Adjournment (Easter).

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament for Epping

13 April 1933 · House of Commons debate on the Easter adjournment · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on April 13, 1933, in the Easter adjournment debate on foreign affairs, urging British detachment from Europe and criticising MacDonald's disarmament plan and the Four-Power Pact.
Main themes
Defence of the post-war peace treaties, principle of nationalism and self-determination, Poland's reconstitution, German rearmament and demands for equality, Nazi dictatorship and persecution of the Jews, France and the small states of the Little Entente, criticism of MacDonald's Geneva disarmament plan, Mussolini's Four-Power Pact, call for British detachment from Europe, request for papers on the Rome visit, Conservative opposition to Russian trade favours and Indian federation, MacDonald's visit to the United States
Duration
~44 min
92nd percentile
Words
5,274
92nd percentile
Sentences
216
91st percentile
Readability
52
68th percentile
Grade
12.2
47th percentile
Syntax
3.10
61st percentile
Vocabulary
2.10
27th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 78%71%
  • Ceremonial 10%9%
  • Institutional 8%7%
  • Economic 3%3%
  • Social 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 9%

216 sentences in 55 paragraphs

This has not only been a deeply interesting but a memorable Debate. We had in the opening speech of the spokesman of the Opposition the hon. Member for Limehouse (Mr. Attlee) a most weighty and helpful contribution to this discussion, and one which, I am sure, will have an influence far beyond the limits of this country. We

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had the very fine speech of my right hon. Friend the former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the right hon. Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain). These two speeches taken together, and the obvious attitude of the House, in all parties, will, I believe, do something to steady the situation, and will be more helpful than many far more flowery utterances which have dealt only with the smoother side of things. Naturally, both those speeches were very agreeable to me, and I shall venture this afternoon to follow up the course which I have adopted for some time now of pressing a view upon foreign affairs based, first of all, upon a study of the realities of the European situation and aiming throughout at increasing the detachment of Great Britain from the more serious dangers which may arise there.

I have heard, as everyone has of late years, a great deal of denunciation of the treaties of peace, of the Treaties of Versailles and of Trianon. I believe that that denunciation has been very much exaggerated, and, in its effect, harmful. These treaties, at any rate, were founded upon the strongest principle alive in the world to-day, the principle of nationalism, or, as President Wilson called it, self-determination. That was the principle which governed the making of those two treaties. The principle of self-determination or of nationalism applied to all the big Powers. Over the whole area of Middle and Eastern Europe this principle of nationalism has been applied. Europe to-day corresponds in its ethnological groupings in a manner that it has never corresponded before. You may think that nationalism has been excessively manifested in modern times. That may well be so. It may well be that it has a very dangerous side, but we must not fail to recognise that it is the strongest force now at work.

I remember, many years ago, hearing the late Mr. Tim Healy replying to a question that he put to himself, "What is nationalism?" and he said: "Something that men will die for." There is the foundation upon which we must examine the state of Europe and by which we should be guided in picking our way through the very serious dangers which concern us there. Of course, in applying this principle of nationalism to the defeated States after the War it was

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inevitable that mistakes and some injustices should occur. There are places where the populations are inextricably intermingled. There are some countries where an island of one race is surrounded by an area inhabited by another. There were all kinds of anomalies, and it would have defied the wit of man to make an absolutely perfect solution. In fact no complete solution on ethnographical lines would have been possible unless you had done what was done in the case of Greece and Turkey, that is, the physical disentangling of the population, the sending of the Turks back to Turkey and of the Greeks back to Greece.

I recognise the anomalies and I recognise the injustices, but they are only a tiny proportion of the great work of consolidation and appeasement which has been achieved and is represented by the Treaties that ended the War. Europe has never rested so securely in its beds in accordance with the heart's desires of the nationalities and races of which it is composed. It would be a blessed thing if we could mitigate these anomalies and grievances, but we can only do that if and when there has been established a strong confidence that the Treaties themselves are not going to be deranged. So long as the Treaties are in any way challenged as a whole it will be impossible to procure a patient consideration for the redress of the anomalies. The more you wish to remove the anomalies and grievances the more you should emphasise respect for the Treaties. I think it is the first rule of British foreign policy to emphasise respect for these great Treaties, and to make those nations, whose national existence depends upon and arises from the Treaties feel that no challenge is levelled at their security. Instead of that I am bound to say that for a good many years a lot of vague and general abuse has been levelled at the Treaties with the result that these powerful States, some of them very powerful States, comprising enormous numbers of citizens—the Little Entente and Poland together represent 80,000,000, strongly armed—have felt that their position has been challenged and endangered by the movement to alter the Treaties. In consequence, you do not get the consideration which in other circumstances you might get for the undoubted

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improvements which are required in various directions.

The Prime Minister last year, in a speech at Geneva, used a very striking phrase when he described Europe as a house inhabited by ghosts. I think that is to misinterpret the situation. Europe is a house inhabited by fierce, strong, living entities. Poland is not a ghost. Poland is a reincarnation. I think it a wonderful thing that Polish unity should have re-emerged from long hideous eclipse and bondage, when the Poles were divided between three empires and made to fight one another in all the wars that took place. I rejoice that Poland has been reconstituted. I cannot think of any event arising out of the Great War which can be considered to be a more thoroughly righteous result of the struggle than the reunion of this people, who have preserved their national soul through all the years of oppression and division anal whose reconstitution of their nationhood is one of the most striking facts in European history. Do not let us be led, because there are many aspects of Polish policy that we do not like or agree with, into dwelling upon the small points of disagreement, and then forget what a very great work has been achieved, a work of liberation and of justice, in the reconstitution of Poland. I trust she will live long to enjoy the freedom of the lands which belong to her, a freedom which was gained by the swords of the victorious Allies.

We may look elsewhere. There is Bohemia, the land of Good King Wenceslas, which has emerged with its own identity re-established. There are all the small countries on the Baltic, all holding tenaciously to their principles of nationhood. There are all those countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea, small individually compared to the greatest Powers but comprising an enormous proportion of the European family. All these countries are armed and determined to defend the lands of their fathers and their new gained independence, and it is most unwise to pursue any foreign policy which does not take account of these facts, which are not, as I have said, ghosts or memories of the past but which are the living forces with which we have to cope at the present time.

New discord has arisen in Europe of late years from the fact that Germany

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is not satisfied with the result of the late War. I have indicated several times that Germany got off lightly after the Great War. I know that that is not always a fashionable opinion, but the facts repudiate the idea that a Carthaginian peace was in fact imposed upon Germany. No division was made of the great masses of the German people. No portion of Germany inhabited by Germans was detached, except where there was the difficulty of disentangling the population of the Silesian border. No attempt was made to divide Germany as between the northern and southern portions which might well have tempted the conquerors at that time. No State was carved out of Germany. She underwent no serious territorial loss, except the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, which she herself had seized only 50 years before. The great mass of the Germans remained united after all that Europe had passed through, and they are more vehemently united to-day than ever before. You may talk of the War indemnity; what has happened there? I suppose that the Germans paid, in round terms, £1,000,000,000. But they had borrowed £2,000,000,000 at the same time, and there are no signs of their paying back. They have lost their colonies, it is true; but these were not of the greatest value to them, and it is not at all true for them to say that these colonies could ever have afforded any appreciable outlet for their working-class population. They are not colonies which are suited for white colonisation.

On the other hand, when we think of what would have happened to us, to France or to Belgium if the Germans had won; when we think of the terms which they exacted from Rumania, or of the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: when we remember that up to a few months of the end of the War German authorities refused to consider that Belgium could ever be liberated, but said that she should be kept in thrall for military purposes for ever, I do not think that we need break our hearts in deploring the treatment that Germany is receiving now. Germany is not satisfied; but, as my right hon. Friend says, no concession which has been made has produced any very marked appearance of gratitude. Once it has been conceded it has seemed less valuable than when it was demanded. Many people would like

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to see, or would have liked to see a little while ago—I was one of them, and I daresay that hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite are in the same position—the question of the Polish Corridor adjusted. For my part, I should certainly have considered that to be one of the greatest practical objectives of European peace-seeking diplomacy. There again, however, hon. Members must think of the rights of Poland. The Polish Corridor is inhabited almost entirely by Poles, and it was Polish territory before the Partition Treaty of 1772. This is a matter which, in quiet times with increasing good will, Europe should have set itself—and might well some day set itself—to solve.

The question of the Germans regaining their colonies is being pressed by them, and the question of their rearmament—which, personally, I consider more grave than any other question—is being brought to the front. They demand equality in weapons and equality in the organisation of armies and fleets, and we have been told, "You cannot keep so great a nation in an inferior position. What others have, they must have." I lave never agreed. I think it is a most dangerous demand to make. Nothing in life is eternal, of course, but as surely as Germany acquires full military equality with her neighbours while her own grievances are still unredressed and while she is in the temper which we have unhappily seen, so surely should we see ourselves within a measurable distance of the renewal of general European war. If this process of rearmament or of equalisation were actually to take place while the present conditions prevail, undoubtedly the nations who are neighbours of Germany and who fear Germany would ask themselves whether they would be well advised to postpone coming to a conclusion until the process of German rearmament has been completed. It is extremely dangerous for people to talk lightly about German rearmament and say that, if the Germans choose to do it, no one can stop them. I am very doubtful if Germany would rearm in defiance of the treaty if there were a solidarity of European and world opinion that the Treaty could only be altered by discussion, and could not be altered by a violent one-sided breach. I therefore do not subscribe to the doctrine that we

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should throw up our hands and recognise the fact that Germany is going to be armed up to an equality with the neighbouring States in any period which we can immediately foresee. There may be other periods, but certainly we ought not to admit it at the moment.

I am not going to use harsh words about Germany and about the conditions there. I am addressing myself to the problem in a severely practical manner. Nevertheless, one of the things which we were told after the Great War would be a security for us was Parliamentary institutions in Germany; that she would be a democracy with Parliamentary institutions. All that has been swept away. You have dictatorship—most grim dictatorship. You have militarism and appeals to every form of fighting spirit, from the reintroduction of duelling in the colleges to the Minister of Education advising the plentiful use of the cane in the elementary schools. You have these martial or pugnacious manifestations, and also this persecution of the Jews, of which so many hon. Members have spoken and which appeals to everyone who feels that men and women have a right to live in the world where they are born, and have a right to pursue a livelihood which has hitherto been guaranteed them under the public laws of the land of their birth.

When I read of what is going on in Germany—I feel in complete agreement in this matter with hon. Gentlemen opposite—when I see the temper displayed there and read the speeches to which my right hon. Friend referred, the speeches of the leading Ministers—because those are quite enough—I cannot help rejoicing that the Germans have not got the heavy cannon, the thousands of military aeroplanes and the tanks of various sizes for which they have been pressing in order that their status may be equal to that of other countries. I listened to the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham with the greatest satisfaction, and it occurred to me that the House has not always done justice to his conduct of foreign affairs. He was very much scolded and condemned at the close of the late Conservative Administration, but the Locarno Treaty and all that followed from it were models of skilful peace-seeking diplomacy. Although other difficulties have come in other times, I

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cannot see that the handling of the Foreign Office since he left it should fill him with any particular feeling of humiliation.

I will leave Germany and turn to France. France is not only the sole great surviving democracy in Europe; she is also the strongest military power, I am glad to say, and she is the head of a system of States and nations. France is the guarantor and protector of all these small States I mentioned a few moments ago; the whole crescent which runs right round from Belgium to Yugoslavia and Rumania. They all look to France. When any step is taken, by England or any other Power, to try to weaken the diplomatic or military security of France, all these small nations tremble with fear and anger. They fear that the central pro tective force will be weakened, and that then they will be at the mercy of the great Teutonic power.

I have described the situation to lead up to the conclusion that we should be very careful not to mix ourselves up too deeply in this European scene. We have expressed our opinions to-day, and they will, I, am sure, be of value, but our desire to promote peace must not lead us to press our views beyond a point where those views are no longer compatible with the actual facts of the situation. It may be very virtuous and high-minded to press disarmament upon nations situated as these nations are, but if not done in the right way and in due season, and in moderation, with regard for other people's point of view as well as our own sentiments, it may bring war nearer than peace, and may lead us to be suspected and hated instead of being honoured and thanked as we should wish to be. Even more vain is it for the United States to press indiscriminate disarmament upon the European States, unless, of course, the United States is prepared to say that those nations which take her advice will receive her aid if trouble should arise, and is prepared to envisage the prospect of sending millions of soldiers again across the ocean.

I sincerely believe that our country has a very important part to play in Europe, but it is not so large a part as we have been attempting to play, and I advocate for us in future a more modest role than many of our peace preservers and peace

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lovers have sought to impose upon us. I remember when I was very young before I came into this House a denunciation by Dr. Spence Watson of what he called "the filthy Tory rag of a spirited foreign policy." In those days the feelings of all those who sat opposite, their forerunners, were directed against jingo policies of bombast, with Palmerstonian vigour. But you may have another kind of spirited foreign policy which may also lead you into danger, and that is a policy in which, without duly considering the circumstances in which others are placed, you endeavour to press upon them disarmament or to weaken their security, perhaps with a view to gaining a measure of approbation, very natural approbation, from good people here who are not aware of the dangerous state of affairs in Europe. There you could have a peace policy which may be too spirited.

It is easy to talk about the moral leadership of Europe. That great prize still stands before the statesmen of all countries, but it is not to be achieved merely by making speeches of unexceptional sentiments. If it is to be won by any nation it will only be by an immense amount of wise restraint and timely discreet action which, over a period of years, has created a situation where speeches are not merely fine exhortations but record the achievements of unity and conciliation which have sprung up. There is the moral leadership of Europe. It is not to be won by such each methods as merely making speeches which will arouse the applause of every good-hearted person in this country.

The Prime Minister spread on the table at Geneva a few weeks ago a vast plan for bringing all armaments down and consequently improving relatively the military strength of Germany. The right hon. Gentleman made an extraordinary admission. He said he had not gone through the figures himself. But he took responsibility for them. It was a very grave responsibility. This proposal which was put forward with the highest motives and with many good reasons behind it, touches all the most delicate and dangerous spots in Europe. If ever there was a document upon which its author ought to have consumed his personal thought and energy, it was this tableau, this scheme of disarmament, prescribing for every country great and small what its military, air and naval forces should

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be. I have not heard it said with any assurance by the Government that the Committee of Imperial Defence were consulted upon these figures. I have not heard it said that the chiefs of the Fighting Services here have been consulted upon these figures. Unknown hands have prepared these figures and the author of the document has admitted to us that he had not himself mastered them, either in scope or in detail.

Here in this country we know that no dark designs are harboured by our

Government against the peace or wellbeing of any country. There may be mistakes; there may be muddles, but no dark designs of that kind areharboured by any British Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary. He could not live under the conditions of British Cabinet Government if it were otherwise. But foreign countries do not always attribute to us this innocence. I have been reading some of the comments in foreign newspapers lately and in a Liberal newspaper of good standing in Switzerland I was surprised to see the interpretation that was put upon the proposals, innocently and precipitately put forward, by the Prime Minister. In that paper all is calculated out and worked up to give the impression that the Prime Minister was deliberately indulging pro-German sympathies and deliberately endeavouring to weaken France, and, seeing the detail with which the argument is set out, one could not help being impressed. On the one hand, the reader is told that the military and naval clauses must be read together; and there were elaborate arguments to show that, owing to the arrangement of the naval forces, it would not be possible for the French to bring their 200,000 Colonial troops across the Mediterranean in certain contingencies. I do not repeat that because I think such an idea has animated His Majesty's Government. Not at all. I repeat it only in order to show how extremely delicate and dangerous these matters are, and what care should be taken before they are thrust upon the council board of Europe.

But that is not by any means the whole story. No sooner had this tremendous step been taken of prescribing to every country what its defences should be, than the Prime Minister left Geneva for Rome.

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He arrived in Rome one day, and found himself with a new foreign policy the next. Signor Mussolini's proposal for a Four-Power Pact or agreement has many arguments in its favour. I liked very much the language used by my right hon. Friend about the importance of the great Powers who would have to bear the brunt of any serious conflict, establishing good relations between themselves and being in close touch with each other, if only to enable them to spread those satisfactory relations wider among the larger number of smaller Powers. As I say, there are many arguments in favour of co-operation of the four Powers, but one does not always need to advertise the fact so very vigorously. There are many Cabinets in which an inner Cabinet grows up without any of the other members being offended, but it is only under the stress of war that we took the step of forming a War Cabinet, which definitely distinguished between those members and other persons in the Government. So it is in this European field.

As I say, there are arguments in favour of this policy, but at the present time there are two serious arguments against it. The first is this: Of all times, this was not the time to make such a proposal with any prospect of success, and, secondly, nothing could be more unsuitable than to combine this Four-Power Pact with the disarmament proposals which had been laid before Geneva only two days before. By those proposals France was asked—I must not say to halve her army, because the Under-Secretary of State would rebuke me—to reduce her army from 700,000 to 400,000; and at the same moment that this very serious demand was made upon her, she was also invited, as the result of the Rome Conference, to take her seat at a table of four, with Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini, the two dictators, and with the Prime Minister, about whom France, of course, still has memories.

I say that putting this double pressure upon France at this moment, both from Geneva and from Rome, was calculated to court defeat for either or both of the schemes which the Government successively and, ultimately, simultaneously advanced. Such a procedure was to doom them to failure beforehand. It could not fail to exacerbate suspicion, and not only to weaken the influence of our country,

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but to involve us more deeply in the Continental situation, for you cannot take the lead in this remarkable manner, presenting these successive policies to Europe with such rapidity, without being entangled to a very large extent as a consequence of the proposals that you have made.

I do not think that plans for disarmament so comprehensive should have been put forward by the Prime Minister without his having studied them most carefully, with all the highest technical experts here, nor do I think the proposals with which Signor Mussolini confronted the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary when they arrived in Rome should have been even entertained on the spur of the moment. There are all sorts of proposals put forward, with great ability, by a very powerful personality, which sound very well and look very attractive at first sight, but in matters affecting the peace of so many countries and the lives and well-being of millions of men, what harm would there have been to have waited till the Cabinet could have examined this proposal, till the trained officials of the Foreign Office could have examined such a proposal in all its aspects? They would not have taken very long to point out what the inevitable reactions would be. It astounds me that the Prime Minister, who has had such considerable opportunities of acquainting himself with European affairs, should not have mastered the real facts of the European situation or the articulation of the different countries which compose the system. At any rate, the results have been quietly apparent. France, confronted with this double, simultaneous demand, was deeply disturbed. But the French have learned to attune their language to the standard forms of phraseology which are highly in favour throughout the English-speaking world. They never on any account make abrupt or sharp contradictions of any proposals that are put to them. They say, "Most interesting, most helpful, and a great move forward," but they leave to their Allies, the small nations—and not so small either—to say what France feels and thinks but which she realises had better be said by others.

What happened? Within one single week, if I may judge from the public

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prints, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania at once made their appearance, and every one of them made in concert—no doubt with pre-arrangement—statements in which the danger of war was brutally referred to. Such a warning must never be disregarded. It is quite true that such warnings do not now bear the significance they would have borne in the days before the great struggle. I am very glad that that is so, but, at the same time, it appears to me that the statements made on behalf of these three Powers do constitute a definite and grave warning of the dangers of pursuing this policy. Thus, all the small Powers, including the Scandinavian Powers, are making common cause in the League of Nations in order to defend themselves against what they think is a threatened over-lordship of the four great Powers. What happens then? The Pact or Agreement so incontinently accepted has to be amended, has to be modified to fit the views of the small nations in the League of Nations. It has to be modified again to meet special claims. It has to be modified again to meet the requirements of France, and it very soon reaches the point when it loses the adherence of Germany. It is no good saying it is merely "much ado about nothing." That is not so. Harm has been done, disturbance has been created, suspicion has been spread, and English influence has lost a measure of its virtue and added a measure to its responsibility. There may be days when all our influence will be required to help to keep the peace of Europe, and when all our detachment will be required to enable us to keep clear of being involved in war.

I am asking the Foreign Secretary specifically to lay Papers on the Rome visit. There is no reason at all why we should not have had some Papers by now. My right hon. Friend's case was overwhelming that we should have had proper detailed information and that Papers should have been laid. The Government know perfectly well what is the proper measure of information which can be in the Papers, but the House is not doing its duty if it allows itself to go week after week in ignorance of what actually occurred in matters of prime consequence to all.

I have only one more remark to make, and I address myself particularly to the Conservative party. Under the late

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Socialist Government and under the Prime Minister there were three main lines of policy in external affairs which were developed. There were the special trade favours to Russia; we know where that policy has led. There was then the policy of strengthening Germany and raising her more to an equality with France. We all agree that that cannot be pursued any further now. Then there was the policy of giving a federal constitution to India, about which we have so often spoken. I have opposed all those policies from their very inception and at every stage. They all arose, naturally, from the views of an international Socialist administration. I did hope, when the General Election swept the board clear, that a new view would be taken of those external policies. I did hope that in regard to Russia we should say, "We will put ourselves in the same position as the United States has done with so much success, and we will not give trade or money favours to Russia which we do not give to friendly countries, to our own Dominions, or to our own industries or municipalities."

I hoped that in regard to Europe we should not endeavour, on any account, to weaken France, increasingly keep ourselves in reserve, and be not too seriously involved, and that we should put our own defences in good order in view of the increasing danger on the Continent. As to India I had hopes there, too, and I still hope. Those who heard the Foreign Secretary cheered when he spoke on the Russian question the other day could easily see what is the true instinct of this House of Commons. Its true instinct is contrary to the well-established lines of Socialist external policy which were in progress under the late Administration, and I hope and trust that the day will come when not only upon Russia and upon Europe, but also upon India, the same changes of opinion will take place as have already taken place on two out of these three subjects during the course of the present Session.

I will say one word about the Prime Minister's visit to the United States of America. It will be only a word. I do not understand how any Prime Minister could have failed to take up, in the spirit of the highest cordiality, the invitation tendered him in such striking terms by the President of the United States at the

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beginning of his tenure of power, and I am very glad indeed that the Government have decided to send the Prime Minister upon this mission, so described and so limited as it has been. For my part, I should not like to have spoken in this Debate in a critical sense without wishing the Prime Minister, who is not here now, a pleasant holiday and an agreeable conversation, a fruitful result for his mission and a safe return to this country.