- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on March 29, 1933, during the debate on Indian constitutional reform, opposing the White Paper's federal proposals while conditionally accepting provincial self-government and a Joint Select Committee.
- Main themes
- Failure of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, India White Paper proposals, Federal government at the Centre of India, provincial self-government and control of the police, Parliament's freedom from pledges on India, restoration of order after the Civil Disobedience Movement, Statutory Commission (Simon) report, Joint Select Committee procedure, role of the Princes in federation, Conservative Party responsibility
- Duration
- ~44 min
- Words
- 5,226
- Sentences
- 204
- Readability
- 49
- Grade
- 12.7
- Syntax
- 3.11
- Vocabulary
- 2.14
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other204 sentences in 51 paragraphs
The two able and informing speeches to which we have listened are fitting elements in the introduction of the third day of this important Debate and, indeed, the whole character and quality of the Debate has shown the keen interest that the House has taken in the subject of Indian constitutional reform. That is as it should be. Our ancestors never grudged attention to Indian matters. Read the great Debates on the impeachment of Warren Hastings, or the Indian Bill of Mr. Pitt or Mr. Fox, or the Debate upon the assumption of the Imperial Crown by
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Queen Victoria, or the Debates of 1919. All these fill our Parliamentary records. And yet I think the Debate that we are engaged in may well be mare important not only than any but perhaps than all these foregoing Debates put together. Whereas all these discussions in the past were the slow, gradual, steady building up of a great structure of peace and order in India and increasing the authority and vigilant attention of Parliament over all the Indian scene, we are now confronted with proposals which mark the definite, decline, and even disappearance, of our authority in India, which proclaim our disinteresting ourselves in the welfare of its people and our readiness to hand over, after 180 years, India's fortunes to Indian hands.
We are to do this at a time in the history of the world when the processes of Parliamentary government and electioneering are becoming increasingly distrusted and discarded throughout the Western world. We are to do it at a time when the struggle for national existence and for the maintenance of secure, firmly attached markets is becoming ever more fiercely intensified and when we see the most powerful, the most civilised, and the most modernised countries resolutely seeking to hold, to acquire or to regain oversea possessions and without the slightest compunction claiming and asserting the rights of colonisation and the rights of conquest. When you think of what we are discussing and of the situation of the world, surely, it is not too much to say that this Debate is fraught with memorable consequences both to the people of Great Britain and to the numberless peoples of Hindustan.
We are approaching the end of this Debate, but it is only the beginning of what may be one of the most serious controversies of British politics. It will be a painful controversy, because it must necessarily largely be conducted against friends or former friends. It will be a long controversy, because the procedure which is prescribed makes it impossible that the Bill to be founded upon the White Paper can become law for 15 or 18 months, and, as I gather, three or more years may elapse after that before the system of Federal Government responsible at the Centre of India can be brought into existence.
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Let me, then, survey the whole scene, and I begin at the turning point with the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms have failed. They were an experiment, admittedly hazardous and doubtful, made in good faith, but they have failed. They have failed by every test, moral and material, which can be applied. Every service which has been transferred to Indian hands has deteriorated markedly. Nepotism, corruption, inefficiency, general slackening, a lowering down of the Services has invaded and infected all the departments which have been experimentally handed over and which, I may remind the House, are of such vital consequence to the daily life of the masses of the Indian people. Instead of increasing contentment, these reforms have aroused agitation and increased disloyalty. Instead of bringing peace between jarring races and rival religions, they have only awakened old passions which were slumbering, and slumbering profoundly, under the long Pax Britannica. These reforms have concentrated the mind of India so far as it is conscious and vocal during the whole of this period upon political and constitutional change, and diverted the energies of the country from all those important material and administrative improvements which are really the main interests of the Indian peasant and of the Indian workman. They have not even contented those political classes for whose satisfaction they were originally conceived.
I do not wish to make this statement too sweeping, because, no doubt, a lot of good work has been done, and will be done, but still, in the main, the first fact on which we should stand to-day is the failure of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. I say they have failed. I dare say that my Noble Friend the Member for Horsham (Earl Winterton), who I am told has a rifle carefully loaded for me, will say that I shared the responsibility for them. I will not disclaim any responsibility. I was not, in fact, a member of the War Cabinet which continued to rule until November, 1919. When the regular Cabinet was restored and for the first time I was asked, officially or unofficially, to express an opinion upon these matters, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms had already been read a Second time in both Houses of Parliament, and had come to us with
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the unanimous recommendation of the Joint Committee of both Houses, or almost unanimous. But, still I was a member of the Government, like my right hon. Friend the Lord President of the Council. We were both members of the Government, and, I have no doubt, made speeches in support of the Administration and its general policy, as others have done before and will perhaps do hereafter. Here I am going to defend my right hon. Friend as well as myself, and carry him along with me under my aegis. We shared our responsibility with all the Members of the House of Commons at that day.
The great scheme of Mr. Montagu and Lard Chelmsford passed through Parliament without a single division. We may well ask why the Members of those days, many of whom are in the House to-day, behaved in this manner, and what were the reasons which led us to this supine neglect? I suppose that we thought, "It must be all right." We thought, "The India Office have approved the plan and all the details have been carefully discussed with the Government of India. The 'Times' newspaper writes able articles in its favour." So we thought, "No doubt the Secretary of State is a very nice fellow, has taken immense pains, and has set his heart on the scheme." No doubt we thought 10 years ago: "We must not add to the difficulties of the Prime Minister whose burdens are so heavy and who has to go abroad so often. We must back up the National Government which has just been returned by so large a majority." I suppose that we thought all those things, and with a little assistance from the able Whips the scheme was allowed to pass through without even any serious examination by Parliament. We are all to blame.
I remember seeing—I do not think that I attended those Debates—on one occasion an elderly member of the Conservative party standing up there—Colonel Yate—apparently very excited and making frantic gestures of warning, but we all said: "Oh, he is only one of those die-hards. Some fellow who has been a lot in India and consequently cannot know anything about it." I am glad to revive his memory to-day. Although we Members of that Parliament may he all to blame, to-day we are deal-
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ing with issues which far exceed in importance the mere awarding of praise or blame to individuals. Let no one who sits here, or wherever he sits, delude himself by supposing that he can escape responsibility for what is now proposed by casting the blame on the past. Here we have to deal with the present and with the future, and every one, from the youngest Member to those who have longest borne the burden of affairs, is accountable to the nation and to history for speeches, votes, action or inaction now and in the critical months which lie before us. If mistakes were made in the past, do not repeat them now. If there are elders in this House who look back with remorse to decisions with which they have been associated in the past, let not those who are more happily situated prepare for themselves sombre self-reproaches in the afternoon or evening of their lives. Blame me if you will, blame the Parliament of those days if you will, taunt me if you will, discount my opinion, as you are entitled to do by any words I have spoken before, if you will; but in your hands, and on your heads lies the responsibility of what you yourselves are now about to do.
The conditions of the last General Election were very exceptional; probably they were unique. Very large numbers of Members are here who have not been here before, and who did not, in many cases, expect to be called upon, and all the more credit to them for coming forward to face the task of fighting an election with no hope or ambition. It is to those Members I particularly appeal. Let them take warning from what has happened in the past. Let them be careful. Let them beware that in years to come when another House of Commons will be here and perhaps other trains of thought will rule our minds, they do not find themselves sitting by their own firesides when across the dark distances from India, to quote a celebrated phrase of John Morley, they hear the dull roar and scream of carnage and confusion coming back to us. Then bitter will be their feelings of responsibility and of agony when they feel that they themselves played a part in bringing about a situation of such frightful disaster. I appeal to them to discard altogether the
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mere recriminations about what happened in the past. They cannot throw the blame upon the past nor can they throw the blame upon the people. What more could the British democracy have done than give the majority which they gave at the last election? Never was there such a vote in favour of the greatness of Britain. Some may say mistaken in some way. I am not arguing that. But everyone knows that the impulse which brought all those millions of very poor people was the strength, honour, and endurance of our country, and its greatness among the nations. It is no good saying that democracy is doing this. If any failure occurs, it is in the respresentatives which democracy has chosen, or in those who have the power to direct their actions.
The first question which we should ask ourselves and which was touched upon by the right hon. Gentleman, is: Are we free to decide, are we free or are we pledged; are we free or are we bound, and to what extent are we bound? We cannot be bound by individual speeches. They may reflect upon the individuals who make them, or may not, but the policy of the State must be determined only upon legislative action and solemn declarations made by the Sovereign on the advice of responsible Ministers. In these days, when so many speeches are made by all people who take part in politics, it would be most dangerous to admit for a moment that speeches even of Ministers and Members of the Government can be taken as pledges and as bonds which fetter the power of Parliament and the representatives of the nation to deal with the great problems of the day as they think right and best. Happily there is no dispute whatever between me and the Government about that. I have always taken my stand on Clause 41 of the Act of 1919. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State read out a passage, carefully prepared, every word of which had been carefully weighed, on Monday last to prove that we were not bound, or pledged, or committed in any way except in so far as you may say by way of moral obligation, the general trend of our institutions, and the growth of opinion in India. Therefore, I say that we have a right to decide.
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Let me ask: have we the power? During the last Parliament, under the late Viceroy, very serious disorders broke out all over India. There were religious massacres of Moslems by Hindus, and there were reprisals. There were perpetual riots in Calcutta and Bombay. We saw the Congress burning the Union Jack at Lahore, with impunity. We saw prolonged paralysis of Government around Peshawar. We saw Lord Irwin negotiating with Mr. Gandhi. We saw the Indian Congress hoping to establish itself as a parallel Government in India and presuming almost to stand between the Government of India as an interpreter to the people of India. Side by side with all these events we had the undermining perorations of the Round Table Conferences, leading Indians to assume, without any warrant from Parliament—because we know that Parliament is free—that they would very shortly be called upon, after a brief period of transition, to assume responsible Government in India. When I protested against this state of affairs, against these tendencies, when I urged that it would be necessary, sooner or later, to break the Congress and Mr. Gandhi and all that his movement stood for, the late Secretary of State, Mr. Wedgwood Benn, and his like, were accustomed to reply that I sought a reign of blood and terror in India, that artillery and machine guns would have to be used ruthlessly, that large reinforcements of troops would have to be sent from England into the country. All these hideous nightmares were paraded for our warning and alarm.
The present Government, the present Viceroy and the Secretary of State, who both share the credit, have acted as I then advised, and what has been the result? Order has been largely restored throughout India. The Civil Disobedience Movement is broken. Mr. Gandhi, upon whom the Prime Minister and Lord Irwin lavished their caresses, has been in prison—I am sorry for it, for many reasons—for more than a year, together with a very large, but happily diminishing, number of his followers. Hardly anybody has been killed or severely hurt. Not a single British battalion has been employed except on the frontier. Very few collisions have taken place of a serious character between the police and the rioters. The decision of the Government of India to enforce the law with-
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out fear or favour has been instantly accepted throughout India by the overwhelming mass of the people. I believe, therefore, that there is no doubt of our ability to govern India justly and wisely, in our own way, and to entrust able, educated Indians, with whom alone the Government of India can be conducted, with an ever broader share of responsibility in the administration, as and when we think fit.
I reject, therefore, the defeatist argument that we have not the power. We have the power, and we have the right to decide. I know that the Secretary of State will tell me that the mere enforcement of law and order would not have produced peace unless accompanied by the kind of proceedings in which he has been indulging at the various Round Table Conferences, and that it is the hopes excited by Ministerial speeches about the advent of central responsible Government in India which have calmed the passions which had formerly been rife. There I differ from him entirely. I believe that is the reverse of the truth. Just as the disorders in India under Lord Irwin arose largely from the rumours that the British Raj—to quote a term well known now in our controversies—was coming to an end and that the Gandhi Raj, or the Congress Raj, would succeed it; just as these rumours promoted the disorders under Lord Irwin, in the same manner these same rumours have hampered the restoration of order, have delayed the revival of confidence, have made the officials less sure of themselves and have spread that feeling of unrest and approaching change among all political classes. The achievement of my right hon. Friend and of Lord Willingdon, who both deserve credit, is remarkable, and it is the more remarkable that they should have so easily restored order in the face of all this continuous undercurrent of political and constitutional insecurity.
If, then, we have the right and power to choose freely, what should our choice be? We are often taunted by those who say: "What is your alternative? I do not think that is a very fair question to ask. You have a great Government in power, with all the resources at their disposal, who, after these many years of labour, have produced this White Paper and their scheme of 110,000 words. Why should they say to a few poor gentlemen
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who represent the Conservative party— If the Noble Lady the Member for the Sutton Division of Plymouth (Viscountess Astor) will go to her constituency, she will find out who represents it. Why should a few of us be expected to present another complete, brand-new, elaborately-worked-out system? We in this matter have the great advantage that we employed a Statutory Commission, which for three years travelled about the length and breadth of India and presented a report, unanimously agreed to by all parties, and we, in our humility, think we are in the first instance entitled to rest ourselves broadly and confidingly upon that. I have never considered the Report of the Simon Commission—I do not know that I ought to call it that any more; I think I had better say the Report of the Statutory Commission, not wishing to embarrass my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary —I have never regarded the Report of the Statutory Commission as if it were a final revelation, sacrosanct, incapable of modification or amendment of any kind.
In particular, many of us have argued that the police should not be handed over to the provinces, and we will argue that as opportunity occurs on the Floor of this House. To do justice to the Statutory Commission, they did not say that the police should be handed over in this crude manner. They used a lot of arguments, some of which we heard yesterday, about the only way to stop the police being abused is to put them in the hands of the people who are abusing them. But when it comes to their actual recommendations there is a very hopeful and very helpful recommendation, namely, that one or more—that is better still—nominated Ministers should be attached to the Governor of every province. Obviously, if that were so, the Governor of any province where the conditions rendered it necessary could entrust the portfolio of the Home Office to one of the nominated Ministers who enjoys his confidence. I say this to show that, while we do not accept the Simon Commission as the final word, to be accepted exactly as it stands, it might well be taken as the basis for Parlia mentary examination. We have contended that it should be so taken and that its members should carry special weight in our debating and should have
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been used in all the subsequent negotiations and consultations with the Indian delegate.
That seems to be a not unreasonable position for private Members to assume in this matter, but the Secretary of State twists our attitude to suit his own contention. He made a speech the other day in which he taunted those who said that they supported the Simon Commission as a basis, with being prepared to force democratic Government in India upon the provinces. He argued, in effect, that by adopting the proposals of the Simon Commission as the basis of discussion we had stultified ourselves in opposing the application of the same principle or of the same system to the Central Government of India. That is another warning to the House of the advantage which will be taken—I am sorry to say it—by the Government, by those I will call the Round Table-ites, of every step taken by their opponents towards compromise and agreement. Only two days ago the Secretary of State said that practically everyone in the House was eager for the setting up of provincial Government in India. I will therefore declare quite plainly, speaking entirely for myself, that while for the sake of agreement between all parties I attach the greatest importance to the recommendations of the Statutory Commission, and many of us are willing to see further experiments made in the provinces, it does not follow at all that we think that that experiment will succeed.
I think that in many of the provinces responsible Government will only accentuate administrative deterioration, racial and religious unrest and political tumult, which have been the fruitful results of the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme. Far from advocating such a scheme, or forcing such a system upon the people of India, or being eager to do so, I wish sincerely that matters had not been handled in this way or had come to this pass; but for the sake of agreement, despite our misgivings—you cannot stop the progress of the world because of misgivings—I should be quite ready to make it clear, by all practical tests, that we are sincere in doing all in our power to help Indians to a greater share in the responsibilities of Government—I think we might well begin in some of the provinces, as was suggested by a Noble
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Lord yesterday—provided, of course, that the power which is given, the delegated power, can be resumed without serious disturbance if it is found to work to the injury of the people of India.
If we thus agree to provincial self-government, it is not because we are forcing it upon anybody, it has been forced upon us; it is not because any of us think it will succeed, it will most likely fail, but if it fails at least the disaster is local not general, it is subordinate not supreme; and, as long as the central Government of India is intact, secure, or to quote the jargon in this matter in India—unitary—it will always be possible to help a province which has fallen into disorder or in which the administration has scandalously degenerated, whose people are suffering from a failure of essential services; it will always be possible to help them back to such poor structure, poor but precious, of justice and civilised organisation which we have hitherto been able to erect in India. If, on the other hand, the provincial experiment succeeds over the whole of India or in a particular province, or in some provinces, we shall have to admit that a tremendous argument has been established, an argument of facts, not of words, an argument of achievement not of aspiration for a further advance. It we were provided after 10 or 15 years with a considerable number of prosperous, orderly, contented, loyal provincial units, nothing could stop an arrangement being made to weave these units into the higher synthesis of a Federal organisation.
There are two contentions of His Majesty's Government to which I must refer. The first is that none of the Liberal elements in India, on which they are relying, will take part in provincial autonomy unless they have the police handed over to them and unless Federal government is set up at the centre. All I can say 'about that is that it is not an argument which should weigh with us. We are here to give what we consider right and wise, not to give what we consider wrong and unwise because it is the minimum necessary to satisfy some not very representative Indian political groups. The second point was contained in the speech of the Foreign Secretary yesterday. He used what I think is an even more questionable argument in his
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guarded, balancing, lukewarm but brilliantly ingenious speech with which he regaled us, and I could not help thinking as I listened to it of the cynical remark, "Distrust first thoughts; they are usually honest." I think we all understand, anyone who lives long enough in this House and who has experienced the vicissitudes of going in and out of Government will realise, the difficulties with which he had to contend and will admire his craftsmanship in dealing with them. On these occasions the skilful advocate will always look for a new fact. When a search is being made for reasons for a change of opinion the first thing is to search for a new fact, and the right hon. Gentleman produced a new fact; that the Princes of India offered to come into Federal government only if it was to be upon a responsible basis.
Is it possible that the right hon. Gentleman does not know, has he never heard, of what lay at the back of that extraordinary stipulation on the part of the Princes? I have heard on fairly good authority that the disappointment of the Princes, their alarm at the announcement of Lord Irwin that Dominion status was brought to the fore again, made them feel that they must look to their own future, secure their future under a totally different order of things. Then members of the Congress party discussed with some of the Princes, and an arrangement was made very much on the basis of what my right hon. Friend opposite would denounce—if you will help us to gain more power at the centre we will see that you keep your full rights over your own subjects in your States. That is the only reasonable explanation of such a stipulation on the part of the Princes.
I confess that I am not attracted by any part of that argument. I am not particularly anxious to see the Princes at this juncture brought into the Central Government of India, nor am I anxious to set up a Federal system in India. I am not at all induced by the argument which suggests that we should do something which we do not like in order to accomplish something which we like still less. In this Debate His Majesty's Government have been very apologetic. Perhaps that is too much to say; at any rate, they have been very deprecatory. The Minister of Health, who I do not see in his place, went even further in
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humility and moderation, in the moderation of his enthusiasm for the Government's proposals, than anything I have heard said in this House. Speaking on Saturday in his constituency, in contact with the opinion of his constituents, he said of the White Paper that
It was in the first place only a suggestion.
This product of so many conferences, inquiries, discussions, debates, the labour of the East and the West, this White Paper, for which we were told to wait and not prejudge the issue before it came out, the Minister of Health now says is "only a suggestion." I think that is going too far. We should really have a little stiffer attitude from the Government about their own proposals because they are every day engaging great masses of opinion in support of them. But they have been apologetic, and no one can say that the Motion which we are to vote upon now is not very cleverly and very adroitly framed, obviously with the intention of dodging a Division and confronting Conservative opponents of this policy with a proposition which they cannot possibly resist. Who can resist a Motion which begins by stating that no decision is to be taken by this House? Who can resist a Motion for appointing a Joint Select Committee, not in substitution for the ordinary Committee and Report stages in this House but in addition to those stages, and as preliminary to the Parliamentary procedure involved in the passing of a Bill? Certainly no one can vote against such a proposal. I think it is our duty to give the Government all possible support in repulsing the extremist Motion put forward by the official Opposition, and I shall certainly contribute my vote to what I trust will be for them a thoroughly satisfactory majority.
But do not let the House delude itself by supposing that the dangers of this question are passing away. On the contrary, this Committee which is to be appointed is appointed by a Government which will have an overwhelming majority upon the Committee and which, in addition, to its own majority will have all the support of the Socialist representatives and all the support of the Liberal representatives. The position of Conservative Members on that body, those who are not addicted to, or affected to, the Gov-
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ernment will, indeed, be forlorn. They will sit hemmed in on all sides by men pledged to secure the triumph of the Government policy or even to carry it further, and then after prolonged discussions have taken place and these unfortunate representatives have been voted down time and again by the machine, the overwhelming machine, at the disposal of the Government, the Government will present to Parliament a Bill which they will say is based upon the report of an impartial Select Committee which they appointed for that end.
I think that the Conservative party is asked to take an immense responsibility. Every party in this country has its own function. The Labour party is concerned with the minimum standards of life and labour. The Liberal party have their liberty, and it is an honourable charge, but the Conservative party have always had the duty of holding together the strong body of constituted authority in the State and the possessions we have throughout the world. It has always been their duty to view with great caution and in a critical faculty widespread proposals for constitutional change. Now you see what happens when the Conservative party, instead of putting its hand on the brake, is led to put its foot on the accelerator—the whole balance of our public life is destroyed.
I invite hon. Members to see how events develop. The Conservative party controls this House of Commons. And Parliament controls the Viceroy and the Government of India. These in their turn come into play. We see the strange and unnatural spectacle of the Imperial Government turning its strength against its own interests and rebuking its own friends. We see the pressure which is put on the Princes. We read the extraordinary incident referred to by the right hon. Member for Hillhead (Sir R. Horne) of the altercation, or discussion, between the Jam Sahib and the Viceroy only the other day. We do not see so closely the pressure which is put on the officials. For five years past the high personnel of India has been arranged, continuously arranged, with a view to securing men who will give a. modern and welcome reception to these sort of proposals. It is one of the greatest evils
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of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms that throughout the Service the path of promotion has tended to be more easy for those who readily throw themselves into what are regarded as the irresistible moods of the British nation.
