- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on July 11, 1935, in a Foreign Office debate, criticising the Abyssinia proposal, the dual Foreign Secretaries and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement.
- Main themes
- Proposed cession of British protected territory to Abyssinia, Italian ambitions in Abyssinia, conduct of diplomacy through ambassadors, Minister for League of Nations Affairs, weakening of the League of Nations and collective security, two equal Foreign Secretaries, unity of command in the Foreign Office, Anglo-German Naval Agreement, German re-armament, naval shipbuilding race, Stresa Front
- Duration
- ~16 min
- Words
- 1,884
- Sentences
- 62
- Readability
- 47
- Grade
- 13.8
- Syntax
- 3.28
- Vocabulary
- 2.16
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other62 sentences in 18 paragraphs
It would complicate matters very much if we attempted to run a discussion on the internal policies of Italy, Germany or Russia at the same time as we are dealing with the general relationship of peoples and nations. Lastly, not only have we as it seems got into the position in which we are thought to be working against Italy, but we have made this proposal of handing over a portion of British protected territory in the hope of procuring a relinquishment of Italian ambitions. I cannot help saying—and it is only expressing what everyone feels up to the present—that no explanation has been offered by the Foreign Secretary in his excellent speech of the very unfortunate methods by which this project was put forward. The policy of ceding British protected territory and British protected subjects in order to get round some diplomatic difficulty, or in order to assuage the disputes of foreign countries, or even to pay our own way from year to year in the modern world, is a very dangerous one for this country to open. When we are considering our vast innumerable possessions and the reduced state of our means of defence, and at the same time the obvious hunger which is exhibited in so many quarters on the continent of Europe, it seems to me that any steps that might tend to direct appetites upon ourselves should be viewed with the utmost caution and scrutinised with the greatest strictness by Parliament.
Still, I say, supposing that, in these years so critical for the peace of Europe, my right hon. Friend the Minister for League of Nations Affairs had returned from Italy with an agreement that she would abandon her anxious and alarming venture, I believe that the gain would have outweighed the loss; but what I do not see, and what I hope we shall be told by my right hon. Friend, is how it ever came to be supposed that this
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particular proposal would have attracted the Italian Government. Why should Signor Mussolini want to prolong the standstill on the borders of Abyssinia while Abyssinia enjoyed a corridor to the sea through which a transit of arms could take place year after year? However you look at it, it was a forlorn hope. It was an honest, well-meaning proposal, but it was a forlorn hope. We have been told that it was an informal, tentative suggestion, and so forth. Why could not that have been put through the ordinary diplomatic channels
There was a letter from Lord Hardinge in the "Times" the other day advising the use of the trained diplomatists much more than they are used at the present time in matters of prime importance. I do not say that there are not occasions when Ministers should go, and the League of Nations is meant to be a place where foreign ministers meet, but I do say the occasions when Ministers go must be most carefuly selected, and they should really only go, in most cases, when they are pretty sure that the result will be to put the seal on an understanding already arrived at by the diplomatists. The matter could have been dealt with in this case by the Ambassador having a private talk, asking whether this kind of offer would be any use, putting it forward as it would be only as a gesture of sincere friendship and desire to help. If he had put it forward in that way behind the scenes, which could so easily have been done, I do not think the Government would have got into the embarrassment in which they are at the present time. I must say one word to my right hon. Friend the Minister for League of Nations Affairs. Some two years ago I ventured to recite to him those words of Dr. Johnson:
Ye who listen to the whispers of credulity and follow with eagerness the phantoms of hope, who expect that age will perform the promises of youth and that the deficiencies of the present will be made good by the future, attend to the history of Rasselas, Prince of Abyssinia.
I am afraid my right hon. Friend has been taking my counsel too literally. Everyone had the greatest hopes of his career, and the whole House, irrespective of party, welcomes the appearance of this new figure, but we hope he will choose his occasions with a little stricter discrimination, and make quite sure before
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he undertakes these different journeys that he will not be asked to run risks which injure himself, and are not sufficiently slight to justify the hope of a satisfactory result.
To recapitulate. During the last six weeks the League of Nations has undoubtedly been weakened by our action, the principle of collective security has undoubtedly been impaired, German treaty-breaking has been condoned and even extolled, the Stresa Front has been shaken if not, indeed, dissolved. Although I cannot believe that any nation in contact with the British Government can doubt our sincere desire for peace, British influence undoubtedly has to some extent been dissipated, and our moral position, or at any rate our logical position, has been to some extent obscured. You could not have had a more complete and perfect catalogue of how not to do it than has been presented by the events which have taken place since we last discussed foreign affairs. Frankly, I cannot understand how it was done. Nothing that has been said shows us how or why it was done. It seems to me as if there were four or five different policies at work inside the Cabinet, and that now one and now the other gain the ascendency according as the incidents of the hour or the events of the day bring these or those considerations to our attention.
That brings me to the new plan of having two equal Foreign Secretaries. I was very glad indeed that the Prime Minister said yesterday this was only a temporary experiment. I cannot feel that it will last long or ever be renewed. At any rate, it is in the nature of poetic justice that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary should, on leaving the India Office, have a personal experience of dyarchy in its most direct and homely connection. What we want in foreign affairs is not, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister suggested, a team, however loyal—and it certainly will be loyal—and however well disciplined it may be. What we need, first of all, is a plain, simple policy, which can be declared in Parliament and to the nation and can be generally approved by them. And then we need that this policy should be adhered to through all the chops and changes of the situation. Secondly, we need the integral thought of a single man responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs,
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ranging over the entire field and making every factor and every incident contribute to the general purpose upon which Parliament has agreed.
The Foreign Secretary, whoever he is, whichever he is, must be supreme in his Department, and everyone in that great office ought to look to him, and to him alone. I remember that we had a discussion in the War about unity of command, and that my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) said: "It is not a question of one general being better than another, but of one general being better than two." There is no reason at all why a strong Cabinet Committee should not sit with the Foreign Secretary every day in these difficult times, or why the Prime Minister should not see him or his officials at any time, but when the topic is so complicated and vast, when it is in such continued flux, it seems to me that confusion will only be made worse confounded by dual allegiances and equal dual responsibilities.
I now propose to say a few words on the Naval Agreement. I am not going into any detail in this matter, because we Are to have a special Debate, but the Foreign Secretary opened his speech with it and dwelt upon the advantages which it confers upon us. I think that those advantages are very dubious. Of course it is quite wrong to pretend that the 'apparition of Germany as a formidable naval power, equipped with submarines and all the other apparatus of war, is the result of the Naval Agreement. That would have happened anyhow. The deep purposes of great nations are not, I am afraid, governed by the ebb and flow of political discussions or by temporary agreements which are made. It has for some time been evident that Germany, intends to embark upon a great process, a gigantic process, of re-arming by land, sea and air, which will make her the most formidable military power in the whole world. I am not blaming upon this Agreement these events and misfortunes which will follow from it, but when my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister says, as he did the other day, that he hoped this would be a great measure of disarmament, let me tell him that I am afraid it is not. I venture to hazard the prediction that it inaugurates the arrival of Germany—not the Naval Agreement in particular—as a great naval power, and
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that this will inaugurate an outburst of shipbuilding in almost every country in the world the like of which has never been seen.
Let us suppose that some great, distinguished and powerful person, who has played a great part in life, dies and his posts, offices, appointments and possessions are distributed, and then he suddenly comes back from the dead. A great deal of inconvenience would be caused. That is what has happened in the resuscitation of German naval power. The equilibrium—such equilibrium as we have been able to establish—in naval matters is entirely ruptured and deranged, and we shall find in every country, in the present temper of the world, that great new constructions, replacing old ships or increasing the total tonnage, will be begun without the slightest delay. And let me say that if the first German programme, which has already been announced, and which is really last year's programme, the programme of 1934, is followed by similar programmes in the next few years, the German 35 per cent. limit will have been laid down, if not completed, by 1938 or 1939, and in the same period, if we are not to endanger our naval security, it will be necessary for us to rebuild and lay down in new construction practically half the tonnage of our existing fleet. I cannot feel that this is at all a, matter for rejoicing—this German Naval Agreement. I remain still under this impression, that the one great fear of Europe is the power and might of the re-armed strength of Germany, and that the one great hope is the gathering together of Powers who are conscious of that fear, but have no aggressive intentions of any kind, in a system of collective security under the League of Nations in order that this tremendous process of the re-armament, of Germany may not be attended by some lamentable breakdown of peace.
