Speech in the Islamic Consultative Assembly during the session reviewing the political competence of Banisadr.

Iran Ali Khamenei · Supreme Leader of Iran

21 June 1981 · Session of the Islamic Consultative Assembly reviewing the political competence of Banisadr · Islamic Consultative Assembly

Context
Khamenei addressed the Islamic Consultative Assembly on June 21, 1981, during the session reviewing President Banisadr's political competence for possible removal from office.
Main themes
Political competence of Banisadr, impeachment proceedings, constitutional qualifications for presidency, Islamic Republic principles, religious duty and accountability, revolutionary legitimacy, legislative authority, factional conflict, Islamic jurisprudence, defense of the revolution
Duration
~78 min
97th percentile
Words
9,324
97th percentile
Sentences
359
97th percentile
Readability
50
64th percentile
Grade
11.8
42nd percentile
Syntax
3.27
80th percentile
Vocabulary
2.31
76th percentile

Translated from Persian

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 61%53%
  • Geopolitical 22%19%
  • Ceremonial 11%9%
  • Economic 3%2%
  • Social 3%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 14%

359 sentences in 88 paragraphs

In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful.

If they had gone out among you, they would have only increased you in confusion and would have caused division among your ranks. If the hypocrites remain alongside you and come to fight against the enemy, they will not add anything but weakness and incapacity to you, and they will sow discord among your ranks.

In these critical moments when one of the most decisive pages of Iran's history is being written, I ask God to guide me to what pleases Him and to keep me from the rebellion of tongue and heart and the dominance of desires. Now that, after a long and painful silence and patience, the opportunity and duty to speak and reveal has been granted, may He assist and support us as He has in the past. The audience of this speech is you, the representatives of the people, and then the entire nation of Iran, and finally history and future generations who will scrutinize our actions with precision and demand accountability. With this awareness, in the presence of God and before you and all those who will hear this speech, I declare that I do not consider Mr. Banisadr, the President, to possess the political competence necessary for holding the critical position of the presidency.

Before I delve into the numerous reasons supporting this claim, I find it necessary to first define the political competence referred to in Article 110 of the Constitution.

Political competence means that a person is adequate and qualified to manage the responsibilities entrusted to them. The absence of political competence occurs when an individual lacks the conditions specified in the Constitution for fulfilling this responsibility and has deficiencies or flaws that contradict the stipulated qualities. Article 115 of the Constitution considers the necessary attributes for the presidency to include trustworthiness, piety, belief in the principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and being capable and prudent. Any individual lacking any of these qualities is unqualified and unsuitable for this position.

With this background, we can now examine Mr. Banisadr's situation in relation to the presidency. Regarding Mr. Banisadr's lack of political competence, meaning the absence of some of these qualities in him, my brothers have previously expressed points that have not received any response from the opponents of this proposal. On the contrary, some opponents, instead of providing evidence of Mr. Banisadr's competence or refuting the reasons of the proponents of the proposal for his incompetence, have often relied on slogans and emotions to obscure the truth.

I must remind you that my remarks are directed at the opponents who spoke at the beginning of the discussion about the opposition yesterday and took the opportunity to express their heartfelt opinions and even their specific views against the current of Islamic jurisprudence, which today stands against the violations and incompetencies of Mr. Banisadr, under the guise of defending him from this podium.

This act was so hasty and clumsy that the first opponent, before even a word had been said in the assembly regarding Mr. Banisadr's incompetence, stated that the reasons presented were related to Mr. Banisadr's violations, not to his incompetence, and immediately objected that this was an interference of the legislative branch in the judicial branch.

In the statements of the opponents of the proposal, there was a strange insistence to attribute the proof of Mr. Banisadr's incompetence to a personal enmity with him or to a political party and faction, which is contrary to reality.

This is not a personal animosity or a party affair; it is a religious duty and a divine responsibility and a response to a public and popular demand. If there were no concern for preserving the revolution and Islam and the necessity of fulfilling our responsibilities to the people, we would have been willing to tolerate Mr. Banisadr with all his flaws and shortcomings, and we would not have thought of our divine responsibility. Certainly, neither Mr. Banisadr nor perhaps these brothers would have accused us of exclusivity and power-seeking and similar trivial and repetitive accusations.

For the sake of God and in response to the confidence that the Imam of the Ummah expressed, and because of the heavy responsibility we bore in the Revolutionary Council, we have always resisted destructive tendencies and the wave of foreign culture that was being spread by them, and this was intolerable for Mr. Banisadr and the faction that considered him their best stronghold, and this was what brought forth all those accusations and insults.

One of the opponents of the proposal, in defense of Mr. Banisadr, stated that his opponents had exploited his removal from the position of Commander-in-Chief and had created a tense atmosphere, leaving no room for him to speak.

This respected brother seems to have forgotten that Mr. Banisadr issued a statement in response to the Imam's action in removing him, which, although filled with falsehood and distortion of the truth, incited the people to resist against the government and to revolt and disrupt public order, and he was allowed to read it from this podium and to have it broadcasted through mass media across the country, and of course, prior to that, it had been broadcasted by many radio stations affiliated with the Zionist propaganda network.

If Mr. Banisadr is not present in the assembly, there are gentlemen who continue to repeat the same baseless claims and unfounded accusations that Mr. Banisadr has been trying to impose on the minds of the people using all means of communication and many propaganda methods for over a year, and he has repeatedly stated in speeches and interviews and writings, attempting to feed the minds of many unsuspecting individuals, and of course, he has never succeeded. They continue to repeat these claims and unfairly portray others as torturers and him as a defender, while others are depicted as aggressors.

Yes, gentlemen, Mr. Banisadr's absence is not felt except by you who are his loudspeakers. He has been speaking and writing for a year and a half and has not received a response commensurate with all that media assault. He has said all his words, of which you are now repeating part. I wish he had personally attended and said whatever he wanted so that it could be proven to you once again that he has nothing to say that he has not already said, and it is others who have many unspoken truths that they have left unsaid for the sake of the revolution and Islam. We cannot hold any grievances against these brothers because we have accepted that what stands against the line of the revolution and true Islam today and has clashed with it is a current, and these brothers, even if they claim to oppose Mr. Banisadr, cannot hide their connection to that current. The spectrum that today fights against the popular and ideological government around Mr. Banisadr includes these elements as well.

The opposing brothers referred to the presence of the people in the streets and the encouragement of Mr. Rajai, whom they refer to as Hezbollah. They deemed this action contrary to the interests and an illogical method, stating that no issue can be resolved by inciting the people. These brothers seem to have forgotten that it was not Mr. Rajai who brought the people to the streets; this overwhelming and decisive presence of the people was solely and exclusively the art of their own fervor and faith, and the loud and ever-resounding voice of the Imam of the Ummah. It has always been so; in the past, no other factor could compel the people to take to the scene. Not only today, but in the past, you neither recognized this movement correctly nor had the ability to do so. The difference between the rightful Imam of this Ummah and the claimants of political struggle lies precisely here: he relies on the people, demands responsibility from them, trusts them, and values them, while the claimants of politics are oblivious to all this and are deprived of its blessings.

On the day when the Imam returned to Iran, there were also those among the claimants who criticized the Imam for spending a long time in the crowded gatherings of the people, suggesting instead that he engage with politicians and, as they put it, with serious people. Hezbollah, whom Mr. Rajai thanked and rightly so, consists of these very people from the streets and markets, the common people, whom political figures belittle, while they are the ones who fight and kill and are also accused.

The intellectuals, who are dependent on the East and West, rain down accusations and slanders upon them, while the heavy burden of the revolution rests on their shoulders. The army, the guards, and the Basij are composed of them, and the Imam of the Ummah is their supporter and defender. I, as one of these people, advise them from this podium to maintain their presence and not leave the scene empty for the enemy. The last point I wish to include in this introduction is that our love for the Islamic Republic has compelled us, just like that brother who spoke yesterday, to guard the institution of the presidency and support the first president. This feeling led us to defend Mr. Banisadr even though we did not consider him suitable for this position from the beginning. I have repeatedly supported him in Friday prayers and called on the people to support him, and despite all the media pressure against him regarding the line of the Imam, I did not react. However, the crux of the matter is that when his existence, through the use of various destructive methods, becomes a blight on this Republic, and he, in the position of the presidency, becomes the greatest claimant of the Islamic Republic and belittles it, does supporting him still mean supporting the Islamic Republic? No, my brother, judge fairly; no support for Banisadr holds the real and practical value of the Imam's support for him.

But you saw that when the Imam, after a year of painful patience and silence, observed that the line of hypocrisy, heresy, disbelief, and arrogance had found a stronghold in Mr. Banisadr, he withdrew his support from him and considered it a duty for himself. You rely on the Imam's support until March 1980; why do you not rely on the withdrawal of the Imam's support in June 1981? If the Imam's actions are wise and worthy of emulation for us and you, why do you differentiate between the two actions of the Imam? Let us truly feel compassion for this revolution, for these people, for this Republic, for all the blood unjustly shed, and not let differences of opinion and divisions interfere in judgments that pertain to the fate of our nation, and let us consider God as our witness and observer.

Now we come to the main issue, and I summarize my reasons in the following points. Of course, some of these reasons may have been expressed in the same language I will use or in another language, but there are also reasons that have not been mentioned until now.

1-

The President must prove his competence and capability by respecting legal institutions, as his legitimacy is based on the sanctity of the Constitution, of which those institutions are part of its external realization. Mr. Banisadr has repeatedly disrespected legal institutions, thereby undermining the foundation of his legitimacy. Examples include his refusal to sign the bills passed by the parliament, insulting the Guardian Council and the Supreme Judicial Council, accusing the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and his continuous and persistent insults to the cabinet and the head of the government, as well as his open and covert opposition to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Jihad for Construction, and other revolutionary and legal institutions. When the President disrespects these legal institutions, which are part of the government structure, he effectively undermines the Constitution, which is essentially his own existence, and this is the utmost level of incompetence.

2-

The President is the highest authority from whom the preservation of the dignity of the Republic is expected; the humiliation of the Republic is the humiliation of the President. Mr. Banisadr, in a short sentence, belittles the Islamic Republic and the institution of the presidency, stating, "This Republic is not one that I take pride in being its President." In this famous and well-known sentence, only one thing is praised, and that is Mr. Abolhassan Banisadr himself. No culture can consider a person who belittles the presidency and the system of the Islamic Republic while elevating himself to be politically competent and worthy.

3-

Mr. Banisadr did not shy away from any action against those he perceived as his enemies, and he did not hesitate to undermine the foundations of the Islamic Republic and the independence of the country. Perhaps today is finally the time to ask what the story of the public crisis was that one of his close associates and advisors raised in that infamous television debate? There are revealing documents in this regard. Based on the minutes of one of the meetings of his close advisors and associates (which is currently available here), one of their plans was that after the establishment of a government that the parliament favored but which Mr. Banisadr did not approve of, they would obstruct its success through sabotage and opposition until it became discredited and silenced, and they would seize control through political maneuvering. The behavior of Mr. Banisadr and his friends in confronting Mr. Rajai's government step by step indicates this very plan. Political piety and Islamic commitment, which are the main conditions for the presidency, condemn such methods and can never reconcile with them.

4-

In our revolution and also in our Republic, which was its fruit, a prominent and striking feature that could distinguish it from all similar experiences was the emphasis on truth-seeking over political maneuvering. Everything in the methods and behaviors of the Imam and the lines of our domestic and foreign policy indicated such an approach. Mr. Banisadr, in the position of the presidency, violated this method and replaced truth-seeking with political maneuvering. This behavior can be clearly and repeatedly seen in him.

Among these is his performance regarding issues of public interest. For example, before his presidency, he promised in a propaganda attack that he would eliminate interest rates. After becoming president, he and his assistant, the head of the Central Bank, deemed the elimination of interest rates, which had been proposed by Ayatollah Montazeri, an impossible act that would lead to an economic disaster.

Among these is his positioning against groups and factions. Before his presidency, he condemned the Mojahedin in a certain manner. After becoming president, when he felt the need to organize them, he drew them closer to himself. He issued them weapon-carrying cards and utilized their elements and organization to manage gatherings that he deemed necessary for his purposes. There is a document in the handwriting and signature of Rajavi indicating their collaboration with Mr. Banisadr regarding the elections of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the violation of the two-stage plan and some other matters. The tone of the letter in Rajavi's handwriting addressed to Mr. Banisadr indicates the continuation of their relationship. They propose and express opinions in a very friendly manner, ask questions, and announce their cooperation.

Among these is his positioning towards the Imam; recently, he pretended to be committed to the Imam. He referred to the Imam as his father and mentor and honored the name of the Imam, yes, only the name, but in practice, he attacked all other aspects of the guardianship of the jurist. The Imam praised the Guards in a tone of admiration, while he repeatedly, including in his speech on March 5, openly criticized the Guards. The Imam referred to the seizure of the spy den as the second revolution, while he repeatedly rejected it. The Imam protested to the newspapers before Ashura and admonished them for addressing divisive and inflammatory issues, while he stated in his Ashura speech that the war does not mean that newspapers should be restricted. The Imam established a three-member committee, and he deemed it invalid. The Imam considered the Supreme Judicial Council valid and a reference, while he declared it illegal. The Imam, in March 1980, obliged the newspapers to remain silent and not to attack each other, while he published in the first issue of his newspaper in April 1981 a record filled with false and inflammatory content.

5-

One of the ethical principles of Islam and a clear example of piety and trustworthiness, which are among the qualifications and conditions for the President in the Constitution, is honesty and truthfulness. Mr. Banisadr has violated this condition and based his work on dishonesty in both expression and action.

An example is the interest rate, which I have mentioned many times and will not repeat; however, a prominent and clear example is the issue of the presidential guard. Following the protests observed in society regarding his guard on March 5, he repeatedly denied the presence of the presidential guard and explicitly wrote in his record, "I have no guard."

I have in my possession a thick file regarding the Presidential Guard. This file is part of a larger file concerning the Presidential Guard, which is twice its size, and what I have demonstrates the existence of such a guard that was established in early 1979, and even Korean trainers were brought in to assist in its training. I will only refer to one page of it, as the rest is available. This is a letter written by Mr. Banisadr on 15 June 1979: "To Colonel Cyrus Parhamdar, by this order - pay attention to the expressions - from 1 May 1979, you are appointed as the head of the Presidential Guard of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is essential that you take action to organize and train as soon as possible and prevent any disorder in all ceremonies. President Dr. Abolhassan Banisadr - his signature is at the bottom of the document."

Despite such an order, he explicitly wrote in his record that I do not have a guard. His agents also began to prepare the ground by saying that he does not have a guard. Following the rumor of the travel of two of his associates to Europe and perhaps America for unspecified purposes, on 5 March, he boldly and explicitly raised this rumor. To prove its falsehood, he called those two individuals, Mr. Mansour Farhang and Sanjabi, to the podium and showed them to the people, considering their presence at that hour as evidence of the falsehood of the rumor regarding their travel.

There is a document that confirms Mr. Mansour Farhang's travel, which is the subject of the denied rumor. The document states: "Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Passport Department. Please issue a political passport and prepare the necessary visa for Dr. Mansour Farhang and Ahmad Tajik, advisors to the presidency, who are traveling to France, England, Italy, West Germany, Austria, and Sweden for a mission. A receipt for 40,000 rials for the exit fee and four photographs and copies of their identification cards are attached."

Of course, later, the head of the presidential office, Mr. Taqva, signed it. Next to this signature, Mr. Taqva wrote that it should be sent to the financial affairs department to pay the 40,000 rials for the exit fee and also to prepare the round-trip ticket.

Regarding the rumor of his residence in a palace, he repeatedly wrote and said that he does not own any house and does not reside in any palace. I, myself, and all members of the former Revolutionary Council, and certainly many government officials, friends, advisors, and guards, have no doubt that he lived until his last day in Tehran in the palace of a member of the former regime's family, which was adjacent to the Prime Minister's palace where he worked, and with the same decorations and the same ceremonies that remained untouched, even those paintings and such remained, and during his stay in Dezful, he also resided in the royal palace at the Dezful airbase. I have visited him in both places many times and testify to that. This is the state of his integrity, trustworthiness, and honesty, and can anyone claim his competence and qualifications in light of this? Another example is his alleged connection to the National Front, which he has repeatedly denied, and many other examples.

Undoubtedly, the enlightened face and the high spiritual and moral character, intelligence, and decisiveness of Imam Khomeini are the heaviest weights of our revolution and republic. The presence of the people in the scene is another enormous weight that discourages the enemy, and the Islamic Republic is the scene of the actions and struggles of the Imam and the nation. Now, what does an intentional or unintentional effort to undermine these great values mean? Is it treason or incompetence? For now, we will settle for the latter.

Now, pay attention to Mr. Banisadr's masterpieces in this regard. In an interview with the magazine "L'Humanité," the reporter asks if Imam Khomeini is not worried about this situation? Banisadr: "Of course. I have written to him and talked to him about this. The Imam acts according to the news and information he receives and according to his specific way of thinking. From what I see and the experience I gain in practice, it results that the Imam does not have direct contact with reality. Perhaps he believes that if all these issues are discussed, the people will become hopeless."

In an interview with "Middle East," there are also comments about the limited information available to the Imam, which is, of course, one of the detailed and shocking interviews. In this interview, he speaks about the Imam twice, and both times he says that the Imam is given incorrect information. In his interpretation, the Imam is a simple individual sitting there, and they go and inform him, and he gives opinions based on that information. - The date of this interview is 28 March 1981. - In another part of this interview regarding the Islamic Republic, Mr. Banisadr says: "Previously," meaning during the Shah's era, "at least there was a prospect; the prospects of a great civilization, today even that does not exist."

In another part of this interview regarding the presence of the people in the scene, he says: "A joke is circulating in Iran; Taleghani sends a telegram from heaven to Imam Khomeini saying that I met the Shah in heaven, but there was no news of the martyrs of the revolution." Banisadr adds: "This is terrible, but it is clear and meaningful." I ask the Iranian nation, is there such a joke in your Iran, the essence of which is disbelief in the blood of the martyrs of the revolution and, conversely, faith in the Shah, the murderer of these martyrs? Has this joke not been created and elaborated by Mr. Banisadr's unbelieving mind regarding the revolution and the blood of the martyrs of the revolution?

The President must maintain the dignity of the republic abroad. Deviating from this is certainly, if not treason, political and moral incompetence and many other forms of incompetence.

In the past nine months, that is, since the formation of the new government and before that, the greatest loudspeaker against the Islamic Republic regime has been Mr. Banisadr, and astonishingly, it was insisted upon and published in foreign media as well. Considering the Rajai government a calamity greater than war, introducing the Islamic government as a lawless government, these are exactly his own expressions that exist in his foreign interviews and are currently available to me, portraying freedom in Iran as completely crushed, spreading the rumor of torture despite the reports of the Red Cross and the investigative commission at the global level, and in summary, introducing the current regime as worse than the Shah's regime, are among the main themes of Mr. Banisadr's statements. Pay attention to a part of the interview with L'Humanité:

Mr. Banisadr states: "Now there is no law. Like the past, individuals are arrested. They are tortured. A commission was formed to investigate this matter, and they have prepared a ridiculous report. A person has no rights. They are arrested and disposed of like garbage. Previously, at least there were prospects; the prospects of a great civilization, today even that does not exist."

Can one really imagine that this President is a country speaking about his own country and system? The Iranian nation must know who Mr. Banisadr was pleasing with these statements at the global level. How was Mr. Banisadr's open letter to the Imam, in which all these discrediting accusations against the Islamic Republic, along with many implicit criticisms of the Imam himself, included, disseminated and published worldwide?

We have a document that clarifies how it was published globally. One of the employees of the "Herald Tribune" reveals that on 2 November 1980, an Iranian came to the office of that newspaper and asked how much it would cost to place an advertisement in the mentioned newspaper? He did not want it to be clear that the letter was printed as an advertisement and preferred it to be published as news. The newspaper demanded a hefty amount for this, and he refused. On 16 January 1981, while holding a letter from the central office of the "Herald Tribune" in New York, he returned to that newspaper. In that letter, it was ordered that Banisadr's letter be published without charge, and thus, at the recommendation of the New York office, that letter was entirely printed on the front page of the newspaper.

(At this moment, Hojjatoleslam Khamenei shows the front page of the Herald Tribune newspaper, where Mr. Banisadr's letter is printed, to the members of the parliament and the attendees of the session.)

Mr. Banisadr's efforts to discredit the Islamic Republic undoubtedly align with the interests of global enemies and are of their liking. This assistance can only be interpreted as a form of political incompetence.

The minimum level of political competence is that the close advisors and associates of the President should be free from notorious, disreputable, or at least suspicious and questionable elements. Here, I did not find it necessary to provide extensive explanations about Mr. Banisadr's entourage, as there have been recent revelations in the newspapers regarding Mr. Taqva. Regarding Mr. Fazli Nejad and some other gentlemen who have taken those documents from the ministry, there is no need to take up time.

The disclosure of the country's economic secrets is also another reason for Mr. Banisadr's incompetence. Stating the extent of Iran's need for oil exports and the amount of the country's foreign currency reserves and declaring economic paralysis are among them.

He, without considering that the foreign currency reserves in the eighth month of the year are low (which he explicitly stated at that time), cannot blame a government that came to power in the middle of the sixth month, but rather it is a result of the incompetence of the apparatus that has dominated the economy of society and the central bank for more than nine months, which condemns him and his close friends. He discredited the Rajai government and, in fact, the Islamic Republic in the world and dealt a severe blow to Iran's economic credibility globally.

He explicitly announced how much foreign currency reserves we have, in order to undermine Mr. Rajai and to say that the government has borrowed from the central bank and what has happened and decreased, while the responsibility for managing the currency directly lies with the economic apparatus of the country, namely the central bank and the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and that Mr. Engineer Sahabi said yesterday that Banisadr was Minister of Economy and Finance for three months is incorrect. Mr. Banisadr, after that, when he became President, himself appointed a guarantor in the Revolutionary Council.

At that time, the appointment of a minister in the Revolutionary Council was opposed; that is, we opposed it and said that it should be approved by the Revolutionary Council, and he wanted to appoint someone himself. There are many details. He could easily find a weak majority in the Revolutionary Council, meaning Mr. Banisadr could create a weak majority, that is, half plus one for himself from that time, and he did this like many other illegal actions.

On 21 September 1980, the large-scale invasion of Iraqi aggressors into our territory began. Thirteen days before that, Mr. Banisadr, in a speech (on 8 September), ignited the fire of internal disputes and raised issues that are inappropriate and unacceptable even in the most relaxed times for a responsible individual, leading to a series of internal hostilities among the people and the emergence of an atmosphere of discord and bitterness. Was Banisadr aware of the imminent outbreak of war at that time or not? In any case, one of the two options, ignorance and lack of integrity, means that in any case, incompetence applies to that. It is highly likely that Banisadr anticipated such an attack. He himself explicitly states somewhere that I knew, but he is such a person that political disputes and conflicts take precedence over everything for him; even in times of war. An example of this spirit, which he could never hide during the war, can be clearly seen in the successive issues of the record and in interviews and speeches on Ashura and 5 March and Qazvin and Isfahan, etc. Now I present an example related to the incident of the fall of the western part of Khorramshahr.

In a letter I wrote to him two or three days before this painful incident, I wrote:

I wrote this letter to Mr. Banisadr two or three days before the fall of Khorramshahr. At that time, I sent this letter to the Imam's office, to the [Center for] classified documents of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and I archived it in the Revolutionary Council, saying that these should remain for historical record; and of course, I also sent it to the Supreme Defense Council, and it was registered there as well. Of course, the letter was such that I met with the Imam, and he mentioned a few points in a short message he sent through me to all military leaders, including that he expressed that the officials feel a delay in the affairs of Abadan and Khorramshahr. He said if you cannot, let me know so that I can decide on this matter myself. I must answer to Islam and this nation. This is the exact wording of the Imam that I immediately noted down and telegraphed to Mr. Banisadr and the commanders. Mr. Banisadr, in response to my telegram, which I received early in the morning, sent me a very harsh telegram, the text of which is also available, and he was very upset and offended by the questions and statements I had made, demanding why I had sent such a telegram. In response to his telegram, I wrote a very detailed letter, and this part is of my concern here:

"9- Regarding Khorramshahr and Abadan, my opinion has been and is that we should protect these two cities with two mechanized infantry battalions or one infantry battalion and one armored battalion on both sides of this city, that is, one on the Khorramshahr-Shalamcheh axis and the other at the intersection of the Mahshahr-Abadan and Ahvaz-Abadan lines. The tanks should be placed in trenches and protected from the enemy's anti-tank attacks and prevent the enemy's advance and provide our anti-tank forces with the opportunity to strike and damage the enemy. You asked me in the telegram if I knew of any other forces, why I did not inform you. It is surprising. The force I know of is the army, which you command, rather the infantry and armored forces stationed in Dezful, which you claim to visit twice a day. I say this force, which has gradually gathered for a month and has not yet been utilized, could have allocated part of itself for this purpose."

This was the part I wrote to Mr. Banisadr; and he, in a record he wrote during those days and for some reasons was not published in the Islamic Revolution newspaper, (if the brothers and sisters remember, one issue of the Islamic Revolution was published without a record; and when asked why, they said it was not expedient. Of course, they did not say "not expedient" at that time [but] in any case, it was not published, and they provided excuses. That unpublished version of that record is now in my possession.) [In this record] he recalls this incident, the issue of Khorramshahr, and our emphasis on this issue as follows: "It was being telephoned from Abadan that Khorramshahr had fallen. Colonel Razavifar, who was in charge of the defense of the city in Khorramshahr, was saying that he was suffering from dysentery and repeatedly said: 'You promised to help me by today and send forces. Why did you not send forces? You are responsible before God and the nation.'" (He quotes this from Colonel Razavifar) Then Dr. Sheibani took the phone to scream and shout. I scolded him a few times and said, "Do you think the forces are in my hands to throw at you?" The day you should have used your intellect, you did not. You hid the truth from the people and gave the opportunists a chance, and they took the axe and struck at the roots."

(He means the issue of discovering the coup and capturing the coup plotters, which in his view is the responsibility for the fall of Khorramshahr or the enemy's advance 80 kilometers into our territory.)

What remains for me to send you? You did not assist me in any area; in every situation and in every matter, as long as the life and existence of ourselves were at stake, you left me alone... and so on.

On the next page, he writes: "Of course, if we end the war, that is just the beginning of the story. There are problems larger than this ahead of us. I warned when all of this became futile. On September 8, I brought up the issue again and warned once more. Unfortunately, the next day, the 'Three Musketeers' began to protest in a way that everyone is aware of. The way the Speaker of the Parliament presented the matter made it seem as if the Imam had told him to do this. It later became clear that the Imam had said that he had nothing to do with this action. You know best, do it or don’t do it." (I find it necessary to testify here: I met with the Imam. After September 8, he spoke to me after some discussion, saying that Mr. Beheshti and Mr. Hashemi had said nothing. They answered part of some of Mr. Banisadr's violations. This was the Imam's expression, which I told these brothers and the other brothers at that time: the Imam's view and expression is this, he says it this way. Now pay attention to when these words are being written. These words are being written at a moment when Dr. Sheibani from Khorramshahr is on the phone, screaming that forces need to be sent, and Razavi says forces need to be sent, and they must be sent, [but] the Imam is sitting and writing this for the Iranian nation, which must have all its forces, minds, and senses focused on Khorramshahr, which is about to fall):

"... Mr. Rajai went to this very Parliament and became so bold that he said if his ministers are insulted, it is either his place or mine, and he will never sit at the same table as the President. Correct! He claimed to be the people's chosen one. Again, I was pressured from all sides not to pursue this any further... (until it reaches this point) Well! Those who were so eager for power, those who wanted and want all the tools of power in their hands, where are they? Why are they not responding to the cries of Abadan and Khorramshahr? (He has left Khorramshahr, saying now that Mr. Rajai has taken the premiership, he should go to respond to Khorramshahr's cries. [While] he is also the Commander-in-Chief.) They said they would send popular forces there; five thousand, ten thousand, then it became 500 and still has not arrived. Yes, where there is danger, they are no longer there."

In this letter, I have exposed his lies and written that we sent five thousand popular forces who entered Khorramshahr—we sent them, meaning I did not send them myself; I told the committee and the Revolutionary Guard here, I contacted Mashhad, and all the places that could be contacted—and five thousand entered Ahvaz, which we received there and went to Mahshahr and Khorramshahr.

11-

The President must strive to realize the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, and in this regard, attention to the main line of the revolution and its leadership, which is accepted by all the millions of the country, is of great importance.

The political competence of the President is manifested in the correct understanding of the foundations of leadership and moving in accordance with its guidelines. Mr. Banisadr not only did not move in this direction, but he also practically stood against the leadership and openly disregarded the Imam's guidelines regarding the line of calm and preventing tension. The clear difference between his method and the Imam's guidelines is recognizable in what has passed and more so in his observable behavior over the past few months, but it is better to hear something on this matter from his own words and writings. In the same issue of the unpublished Karnameh, he says:

"I asked the Imam to either expel these groups or let us remove them with the help of the people; it was not possible. Any decision made in a certain way led to a disaster that had the opposite result. The last one being the Defense Council... (His point here, which he had of course mentioned many times verbally, but he has written it down here, in a letter to the Imam. His view is that everything that has gone to the Imam has been suggested with consideration, and the Imam has changed it in a way that has led to the opposite result, and he believes that the Imam has ruined his work.) ... On Eid al-Fitr, I went to the Imam. For fifty-five minutes, in the utmost excitement and shouting, I said everything. Then I said and repeated and... and... Unfortunately, those whose work is corruption have misrepresented everything. The result is that now we are a nation alone in the face of an enemy that has been preparing itself for such enmity from the beginning. Then I said about the Parliament that I do not want a weak Parliament, but this Parliament is weak. A Parliament whose elections were held in the situation it was... (Pay attention to his views with the Imam, and he has written these for the people's information)... that those who were elected became, is not a Parliament that expresses opinions with a sense of responsibility and knowledge regarding the issues of the country. During this time that has passed since the Parliament's existence, its product has been the Rajai government; I have written in a letter to the Imam that in my opinion, the calamity of this government is far greater than the calamity of war and the enemy's aggression, and nothing else..."

And there is much more that I do not want to take time in this way.

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The denial of absolute power was a characteristic of our revolution; naturally, our republic refrained from accepting any other power, and our constitution is also based on this, the foundation of breaking power and dividing it among legal institutions. Mr. Banisadr, on the contrary, has always sought and endeavored for absolute power. It was natural that there would be resistance against him, and he called this resistance sabotage, and it is regrettable that some still repeat the same words and give legitimacy to power-seeking and authoritarianism both verbally and in practice.

He, contrary to the explicit constitution that separates and makes the powers independent of each other and contrary to the principles of popular governance, believed that the Parliament should be in harmony with the President. This was a clear insult to the Parliament and the representatives of the people, which he repeatedly stated. He accused the judiciary, which was unwilling to become his tool and appoint those he wanted to high judicial positions, of corruption and non-compliance with the law and Sharia, and he accused the members of the Supreme Judicial Council, all of whom were appointed by the Imam and were prominent clerics, of power-seeking and corruption. He even did not hesitate to preserve absolute power from the misinterpretation and distortion of the constitution. On April 1, 1981, he issued a statement and referred to the explicit text of the constitution and paragraph five of the statement dated March 15, 1980, by the leader of the revolution, which stated, "Issues related to defense are discussed and addressed in the Supreme Defense Council, and after approval, decision-making is with the Commander-in-Chief, and without this, no decision should be made regarding defense issues. He deems it necessary to remind all organs, ministries, and relevant governmental and official organizations that all propaganda activities, opinions, proposals, political plans regarding the imposed war, and any actions in this regard that have any reflection in the world (referring to foreign policy) must be presented in the Supreme Defense Council so that after approval by the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, it can be communicated and executed." He presents this as a declaration and refers to it; firstly, to the constitution and secondly, to the Imam's command.

In the constitution, there is no independent discussion regarding the Supreme Defense Council; it is mentioned incidentally among the duties of the leader, and in that reference, the Supreme Defense Council does not have any of the duties he mentioned. In the command dated March 15, 1980, by the Imam, it is exactly the same, meaning that previously the Imam had issued a command according to which the Revolutionary Council was responsible and committed to all matters related to the war, and then in the command of March 15, the Imam took these duties from the Supreme Defense Council and established the Supreme Defense Council according to the constitution. He includes a clear and blatant lie in his declaration and refers to it, and his intention is that Mr. Rajai had made a statement at that time regarding international issues, which he said was related to the war, and why did you make this statement regarding foreign policy, which is now related to the war with one or two intermediaries? This declaration of his and the way he utilizes the constitution is.

And even in confronting the people, he announced in an interview that it is the people who must change themselves, not me; meaning the people must change according to Mr. Banisadr's view. It seems that the contradiction of this trait of piety and trustworthiness, which is among the most important conditions for the presidency, is clearer than the sun.

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The most astonishing phenomenon that can be examined regarding his incompetence is his disruption and incitement. This is something that can be imagined from anyone in a social system, but it is unreasonable for the head of a government. He has repeatedly invited the people, workers, and military personnel to resist against the existing order; as if to compensate for his absence from Iran during the public resistance against the Pahlavi regime! To the extent that a foreign journalist who interviews him calls him the leader of the opposition to the government; he also accepts this. Is this invitation related to what one of his friends said in a television interview that he is waiting for a public crisis? This disruption, which is reflected even in the last opinions and words of Mr. Banisadr during his presidency, necessarily means attracting disruptive groups and is not merely about inciting simple elements of the streets. Now we are witnessing street riots in Tehran, for which Mr. Banisadr is undoubtedly not absolved of responsibility. If handing over a country to chaos through its President does not result in his incompetence and inadequacy, then what does it result in?

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His personal characteristics also each play a role and have an impact on disqualifying the necessary qualifications for the presidency of an Islamic government. His arrogance, which considers himself the great thought of the century and his book the greatest work in the history of Islam, is recorded in a tape of his statement, which incidentally was made here in the current secretariat of the Parliament. His trick of pretending to the army that if I step aside, all of you will perish, and thus he tries to present himself in the eyes of military elements as a "savior" so that he can perhaps use the army as a tool. While the army, after the Imam's support and the declaration of brotherhood from the people, never needed such an intermediary between itself and the revolution. His obsession with status, which allows flattering and sycophantic individuals to infiltrate his close circle. His self-importance, which believes that after the Imam, no one is more suitable for leadership than him, and many other negative traits in him are factors that make him a person lacking the necessary qualifications for the presidency of the Muslims and the leadership of a country in an Islamic society.

There are several other topics that I found important and fundamental, which I did not have time to write about. One topic is the issue of the proposed contract by the four non-aligned countries, in which he has made a blatant lie in his recent declaration regarding this contract. This contract was one that was revealed in the meeting of the Supreme Defense Council, and if I were to bring it up here and the honorable representatives and the Iranian nation were to find out what conditions were imposed on us in that contract, everyone would reject it. Two proposals regarding that contract were made in the Parliament, one by Mr. Rajai and the other by myself, and it was accepted that if these two proposals were implemented, then this contract would be considered acceptable, and we have not yet responded to that contract; and in this declaration, he pretends that this contract existed and that the non-aligned countries were supposed to come and pursue it, and his removal from the command of the armed forces has harmed this work and delayed the honorable end of the war, and this is a blatant lie.

Another issue is one or two important memories from the time of the Revolutionary Council. One memory is the taking over of the hostages from the hands of the Muslim students following the line of the Imam and handing them over to the Revolutionary Council. This was one of the sensational issues of that day within the Revolutionary Council. On that day, we, the clerics of the Revolutionary Council, firmly opposed this action and said that we would not accept and undertake this work. He and some others who were in the Revolutionary Council insisted that we must take the hostages from the students and place them in the hands of the Revolutionary Council, and this was something that the mediating delegations wanted at that time, and he insisted that it be done. The second memory is the issue of appointing a head for the radio and television, where he appointed one of his friends there. Each of these is an incident; however, this incident indicates a direction in Mr. Banisadr's work; he who talks so much about the constitution. Of course, he has had many such actions during that period; I will count them briefly. One is this issue. One issue is the cleansing that he signed and introduced a person as a cleansing agent, and he gave him the decree of the Revolutionary Council, and he carried out all the cleansings in the country, which is the same Mr. Fazli Nejad who is in his office and was responsible for referring to the ministries to bring the files; he was appointed by him and signed by him on behalf of the Revolutionary Council as responsible for cleansing, and all the work done in cleansing at the national level, except in education, which was not related to him, is related to this gentleman. They established cleansing committees at the national level and tried to cover their own benefits in response to the people's protests and pretended that the cleansings were carried out by clerics or elements who were opposed to them.

The issue of Mr. Farahi is also of the same kind. One day he attended the Revolutionary Council, while a few hours earlier the radio had announced that Mr. Farahi had been appointed by the Revolutionary Council as the head of radio and television. A few hours later, when we attended the meeting and strongly protested to him about why he did this, he said that I voted and it was approved. We said that this issue was not raised and not approved. He said I got a vote. We asked, from whom did you get a vote? He said Dr. Sheibani agreed. We said, Mr. Dr. Sheibani, did you agree? He said no. He said Mr. Bazargan agreed. Mr. Bazargan came, and he also said that he did not agree. Then [it became clear] that he had sat by the phone and called Mr. Bazargan and said, "Everyone else agrees, do you agree that Mr. Farahi should be the head of radio and television?" Mr. Bazargan had said, "Well." Then he called Mr. Sheibani and said, "Everyone else agrees, do you also agree?" He obtained agreement from the members of the Revolutionary Council in this way, over the phone. Of course, apparently, from the six people, including himself, it becomes seven. We rejected this and said this vote is not legal. Of course, since it had been announced by the President and had been announced on the radio that Mr. Farahi is the head of radio and television, the Revolutionary Council did not find it expedient to openly and explicitly oppose it.

Another issue is his inquiry regarding popularity among the people, where he conducted a survey that resulted in Mr. Banisadr (I may be mistaken with the figures, I do not remember correctly, but the ratios are close to this amount) having popularity among 80 percent of the people, the Imam having 53 percent popularity among the people, and the rest having their own places. He brought this to the Revolutionary Council and said that our survey shows that my popularity is greater than the Imam's today in society! And he had said this in a foreign interview, and then it was raised in the Revolutionary Council. Mr. Beheshti asked, "Did you say this?" He said, "No, this is a lie." He did not remember that he had told us this in the Revolutionary Council and was expressing ignorance about the original matter.

He started and continued his work with such knowledge of the people and society. I believe that with these details, one-tenth of it would have been enough to prove his incompetence. I may have three times what I have said here now that I can express. The issue of his incompetence is a clear and evident matter. Truly, if someone has not been convinced by all these statements, reasons, and evidence that Mr. Banisadr lacks the political, moral, and other qualifications for the presidency, it must be said that they have not been present in this assembly and have not listened; otherwise, if someone has listened to these words and does not reach this conclusion, it is not acceptable to me.

However, regarding the statement made yesterday by Ms. Azam Taleghani about Hoveyzeh, it is my duty to say, gentlemen, that I was in the Hoveyzeh region myself on the fifteenth of Dey. The fifteenth of Dey was the day of the attack on the Iraqi forces by our troops. Here, I find it necessary to express my gratitude from this podium to the commander of that division, Colonel Lotfi, who bravely, faithfully, and fearlessly moved in the front lines that day and constantly went back and forth in the battlefield. I remember him as a worthy and brave officer in this incident. It was a battlefield. Our forces were attacking. The enemy forces had been destroyed, and one of our divisions was in danger and was moving.

Of course, the boys of the Revolutionary Guard were also around that time, between two and two-thirty in the afternoon. I saw those boys who became martyrs moving between Hoveyzeh and that area, which was the front line, heading towards the banks of the Karkheh River; that is, they were coming from the west to the east, while the enemy forces were moving in the opposite direction; that is, they were fleeing to join their forces in "Dab Hordad," which is located in the west of Ahvaz and to the east of the point I am mentioning. I told some of the brothers that our forces were also advancing; do not rush, and they said no, we want to go. In that incident, I did not find anyone at fault. The next day, on the sixteenth, I was there until about three to three-thirty in the afternoon, and Mr. Banisadr was also there, and our forces gradually began to suffer blows; that is, a large reinforcements came to assist the Iraqi forces and targeted our forces from the flank, which was not calculable for us and had not been calculated by our forces and our intelligence apparatus. This was why our forces began to retreat. Between three and three-thirty, I hurried back to the city to be present at the headquarters of that division and to emphasize and advise those commanders and officers to enter from another side. Some other military brothers came to gather ammunition, and all that hour, "between God and myself," they were trying; that is, I did not find those who are high-level officials, military or civilian, not making an effort. Of course, at that hour when I arrived, Mr. Banisadr was not there; either he was eating, praying, or sleeping. In any case, he was not there. One or two hours later, however, when we arrived, he was there. He was there for several hours, and when our forces were destroyed, he was there. He witnessed it and later came to tell us.

In any case, in Hoveyzeh, where our boys were martyred, I do not deny it at all, but I did not observe any deliberate negligence, deliberate weakness, or treachery, God forbid. Because it was heard yesterday that some were saying this was Mr. Banisadr's doing, no. Regarding Mr. Banisadr, we have so many objections and logical criticisms that we do not need to accuse him with this issue, which has no way of being proven. I do not consider this a fault of Banisadr; that is, according to my assessment, as far as I know, it is not Banisadr's fault. If Banisadr has any fault – which he certainly does – it is in other areas.

And peace be upon you and God's mercy.