just mentioned, and this phenomenon does not come from me, but I quoted it from one of the speeches of the French president, who said that this ratio cannot be considered friendly. I do not know what a friendly ratio is, or whether this approach is even a sensible thing in economic policy, but undoubtedly this is the situation.

Thus, a historically new distribution has emerged, where the European economy, which was previously competitive because it combined its own technological development with raw materials and energy from Russia, has had its energy leg replaced, and from now on, the European economy is not connected to the Russian economy, but to the American economy, with all the consequences that come with it, which I do not want to weigh here, and I cannot fully unfold the picture before you yet, because many consequences of this process are not yet clearly visible, but we must understand that we are in this process, and this circumstance is likely to influence events. Along the same logic, we can also clearly see that the new great phenomenon in world history, called China, is on the winning side. It invests not a single penny, loses not a single person in this war, yet by Europe decoupling itself from the Russian economy, decoupling itself from Russian energy, it gives China a huge opportunity, which, by the way, is absorbing the Russian economic potential that has been pushed out of the European market and incorporating it into its own development. And it receives this as a gift, so it does not give anything, it does not have to pay anything extra, it simply has to use this global economic opportunity. Knowing the Chinese, I would not think they will let this slip.

Our biggest problem, we who are on the losing side, stems from the lack of leadership. So it is not God's decision and order that in this situation Europe must be a loser. We are losers because there is no European leadership. And the situation is worse in this respect than it was in 2019. We are Hungarians, we have never been satisfied with European leadership, in fact, I could say, show me a European leader with whom we have ever been satisfied, I would like to see that, but nevertheless, there was at least some leadership in the European Union to which we could relate. But now we cannot think of Europe in this way, because we simply do not know who the key players are, who the key forces are; we can apply a sociological approach, but there is no power description of the European structures today. And since we have no leader, there is no European leader, as a result, in this process, Europe, even if it recognizes its interests, even if it had the will to assert them, is unable to find a way to do so. Therefore, with each passing day, Europe will become weaker. The Americans are gaining more and more, the Chinese are becoming stronger, and the Europeans are becoming weaker. If things continue like this, then this process will define our daily lives in the future as well.

Hungary must find its own foreign policy path in this situation, and what we must reckon with is the revival of a tendency that, according to historical experiences, has always brought only bad things for Hungary. This is the bloc formation of the world. So if you look at the map, you can immediately see that if there is East-West cooperation, political cooperation, trade, investment policy, and so on, then Hungary is located in the middle of a large region. The moment bloc formation begins, and there will be a western and an eastern economic bloc, we will be a periphery, we will be on the edge of something. If God helps us, we will be on the western edge, more precisely on the eastern edge of the western bloc, and not on the western edge of the eastern bloc, but we will be on the edge, and this is still a periphery, even if it is part of the West. And this offers a completely different perspective for the Hungarian economy and for the assertion of Hungarian interests than when there is an international cooperation system in which Hungary is elevated due to its situation, which it can adapt to flexibly and can channel advantages from all directions into its own political and economic system. Therefore, Hungary has no interest in bloc formation. If the world economy splits into eastern and western, two world economies, the Hungarians will be the losers of this process. This also stems from the fact that the newer idea I see emerging in European politics after decoupling from the Russians, where it came from, would lead us far, it is not worth discussing, what is called decoupling, which is about eliminating the European economy's dependence on the Chinese economy after the dependence on the Russians; decoupling, that is, separating the European economy from the Chinese economy, if this happens, the price will be even higher for Hungary than what the Hungarian national economy is already paying for decoupling from the Russians. So we have no interest in a bloc-forming military policy and a bloc-forming economic policy developing in Europe. We will never be the winners of this process; we will always be the losers of this process.

In such a situation, when everything around us is changing, and a new strategy must be developed, we are right in the middle of this process, we are in the thick of it, trying to renegotiate our relations with the Americans, the Chinese, the Russians, and the European Union as well, so when we are in the thick of such a process, when we need to redefine our place again, we must start from our strengths. The question is, what strengths does Hungary have that it can assert in its national strategy valid for the next decade or perhaps decades?

The first thing we must do to find our strengths is to have accurate self-knowledge. And here we must say a few words not for the sake of philosophizing, but for a very practical strategy, about what distinguishes us from other Western countries? This is a very important thing.

Here I will make this digression for just a few sentences, that the Western nations were created at a certain moment in a given era in response to certain challenges. Every European nation, with the exception of two, the Polish and the Hungarian, so if someone started traveling in Europe in the Middle Ages or early Middle Ages, they would have experienced the surprising thing in Hungary that if they entered Hungary, both the lower and upper classes spoke the same language, understood each other, and could talk to each other. This was not the case in the West. And not only could they communicate in a given area, but within an entire national border area. So a person from northern Hungary could speak the same language with someone from southern Hungary or eastern Hungary, or a person from northern Hungary could speak the same language with someone from western Hungary. István Nemeskürty wrote this a long time ago; we just did not think when we read this from the teacher that it would have such direct political significance. The teacher wrote long ago that when the term nation is used by Westerners, they are talking about a political entity related to the modern era, industrialization, as a political and cultural phenomenon. Hungarians do not talk about this because the Hungarian sense of nationhood goes back much further, measurable in hundreds of years, than that of the Westerners, which is why our thinking is different. When we say, which is why Westerners laugh at us because they do not understand, when we say that we think in terms of nation, this is a meaningful expression in Hungarian. Let us try to translate this into some other language, say, Western languages! This will cause a problem because its cultural significance is entirely different. Therefore, for Western people, the nation is a garment, for us it is our skin. And they can talk about it, and they do talk about it, without any kind of spiritual or moral dismay, that their countries have entered a post-national era. For a Hungarian, this means that entering a post-national era means stepping out of our Hungarianness, or what does this mean? But that is not what they have in mind; in their heads, they think that the nation is a formation defined by a historically bound period, and they are now transforming it into something else. It is very important that when we seek the strategically correct direction, we must know that the Hungarian sense of nationhood, the thinking in terms of nation means something different in content – not the garment, but the skin – than what Western Europeans feel under the nation and their attachment to the nation. And therefore, their political possibilities extend to the point that they want to enter a post-national era. For a Hungarian, entering a post-national era means stepping out of our Hungarianness. So this is an incomprehensible thing for us. It is important that we feel this, and we must decide whether we cling to this heritage that we think in terms of nation, that we seek answers to this situation in terms of nation, or whether we adopt the Western European approach, which simply includes the establishment of a post-national structure among the possible answers in this strategically open situation. And I suggest that we do not step away from what we have been progressing on so far. Not only because we feel good in it – this is not the case every day in life, but still, we fundamentally feel good in it – but also because we cannot move in the other.

I apologize for the digressions, but I would like to remind everyone that in 2010, when we first won a two-thirds majority, a long-lasting, let’s say, intellectual process began within the coalition parties, that we have a parliamentary system, but the two-thirds majority – since a new constitution can be created – would also allow for a transition to a presidential system. We had long debates about whether it was sensible, nonsensical, desirable or not. And in the end, we decided not to transition to a presidential system because, as we looked back over the past two hundred years, it became clear that we can think in parliamentary systems. We know how that works. It may be a nice adventure to have a presidential system, but we do not know it, we do not know how it works. Therefore, I suggest, returning to my main point, that we should remain within the framework of traditional national understanding, not only because it is dear to our hearts, but also because it is what we know. We know what it is like. When we make decisions in this system, we know the consequences. If we turn a screw in this machinery, we know what will happen. But if we step into a post-national Western European world, where we have never been, then the possibility of error increases exponentially. Therefore, I suggest once again, based on values, historical grounds, and practical considerations, that we derive our strategy, which we need to develop in this current period, from the nation, the interests of the nation, and the national frameworks, from thinking in terms of the nation. You see, the Westerners do things differently, as they say that not every challenge needs a national response. They say that a challenge can also be addressed outside of national frameworks, starting from the interests of the whole world. So we do not derive our decisions from a national interest, but, for example, we try to do so in the context of all humanity. The whole climate policy and the environment, this whole topic also tempts leaders to move in this direction. Or there is also the possibility that, for example, instead of thinking in terms of the nation, we think in intellectual frameworks, deriving the strategy we need to apply to the now changed situation from ideologies. So there are certainly three options before us: to provide a national response, to think in terms of the nation, to think in the context of all humanity, and to think in terms of ideology. These are, of course, not hermetically sealed areas, because we always need to think about all humanity, and we always need to consider ideological questions as well, but it matters how you define the starting point. And the starting point, in our case, I believe, must be within national frameworks, because this is the primordial state of the Hungarian nation, and this is the primordial experience of Hungarian existence. Therefore, the nation, as a permanent formation, should be, in my opinion, the starting point of the strategy for the period ahead of us. Now, after this, let’s look at our strengths. We have four strengths that we can utilize.

Our first strength is that Hungarians unite in times of trouble. This is a huge strength. I have experienced this throughout the past twelve years: during the financial crisis, during the migration crisis, during COVID, and I am experiencing it now as well. I think this can be built upon. In peacetime, we tend to scatter. In times of trouble, there is somehow a sense of unity. Therefore, Hungarians show quite different character traits when there is trouble than when things are going well. We are now in a period of trouble, and I think we can count on the Hungarian nation’s ability to know that we need to come together in such times. At such times, Hungarians also tend to put themselves on alert. Just look at how, in a completely mundane way, Hungarian households have adapted their habits to the newly established economic situation in the past two or three months. So, businesses have put themselves on alert in no time, households have put themselves on alert, and everyone is trying to find some solution to the situation. There is no waiting, no idleness, but rather a kind of search for solutions, and this search, if a country has good political leadership, results in unity. Moreover, Hungarian politics has another interesting characteristic, which Churchill cynically articulated as an Englishman: do not waste a good crisis. So when we talk about Hungarians putting themselves on alert and coming together, they consider the moments of trouble to be the most suitable for adjusting their systems that have been functioning poorly until then. This is what we did in 2010, if you think about it. So at that time, we were not simply trying to survive, but we were trying to transform, let’s say, the functioning of the state, and we corrected what was not good precisely during the time of trouble. So Hungarians do not reform, do not transform their social and economic systems in such a way that they thoroughly debate, understand, and then make smart decisions in peacetime, but rather in times of trouble, everything starts to move, it is clear that we need to stick together, general considerations of reasonableness obviously prevail, and then they are willing to accept changes that they would otherwise never accept based solely on persuasion and understanding in peacetime. Therefore, we must also see an opportunity in this situation, and where the Hungarian state is not functioning well, we need to make changes in this difficult situation. One such area is energy policy, in which we will now implement quite significant changes. If everything had remained as it was, these changes would probably not have occurred, or would have occurred much more slowly. Now these changes, which are overall beneficial to Hungarian national interests, will take place more quickly.

Our second important virtue, let’s say strength, that we can build on is that national interest comes first. I already spoke about this in an intellectual sense, but it is also true politically. So the situation is that we condemn Russian aggression and support the Ukrainian people, but we are not willing to place Ukraine’s interests above our own. Let’s speak plainly: because we start from national interest. And we do not expect Ukraine, just as I do not believe there has ever been such a thing, nor could there be such a thing in the future, that Ukrainians would not place their own interests above Hungarian interests. This is the order of the world. This may sound harsh at times, but it must be said. We help them, we condemn Russian aggression, we support the Ukrainians, but we are not willing to place Ukrainian interests above Hungarian interests. This is our second strength. Because I think other countries think this way too, but it is impossible to say this in other countries today. There, it is sacrilege precisely because politics is not derived from national interest, but from a liberal, I don’t know what kind of worldview, which collides with thinking in national frameworks in such a case. But we can calmly and boldly say, although this has a price, that of course we will never place Hungarian interests behind Ukrainian interests. And we will not accept that anyone is offended by this. Therefore, we do not accept the Ukrainians’ argument, which is completely understandable from their perspective, that they are now making sacrifices for us. This is not true! The Ukrainians are not making any sacrifices for Hungary right now. The claim that Ukrainians are currently defending European freedom, defending Europe or Hungary from Russia is not true. This does not correspond to reality. Ukraine is not defending us; we can defend ourselves together with NATO. Our security is not guaranteed by Ukraine. What is happening there is not worth a single penny to us. We do not help because it is in Hungary’s interest, but because they are in trouble, and up to the point where it does not harm Hungarian interests, a people in distress must be helped. That is why we help. But not because it is in our interest. Let’s make this very clear! The assistance provided to Ukraine is not a Hungarian national interest, but simply a civilized way of behaving, which we can naturally provide up to the point where it does not harm Hungarian interests. Therefore, for example, we will not accept that the member states of the European Union jointly take out loans and finance Ukraine from that, but we can accept that we look at how much money we want to give to the Ukrainians for their functioning, let’s distribute that fairly according to proportions, how much goes to the Hungarian, the German, the Spanish, and so on, and what falls to the Hungarians, and can still be coughed up from the budget, so it does not undermine our national interests, and I think this can still fit, we can provide this amount from the Hungarian national budget, within the framework of a bilateral agreement with the Ukrainians. Not through Brussels, not with joint borrowing; if we want to help, let’s help in the right way. Let’s state that this does not fundamentally harm Hungarian national interests yet, although this money will be missed, this 60-70 billion forints per year will be missed from Hungary, but it does not yet undermine our national interests, and we can provide such assistance. And let’s state it this way, as I am trying to say now, and not within the framework of some common European, I don’t know what kind of assistance, loans, and God knows what we embed it in, considering that if we allow this, the European Union will irrevocably transform into a debt and credit community. The European Union is not such a country today, or such an integration; the European Union today is a cooperation order of member states. By agreeing to joint borrowing during COVID, we shifted the entire union’s developmental direction towards a credit community. Many have also stated from the other side, who stood against us, that this is what they call a Hamiltonian moment, because it was also a decisive moment in the creation of the United States when they first took out a loan together. Many have said that I had to debate in the Hungarian parliament, I think with the members of the Democratic Coalition, who welcomed this development as a positive Hamiltonian moment, that we are finally transforming the European Union into a debt community. I think this is deadly for Hungary. We must not do such a thing; we will lose our influence on this process, and they will mortgage and burden the future of future Hungarian generations in such a way that we will have very little influence on it – if at all. Let’s not do this! Therefore, okay, COVID was once, it was extraordinary, the Germans and everyone said it was a one-time occasion, but now we are already at the second occasion that we are giving money to the Ukrainians in this way, and the French are already knocking on the door, asking for us to create another such common loan package due to the energy crisis, which we would again distribute among each other. The European Union is slowly but surely transforming into a debt community. I think this is not in Hungary’s interest. Parenthesis closed. We can help the Ukrainians in other ways as well.

Our third strength, which we can build on while exploring the future, is that we are realists. This is a very important virtue because, although the ideas of improving the world, especially our poets and writers, are always welcomed with great enthusiasm in Hungarian public life, fortunately, politics does not usually fall prey to this. Since the French Revolution, if we look at when what changes took place in European politics, I must say that the Hungarian nation has been quite resistant to ideologies because we are realists; we love ideas that improve the world, we are happy when such ideas refresh our lives, but we do not usually get caught up in the wake of these world-improving ideas because we always ask the question: what is in the Hungarian interest? Jesus Christ is, of course, an exception to this because he proclaimed a kingdom not of this world, so that can be discussed. The worldly is another case. Overall, therefore, I must say that it is worth preserving this sense of reality.

And finally, here is our fourth strength, which is popularly referred to as Hungarian ingenuity, but in reality, it is about the Hungarian ability to see opportunities in everything. Even in trouble, it sees opportunities. And this is a huge advantage. And that is why I am infinitely optimistic. The situation is not easy, but I want to conclude my remarks by saying that I look at the challenges ahead of us with great optimism. I see unique opportunities in this. This may sound strange at first glance, but I would like to remind everyone, for example, that we viewed COVID in the same way, and of course, we had to fight against COVID, and people died, so it was not a funny story; in fact, it tormented us, but in reality, COVID forced or offered economic opportunities that we seized, and look at how, on the European ladder, where countries are assessed in relation to European development, we have surpassed the Portuguese in the last two years. I just want to say that, of course, it would be better to avoid every crisis, especially those that involve human lives; it would be better if they did not exist, but if they do, we must view them as opportunities and seek the path to strengthening. And of course, strengthening is always relative, because it is not just about you being stronger, but whether others can strengthen at the same rate as you, but it is certain that you can advance your country in the competitive rankings if you maneuver well in a crisis situation, as happened during COVID. So, in this situation, we must also see opportunities. That is why we are not willing, for example, to give up our relations with Russia. We understand everything, we are in solidarity, we cooperate, but as long as possible, we must take advantage of the opportunity to cooperate with the Russian economy. And we will find the forms to do so, just as others will find them. I would remind everyone that, for example, Turkey, although a NATO member, does not impose any sanctions on the Russians. None! Not just energy, none at all! So, I want to say that even in matters involving political conflicts, it is worth searching for those opportunities that, if we utilize them well, will provide a competitive advantage over our competitors. We must sometimes twist things, and then it works. In the third quarter, the Hungarian economy grew by 4.1 percent. In the Czech Republic, it was 1.6 percent, in Germany 0.3 percent, and in Slovakia 1.2 percent. This is, by the way, the result of managing the economic crisis caused by COVID, because during COVID, we launched an economic crisis management program that supported capital investments, supported businesses; if you remember, investments had to be initiated within a year, people could not be laid off, and these capacities are just now starting to produce. Now, I do not want to give a lecture on crisis management here; I just want to illustrate that adaptation, survival, and sidestepping are not the only possible behaviors in such a situation, but rather seeking opportunities.

What concerns you in this is to look for opportunities with your neighbors as well. I suggest that we view this crisis moment as a time when we may be able to improve our cooperation with our neighbors more easily than we could before. For example, the Serbian case is the best example of this. During the economic crisis, there are troubles. Sometimes we get into trouble, sometimes the other side does. Now, gas is coming through the Serbs because it comes from the South Stream. But the Serbs could not store it; in fact, they needed additional quantities. We have given, sold, and stored for them. I just want to say that trouble is also an opportunity to establish closer cooperation with our neighbors. So let us not view this as everyone trying to get through this crisis on their own, but let us see where there are economic touchpoints with the Slovaks, Romanians, and Serbs, the significance of which is increased by the current crisis. And where such points exist, let us immediately try to be active and want to cooperate with them, as close cooperation with them is also the starting point for our national economy and national strategy. So let us use this upcoming crisis, difficult economic period to improve our relations with our neighbors. And now we can do this not on a party-political basis, but by searching for common tools for dealing with trouble, crisis, and crisis management.

The Romanian Foreign Minister was with me the other day, or rather at the Hungarian Foreign Minister's office, but he also stopped by to see me, and it turned out that in the Romanian-Hungarian cooperation, for example, there are now much stronger arguments for the realization of certain flagship projects than before, when, by the way, the economies were functioning quite well on their own. Now, a major project, say, the construction of a high-speed railway from Bucharest to Cluj to Budapest, can also be interpreted as a crisis management tool that can provide a boost of strength or energy to the cooling national economies. And I could go on. I suggest to you, who are sitting around the table and have come from neighboring countries, that we should not simply set the goal of preventing our economic and political relations from deteriorating, but rather seek those opportunities where we can strengthen our cooperation with the majority leaders of neighboring countries, while ensuring that the Hungarian minorities also benefit.

Ladies and Gentlemen!

I believe I have reached the end of my remarks, perhaps it has been longer than necessary. Perhaps I need to touch on one more topic. This is the matter of negotiations with the union, which may bring particular joy to crossword enthusiasts, as to how to connect words so that they intersect meaningfully. Our debates with the European Union are, on the one hand, philosophical, even spiritual in nature, which I have already referred to earlier, and I will not talk about them again, and on the other hand, they are of an economic nature. At the center of the economic debates is money. There is a debate about how Hungary should connect to the union in terms of financial transfers. This means, on a practical level, that there are currently four channels through which money flows from Hungary to the union and from the union to Hungary. At this moment, the balance of these two flows is positive for us, and I would like to say a few words at the end about what it means to be positive. So there are four channels.

We have an agreement with the union regarding the payments for the unresolved issues of the already completed budget. This concerns the completion of financing for the remaining programs from the 2014-2021 seven-year budgetary period. We have no disputes here. We have no disputes! Last year, I should know the exact number, I think an amount around 1,000 billion forints arrived, this year an amount between 500-800 billion is expected, and next year, about 500 billion is also coming. This is the previous one.

Our second dispute is the recovery fund, which is referred to as the reconstruction fund. This is the financial fund established due to the COVID crisis, which, by the way, is of a different nature compared to the sources of the union's budget, because here we are not distributing each other's money in some proportion, but rather distributing a jointly borrowed loan. So, it is not about the Germans giving us money, or the more developed countries giving us money in the name of cohesion because we are less developed, but rather that we jointly took out a loan with a prior agreement on how much each will receive. These negotiations are stalled. When you see the news, you see that negotiations are ongoing about whether we will have access to this financial instrument or not. Here, we are at the back of the line; even the Poles are ahead of us because the Poles at least have a signed contract that they will receive this money at some point. It is another matter what they can do with that paper; there are now popular interpretations in the spirit of crossword solving, so at this moment, they have paper, but no money. Now Hungary is not at the point of getting money, but rather at the point of reaching where the Poles are, that we have a signed contract. I believe this will happen, probably because since this is not money received from other countries, but money from a common loan, the rules regarding this state that it must be given to the countries that participated in the loan, so it must be given. Here, at most, time can be delayed or dragged out, as has happened in the recent past. This does not reflect well on the European Union, where fair competition in the single market is the guiding star, and in comparison, there are countries that receive billions of euros in advance, while we have not received anything even after a year; then how is this fair competition, and how is this a single market? Closing parenthesis. But anyway, it can only be delayed; this must be given to Hungary sooner or later. I think it will happen in the coming days that we will have paper on it.

The third source of funding is the agricultural cooperation between the union and Hungary. There can be no blockage here, simply because agricultural support is a production subsidy, and if even a single country does not receive the production subsidy it is entitled to, then the local budget comes into play, and if the local budget comes into play, competition begins in the world of agricultural subsidiarity, and agricultural support, and that would break the European Union. One of the most important pillars of the European Union is that it is limited how much money a country can give to its producers from its own budget. If this collapses, the entire agricultural system collapses. And no one wants that, which is why we signed our agreement regarding this amount. These sources are arriving properly; they are outside the scope of the debate.

And the fourth source of funding that you may hear about is the sources due to Hungary from the already started budgetary seven years between 2021 and 2027, for which an agreement must be signed before they start disbursing them. We are still before the agreement here, and even if we sign the agreement, whether they will pay or not, what they will suspend, and how, is an opaque jumble, a jungle, and a minefield for a normal person, but the essence is that something will happen there. This is the fourth source. But this is the largest.

But what is worth knowing even about the largest? So what are we talking about, in forints, what are we talking about? We are talking about that if we look at the net sources arriving in Hungary during the next seven-year budget in proportion, we can say that it is a net positive of 2 billion euros. That is about 800 billion forints. So we gain this much every year. We receive a net 800 billion in new, fresh sources from the European Union. 800 billion! It is true that it is in euros and for developments, but overall we are talking about 800. The Hungarian GDP is 62,000 billion forints. So, what is the national economic weight of what? So the Hungarian national gross product in a year is 62,000 billion forints, and now we are talking about 800 billion forints... That is why I say that, of course, political games can be played with European Union funds, but this is not actually a real blackmail tool in the hands of the union. Politically, it is, because it is obvious that governments can be attacked by saying that there would have been more money for this and that and that for 800 billion forints if we had not been obstructive here and there. This is a political attack. But in economic terms, this is not a significant thing. So, that is why the Hungarian starting point in negotiations with the union is that we cannot be cornered. So if someone wants to negotiate with us by cornering us, they are condemning their own goals to failure; they will never achieve their goals against Hungary because these sources are too small for that. Now, of course, an absurd situation could arise, for example, that after not receiving the development sources, we might carry out the greening of the Hungarian economy with Chinese loans. I have also told the union that if the sources that are due to us do not come from there, then we will naturally gather sources from the world market, and it could even happen that the program for greening the Hungarian economy will be financed by Chinese loans. Well, good day to you, then that is how it will be! I will only say that it is possible to cause harm to Hungary, to be cheeky, to play political games, but economically, Hungary cannot be cornered. This has not always been the case. There was a time when Hungary was weak enough for this to be possible; we have long since moved beyond that. So the 150 billion euros of annual GDP that the Hungarian economy produces has already pulled Hungary out of the category where it could be financially blackmailed. Of course, there are easier and more difficult situations; sometimes more money is available, sometimes less, but Hungary cannot be blackmailed with this.

And so, in conclusion, we have arrived at the economic context that pertains to you. Árpád, I still have two minutes, right? That's good news. What would we have done if we didn't? But what I want to say is the following. Given that we are in such a difficult situation, which I have tried to detail here, one possible mindset is the one that says this is not the time for a nation to achieve its great strategic goals, and those should be put on hold. And there is another approach that says that to survive and manage a crisis, fundamentally, you need inner strength. And if you give up your strategic goals, you lose part of your inner strength, and therefore you will actually be unable to manage the crisis. That is why we should not give up strategic goals; in fact, during a crisis, we should reinforce some national strategic objectives that everyone else might abandon, put on hold, or postpone. I believe we should not do that. So, while we will see the processes of the 2023 economic year by December – we have to wait until then – if it is even possible to foresee anything today. Hungary currently has a budget that we adopted in the usual manner back in July, but the world has shifted so much that those numbers are only partially valid, and they will need to be modified. We will carry out this modification sometime in the first half of December. And when we make the modifications, we must ensure that we express in the language of the budget that we are not giving up national strategic goals. Such is family support, which is a national strategic goal, so we will expand the system of family support. We are not stepping back from it; rather, we will expand it. Such is the economy, full employment; we will not give that up, but, you know, we will support investments that will create jobs. And such is national unification as well. Therefore, we will solve long-standing, unresolved issues now. This is our plan, at least by early December.

What I am saying now should be interpreted as a strong intention by those present, not as a decision that has already been made. But now is the moment to address the problem that the amount of educational and training support has not increased for a long time, is ridiculously low, and has lost the motivating power it once had. It must be raised. It must be raised noticeably and significantly. I have some quite wild numbers in my head. It is not important to specify them here now, but we would like to multiply the educational and training support. To the Hungarian diaspora, we owe the old debt that there is no special scholarship system for Hungarians of Hungarian descent, who may no longer even speak Hungarian, living in the diaspora, to come home for half or one year of studies, while we spend a lot of money bringing students from other countries here; this is also an imbalance that has long cried out for a solution. Such things are not usually solved during a crisis, but I believe that from the logic I am speaking from, it follows precisely that this issue must be resolved now, and a robust, powerful scholarship program must be initiated. So, I would like to tell the leaders of the communities beyond the borders present here that I do not want to talk with you in the coming period, until the end of the year, about how not to implement things, but rather about how to implement them. Moreover, how to set goals that we previously did not feel were realistic and did not set. It is true that we probably do not recommend initiating new developments; we want to carry through all ongoing ones, we will provide the necessary resources for operation, and we will also make new types of resources available. The period of high-value investments may not be in the next one or two years, but rather they will need to be revisited later. But this does not mean that overall, there will not be better-structured and more resources available in the future than there have been in recent years.

I respectfully thank you for listening. I hope I have managed, if not to convey, at least to convey the sense of what kind of year awaits Hungary. We will be under pressure, we will have many debates, we will stand up for our interests, there will be wartime conditions, we will have to grapple with an energy crisis, but Hungary will not step back from any strategic goal, will not retreat, and in fact, in some areas, we will demonstratively and with inner strength move forward.

Ceterum censeo, the prerequisite for this is always that Hungary has a stable, capable government. We haven't even talked about the fact that there was an election this year because it was so far away that we don't even remember it, but I would like to draw everyone's attention to the fact that there was an election in Hungary. We won this election with a two-thirds majority, which gives us this enormous opportunity to have, unlike any other European country, more than three years of mandate, perhaps three and a half years of mandate for this government, with a two-thirds majority and with the mindset that I have tried to present to you here. Only good can come from this.

Thank you very much for your kind attention!