Opening statement at the Security Council meeting

Poland Andrzej Duda · President of Poland

13 July 2023 · National Security Council meeting

Context
Duda addressed Poland's National Security Council on July 13, 2023, to brief members on key decisions made at the NATO summit in Vilnius.
Main themes
NATO Vilnius summit decisions, deterrence by denial strategy, eastern flank security, NATO defense plans, rapid reaction forces, prepositioning of weaponry, 2% GDP defense spending, brigade battle groups, Poland's NATO contributions, Cold War-era deterrence shift
Duration
~18 min
62nd percentile
Words
2,215
62nd percentile
Sentences
102
64th percentile
Readability
47
54th percentile
Grade
12.0
45th percentile
Syntax
3.09
59th percentile
Vocabulary
2.12
30th percentile

Translated from Polish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 78%76%
  • Institutional 13%13%
  • Ceremonial 6%6%
  • Economic 3%3%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

102 sentences in 26 paragraphs

Madam Speaker,

Mr. Speaker,

Honorable Ministers,

Esteemed Chairs,

Members of Parliament,

Senators!

Thank you very much for accepting the invitation to this National Security Council, which I convened in connection with the NATO summit that took place the day before yesterday and yesterday in Vilnius, Lithuania; a summit whose decisions we have been working on for a long time, it can be boldly said that the work on them has actually lasted for a year, and in some cases even longer than a year, because these were issues we discussed in Madrid a year ago as already relevant at that time. But in order to reach certain solutions, this work indeed took longer. Those of you who know how NATO functions in its structures know that decision-making in NATO, which is formally approved at the summit, takes time. And that is what happened now.

But indeed this summit was important, it was a decision-making summit, although when we look at it through the prism of the knowledge that an ordinary citizen possesses, we might say: "Well, actually nothing spectacular happened." It is not like it was in Warsaw in 2016, when the decision was made that for the first time on the eastern flank, here – in the Baltic states, in Poland or in Romania – there would be military contingents of the North Atlantic Alliance and that as a result, the security architecture would actually change in a way very visible to people.

Now there are no such decisions that would be so vivid in their direct visual reception, although in fact these decisions are very important. Because if we take into account primarily that for the first time since the Cold War, NATO's defense plans, prepared for over a year, have been approved, according to which there is a kind of change in the philosophy of defending NATO territory, from the famous deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial, that is, to literal deterrence, meaning deterrence to prevent the occupation of NATO territory, then that is – so to speak – a significant change.

This is a memorable discussion for me that took place a year ago in Madrid and around the Madrid summit, when someone said: "We can never agree to a situation in any of our countries like in Bucha, that we will see such a sight. That we will expel the enemy and what of it, if it turns out that in the meantime innocent civilians have been murdered, who simply lived in that place. That this is how the enemy's occupation of our territories will end. Therefore, NATO's response must be immediate, swift, and very decisive."

And then the idea was born that indeed these NATO rapid reaction forces – practically unimaginable at that moment to react within 10–30 days – would number about 300,000 soldiers, which is indeed a huge contingent. It was also quickly stated that for this to actually happen, two conditions are needed. On the one hand, there must be specific, pre-defined military units in individual NATO countries that will be subject to this relocation, this rapid response. And they will indeed be relocated to areas where security needs to be ensured. And the implementation of this task – designating these units – is currently underway. We in Poland have already designated these units from our resources. But not all NATO members have indicated them yet. So this is in the process of being realized.

On the other hand, what was – I can confidently say – our success, is that we postulated: "Well, but there must also be the so-called prepositioning, that is, there must be weaponry." For it is obvious that in order for these units to be quickly relocated, they must have weapons on site. This weaponry, which they will use, must be stored in potentially target countries. That is, where there is indeed a danger that a potential attack may occur – there the weaponry must be gathered. Just as today NATO countries have weaponry stored in some places for decades – there are such countries – we also postulated that this should be found on the eastern flank. And this decision was indeed made that the warehouses that are already prepared today are to be filled. And this prepositioning is to be realized. So that was the second very important decision that indeed took place. That was our postulate.

We also postulated that the 2% of GDP for defense, which has been talked about in NATO and which has been promised – one could say – by NATO countries as what should be achieved in terms of defense spending, should be accepted by the Alliance as a minimum. That is, it cannot be less. And that at least 20% of that amount must be spent on the modernization of armed forces in each NATO country – so that at least 20% are modernization expenditures each time. So this principle was also adopted, and these were indeed the decisions that were most significant from the perspective of security on the eastern flank. Of course, in this context, there is also the transformation of these battalion battle groups into brigade battle groups. This will happen gradually. However, the elements I mentioned will indeed be the most important.

A very significant change is also the change in language. No one today speaks of the fact that – and until now it has always been so… Those of you who have attended NATO summits, the Minister has attended NATO summits, so you know that the great countries of the Alliance have always pushed to define Russia as a NATO partner, this was very strongly emphasized. Even at those first NATO summits I attended before 2022, the status of Russia as a NATO partner and the Russia-NATO agreement were very strongly emphasized each time.

Now this topic is no longer present at all. Russia is listed in NATO's official documents as a country that poses the greatest threat to the Alliance's member states, and no one even thinks of calling Russia any partner. Today it is known that Russia is simply an aggressor state, today Russia is dangerous, today NATO officially considers Russia to be a country threatening the Alliance's member states. And this tone could also be heard practically in all the speeches of the individual leaders of NATO countries that were represented during this Vilnius summit. So these are issues that clearly show this change in language.

And finally, the last of the most fundamental elements – the issue of Ukraine. There was also a long process regarding this topic. For me – one could say – regarding the NATO summit concerning Ukraine, it began in January when President Volodymyr Zelensky told me and the co-host of this summit, President Gitanas Nausėda of Lithuania, that he would like Ukraine to receive an invitation to NATO, and that it was very important for him that we lobby for this among NATO countries to make it happen.

We tried to raise this topic at all the meetings we had with our colleagues from NATO countries – with the leaders of NATO countries. As you know, ultimately we were unable to achieve such a decision as a result of the Alliance's work – as a result of this Vilnius summit. Instead, we have the issue of the invitation included in the conclusions, but conditioned on meeting the requirements that NATO generally sets for the admission of Ukraine. In this context, there is talk, among other things, about fighting corruption, further modernization of the Ukrainian army, and training Ukrainian soldiers. So here a whole range of these arguments is raised by NATO countries.

However, we managed to secure other elements. Our postulate, among other things, was that a formal procedure should be carried out regarding Ukraine – as it is said in NATO – tasking, that is, assessing the country's readiness to join the North Atlantic Alliance, of course within the framework of full membership. This procedure is carried out by foreign ministers. And it was included in the summit conclusions that such tasking will be performed by foreign ministers. The next meeting of NATO foreign ministers, as every year, will take place in November, and already in connection with that, we assume that this first tasking will be conducted precisely in November. This is a clear procedural step towards NATO. So one could say that this procedural path for Ukraine's entry into NATO has been opened. So this is certainly a very important element.

In addition, a NATO-Ukraine Council has been established – instead of the Committee that existed until now, there will be a Council. This is a new quality. This was emphasized many times yesterday. First of all, the meeting of this Council took place for the first time yesterday. The formula of President Volodymyr Zelensky's presence, who sat among representatives of NATO countries – as it was emphasized – on equal terms at the round table, at which the Alliance always deliberates, was significant and it indeed showed this change in Ukraine's status among the countries of the Alliance. So the NATO-Ukraine Council has been established. And this is indeed certainly a new quality for Ukraine that we are now dealing with.

These were the most important issues we discussed. What else can I tell you? We also postulated strengthening NATO's air defense. So a decision was made regarding such strengthening of a rotational nature, that is, NATO air forces will continuously monitor the area of potential threat, that is now the eastern flank. The air forces of NATO countries will continuously operate here. So this will be an additional strengthening of air defense here, in our part of Europe, which the Alliance has decided upon.

We were very strongly influenced by what you have seen recently – after the Wagner Group's rebellion in Russia and Prigozhin, after the statements of Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding, firstly, the relocation of Russian tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus; secondly, the de facto relocation of the Wagner Group to Belarus – we had no doubts that this significantly affects the change in the security architecture in our part of Europe.

And that is why we decided just before the NATO summit – literally a few days before the summit – to send a letter to NATO leaders and NATO countries on this matter. We decided this with President Gitanas Nausėda and President of Latvia Egils Levits. This was actually the last formal act that President Egils Levits, finishing his term and presidency in Latvia, decided as a neighbor of Belarus. So we – three NATO countries neighboring Belarus, three countries that share a border with Belarus – sent such a letter.

And we indeed achieved the effect in the form that Belarus not only appeared as a subject of discussion for the first time so seriously at the NATO summit, but it was also mentioned five times in the conclusions of the NATO summit in the formula that we know as the Brest Gate, as it is popularly called in NATO – as a strategic area that is currently indeed under increased threat. So this issue is there.

Of course, in this context, there was also talk about the nuclear issue. Well, if there is a relocation of Russian nuclear weapons, some response from NATO countries must be made. It was hard to expect that any decision would be made at the NATO summit on this subject, but it is very strongly emphasized in the conclusions that NATO's nuclear umbrella is extended over all member states, including us. That in the event of any threat, there will be an immediate response from NATO. I think we can speak of this as a certain signal from NATO that this situation is being taken into account, it is being monitored.

But – of course – we will continue to strive for further steps to be taken within NATO. I am thinking here about decisions, so I do not rule out that at the next summit in Washington – which will be a jubilee, we will celebrate 75 years of NATO next year, the summit will be in the capital of the United States as the largest NATO country, so there will be a jubilee – the hosts will certainly want it to be a strong summit, carrying a strong message of the strength that the North Atlantic Alliance has as the largest defense alliance in the world. So I think that various very important decisions will be made there. We will certainly want this issue to be strongly emphasized there.

And Sweden – a very important element. This is indeed very good news for us. There is no need to explain this to anyone, but the presence of Sweden in NATO will be a powerful reinforcement and a closing of our security sphere from the north. Sweden is – we can boldly say – our neighbor across the Baltic Sea. And it is very good that we will now be able to cooperate with Sweden in NATO not only on bilateral terms, as has been the case so far, but also within the Alliance, within the entire defense community. This is indeed a very significant strengthening for NATO.