- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons debate in London on April 14, 1937, opposing forcible British action to break the insurgent blockade of Bilbao and defending the Government's neutrality in the Spanish Civil War.
- Main themes
- Neutrality in the Spanish Civil War, blockade of Bilbao, opposition to tyranny of any form, individual rights against governments, reprisals against the vanquished, British naval power, non-intervention policy, legitimacy of blockade in war, German naval conduct, Franco and Caballero factions, Valencia Government blockade hypothetical
- Duration
- ~7 min
- Words
- 875
- Sentences
- 30
- Readability
- 47
- Grade
- 14.0
- Syntax
- 3.33
- Vocabulary
- 2.26
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other30 sentences in 8 paragraphs
It is not a question of opposing Nazi-ism or Communism; it is a question of opposing tyranny in whatever form it presents itself; and, having a strong feeling in regard to the preservation of individual rights as against Governments, and as I do not find in either of these two Spanish factions which are at war any satisfactory guarantee that the ideas which I personally care about, and to which I have been brought up in this House to attach some importance, would be preserved, I am not able to throw myself in this headlong fashion into the risk of having to fire cannon immediately on the one side or the other of this trouble. I have found it easier, I must say, to maintain this feeling of detachment from both sides because it seems to me that, before we could give any help to either side, we ought to know what the victory of that side would mean to those who are beaten. I can understand a British subject espousing the
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cause of General Franco or Señor Caballero, but what would be that man's remorse if he found that, after contributing to the victory of either side, a horrible vengeance was wreaked, perhaps for years, upon the vanquished? Certainly I do not feel that the House of Commons ought to take any decisive action either way without, at any rate, knowing quite clearly what the results would be to those who were conquered as the result of any intervention in which we engaged.
I cannot feel any enthusiasm for these rival creeds. I feel unbounded sorrow and sympathy for the victims, but to give a decisive punch either way, without making sure that the result of it would not be to make yourselves responsible for a subsequent catalogue of foul atrocities, would be a responsibility which no one in the House ought to be willing to accept. The right hon. Baronet, carried away by the strength of his feelings, seems to have forgotten altogether the appeal that he has made, and the advice that he would give to the Government, which is nothing more or less than to break the blockade by force of arms. There is nothing in this world, it appears to me, more horrible than the taking out of great masses of men, quite simple men, in batches, sometimes for no fault greater than to have been the secretary of a trade union or to have voted Conservative at the previous election, and shooting them by firing parties against a wall, yet that is proceeding on both sides to a terrible extent every day. I certainly do not feel able to work up this tremendous desire to intervene, nor do I desire to take upon my shoulders any share of the blood-guiltiness which would fall upon anyone who made decisive intervention in this struggle.
The right hon. Baronet is asking us to use our overwhelming sea power to break the blockade at Bilbao. A blockade is a perfectly legitimate operation of war. If a nation has naval forces strong enough to establish a blockade in a civil or any other war, it is perfectly entitled to carry out its blockade. He argues that we should be made at this stage to break the blockade which the insurgents have established and have, according to our naval officers, effectively established. We are told that we are afraid, that we have hoisted the white flag, and so on. Of course, if people are going to allow
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themselves to be provoked from the course, which prudence and careful thought had dictated, by taunts and high-pitched reproaches of that kind, they must have very little confidence in their own judgment. It is easy to point the finger of scorn and to accuse the Government of fear, but there is no need to fear. Overwhelming naval power is in our hands. But our policy is not to be drawn, certainly not single-handed, into this dismal welter. I thought we had decided to be neutral, and I earnestly hope the Government will bear the harsh reproaches that are addressed to them and move steadily upon the path they have taken.
Let us see what would happen if we were to break this blockade. We should immediately find ourselves sinking one or two ships that belong to the insurgent junta. I gather that that action would be agreeable to our non-intervener opposite. To show how far he allows his feelings of partisanship and partiality to carry him, he has even held up as a good example the bullying conduct of the German Navy. I do not think that is a good model to hold up to us. What would happen if, for instance, in a few weeks' time the Valencia Government regained command of the sea and established an effective blockade outside Cadiz or outside the Balearic Islands, and supposing German ships wished to carry merchandise or munitions or food into Cadiz, or, similarly, Italian ships wished to convey supplies of food to Majorca? If the Spanish Government declined to allow those ships to pass, the right hon. Baronet would, apparently, hold the German or Italian Fleets perfectly justified in sinking the ships of the Spanish Government.
