Air Estimates, 1935; Air Supplementary Estimate, 1934.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament for Epping

19 March 1935 · House of Commons debate on the Air Estimates, 1935 · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on March 19, 1935, during the debate on the Air Estimates, arguing that Germany's air power was overtaking Britain's and that the government's provision was inadequate.
Main themes
German military air strength, British air rearmament, inadequacy of the Air Estimates, comparison of first-line aircraft numbers, German aircraft production methods, conversion of German industry to war purposes, vulnerability of Britain to air attack, retaliation as deterrent, air raid precautions and earthing in aerodromes, Lord President's November 1934 figures, government responsibility for national defence
Duration
~21 min
69th percentile
Words
2,561
69th percentile
Sentences
110
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Readability
57
80th percentile
Grade
11.1
34th percentile
Syntax
3.05
54th percentile
Vocabulary
2.09
26th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 60%56%
  • Economic 18%17%
  • Institutional 17%16%
  • Ceremonial 4%4%
  • Social 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 5%

110 sentences in 24 paragraphs

But that is not an increase of 150 in the first-line air strength, because the squadrons are not in existence. It simply means that 150 additional machines of the newest pat-torn will be added to our Air Force. What we are comparing in this matter is not air strength with air strength, but the best class of hew machines with the comparable production in Germany. I hope no one will mix up the comparisons, because that is absolutely destructive of obtaining a coherent result. We now know that the financial provisions only permit of an addition of 150 machines of this type and the addition of 11 squadrons, which will raise our first-line air strength for home defence to 659 and our military aircraft to 1,170, exclusive of training machines. I hope that these figures will be found to be right, but it would be of enormous help if we could get a proper basis upon which to argue these vital matters. However, I do not think there is any dispute about the two figures of 659 and 1,170. What, then, will be the German first-line air strength at the end of this year? We cannot tell. We shall learn officially on 1st April, and it is no use speculating on what they will declare as their first-line air strength. I must confine myself to German military aircraft, the other factor.

Here, again, mystery shrouds all German preparations. At various points facts emerge which enable a general view to be taken. Enormous sums of money are being spent on German aviation and upon other armaments. I wish we could get at the figures which are being spent upon armaments. I believe that they would stagger us with the terrible, tale they would tell of the immense panoply which that nation of nearly 70,000,000 of people is assuming, or has already largely assumed. But there are certain things which strike one. For instance, the popu-

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lation of Dessau increased during last year by 13,000 people. Dessau is a centre of the great Junkers' aeroplane works, but it is only one of four or five main air factories of Germany. There are at least 20 others of a secondary but important character; and 13,000 people are known to have entered the town of Dessau—I do not say that they are all workers—in the course of last year. One can see what the scale of production must be. Further, owing to the fact that the Germans had to prepare their air force in secret and unofficially, there has grown up a somewhat different method of producing aircraft from that which obtains in this country and in France. Much smaller elements are actually made in the main factories than are made over here. Nuts and bolts and small parts are spread over an enormous producing area of small firms, and then they flow into the great central factories. The work which is done there consists in a rapid assembly, like a jig-saw puzzle or meccano game, with the result that aeroplanes are turned out with a rapidity which is incomparably greater than in our factories, where a great deal of the finer stages of the work are done on the spot.

I must assemble these facts because they are very important. According to yesterday's "Daily Telegraph," in this same account which I thought was so Very well informed, between 250 and 300 military aircraft have been added to Germany's total since November. I fear it will be found that the German factories are working up from their present rate of output of more than 100 a month to some unknown monthly increase. It may be 100, 120, or 140 a month; I do not pretend to be able to say. Nothing I have gathered from the newspapers enables me to say what the ultimate result will be, but it seems to me that if you take the next 12 months at an average output of 125 machines a month—I am sure there are a great many people who will scoff at such a low figure, and I may be only making myself ridiculous by using such a figure and may afterwards be mocked at for doing so—even if you take that moderate figure of 125, it will mean an addition to Germany's military aircraft in the financial year 1935–36 of 1,500, of which a portion will go to replace wastage, and the rest will be a net addition to their total military aircraft strength.

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That is many times larger than any programme of deliveries provided in this Estimate, which we see is concerned with an increase of 150, plus the natural wear and tear and wastage. Therefore, I am unable to accept the second statement of my right hon. Friend the Lord President in November last, which I have read to the House and will read again:

As for the position this time next year, so far from the German military air force being almost as strong as and probably stronger than our own, I estimate that we shall have in Europe alone a margin of nearly 50 per cent.

On the contrary, I must submit to the House that the Lord President was misled in the figures which he gave last November, quite unwittingly perhaps, because of the great difficulty of the subject. At any rate, the true position at the end of this year will be almost the reverse of that which he stated to Parliament. We must remember also that Germany's scale of reserves, judging by the lectures which are being delivered at different times by those who have been presiding over German aviation development—the scale of reserves of first-line air strength is 200 per cent. The reason is this: It will take them three months to get their peace-time industry working at full blast on a war-time basis and they calculate on a loss of 100 per cent. of aeroplanes per month, that is damage to 100 per cent. per month in time of war. Thus they would have three months' supply at the end of that three-monthly period. They hope to transfer the whole of the civilian industry into the means of getting their air force into permanent being on a wastage of 100 per cent. a month. They have, of course, made preparations for converting the entire industry of Germany to war purposes by a simple order being given of a detail and refinement which is almost inconceivable. I am not particularly stressing at this moment what comparable measures have been taken, but I am certain that Germany's preparations are infinitely more far-reaching. So that you have not only equality at the moment, but the great output which I have described, and you have behind that this enormous power to turn over, on the outbreak of war, the whole great force of the German industry.

I must again remind the House that when the War came to an end as

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Minister of Munitions I was presiding over an output of over 24,000 aeroplanes in a year, and our plans for the next year went to over 40,000, for a campaign that was never fought. It must be recognised how terribly large these figures are. Although they sound astronomical, they are not entirely removed from probability. I do not wish to complicate this argument on figures which it is difficult to make clear by qualitative analysis of the conditions in the two countries, but I must say this: It is admitted at the present time that the only effective means of defence against air attack is retaliation and counter-attack, and from the point of view of counter-attack the Germans seem to have a great advantage over us. Although they declare that their force is purely defensive, it has a much larger percentage of long-distance bombing machines than any other force—far larger than we have ourselves.

The next point is a matter of geography. The frontiers of Germany are very much nearer to London than the sea coasts of this island are to Berlin, and whereas practically the whole of the German bombing air force can reach London with an effective load, very few, if any, of our aeroplanes can reach Berlin with any appreciable load of bombs. That must be considered as part of the factors in judging between the two countries. We only wish to live quietly and to be left alone. If it is thought that a measure of retaliation, the power to retaliate, is a deterrent—I believe it is—to an outrageous attack, then it seems that we are at a disadvantage in that respect, quite apart from any numerical disadvantage. I was very glad indeed that the Prime Minister to-day, in answer to my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain), spoke about the committee which is to examine defensive measures against aeroplane attacks. That is a matter in which all countries, in my opinion, have a similar interest—all peaceful countries. It is a question not of one country against another, but of the ground against the air, and unless the dwellers upon earth can manage to secure the air above their heads it is almost impossible to forecast the misfortunes and fears which this invention, of which the world

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has proved itself so utterly unworthy, may bring upon them.

But in regard to this question of counter-attack and retaliation, which we hope to use here as a deterrent to keep us safe, one of the factors is the preparation made by the civilian population on either side to guard themselves against an air raid. Obviously if one side has made good preparations the loss inflicted upon it will be very much less than that inflicted on the side which has made no preparation at all. Great panics may arise if this is not foreseen. Up to the present what has been done on the Continent is incomparably ahead of anything that has been even presented on paper publicly here. In November last I threw out the suggestion that unemployed labour should be recruited to "earth in" our aerodromes. Foreign aerodromes, German aerodromes, are all tucked under the ground. Such a task might well be undertaken here. It would relieve the congestion of the labour market and at the same time put vital plant, without which you have no means of defence, in a state of security not dissimilar from that which other countries think it necessary to employ. Perhaps the Under-Secretary will say whether anything has been done about that. It takes a frightfully long time to get anything done in this country. We move like a slow-motion picture in all these matters. Four months is a tremendous period, and there is not the slightest reason why 20,000 men should not have been at work doing that which cannot menace anyone in the world, and which would give us security.

I therefore say, on a general survey, that I do not think my right hon. Friend's solemn pledge, that we are not inferior to any country within striking distance, is being kept, or that it will be kept, because the efforts which are being made will not be made by this country alone. The great advance of German aviation is only now beginning to take its full force. The programme which was announced in this country in August last was hopelessly inadequate. Its leisurely, stinted execution has so far made no appreciable addition to our strength. I do not think there would have been a Supplementary Estimate for the Air Force but for the Amendment to the Address which my Noble Friend and

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others put upon the Paper. It was only announced after that Amendment had appeared. The provision for this year is equally inadequate, hopelessly inadequate. I know with what satisfaction the Under-Secretary would announce the double or the treble of these proposals, but I have to deal with the facts presented to us. We are told that we are expanding as fast as we can, but that the preparations have to be made, that aerodromes have to be bought, the training schools enlarged, and that all this takes time. There are many arguments which the Government can use to show how slow and difficult the work is. I do not accept those arguments at their face value.

I am sure that if the vigorous measures that the situation requires were adopted to put ourselves in a position of defensive security, very much more rapid progress could be made in every branch. But even if the argument were true and there is to be this great delay, if we can only proceed by such very gradual stages, then I say that the responsibility of the Government and of the Air Ministry will be all the greater. If the necessary preparations had been made two years ago when the danger was clear and apparent, the last year would have seen a substantial advance, and this year would have seen a very great advance. Even at this time last year, if a resolve had been taken, as I urged, to double and redouble the British Air Force as soon as possible—the right hon. Member for Darwen (Sir H. Samuel) described me as a Malay run amok because I made such a statement—very much better results would have been yielded in 1935, and we should not find ourselves in our present extremely dangerous position.

Everyone sees now that we have entered a period of the gravest peril. We are faced, not with the prospect of a new war, but with something very like the possibility of a resumption of the War which ended in November, 1918. I still hope, and I believe—the alternative would be despair—that it may be averted. But the position is far worse than it was in 1914, and it may well be found to be uncontrollable. We are no longer safe behind the shield of our Navy. We have fallen behind in the vital air defence of this island. We are not only far more deeply and explicitly involved in Con-

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tinental affairs than we were in 1914, but owing to the neglect of our own defences we have become dependent upon other countries for our essential security.

From being the least vulnerable of all nations we have, through developments in the air, become the most vulnerable, and yet, even now, we are not taking the measures which would be in true proportion to our needs. The Government have proposed these increases. They must face the storm. They will have to encounter every form of unfair attack. Their motives will be misrepresented. They will be calumniated and called warmongers. Every kind of attack will be made upon them by many vocal forces, powerful and numerous forces, in this country. They are going to get it anyway. Why, then, not fight for something that will give us safety? Why, then, not insist that the provision for the Air Force should be adequate and, then, however, much may be the censure and however strident the abuse which we have to face, at any rate there will be this satisfactory result, that His Majesty's Government will be able to feel that in this, of all matters the prime responsibility of a Government, they have done their duty.