Army (Royal Ordnance Factories) Supplementary Estimate, 1938.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Member of Parliament

14 March 1939 · House of Commons debate on the Army (Royal Ordnance Factories) Supplementary Estimate, 1938 · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on March 14, 1939, during the Army Supplementary Estimate debate, welcoming Territorial Army re-equipment and the 19-division commitment while criticising three years of delay.
Main themes
Arming the Territorial Army, 19-division expeditionary force, cost of Munich, industrial war production planning, draft-finding units and the Cardwell system, anti-aircraft defence and air attack, criticism of Government rearmament delay, home defence against airborne invasion, Army recruiting, ammunition supply
Duration
~44 min
92nd percentile
Words
5,259
92nd percentile
Sentences
203
89th percentile
Readability
56
79th percentile
Grade
12.1
46th percentile
Syntax
3.22
75th percentile
Vocabulary
1.98
8th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 40%38%
  • Institutional 39%36%
  • Ceremonial 13%12%
  • Economic 5%5%
  • Social 3%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 6%

203 sentences in 48 paragraphs

The right hon. Gentleman would not, I am sure, wish to confine all requests made to him to the usual channels. Members in the House have a perfect right to put questions and to raise points about Votes to be discussed, and I asked, in a passing remark, whether there would not be the usual opportunity given for a general discussion on the three arms combined. At any rate, it is for that reason, because I expect that such an opportunity will be given, that I do not attempt to follow the speaker from the Opposition Front Bench into the very interesting survey which he has made. But there is one point to which I will certainly refer. He spoke of the number of aeroplane squadrons which in the last War were retained in this country at critical times by the fear of air attack, and the great diminution in our effective air force at the front which was entailed thereby. But that is going to happen in every country and over a far larger sphere than has, I think, been realised. The fact that air attack has spread this vast general alarm throughout the whole area of countries is going to mean that the feature of the next war—and, after all, that is the war that, from a military point of view, we must consider, though certainly the War Office is said to be always preparing for the last war—the feature of the next war will be a very vast diminution in the offensive power at the front, because of the enormous abstraction from the resources of the nations which will be frittered away, or dispersed, or in many cases wasted, over a vast area of home defence, against this attack from the sky.

When you recollect that Germany probably has 7,000 anti-aircraft guns, with gunners and batteries, all standing in their places to-day, and that in the late War those 7,000 guns, probably as many as went into action at the beginning of the War, would all have been at the fighting front, it is not only this country and the Air Arm which will be subjected to continual diminution, drain, pulling back from the front, and dispersal, but all countries and all arms; and I entirely agree that you may very easily reach static conditions at the fortified fighting line, and that other stresses and other strains will come into play, out of which the decision of the great struggle may arise. I did not intend to be drawn far

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into that particular topic, but only to refer to it, as it seemed to me quite a suggestive point that the right hon. Gentleman brought forward.

I would like to compliment the Secretary of State for War upon his speech the other day. It was a very excellent and carefully considered statement, and I am very much in favour of carefully considered statements, however well they are prepared. The better they are prepared, the greater the advantage to the House, because it is far more desirable that we should receive a statement which is the result of weeks of careful thought, although it is clearly in an advanced state of preparation before it is delivered— in fact, I think this one was in print before it was delivered—than that we should be treated to a discourse which, though it may have superior oratorical merits, does not carry with it anything like the same measure of information and of thought to the House. I think my right hon. Friend made a very admirable speech, which will bear careful scrutiny and study in future years and will be looked upon as one of the definite pronouncements on behalf of the War Office upon military policy.

There are a few points, and very few, to which I venture to draw attention this afternoon. They are all concerned purely with the Army; they do not touch any of these other, wider topics. First of all, I should like to congratulate the Secretary of State, and His Majesty's Government, and the Prime Minister—congratulate them all—upon the decision to which they have come to arm the Territorial Force with the same weapons and equipment and on the same scale as the Regular Army. We may recall a shocking sentence in the White Paper of March, 1936, the same month three years ago, in which it was stated:

For the present, owing to the demands upon the capacity of industrial output which must necessarily be made in the first instance by the Regular Army, it is not possible simultaneously to recondition the Territorial Army.

Immediately, I asked why. These two Forces put together, I said, are only 250,000 men, and we are told that our vast, adaptable British industry would not be capable of providing for these two Forces simultaneously. I called it a very bad sentence, one which ought never to

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have appeared, and an altogether wrong decision of policy. 'It seemed such a monstrous thing that we should appeal to the youth of our country to come forward and join the Territorial Army—just a few men, a couple of hundred thousand out of all the manhood of the nation—to come forward and take on this extreme obligation of serving anywhere at any time should the emergency occur, perhaps not even in their own units; to come forward and undertake that devoted sacrifice the like of which has been hardly seen in any other sphere of life; and then, when they did that, not even to give them the ordinary weapons which are necessary, and which would put them on equal terms with the contemporary forces they might have to meet. I thought it was a deplorable situation.

I am not blaming my right hon. Friend who was Secretary of State at that time, because I had it out with him in private, and I well know how glad he would have been if the funds and sanctions had been forthcoming which would have enabled that obviously necessary step to be taken. Actually the Minister of a Service Department would always be glad if those provisions were made. I entirely agree with the doctrine that the Minister of a Service Department is under no obligation to resign simply because he does not get this, that or the other thing for which he is asking; any theory that he should do so would make the course of government intolerable. It is only on very grave issues, moral issues or issues affecting the life and safety of the country, that the weapon of resignation should be used. Therefore, in what I say I am not making any aspersions upon my right hon. Friend the late Secretary of State for War. It was a matter of Cabinet policy, and those who were controlling the policy of the Cabinet in March, 1936, are responsible.

I am not being wise after the event, because I could read arguments which I addressed to the House—I am not going to do so—both in March and November of that year, and in the year following, urging that the equipment of the Territorial Army should be undertaken pari passu with that of the Regular Army. One must regard the decision of policy in that sentence of the White Paper of 1936 as being very short-sighted and altogether wrong, wrong not only from the point of view of judgment, but wrong from the point of view of the spirit in which it was

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taken. Of course, my arguments made no difference. It was pointed out at the time that the forces behind the administration were perfectly ready to deny the Territorial Army the weapons which it needed at that time, and to stand by while there was that neglect. When I used these arguments—in vain—a few Members said, "Hear, hear!" but the great bulk of the supporters of the Government merely gaped, and went away. [An Hon. Member: "The Labour party voted against you."] The Conservative party has always, or at any rate for 100 years, had the tradition of endeavouring to sustain the defences of the country and the safety of the country. It is only in recent times that we have reached the position where, whatever the Government decide to do or not to do, there is no means of shifting them by Parliamentary debate or by the pressure of party, and in many cases the arguments are not fairly met. I thought at that time that there was no one in the House who did not think that we ought to undertake the rearmament of the Territorial Army at the same time as the Regular Army; but nothing was done and nothing has been done until now—three years later.

The present Secretary of State for War is more fortunate than his predecessor. He functions at a period when the ruling powers in the Government are, I will not say fully instructed, but more fully instructed upon verities than they were in March, 1936. Now we have this declaration which was made last Wednesday which tells this band of devoted men, who join the Territorial Army, who come forward to our aid, that at any rate they will be given the equipment, weapons, tackle, and tools necessary to enable them to do their job. But how are we to excuse the waste of these three years? Three years have gone. If those orders had been given then, we should now have the original 14 divisions of the Territorial Army, or whatever form they would have taken, equipped with modern weapons, whereas, as is perfectly well known to every General Staff in Europe, a long, painful, critical interval lies between us, before we can attain the position which prudent forethought, nay, right thinking and decent thinking would have secured for us easily by now.

The Government, no doubt, will protest that they never thought in 1936

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things would turn out so rough. Well, they were wrong. If that is what they thought, it is clear that they were wrong; and anyone who accepted it from them was misled. But then there were 1937 and 1938, when things were a great deal worse, when successive warnings occurred, when one event after another began to shake the stability of Europe, when a stream of facts flowed in from every quarter showing the immense preparations that were being made elsewhere and the dangerous ambitions that were, nursed. Still the Territorial Army was denied its weapons, still we were told that its equipment could begin only after the equipment of the Regular Army was completed. I believe that on the original programme it was to be 1940 or 1941 before it could even be begun on a large scale.

I quite recognise that the Prime Minister and his colleagues are perfectly safe and will get away with it. They will get away with it without any difficulty, because there are too many in it, Many powerful forces and interests have been responsible for the decision, and the great mass of a great party has endorsed it, and endorsed the neglect. So, undoubtedly, they will escape. What would have been the fate of any other administration that I have ever seen on that Bench, if faced by anything like an equal Parliamentary opposition, would have been the grave censure of Parliament. That the Government will escape. They will face only such censure as the course of events may inflict upon them in the pages of history. No doubt many will say what very bad taste it is for me to mention that fact. They will say that the Territorial Army is now being armed, that I am getting what I asked for, only three years later than it was asked for. Why look a gift horse in the mouth? Why not accept it in the spirit in which it is made? I will endeavour to do so, and I will conclude this section of my remarks by offering my sincere congratulations to His Majesty's Government upon the decision to which they have come in this matter.

I should also like to praise the Government and the Secretary of State for the declaration that they have made that it is our duty to provide 19 Divisions from this country, apart from our Reserves in India and the Middle East, for general

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service overseas should the occasion require it. That is a momentous declaration. I have rarely heard anything so important stated in a Service Debate. Anyone can see the explanation. It is the first instalment of the bill for Munich. People say that we are not involved in the affairs of these remote countries, but afterwards it is found that they alter the whole life of the people of this country, their daily habits, their financial position, their trade, everything. This is the first instalment. I wish I could think it was the last instalment of this bill which has come in, but I am afraid that other drafts will be presented month after month and year after year through the greater part of our lifetime. It is a great pity that this statement was not made a year or two years ago. I am not aware that there has been any alteration, except the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia, in the factors at work in the world during these two years. It was clearly visible that a great danger was approaching and that the stronger this country was, the more likely we were to be able to ward it off.

Of course, we shall be told that the public would not have stood it. I think there is something in that. I do not under-rate the effort that would have been required from Ministers if they had made this declaration a year or two years ago. The outcry that would have been directed upon them would have been a very serious one. Yet, when all is said and done, I certainly cannot recall any instance in my lifetime, or in recent times I have read about, when, if Ministers went in faith and confidence to the nation and demanded particular measures, and gave as reasons that the national safety was involved, those measures have not only been voted by Parliament, but even more actively supported by the people at large. Tell me anything for which a Government has asked to defend this country which has been denied. I cannot recall such a case. I remember that before the War there were a great many struggles inside the Government as to the provision that should be made, but the House was overwhelming, divided as it was on party lines, and in the country, fighting as it was for party politics, there was not the slightest hesitation in providing whatever was necessary. And believe me, the Government will have to make more heavy demands upon the country, demands

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which now seem to them as difficult as it would have been to have asked for 19 Divisions of the Army. The time will come when they will have to make those demands, but if they will face that as a necessity, the people of this island will submit and endorse those steps which are necessary for their safety and freedom and the triumph of world causes with which they believe the life and honour of this country to be inseparably bound up.

At any rate, a year ago, after Austria was subjugated, there was a temper in the land which would have welcomed such a declaration, and if it had been made on top of the decision to equip the Territorial Army earlier, and at the same time as the Regular Army, with modern weapons, then very likely the whole course of history would have flowed by now into much easier channels, and we should not now be the prey to the gnawing anxieties which afflict every thinking man. The more resolute he is to do his duty in these times, the more these anxieties must crowd upon him, and crowd upon him in the morning and in the night.

I must congratulate the Government again on this, and I do so on the basis, better late than never, provided that it is not too late. But these 19 divisions which are spoken of as an oversea expeditionary force involve a very serious obligation. Other people will count upon those divisions, and even though you may not have made any commitments, here or there, undoubtedly the object of this announcement was that reassurance should be given elsewhere. Other people will count upon the delivery of these divisions, wherever, in any common struggle, a real need may arise, and then you will have to produce those divisions. It is not a question of paper schemes or of a declaration in principle. You have to produce and hold available for general service in the common cause, in a war in which we are defending ourselves against aggression, with Allies, 19 divisions from this country alone, for expeditionary service. That is a tremendous declaration, and it is in no wise diminished by saying that they will go in certain echelons, and so on. That is not what will be regarded elsewhere. What will be looked at abroad is the declaration itself. It will be looked at by your friends, who will count upon it, and by your potential enemies, who will probably take counter-measures as

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far as those are in their power. There-tore, I say that it is a most serious obligation.

I wish to ask, then, what steps are being taken to provide these 19 divisions of the Field Force, as it is called, with the necessary equipment? Hitherto, we have not contemplated anything of the kind. Evidently large new installations must be set up for this purpose. It is not only that equipment will have to be made for a force of this size but that plant must be created, in actuality and potentially for the maintenance of such a force in action. The moment a division goes into action it bums up, not only human life but every form of war material at a prodigious rate. I remember in the early days of the War asking Lord Kitchener why he did not send out one or two Territorial divisions—Kitchener Army divisions—to help our struggling, torn front line. He said, "If they get there what are they going to eat? What are they going to consume? I have not got it." What is being done about this in the present instance? I asked the question the other day before I knew this statement was going to be made. What is to be done to provide the great ammunition supply that will be required when large armies are in the field? Has that been settled yet? It certainly does not exist at present. That we know. We have always been assured that all the programmes of artillery and munitions, machine-guns, anti-tank rifles, grenades and the like have been made upon the approved scale, but what is the scale? I put it to the House that the scale has now been vastly increased. It has been increased to the scale of the units that would be employed in the full blaze of a European war.

Again, I ask, what is going to be done about it? The right hon. Gentleman who spoke from the Front Opposition Bench mentioned a very pregnant fact in this connection. If we contemplate a field army of 19 divisions—and more if we include Egypt and India—how, he asked, do we propose to provide it with the necessary air force, the military co-operation squadrons, the artillery spotting squadrons, and the fighters to protect it? Certainly all that involves a great new expansion of Air Force activities, and we should like to know in good time from the Government that steps are being taken to deal with this matter, because otherwise

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we run the risk of making a potential threat in the shape of 19 divisions, and of having, when the time comes, no effectual means of making it good. Thus, as I say, you would excite the counter-preparations, but find yourself without your own resources when the time came. I should think that the approved scale of the Expeditionary Force has been at least doubled.

I wish to know: Are you now planning and making factories for the production of the supplies necessary to keep such a force in the field? Are you not only making the weapons to give them at the outset, but are you laying down and preparing factories in the country, which, when these divisions are engaged in action —as they will be as soon as they can be prepared, if we are at war—will enable them to have a continuous supply of ammunition? Practically everything such as rifles and equipment, which is put into the hands of troops engaged in war is destroyed before a year is out and sometimes much more quickly. What is being done to maintain supplies? Whatever might have been said three years ago, surely it is relevant now to ask that we should have from the Government a very clear and precise statement on this subject. I do not say that we should have such a statement to-day, because we shall have other opportunities which will be more suitable, of showing the House the scale—and I am not sure that it is my right hon. Friend who ought to do it— upon which factories are being laid out to meet these new requirements both for the service of the Army itself and for the Air Forces which will be attendant upon the increased Army.

This does not mean, let me say, that everything should be provided by special factories. That, I certainly do not think necessary. You make the factories which you need to produce the required material and equipment, but for the war potential in this class of article, it is a question of the preparation of factories, which will continue to work at civil production, for alternative forms of production to which they can immediately turn over when required. This means that you will mark down a great many factories for cannon production, rifle production, shell production and the like; that all the plans will be made, that the jigs and gauges for the alternative production will be made and held in store at the factories, that the

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necessary alterations in lay-out of the existing factories will all have been considered, that the re-arrangement of skilled labour will have been gone into carefully, so that in a few days or at most in a week or two, a large number of plants now making for civil purposes can leap into war activity.

There has not been in Germany for three or four years a single factory which has not everything arranged for this kind of alternative production. One hears so many things nowadays that it is very difficult to discriminate between truth and rumour, but I have heard that the actual deliveries of the raw material required for the preparation of the factories for war production, have, over a very large part of Germany, recently been completed. I hope to hear from the Secretary of State, or from the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, or his representative, that the industrial arrangements are being made which will enable 19 divisions to be maintained at the front on the same scale as the divisions of other countries which they might have to meet. This is a very considerable effort, and I say, again, that if you expect Lord Chatfield, who has to deal with great questions of strategic coordination, to get a move on with this great expansion in the industrial sphere, without having under him a really responsible Minister in the House of Commons with full executive power, you will only have in the end another failure and another awakening to grim reality.

The Secretary of State for War takes great pains with his work. I have watched his career with much sympathy —except on some occasions—and I should like to remain one of his supporters. He has given us a very broad view of Army problems, but I have always been surprised that we have heard nothing from him, either last year or now, about draft-finding units. I have followed Army Debates in this House for nearly 40 years. I knew the great champions of the Card-well system. I have heard all the discussions in this House about the abolition of the old Militia and the alternative provided, when the Militia was abolished, of the 60 Special Reserve battalions of Lord Haldane. It was always understood that those draft-finding units were an absolutely vital need in the maintenance of divisions at the front—just as much as their ammunition. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has never given

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any sign, in any speech of his which I have heard, that he is even aware of this problem. It may be that he has a complete plan which he has not had time to mention yet, but I do not remember any explanation being given us of how the function which used to be discharged by the Militia, and was afterwards discharged by the Special Reserve battalions, is discharged at the present time.

Let me put the actual position to the House. Under the linked-battalion system, there is one battalion abroad and one at home. The battalion abroad is at full strength and the battalion at home is raised to full strength on mobilisation by calling up the Reserve. The battalion at home also trains recruits and sends them out to the battalion abroad when they have been properly trained. That is the admirable balance of the Cardwell system. An emergency is declared; the reserves are called up, the regular home battalion is mobilised; it proceeds on active service, it marches out of the barrack gate to the port of embarkation, and what happens then? Remember that the other linked battalion already on foreign service, is also probably in action at the same time, so that there are two battalions to be fed—not one feeding the other, but something else feeding both. How shall we provide for both to be filled from the one depot? In the course of three months' fighting, what with casualties, sickness and other drains upon them, these battalions will require to be reinforced by certainly 30 or 40 per cent., or perhaps more, of their original numbers. Volunteers you will have in plenty of reservists there may even be, for the first few months a surplus but when all these pour into the depot at the deserted barracks, how are they to be handled and trained? Are they merely to be trained in an incoherent body, or are they to be woven into the structure of the military unit? That is a very important matter.

I am sorry to be so technical, but we have to look at these points. There is nothing in this about which we need quarrel. I am sure the Secretary of State will be able to give us a full explanation. I am not at all supposing that this is a matter which has entirely escaped his attention, but it has escaped the attention of many. It was always thought that the Militia battalions or the Special Reserve battalions, which succeeded them, that is to say battalions which already had a

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recognised existence, would come into these barracks and spring into full life, and grip all these ardent recruits and surplus reservists into the structure of the regiment, and that their training would proceed at an intensified rate within the proper, necessary structure and encadrement, so that drafts could be sent continuously to the front, with a sense of incorporation in the regiment to which they belonged, while at the same time-mark this—these Special Reserve battalions themselves would possess, at every moment, an important intrinsic value for home defence.

Do not let us under-rate that factor. We have been talking about fighter squadrons which might be kept back, and which would be needed with the expeditionary force, but how do you know, when your expeditionary force has gone, when it has disappeared from this country, whether, under new conditions of warfare, you will not have an invasion of forces conveyed by air? If you have no troops at all, or very few, and no arrangements or organisation for large numbers of armed men, who will be there at your command and awaiting your orders, it would be quite possible for an enemy to land 4,000 or 5,000 men by an appropriate arrangement of aeroplanes. It would be perfectly easy to do so. There are tremendous munition centres that might be captured and great ports that might be seized, bat not if the whole population is armed and trained as is the case in Europe. Then a large force can be gathered from any part of the country. If the defensive part of our Territorials is confined to the business of anti-aircraft artillery and the other part has gone away and been earmarked for the expeditionary force, it is indispensable that there should be definite units always in being which are capable of proceeding to any point. There are many cases where even an invading force of 500 men could do immense havoc before they were arrested, and the idea that we should not have a nucleus force of that character at this time is altogether unwise. I was always brought up to believe that the draft-finding units were one of the keys to military organisation. I hope that we may hear from the Secretary of State how he proposes to deal with this subject and what is to be the condition of the depots when the troops have marched away to the front.

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I have, I think, been critical, but I hope not entirely captious in my criticism. I should like to pay my tribute to the great achievement of the Secretary of State for War in the improvement of recruiting. He took over at a time when it was still fashionable to doubt the possibility of war, and to scoff at ideas that we should ever again send a large expeditionary force overseas. Undoubtedly there has been an enormous improvement, not only in the Regulars, but in the Territorials. It is a strange and, indeed, a sublime quality in human nature that men should come forward and volunteer the more actively as the service likely to be required from them becomes more arduous and dangerous. This faculty is a gift of the gods to nations which have in them the quality of survival. The increase of danger, the probabilities of having to go and fight and die, have been the great recruiting sergeant this year among our youth. But none of this should deprive the Secretary of State for War of a large share of the credit for the improvement in recruiting. He has made the Regular Service attractive in many ingenious material and moral ways. He has made it possible for those who wish to join the Territorials to get a measure of training without upsetting their ordinary lives. He has presided over a marked revival of the British military spirit and he has contributed to it by many well-conceived and notable expedients.