Navy Supplementary Estimate, 1936.

United Kingdom Winston Churchill

28 May 1936 · House of Commons debate · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on May 28, 1936, in the Navy Supplementary Estimate debate, opposing the sinking of five serviceable cruisers when the Treaty's escalator clause allowed Britain to keep them.
Main themes
Scrapping of five serviceable cruisers, escalator clause of the naval Treaty, Admiralty's decision not to invoke treaty powers, Prime Minister's statement of 11 March 1935, destroyer versus cruiser tonnage, naval threats in the North Sea and Mediterranean, protection of food convoys, Japan's reciprocal cruiser reductions, non-Treaty Powers' naval construction, government shifting its argument
Duration
~6 min
18th percentile
Words
667
18th percentile
Sentences
36
22nd percentile
Readability
64
93rd percentile
Grade
9.2
13th percentile
Syntax
2.97
43rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.18
44th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 79%53%
  • Geopolitical 17%11%
  • Ceremonial 4%3%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 33%

36 sentences in 7 paragraphs

I am going to argue this matter, with great respect to the Noble Lord, because I do not think it is satisfactory where it stands. I did not use the word "complacency." The case is that those five serviceable ships are to be sunk when you have a clause in the Treaty which would enable you to avoid sinking them—when you could notify foreign Powers, and when you would not have to sink them to avoid breaking the Treaty. The reason, the honourable reason, which you allege for not using this power which you have is that nothing has occurred which in your opinion requires this emergency use of the escalator clause. I am content with that statement of the case. I am

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not charging my Noble Friend with complacency. I know perfectly well that he would be delighted to keep those five cruisers. I am sorry to say that he and his advisers and the Admiralty have been led into this position on the subject. I say the Treaty foresaw that there was no limitation by categories. It is quite clear that if you find yourselves affected by naval developments and new construction by non-Treaty Powers in any part of the world you are entitled to preserve your own building or, if necessary, to make new construction. Those are the facts of the Treaty. I do not think they are at all denied. The only thing is that the Admiralty have chosen to say that, in their opinion, nothing has occurred to make them use the powers; but they have the powers—there is no dispute at all about that. I think that is a very serious matter.

The next question is whether the case is good upon its merits. There is no dispute about this, because the Prime Minister said on 11th March last year that it was clear that there was ample tonnage to enable us to invoke the escalator clause. It was explained that that referred only to the escalator clause in respect of destroyers, but what has that to do with it? There are no watertight compartments in this matter. If there was enough tonnage to enable us to invoke the escalator clause in respect of destroyers and we chose to invoke it in respect of cruisers, we are absolutely entitled under the Treaty to do so. Instead of building, say, 20 destroyers, we build, say, three cruisers. It is for us to decide absolutely. Something has happened in the interval I do not know what, which has tended to alter the position of the Government since the declaration which the Prime Minister made on 11th March last year. It therefore seems that a misapprehension has arisen.

I repeat that there is nothing whatever in the Treaty argument. What is required of us is clear, the facts are clear, the merit is clear and the intentions are clear. In the comic g years of danger in Europe, when we have not only to consider the North Sea but the Mediterranean in the most pointed fashion, and when the convoy of our food supplies may be a most grave pre-occupation, can any one suppose that it is wise or prudent

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to take five serviceable cruisers out to sea and sink them, without any Treaty obligation? Apart from the statements which have been made by the Government, the facts of the world in no way warrant us in making this sacrifice. There is, however, I admit fairly to the House, another aspect of this matter. When my Noble Friend first opened this case upon another occasion, he based himself entirely upon the Treaty: the Treaty compels. Now we see another line of argument being brought forward, which is that if we do not sink or scrap the five cruisers, Japan will not sink five of her cruisers—or seven of her cruisers. That is how I understand the argument. If that is an afterthought, it must be admitted to be a very substantial afterthought.