Navy Supplementary Estimate, 1936.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill

28 May 1936 · House of Commons debate · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons debate on the Navy Supplementary Estimate in London on May 28, 1936, asking the Government to promise that British cruisers would be scrapped only alongside Japanese ones.
Main themes
Escalator clause of the naval treaty, retention of destroyers beyond treaty tonnage, Japanese cruisers in the Far East, scrapping of five British cruisers, absence of treaty obligation, Japan's refusal of a future naval treaty after 31 December, growth of the German Navy, trade routes and the Mediterranean, Admiralty judgement, pari passu destruction of cruisers
Duration
~6 min
18th percentile
Words
670
18th percentile
Sentences
29
17th percentile
Readability
63
92nd percentile
Grade
10.4
25th percentile
Syntax
3.07
57th percentile
Vocabulary
2.05
18th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 89%86%
  • Institutional 7%7%
  • Ceremonial 4%3%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 3%

29 sentences in 7 paragraphs

She has not even heard it said that we are invoking the escalator clause in respect of destroyers and keeping 40,000 tons beyond what would be— The Noble Lady says: "By agreement." That is not so. It may be that others will agree, but we are acting on our right, and that is the whole point. If others agree and think it reasonable, all the better, but we are acting on our right. I hope I have given the Noble Lady a satisfactory answer.

What I want to say about these Japanese cruisers is that a question is raised which is very difficult to decide, and it is this: Is it more dangerous for Japan to have five more cruisers in the Far East in the next two years than it is for us to have five fewer cruisers on our own trade routes, in the Mediterranean and in the narrow seas? That is a question which I am certainly not going to attempt to decide. I take it that the Admiralty, having weighed it all, have considered that they would rather be without the five vessels themselves than that Japan should retain those five cruisers—or seven cruisers—which it is believed it is urgent under the Treaty to scrap. The second question I want to ask is: Are we sure that Japan is, in fact, going to scrap or sink those five—or seven—cruisers? Have they done so yet? I will gladly give way to the Noble Lord. We know that they have refused to make any future naval treaty after 31st December, and that they will be absolutely free to build any class of vessel that they may require. They may be perfectly free to build cruisers with 9-inch guns, or 12,000 or 14,000 tons cruisers. Only those cruisers within the Treaty area will be debarred. Anyway, this happy and prudent Japanese Admiralty is absolutely free.

I want to know whether they have, in the exercise of their freedom, begun to dismantle and destroy these five or seven cruisers. Before we sink or scrap our five cruisers we ought to know what is being done at the other end of the world. Observe that there is no question of charging Japan with bad faith. My contention is that they are perfectly entitled, if they choose, to retain those vessels, on the ground of the great changes which have taken place in the naval situation in the world and of the

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new construction that has taken place. All that they have to do is to notify us of the great recrudescence of naval building and the growth of the German Navy, a factor not foreseen when the Treaty was made. They can invoke the escalator clause, and no one can reproach them, any more than they can reproach us with having departed from the Treaty either in the letter or the spirit.

What is to happen, supposing we destroy our five cruisers, and thereafter the Japanese, as they are perfectly entitled to do, invoke the escalator clause on the general grounds of world shipping, and keep their cruisers? Surely that would not be very satisfactory. We should lose on both counts and on either side. I ask that whoever is going to speak further in this Debate, perhaps the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, will give us a definite assurance that our cruisers will not be destroyed except pari passu with similar Japanese destruction. That, I think, is the least that can be asked.

I therefore conclude: (1) that there is no treaty obligation; (2) that the Government have taken this step because they consider that being five cruisers short in the next two years on our trade routes in the North Sea is a lesser disadvantage than the Japanese retaining five cruisers in the Far East, and (3) that the Government will give us an absolute assurance that, whatever happens, we shall not mutilate our own Fleet until we are sure that similar sacrifices are being made elsewhere.