- Context
- Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on March 16, 1939, in the Navy Estimates debate, criticising the presentation of the figures, welcoming new destroyer and personnel measures, and objecting to the planned scrapping of the Royal Sovereign battleships.
- Main themes
- Misleading presentation of the Navy Estimates, net decrease claimed in naval expenditure, Vote A personnel figures, increase of naval personnel, promotion from the lower deck, re-institution of the immediate Reserve, shortage of Mercantile Marine reserves, destroyer and escort vessel construction, German U-boat parity under the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, scrapping of the Royal Sovereign class battleships
- Duration
- ~14 min
- Words
- 1,734
- Sentences
- 68
- Readability
- 55
- Grade
- 12.1
- Syntax
- 3.23
- Vocabulary
- 2.09
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other68 sentences in 16 paragraphs
It is well known that at the most critical period of the War this officer, then in a subordinate station, taking his career in his hands, presented facts and figures and arguments which eventually reached the highest authority—the Prime Minister—and that through that report a great change was made in our naval disposition, without which it could not be said with certainty that the submarine menace at that time would have been overcome. I naturally can touch upon only very few points in the extremely important and weightily considered statement to which we have
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listened. The first is a very small point, but as I am dealing with the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty I would say that it has particular relevance to his office. The expense of the Navy is rising this year by £23,000,000, and yet the Estimate is presented in a form which states, in a most decisive manner, a net decrease of £26,000,000. This is due, as footnotes explain, to the fact that £84,000,000 is provided by Loan or Appropriations-in-Aid in 1939 instead of £34,000,000 from that source in 1938. It would hardly be possible to make a financial statement in amore misleading, and I must say, or more silly fashion. After all, the fact that this House is providing £153,000,000 for service of the Navy in this critical year, is a factor which may play an important part in maintaining stability. Why then state it in the worst way? I happen to know that many people, some of whom ought to know better, have been misled by the form in which these figures are presented, and by the statement that there is a net decrease in the expense of the Navy of £26,000,000.
The same pedantic character presents itself in the case of the number of men. Here again we have the number of men—net decrease, 13,500 in Vote A. But is this really so? Is there to be a net decrease in the Navy of 13,500 this year? I should have thought that actually the Navy was increasing every year by, I suppose, 6,000 or 7,000 officers and men. That, I believe, is the fact, but owing to some intricate convention about the form in which the bearing of personnel on Vote A during the financial year is calculated we tell the whole world on the face of our estimate that we are reducing our manpower by 13,500. I noticed that this was made the subject of sneering abroad in countries which are inclined to say that we are unable to provide the man-power even for the highly technical services. I hope that I am right in thinking that this is only a case of clerical pedantry, of which I have no doubt the War Office are equally guilty. The same confused form of presenting the Estimates occurs also in the Army Estimates, but I still ask why, in the name of common sense, an Estimate cannot be presented to the House which states intelligibly and obviously on the face of it what are the true and salient facts of the finances of the year.
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I was glad to hear the statement that even the heavy programmes of new construction for which I was responsible before the War were now exceeded—220,000 tons as against 170,000 tons. I am not jealous. I am very glad that another generation is raising that effort which we made, and which proved adequate. May I point out that the increase of personnel is also most important? In 1914 Vote A reached the record total of 148,000, that is to say it equalled the highest figure obtained by the British Navy in the height of the Napoleonic Wars. We have now 133,000 according to this Estimate as the maximum power for 1939, so there is still leeway in which to continue the increase of personnel. It must be remembered that we have not now the resources of the Mercantile Marine open to us in the same way as in 1914. The Royal Naval Reserve, owing to the shrinkage of our merchant officers and seamen, will be almost entirely needed, if not wholly, for the Merchant Service. That is a fact which makes it necessary to increase the personnel, and particularly increase the officer personnel.
I associate myself entirely with what was said by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Hillsborough (Mr. Alexander) that promotion from the lower deck should be opened out in the widest manner possible, and that in the manner most likely to give a real chance to those who come into the Navy by that method to rise to the highest positions of command in the naval profession. I am absolutely certain that there must be in these ships, with their enormous classes of highly trained and intricate, technical personnel, men who will make officers in large numbers to command His Majesty's ships in the future. It was in my day that we opened the gate that had been closed for many years, and it has not been kept as wide open as it ought to have been until recently. I hope that the need for expanding our personnel will make it felt that, although there are and must be rigid gulfs of discipline and rank between different classes, all may move forward and have a chance of obtaining the highest and most responsible commands.
There are several points in these Estimates which I am extremely glad to see. In the first place, we have the re-institution of the immediate Reserve. That is no doubt only a minor improvement.
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What is the immediate Reserve? It is three or four thousand men who have served in the Fleet for 12 years, and who are coming to the Reserve to take on at a small retaining fee an extra obligation to come up in advance of a Royal Proclamation calling up the Reserves, and merely on a summons from the Admiralty. I instituted this before the War, and its convenience was proved in the early stage of the emergency. When I urged its re-institution in 1937 I was assured that it was not necessary and would be much too expensive. Considering that it was a matter of an extra retaining fee of £5 or £6 a year to only 3,000 or 4,000 men, this seemed at the time a very absurd answer. But of course it was quite easy for the Admiralty and the Government, once they made up their minds, to brazen it out. All that I could say, after having made four or five attempts to persuade them, was "Never force little dogs to eat mutton." Now they are eating their mutton.
The Government have been confronted with the difficulty of bringing forward the extra personnel required for mine-sweeping and other special services in the preliminary stages of mobilisation. They would not believe the experience of the past. They brushed aside its lessons, as they have brushed aside so many lessons of the past, but now that the modern Admiralty have had a taste of it themselves there is no more argument, and this small but necessary device, which we were assured on the highest expert authority, both professional and political, was quite unnecessary, has been adopted, and I should like to congratulate the Admiralty and the Government on their decision, to which happily instant effect can be given.
I take up the point mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, the destroyers. Last year, when we looked at the programme of new construction, many people were astonished to find that no destroyers were included. I said that perhaps it was due to a misprint, for nothing could be more necessary and obvious than the construction of destroyers, particularly since under the Anglo-German Naval Treaty the creation of the German U-boat fleet was authorised. We have now received the announcement that 100 per cent, parity in submarine tonnage is to be constructed by Germany, and I think a very shrewd guess can be made that very much of
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this tonnage is already made in sections and all that is now necessary is to put these sections together. There was no part of the Parliamentary Secretary's speech more justified than the examination of the dangers which threaten the naval power of Britain at the present time. I entirely agree with him that we have the measure of the submarines. It is not merely a question of the marvellous inventions which have been perfected, but, after these inventions have been discovered, of familiarising large portions of the Fleet to the use of these devices so that they have become a matter of ordinary routine.
I gladly add my testimony to his that it would appear that the perils which will be run by submarines in a future war are incomparably greater than the perils to which, let us not forget, the submarine succumbed in 1918. But there is this to be said in connection with destroyers. We only have this measure of the submarine, this superiority, if there is an abundance, a super-abundance, of destroyers and other small craft available. Last year, for the first time, no destroyer flotilla was provided in the programme, and, of course, high and technical reasons were given to show how inopportune such a provision would have been. However, this year there is not only one flotilla but two flotillas, and in addition 20 900-ton escort vessels. As to the design of these I am not particularly informed, but it would appear that these vessels are a most valuable feature. It seems a great pity that the usual flotilla was dropped last year because we should have had all the hulls built by now. I think the House is glad that the omission is being rectified, and I am glad to congratulate the Admiralty on the step that has been taken.
But there is one point upon which I cannot approve of the proposals now made. It is, I think, a serious matter which affects to a certain extent the whole of our defensive system and weakens our means of survival in the case of a major war. I am horrified to learn that the Admiralty propose to scrap the five 15-inch battleships of the Royal Sovereign class, one in 1942, one in 1943 and the rest, I suppose, in the following year.
