- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on May 28, 1936, during the Navy Supplementary Estimate debate, criticising the Admiralty's plan to scrap five light cruisers and arguing the 1930 treaty's escalator clause did not require it.
- Main themes
- Scrapping of five light cruisers, London Naval Treaty of 1930, escalator clause in Article 21, cruiser tonnage increase from 50 to 70, burden on the taxpayer, Admiralty decision to build battleships, Fleet Air Arm inquiry, French destroyer programme, Mediterranean strategic position, German naval growth, size of peacetime Navy Estimates
- Duration
- ~11 min
- Words
- 1,367
- Sentences
- 59
- Readability
- 57
- Grade
- 11.3
- Syntax
- 3.03
- Vocabulary
- 2.03
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other59 sentences in 14 paragraphs
I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention, and we shall all await with great interest the result of his decision about the Fleet Air Arm. With regard to the question of whether battleships can be built or not, that has been settled, whatever the result of his inquiry, by the decision of the Admiralty to build them, and, that being so, I hope in this time of pressure
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and strain that he will not unduly burden himself by performing acts of civility to a committee which is certainly dead before it is born.
Now I come to the most serious matter whit happears to me to arise out of the discussion of naval affairs this year, and that is the intention of the Admiralty to scrap these five light cruisers. Let the House face the facts. At a time when it is universally agreed that we ought to increase our cruiser tonnage, when the Admiralty are proposing to raise the number of cruisers from 50 to 70, when it is well known how deep is their anxiety on this matter, at this very time we have to pole-axe five quite servicable cruisers. At a time when we have to make the most onerous demands upon the taxpayer we have to take his money out to sea and sink it. It is a very unappetising and melancholy conclusion to offer the British taxpayer—not the sort of finale to policy which one would hope the British Government would be able to produce. It is not the sort of thing to make people willing to meet the renewed demands which have now to be made continuously upon them, that they should see that good money has to be thrown away in this fashion. It is certainly not the sort of event that the manager of a great private business would announce with gusto in his annual report. It certainly is not a step which can in any way, however it might be explained, be associated either with foresight or with good and happy arrangements.
But, we are told, it is all because of the treaty. The sanctity of treaties! The word of Britain, however great the sacrifice, must be redeemed. Absolute fidelity to the letter and the spirit of the treaty. There, and there alone, we take our stand. No one is going to quarrel with my Noble Friend and attack him when he occupies so majestic and unassailable a position as that. We are absolutely in accord on that question. But let us look at this treaty. I have always been a severe critic of this London treaty of 1930. In those days, when I was the present Prime Minister's guardian angel in naval affairs, endeavoring to keep his steps from falling into evil courses or pitfalls of any kind, I persuaded him to lead the Conservative party through the Lobbies against that treaty, and I have always regarded it as deeply detrimental to the interests of the Royal Navy.
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However, I am not prepared to blame the present unfortunate situation upon the treaty. I do not think it is right to do so. The Government have done less than justice, it appears to me, to this treaty. I never expected that I should find myself defending the Lord President of the Council on a naval matter against his Conservative colleagues. I think it only fair to say that this treaty does not bear the interpretation which has been placed upon it in this respect. It is unfair to say, as was said in the late Debate from the Government Benches, that these five cruisers have to be sunk just because of the improvident Socialist treaty of 1930. I have been reading the treaty again, and have taken such advice as I can upon it, and I say without hesitation that nothing in the treaty obliges you to sink these cruisers unless you want to. My Noble Friend has read Article 21, a very remarkable article, which deals with the escalator clause. Let me emphasise some of the points in Article 21. I will not read it again. First, if in your opinion—if in the opinion of the British Government or any of the other contracting Governments your security is affected by the new construction of non-Treaty Powers, you do not have to obtain the consent or the agreement of the other Powers to the treaty; you have only to notify them. You are the sole judges. This is very important.
When this treaty was being put through many people said, "If we find at the end of the six-year period the state of the world is dark and new construction is growing up, how are we to rid ourselves of these new dangers?" and we were told, "There is the escalator clause." "But," we said, "supposing other people do not agree?" They said, "Oh, that has been provided for. You have only to notify. If you think your interests are affected by the change in the naval situation and by the growth of new construction abroad, you only have to notify. It does not depend upon the consent, agreement, or even the subsequent approval, of any of these other Powers."
The second point is this: If this external new construction affects our position there is no question of the escalator clause being limited—as I imagine from what I have heard in this Debate was the impression on the Government benches —to any particular category for meeting
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a new development in foreign construction. For instance, the building of submarines is not necessarily the argument for freeing us to build more submarines. The answer to the submarine is not another submarine but a destroyer. In the same way, the answer to a destroyer is not necessarily another destroyer; it is very likely a light cruiser squadron. As the Noble Lord knows so well, in the orthodox scheme of great naval battles when the flotillas of the enemy attack the battle fleet, the light cruiser squadron advances and, with their superior gun-power and high, stable gun-platforms, they are capable of destroying the flotilla attack. That is the whole theory. Therefore, there was never any idea that it should be limited category by category and one can see, by reading the answers to questions in this House, that that has been in the mind of the Government all through and in the mind of the Prime Minister and of the Noble Lord—that you had a case on destroyers but you had no case on cruisers. The French destroyer programme includes 32 2,500-ton vessels which, as they are taking the water, do constitute a very important fact in the naval situation.
Then there is the position which has grown up in the Mediterranean, true a strategic position but one which throws a different emphasis upon the character of the new construction. Then there is the arrival of German naval power, growing from year to year. To say that none of those facts has made any difference, and that the Admiralty representative can get up and say, "We are perfectly satisfied with the situation" is an absurdity, especially when it is contrasted with demands for the greatest naval expansion that this country has seen since the War and with the greatest Estimates that it has ever seen in time of peace. You cannot have it both ways; you cannot say "All is going on perfectly well; we are entirely satisfied; none of the external circumstances cause us the least anxiety; everything is proceeding according to plan; and therefore we do not need to invoke the escalator clause, we do not need to use our rights under the escalator clause," and then the next clay, or almost on the same day, come forward and ask for a continuation, year after year, as it must be, of the most formidable and tremendous Navy Estimates which we have ever yet faced in
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times of peace. No, Sir; the Admiralty stulfify themselves and stultify the case of Members supporting them who will be defending this naval expenditure all over the country when these very reassuring statements are made in one small connection.
