The President of the Republic of Poland summarizes the NATO Summit in Vilnius.

Poland Andrzej Duda · President of Poland

12 July 2023 · NATO Summit in Vilnius (summary)

Context
Duda addressed media at the conclusion of the NATO Summit in Vilnius on 12 July 2023, summarizing key decisions from Poland's perspective.
Main themes
NATO summit outcomes, eastern flank security, Poland's strategic priorities, Russia as threat to NATO, Belarus and Wagner Group, NATO defense plans, nuclear deterrence, deterrence by denial, sovereignty over troop stationing, Ukraine war, Alliance language shift
Duration
~32 min
84th percentile
Words
3,783
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Sentences
189
88th percentile
Readability
50
64th percentile
Grade
11.0
33rd percentile
Syntax
3.00
47th percentile
Vocabulary
2.09
25th percentile

NATO Summit Statements Translated from Polish

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  • Geopolitical 75%67%
  • Institutional 12%11%
  • Ceremonial 12%11%
  • Economic 1%1%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 12%

189 sentences in 46 paragraphs

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen!

As you know, the NATO summit in Vilnius has officially concluded, as announced by the Secretary General of NATO. Two days of very intense discussions, very intense debates, and important decisions were made at this summit, particularly regarding the strengthening of the security structure on the eastern flank of the Alliance and also concerning a change in the language and approach presented within the Alliance. This change is gradual, but it is happening.

What can I say about the issues that we, from a Polish perspective, consider the most important? If you read the communiqué from the summit, you will see that it is clearly stated, above all, that the issue of any location or relocation of NATO troops on the territories of NATO member states is an absolutely sovereign decision of the member states.

This means that it is a complete break from the language that has prevailed in NATO for the last several decades, where – as we know – there were various agreements between NATO and other parties that also conditioned the issue of the stationing of NATO troops and similar matters. This statement unequivocally resolves and negates that issue. We have been demanding this for years, and we are very pleased that these efforts have finally borne fruit and that this statement is so unequivocal. This is indeed an important decision made by the Alliance.

It is – of course – also related to the general change in the Alliance and in the language of the Alliance regarding Russia. Russia is no longer a partner of NATO in any way. For many years, it was referred to as a partner of NATO, and for many years there were allies who strongly advocated for this designation of Russia as a NATO partner to be included in NATO documents. Today, there is no doubt – Russia is the aggressor, Russia is today the greatest threat to NATO member states, and this is stated plainly and directly. It is waging an aggressive war in Ukraine, as it is also referred to by the North Atlantic Alliance. It is indeed the entity that poses the greatest threat to the Alliance today.

What is our undeniable gain here? I announced to you that, in light of what we hear from the Russian side, but also from the Belarusian side, we will raise the issue of Belarus at all possible NATO forums – that is, both in full NATO meetings and in smaller groups, as well as in bilateral meetings – we will talk about the issue of Belarus, the announced relocation of Wagner Group mercenaries to Belarus, the tactical relocation of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus, and what has been stated clearly and explicitly by President Putin himself recently.

In the communiqué, Belarus is mentioned five times, with particular emphasis on what we call the Brest Gate, which is the area of strategic and military threat that will be under special observation by NATO and will therefore be particularly monitored during this period.

This also translates into discussions about security and NATO's nuclear umbrella. This nuclear umbrella – as emphasized – is extended over all member states of the Alliance, so in the context of these announcements regarding the relocation of nuclear weapons, this statement clearly responds to that. It should be read as follows: if Russian nuclear weapons were to be used against NATO member states in any way, NATO member states would also respond appropriately. So here, this message is unequivocal. That is how it should be read.

Ladies and gentlemen!

What else? Well, a groundbreaking decision, which may not be very clear to an observer who has never followed the decisions made by the Alliance and does not know the details of the Alliance's documents, is that for the first time since the Cold War, the Alliance has created and approved defense plans. This is work that has been ongoing since the NATO summit in Madrid. Until now, we had so-called contingency plans, which were somewhat provisional in nature.

The plans that have been created and approved are plans that today view the defense of the Alliance's area in a different way than before. It can be boldly said that this is a practical realization of the multiple announcements and commitments made by President Joe Biden of the United States, especially in recent years, when he stated that every inch of NATO territory would be defended.

So, ladies and gentlemen, this is precisely that change. These NATO defense plans foresee a shift from deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial, meaning from deterrence through punishment, where we mobilize and respond only after we are attacked and our territory is occupied, to simply deterring by preventing access, meaning they will not enter, they will be stopped immediately. This is what has been raised repeatedly here in discussions at the Alliance forum since Madrid: that we cannot allow a situation like Bucha to happen again, where enemy forces enter our territory, occupy it, and only then do we liberate that territory from enemy occupation, and only then do we potentially – unfortunately – find murdered people, our loved ones, innocent civilian victims.

NATO says a decisive "no." Such a situation cannot happen from the perspective of the Alliance, which is why we are adopting these new defense plans with a completely new – it can be boldly said – doctrine of defending NATO territory, and this is indeed a very important change. It is accompanied by a whole series of subsequent changes, namely the increase in the Alliance's forces that will respond immediately and that will carry out this immediate defense of the Alliance's territory – something that has also been discussed for a long time, but which has now found its expression in planning documents, although the procedure for dedicating these units is still ongoing. Some countries have already implemented this, while others have not yet. But at this moment, the military part of the Alliance is continuously working on these issues. However, it is already planned, and this is the immediate increase in the presence of response forces to 300,000.

I can explain to you that it is estimated that if there were to be an attack on the aforementioned Brest Gate, then approximately 100,000 NATO troops could be directed to our territory for immediate defense. So these are the assumptions that are currently being adopted and that have been approved by the Alliance as part of the aforementioned defense plans. So these are, ladies and gentlemen, the most important things from our perspective.

We were also very pleased with the realization of a demand that we have been firmly raising for a long time, but very strongly this year. This was what I said, ladies and gentlemen, that there must be NATO weapon depots. That there must be weapon depots so that soldiers can be relocated without having to bring all the infrastructure along with them, that this armament must be stockpiled. Such a decision has been made. These depots will also be filled in our country, and there is a decision from the Alliance in this regard. And this is certainly another positive aspect of the debate we concluded and the decisions that were made.

If someone asks what this means for Poland – I always say: "For Poland, yes, but it is more for the eastern flank." Because that is how NATO views it. It does not look at it in a completely individual way; it looks at it through a certain defense doctrine. So within this doctrine, this task will also be carried out in our country. And this – we can boldly say – is our success. We have advocated for this, and it is happening; it is approved.

Ladies and gentlemen!

Of course, from our point of view, the issue of Ukraine is also important – because it is also a matter of our security. The bar was set high; there was a lot of bidding. It is clear that for a long time, in supporting President Volodymyr Zelensky, we have raised the Ukrainian expectation for a formal invitation to NATO for Ukraine.

As you know, such a far-reaching decision was not made. But a whole series of decisions regarding Ukraine were made. Undoubtedly, these decisions bring Ukraine closer to NATO. Among those that bring Ukraine closer, the most important is that the summit approved the abandonment of the Membership Action Plan, meaning that Ukraine no longer has to go through that stage. So it saves time – one could boldly say – in its accession to NATO. This formal requirement has been lifted from Ukraine, just as it was previously lifted from Sweden and Finland. This is indeed extremely important.

In this context, a very important issue is that – as you know – Finland was recently admitted to the Alliance, but there was a problem with Sweden. This decision – as you know – was made by Turkey. President Erdoğan has declared that he will submit the ratification documents to the parliament, and this is indeed undeniable progress. We hope that very soon the Turkish parliament will carry out its work and address this issue and these documents. We then assume that this will also be done by our allies from Hungary and that literally in the near future – I hope – in the coming months, Sweden will be fully admitted to the North Atlantic Alliance. This is, of course, fundamentally important for our security and for the eastern flank of NATO. This is a tremendous strengthening and a great – one could boldly say – success for NATO.

For us, this is our additional shield from the north. There is no doubt about that. The Prime Minister of Estonia emphasized this strongly as well. The only real security for his country, for Estonia, was the Suwalki Gap as the only land route connecting the rest of NATO with the Baltic states. Now, to the north, there is already Finland, further strengthened by Sweden – two powerful countries of the Baltic Sea region. This is a tremendous strength. Also in our immediate neighborhood, providing us with additional security from the north. So one could boldly say that for us, this is also a significant event that Sweden, supported by us, will soon be part of this Alliance.

Returning to Ukraine: ladies and gentlemen, apart from the exemption from the MAP, the second very important decision for Ukraine is the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Council, meaning the transformation of the Committee into a Council. This Council met for the first time today, with the participation – everyone emphasized this – of President Volodymyr Zelensky sitting with us at the NATO table, almost as an equal participant in the NATO summit. This is absolutely a qualitative change, providing Ukraine with additional opportunities for cooperation with NATO, allowing NATO to address Ukraine's issues. So this is also an extremely important element and a change in the nature of relations between NATO and Ukraine.

Another very important element is the package of assistance that has been adopted for Ukraine, support for Ukraine from the North Atlantic Alliance member states. These are the elements that certainly strengthen the ties with Ukraine today. And also in the context of the very use of the word "invitation." It is clearly stated in the communiqué that this invitation will be extended, of course, when the conditions are met. The truth is that our Ukrainian partners, President Volodymyr Zelensky, were well aware and are aware that Ukraine's full membership in NATO today is simply impossible due to the ongoing war. And this was clear to them.

However, we assume that this clear statement that this invitation will be extended… It is clear what conditions are primarily at stake here. So we hope that this announcement also represents an additional small step for Ukraine towards full NATO membership. This is – as I said – important for our security. For the eastern flank of the Alliance, this is undoubtedly a significant shift to the east. The shifting of NATO's border in this part away from our borders, moving it eastward, thus certainly a significant strengthening of Poland's security from that perspective – purely territorial.

Let us remember that Ukraine is over 600,000 square kilometers, a country twice the size of Poland, a vast area, also in terms of the so-called strategic space, as the military say. However, let us also remember that today it has a very strong army. Very strong not only in numbers as one of the largest armies in NATO, but it is primarily a very strong army because it has combat-experienced soldiers – soldiers who are gaining experience in extremely difficult frontline and combat conditions. Currently, every day. So this experience is invaluable. And indeed, Ukraine's accession to the North Atlantic Alliance in the – I hope – near future will certainly be a tremendous strengthening of the military potential, precisely the defensive potential of our security community. So these, ladies and gentlemen, are the basic elements regarding Ukraine. I think that, of course, our colleagues from Ukraine, our neighbors would like more, but today this is what NATO, what the allies could offer after long negotiations and debates, including our participation. And these are the most significant decisions that were made at this summit.

What is the most important thing, ladies and gentlemen, that everyone has strongly emphasized: NATO is unity, there are no deeply contentious issues within NATO, no matters have fallen apart at this NATO summit. There is therefore unity, there is solidarity, there is full support for Ukraine. This language is extremely pro-Ukrainian, it is very strong language, clearly and distinctly showing who is waging a war that we would call just, that is, a truly defensive war, and who is the aggressor here. It is clearly stated: "Russia attacked Ukraine for no reason." And this is the language that is being used in NATO today, and this is also a change that has occurred over the last period.

*

Grzegorz Tkaczyk, Fakty TVN: Mr. President, I wanted to ask in the context of what you just said. We know that NATO will strengthen the eastern flank, we know that there are plans for joint exercises and assigning specific units to defend specific areas in individual Allied countries. As you said, these are the first such plans since the Cold War. What more can we say concretely about this? Who would be defending us and how many more NATO soldiers can we expect in Poland? How will our security increase?

To this, I can only answer specifically that there is a clause "NATO secret."

Or maybe there is some clause that would gently declassify it?

Please believe me – as much as I could say on this topic, I have said. Who knows – maybe I even said more than I should have said. Because estimates of how many soldiers we can expect in the case of force relocation, my colleagues are nodding their heads that such estimates are only for today. Because – of course – it will depend on the specific danger situation that may arise. And the military will continuously assess what forces are adequately needed to move them in these very short – I emphasize! – timeframes: 10 days, 30 days. This is rapid relocation.

However, work on this in terms of very strong military facts, indicating specific units, is partially completed – as I said – and partially not yet, but it is in progress.

Mr. President, can we say a word about the National Security Council? Have you already made a decision…

Yes, the Council will meet tomorrow at 2:30 PM. Because – as you know – we have a very important visit tomorrow and a very significant guest. The President of South Korea will be visiting us along with his wife and the entire delegation. They are coming to us from Vilnius, from the NATO summit, for an official state visit. Therefore, practically all the facilities in this context that are under the authority of the President of the Republic are simply occupied due to this visit. Because both the Presidential Palace and the Belvedere are also partially used by the First Ladies in connection with this visit. Therefore, I asked Minister of National Defense Mariusz Błaszczak to provide a room for this meeting to take place in a broad spectrum of our political scene, as I have usually done so far, to convey information from the NATO summit in a more closed format, where it is possible to say a bit more.

And since there has been a consensus so far regarding building and strengthening our security, I have no doubt that it is appropriate to share this information with the most important politicians in Poland who decide on Polish matters, even through voting in parliament. And that will happen tomorrow.

Dominika Ćiosić, TVP: Good morning, Mr. President, I wanted to ask about Ukraine. In 2008, when Ukraine and Georgia did not receive MAP at the summit in Bucharest, it was perceived as removing the protective umbrella from these two countries, and Russia actually took advantage of that. Now, in the case of Ukraine, there is a resignation from MAP. What does this mean in practice? And the second question: what do these security guarantees for Ukraine consist of? Thank you very much.

It means that a very important procedural point, which anticipated a whole series of elements that had to be fulfilled, is considered to be realized. Because, in essence, one can say that. If Ukraine is exempted from fulfilling this MAP, it means that the Alliance has simply recognized that there is no point in outlining this procedure for Ukraine, as it is already simply there. Creating this at this moment would be a kind of artificiality and might unnecessarily prolong the time.

Here is one very important note: I do not know if you have noticed this, or if you remember it, but we mentioned that we proposed – when we realized that obtaining that formal invitation to NATO for Ukraine would not be possible – to foresee for Ukraine and decide on a smaller procedural step than an invitation, namely the tasking procedure, that is, the assessment by the foreign ministers of NATO countries of Ukraine's readiness to join NATO. And this was approved by the Alliance. So this is also important information. That the foreign ministers of the Alliance countries will carry out this assessment – this is in the summit conclusions. So this is a very significant decision. It also has a procedural dimension regarding the path to NATO, the procedures for – one could say – accepting into the North Atlantic Alliance.

And the security guarantees, Mr. President?

Ladies and gentlemen, security guarantees primarily mean that everyone has committed to continue supporting Ukraine. To support Ukraine militarily, to also send military assistance in accordance with agreements, to support in terms of ammunition supplies, to support in terms of all other – depending on what each has at their disposal – types of armament. These are the decisions that the Alliance makes. And we can call these security guarantees, that the Alliance's declaration is absolutely unequivocal that as long as Ukraine is attacked by Russia, as long as this war continues, NATO will continue to support Ukraine. This has been stated unequivocally, repeatedly, and there is no doubt about it.

Grzegorz Urbanek, Polsat News: Mr. President, I would like to ask about your conversations with the Ukrainian side after what the Ukrainians heard about all these guarantees you mentioned, about the prospect of joining NATO. How do they assess such an offer from NATO? And I would also like to ask about the mechanism for the rapid relocation of soldiers. What is the time perspective? When could this mechanism fully start functioning? Thank you.

Please direct that question to President Volodymyr Zelensky. I do not presume to answer in place of the President of Ukraine whether Ukraine is satisfied or not. I can only say this: there is no comparison – any comparison between what was in 2008 and what is now. This is a completely, entirely different situation in absolutely every respect.

And I say this to you with full responsibility, because I was then by the side of President Lech Kaczyński and I remember that summit, I remember that atmosphere, I remember the relations that President conveyed to us directly from the summit discussions. I can tell you this: it is a completely different situation, a completely different language that is being used today to talk about Ukraine, and a completely different treatment of Ukraine by the North Atlantic Alliance.

However, please understand – it is not possible today to accept Ukraine into the Alliance on full terms, and I say this to you with full responsibility as the President of the Republic of Poland. Because if Ukraine were to be accepted today on full terms, with full membership rights in the North Atlantic Alliance, one must assume that on the same or the next day it would apply for the invocation of Article 5, that is, for collective defense. And if the Alliance were to behave as it should in such a situation, we would have to send our soldiers to the front. Just like all other Alliance countries. That is the foundation – from our point of view – of the North Atlantic Alliance: the most important security guarantee. That is why we are in the North Atlantic Alliance. That it guarantees exactly that. If we were to give that guarantee to Ukraine today, Polish soldiers would have to go to the front. I, as President, would not want to make such a decision.

Piotr Grzybowski, Tygodnik Katolicki Niedziela: Mr. President, referring to the decision to send our special forces to secure the NATO summit, to what you said about defense in the direction of the Brest Gate. Is Poland planning to send a new military contingent to support Lithuania?

We are in talks with the Lithuanian side. These are discussions that have been ongoing for some time. Earlier, we held consultations with the highest military commanders. With the Minister – here – we had a special meeting at our National Security Bureau, where the commanders were present. We discussed this in detail with them. And yes, we assume that the 15th Division could conduct very serious exercises together with the Lithuanian side, with Lithuanian soldiers. And in these terms, we are considering the presence of Polish soldiers in Lithuania today.