CLAUSE 18.—(Constitution of the Legislature.)

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament

12 March 1935 · House of Commons debate on the Government of India Bill · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on March 12, 1935, in the debate on Clause 18 of the Government of India Bill, condemning the proposed federal legislature as the worst ever planned.
Main themes
Clause 18 and the constitution of the federal legislature, indirect election replacing direct election, loss of the power of dissolution, wealthy second Chamber protecting property, role of the Indian Princes, Governor-General's powers and safeguards, responsible government as a farce, tariff pressure on Lancashire trade, predicted friction and disorder in India, Princes refusing to join the federation, Indian unity against the scheme
Duration
~15 min
53rd percentile
Words
1,840
53rd percentile
Sentences
81
53rd percentile
Readability
54
73rd percentile
Grade
11.7
41st percentile
Syntax
3.09
59th percentile
Vocabulary
2.19
47th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 72%71%
  • Geopolitical 10%10%
  • Economic 6%6%
  • Social 6%6%
  • Ceremonial 5%5%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

81 sentences in 19 paragraphs

I find myself in general agreement with the condemnatory epitome of this Clause which has fallen from the lips of the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Cocks). It is one of the most important Clauses in the Bill, because it presents to us the structure of the new Assembly which is to exercise responsible government over all India. I have asked myself whether, upon the whole, the scheme of this Clause, set where it is in the general articulation of the Bill is not the worst legislature that ever was planned. Perhaps I ought to abate a little the rigour of my assertion, because no one can have an exhaustive knowledge of all the legislatures that ever have been planned, but certainly this is the worst that I have ever seen brought

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before this House and the one least likely to give contentment or proper government to the persons for whom it is designed. What the hon. Member for Broxtowe has said seems to be true. The Government have taken away from the people of India, from the electors, 1,500,000 of them, direct election to the existing Assembly, and in place of that they have substituted indirect election, which the Secretary of State opposed, which the Government of India opposed, which the White Paper opposed and which was introduced into the Joint Select Committee as the result of all kinds of negotiations, over which the veil of hitherto unviolated secrecy had been thrown.

I certainly was told that one of the reasons which weighed with the Commissioners who went out there in advocating direct election was the danger of a caucus, the danger of corrupt influences being brought to bear on the comparatively small number of people who now will choose. That danger resumes itself in all its force, and at the same time the salutory relief of a dissolution, is practically robbed of its efficacy. The same answer will to a large extent be returned even if the Assembly is sent about its business. One of the greatest safeguards of parliamentary institutions is the power of dissolution, the certainty, that assemblies can be scattered to the winds, and there is what is called a new deal operating in parliamentary and political affairs. But for that destruction would overtake all legislative assemblies. They would become odious to those in whose name they presume to act. In this system you will have an assembly increasingly hide-bound and stable. You will take away altogether from your Indian polity that indispensable device—namely, a dissolution, and a new set of men, which has everywhere been found necessary for parliamentary procedure.

As for the second Chamber, I suppose it will be about the richest body in the world, man for man. It will certainly be a chamber which will be well able to protect the rights of property, I do not mean the rights of British property, but Indian property. They may not take a very high view about the interests of British merchants and manufacturers, or of the Lancashire traders, but I think it will be very strong in interpreting the rights of property when it is a question of the interests of the Ahmenabad or

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Bombay mill-owners, who are large subscribers to the funds of the dominant party in India. It will be strong in enforcing the sanctity of contracts and the interests of the money-lending classes, and will no doubt take a robust view of the interests of landed proprietors. In religious matters it is highly probable that their bias will be strongly conservative. As for the general questions of social legislation and so forth, it is unlikely that any strong initiative will come from this body. And remember that this institution which you are now imposing on India, which you are now ramming down the throats of Indians, whether they like it or not, will be largely unalterable. There they will be, and there they will remain. You are riveting the shackles of the worst aspects of capitalism without its progressive reforms, and without its continued elections and refreshed assemblies. And you are riveting these shackles upon the people of India for an indefinite period.

Compared with the present Assembly this new federal structure is at a serious disadvantage. We are told how much stronger it is to be, and how we are escaping from the defects of the present weak Assembly. It has not worked so ill. The people have got used to it, they have voted for it, and have associations with it. It is true that the Government defer too much to it, although not perhaps too much, having regard to the tolerant working of British rule in India. In its place you are substituting this new body in Clause 18, this new organism, with what are called responsible powers. I think that the Government have throughout proceeded upon a wrong assumption in regard to the part which will be played in the Chamber by the Princes. All through our Debates we have heard the suggestion that you can safely dispense with the official bloc; that you can safely entrust what is called responsible government to the new Assembly because of the representatives of the Princes of India who will be there, who are expected to sustain British interests and give stability and responsibility to the structure. We are asking the Princes to become as it were the champions of British action in the Assembly and the defenders of the prerogatives of the Governor-General and the safeguards. That is a strain to which

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it is very unfair to expose them in the eyes of their fellow countrymen.

I believe also that you are putting a burden on the Princes which they will not accept, even if they come in. Nothing is more remarkable than the quickness with which solidarity has been established between the Princes and political forces in India. The Secretary of State and the Conservative party who are going forward on this issue, suppose that they are going to have a bulwark and security in the Princes which will counteract the subversive and violent forces which exist in India. I think they will find that they are on very insecure foundation. You are asking more than you ought of the Princes in asking them to undertake such responsibilities. In principle this abstraction, which you are clothing with reality and which you call the Indian nation, will act together in all matters or in almost all matters on which the cleavage is between Indian national aspirations and the safeguards retained by the British executive.

I have not had time to count the numbers accurately, but I think there are some 600 gentlemen, or 615, who will be gathered at Delhi. I agree with the hon. Member for Limehouse (Mr. Attlee) that they will have very little to do. What are they to do?. You have only to read Clause 12 and see what they may not do to realise that it utterly destroys the reality of responsible government. No one can read that Clause and the Clauses which immediately follow, which enable the Governor-General himself to legislate by ordinance or by proclamation, or to take over at any time the entire Constitution, in conjunction with Clause 18, and imagine that what is being given to this new body, to these institutions, is responsible government or anything like it. It is a farce and a mockery on the name of responsible government. When we are told that the Princes insisted on responsible government and now say that they will not come in, they have a right to say that the condition of responsible government has not been made good.

You are not giving them responsible government. What are you giving them? You are giving them something which is more dangerous than responsible government; you are giving them the power to extort responsible government by all the

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weapons of Parliamentary procedure. They will have very little to do except to find fault, to press for the abolition of the safeguards. They will have very little to do except to carry out those tariff wars against South Africa and Australia, to which the Secretary of State referred the other day in terms from which a suspicion of gusto was not wholly excluded. They will be able to deal with tariffs—they are under their control—so long as they do not discriminate against British trade; and by raising their tariffs they will be able to bring endless pressure to bear on the Governor-General by maltreating Lancashire trade and British trade until he accepts their point of view or the Government dispenses with these indispensable safeguards. And you are inducing the Conservative party to become the draught animals to drag this Bill through. It is not responsible government.

The Clause sets up an arena of strife, in which will be fought a controversy not novel in the world, a struggle which we went through in the 16th and 17th centuries, between representative institutions, which had one set of ideas, and the prerogative of an almost potentially absolute monarch on the other. The friction will be endless. This will be an assembly given over to politics. It will occupy its time with politics. It will seek to gain for itself those attributes of that responsibility which you have pretended to confer upon it, and in that process you are inaugurating a decade of friction, tumult, disturbance, disorder, irritation and anger in India, at a time when the healing processes of constructive economy and of industry should repair the depression through which the country is passing and make some definite inroad upon the awful poverty in which the great masses of the Indian people are plunged.

We see in this Clause a bad piece of work. Happily I do not think that it will come to fruition. I do not think that it will ever emerge from the paper form in which it has darkened the pages of this bulky Bill into actual operation. I predict that that will not be so. The Princes will not come in, and, if they do not, then obviously the whole of the structure is meaningless and invalid. The Lord Chancellor said some time ago that

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the Princes would not dash the cup from the parched lips of India. They have dashed the cup from the parched lips of India, from one end of the country to the other, and drawn forth a chorus of jubilation hailing them as deliverers. The policy of the Government, the aim and the ideal they set before themselves, is a united India. We may congratulate them. They have united India from one end to the other, from Karachi to Rangoon, from the Khyber Pass to Tuticorin, from rajah to ryot, from untouchable committee to mahasabha. All, without exception, have joined together, united, speaking with one voice and one heart, and repudiating this scheme of which Clause 18 is one of the central and perhaps the most peccant part.