Government statement by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel on the European Council and the Euro Summit on October 26, 2011, in Brussels before the German Bundestag on October 26, 2011, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

26 October 2011 · European Council and Euro Summit; Government statement before the German Bundestag · German Bundestag, Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the German Bundestag on October 26, 2011, ahead of the Brussels Euro Summit, outlining Germany's position on resolving the eurozone debt crisis.
Main themes
European debt crisis, eurozone stability, Greece debt sustainability, economic and monetary union reform, fiscal responsibility, private sector involvement, competitiveness reforms, Germany's economic recovery, Stability and Growth Pact, Troika program oversight, sovereign debt restructuring
Duration
~36 min
88th percentile
Words
4,277
88th percentile
Sentences
233
92nd percentile
Readability
54
73rd percentile
Grade
10.4
24th percentile
Syntax
2.85
28th percentile
Vocabulary
2.09
25th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 57%56%
  • Institutional 20%20%
  • Geopolitical 15%15%
  • Ceremonial 6%6%
  • Social 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 3%

233 sentences in 75 paragraphs

Mr. President!

Dear colleagues!

Just over three years ago, the bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers triggered the largest stock market crash since the war. What began as an American real estate crisis quickly developed into a global financial crisis. Joint efforts by the federal government and the Bundestag prevented Germany from falling into a deep recession at that time. Nevertheless, the crisis demanded a lot from the citizens: economic losses, but also patience and trust.

Today we can state: Our joint efforts have paid off; for Germany has emerged from the global financial crisis stronger than it entered it. We can rejoice in significant economic growth. And above all, unemployment is at its lowest level in 20 years.

It is also clear: Germany cannot thrive in the long term if Europe is doing poorly. Therefore, the most important concern of the federal government now is that Europe also emerges from the crisis stronger than it entered it. This means nothing more and nothing less than: Europe must become a stability union. What does that mean?

This means

first:

We must overcome the acute crisis. To do this, we need to find viable solutions for the countries that have excessive debt, thereby correcting the mistakes of the past. At the same time, we must prevent the crisis from spreading further to other countries.

Equally important as the first point is second:

We must make provisions for the future. To do this, we must decisively tackle the root causes of this crisis. This is excessive debt, but also the lack of competitiveness of some Euro member states. This means nothing other than that we must strengthen the foundations of the economic and monetary union to the maximum.

Each of the two challenges I have mentioned is already relatively large in itself. However, we must find convincing answers to these challenges simultaneously if the economic and monetary union wants to withstand its stress test and emerge from it permanently strengthened. I believe we agree: This is the greatest stress test the economic and monetary union has ever faced.

In formulating the answers, we made good progress over the past weekend in the discussions of the finance ministers and the heads of state and government, and I will work this evening to ensure that we arrive at viable decisions overall. The problems we are dealing with have their origins partly long before the outbreak of the current crisis. However, interestingly, this was ignored for far too long by both the markets and, unfortunately, also by politics.

The truth is: For years, it was possible to incur debt without facing market sanctions in the form of higher interest rates or the sanctions in the Stability and Growth Pact that were actually intended for this purpose. For years, it was possible to avoid necessary reforms and fall behind in competitiveness. The truth also includes that the funds intended for the convergence of competitiveness within the European Union – the structural funds and the cohesion fund – have partly led to adverse effects and have not produced the desired results. We are now grappling with this years-long backlog of reforms. Therefore, it would be completely irresponsible to claim that this could simply be resolved overnight.

But there is also positive news. Above all, Ireland is back on a good path, Portugal is firmly determined to implement its adjustment program, and the Greek government has begun urgently needed reforms in recent months. It is also worth mentioning here that the people in Greece are being asked to bear a lot. They deserve our respect, and above all, they deserve a viable future perspective in the Eurozone.

Nevertheless: There is still much to be done to get Greece's problems under control. The so-called Troika, consisting of representatives from the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, monitors the implementation of the program and assesses whether Greece can fundamentally bear its debt burden. From the latest report of the Troika, which is now available, we must draw the right conclusions. The report paints a realistic picture of the situation in Greece based on the experiences of the past one and a half years. This is particularly due to the IMF and its new director, Christine Lagarde, to whom I would like to express my explicit thanks at this point.

The Troika report makes it clear that Greece is only at the beginning of a long and difficult journey. It also makes clear that the private sector must make a significant contribution to sustainably improving Greece's debt sustainability. The result is also: The measures we decided on July 21, 2011, at the European Council based on the results available at that time are no longer viable today. The outcome of today's discussions must be – this is the goal – that Greece's debt sustainability is structured in such a way that Greece reaches a debt level of 120 percent of GDP by 2020. This cannot happen without the private sector contributing significantly more to the burdens than was foreseen on July 21, 2011.

A debt relief alone – I want to make this very clear – regardless of how it is structured, does not solve Greece's problems. Painful and necessary structural reforms must be implemented consistently. Otherwise, despite debt relief, we will find ourselves back where we are today in a short time. This must always be clear. Therefore, the principle we have applied from the beginning is correct: Aid can only be provided if the recipient takes responsibility. Aid must always be tied to strict conditions.

On this path, we will certainly have to accompany Greece for quite some time. I believe – and we will also discuss this today – that it is not enough for a Troika to come and go every three months. It would be desirable for there to be permanent monitoring in Greece.

Equally, we are obliged to do everything we can to ensure that Greece is given the opportunity to grow again. This naturally also means: investments under probably improved conditions. That is why there is an EU mission led by the German Horst Reichenbach. That is why there was the trip of the Federal Minister of Economics to Greece – with a multitude of potential investments from German companies in tow. And that is why there will also be a meeting of representatives from German and Greek municipalities next week. They want to discuss how they can help each other.

I say explicitly – I believe I say this on behalf of all of you –: We want Greece to get back on its feet quickly. We will do everything we can in all areas, in the spirit of German-Greek partnership.

A debt cut for Greece, meaning a participation of private creditors, means, regardless of how it looks, that we must also find a solution to avoid systemic risks, that is, to prevent other countries from being infected as a result of this process.

Therefore, we must pursue two paths.

We must ensure – this is the first path – that banks do not lose trust in each other. Therefore, a stronger recapitalization of the banks was decided by the finance ministers over the past weekend based on the proposals of the European banking authority. This is absolutely necessary and will be a very important element in preventing such contagion. When we carry out this recapitalization of the banks, the following order applies – this is clear –: First, the banks are called upon to capitalize themselves, secondly, the nation-states must help, and only then, if the stability of the Euro as a whole is at risk because a nation-state cannot manage it, can it be considered that the EFSF is called upon. That is the order.

A

second

important element to prevent the risk of contagion is the so-called firewall, which we have talked about a lot now. You can also call it a firewall if you are proficient in English; however, I wanted to express myself in German, which is certainly helpful.

To this end, we must – this is the second path – shield all other countries from the contagion risks that may arise from Greece. To this I say: It is essential that before we take such shielding measures, every country that could be affected does its homework and tries to prove its own solidity with additional measures. This will also be discussed first.

Now it is about the forms of shielding; much has already been said about this. The EFSF now has an effective capacity of 440 billion euros; we have decided this here. Germany provides guarantees amounting to 211 billion euros. This remains the case: both in terms of the total volume of the EFSF and the upper limit of German guarantees.

In our discussions today, it is about ensuring that the EFSF achieves the greatest possible effect with this capacity in preventing contagion risks. The effect of this shielding must be large enough. There has been a comprehensive public discussion about this. I say again – this is very important in this context –: All models that require the participation of the European Central Bank are off the table and are not the subject of today's discussions. They contradict the European treaties. I have made it clear that such solutions are not an option for the federal government.

Now, two options are being pursued without the involvement of the European Central Bank:

first

the partial guarantee of new state securities of the respective Euro state and secondly, the creation of the possibility for private and public investors to participate in the financing of measures, that is, in the EFSF.

Both options can only be applied within the framework of the instruments agreed for the EFSF. This also ensures that the clear principles of the EFSF always apply. The member state must submit a request for assistance, a memorandum of understanding will be negotiated, and strict conditionality of the aid will be agreed upon.

The German Bundestag and the federal government must agree to the granting of assistance in individual cases and thus to the application of one of the two options, in the form that includes the proposals for parliamentary procedure. Both options will be politically decided by the Bundestag today in principle, and we will discuss and decide both options again this evening in the context of the meeting of heads of state and government. Of course, the guidelines, when they are available, will subsequently be discussed in accordance with the parliamentary procedure here in the German Bundestag.

In addition, there is consensus at the European level to hold talks with the International Monetary Fund on how the IMF can contribute to stabilizing the Eurozone beyond its current level, both in terms of its expertise and, if necessary, its financing instruments.

I would like to emphasize once again, as it is important for today's decision-making: Whoever wants private creditors to participate in Greece's debt sustainability must ensure that a shielding, a protection against contagion risks is also decided. Anything else is grossly irresponsible.

I have said it: The federal government wants the economic and monetary union to become a stability union. Therefore, in addition to overcoming the acute crisis, we must also make provisions for the future, by ensuring that the Euro member states take more joint responsibility. We have already taken initial steps in this direction, for example, with the Euro Plus Pact, in which the heads of state and government of the Eurozone have voluntarily committed to implementing structural reforms. This means: Competitiveness is now also a matter for the heads of state in the European Union. With the new procedure that has just come into force to prevent and correct macroeconomic imbalances, competitive weaknesses can be identified and addressed earlier. The structural and cohesion funds must also be used more in the future to genuinely improve competitiveness.

But I also say – we will pay attention to this in the further process –: Economic imbalances are not inherently bad. If a surplus arises because one country is more competitive than another, then that must not be called into question and leveled out, just as different interest rates are an expression of different strengths.

We have tightened the Stability and Growth Pact. Sanctions come into effect earlier. They are more effective. The pact now has much more bite. In this respect, we have initiated a trend reversal here.

Furthermore, the French President and I have proposed – we will also discuss this – that parliaments voluntarily commit to take into account any criticism expressed by the European Commission during the review of budgets in the context of the European Semester when implementing them in the national parliamentary process, and that all Euro member states commit to include a debt brake in their constitutions. The discussion on this is already in full swing. I find it absolutely remarkable that a country like Spain changed its constitution shortly before the elections to include such a debt brake.

We are tightening and improving European procedures. We complement and strengthen these through self-commitments, as I just mentioned. In doing so, we are making full use of the framework of the existing European treaties. The problems we face today must and can be solved within this framework. But I also say: We need more. It is my firm belief that we must go beyond this approach.

Moreover, it is also the case that when the international community looks at us in Europe, it wants to know how the development of the European Union will proceed in the medium term, because it needs assurances that the Eurozone stands together, improves its competitiveness, and strengthens the culture of stability.

Therefore, we will have to amend the European treaties. The Federal Foreign Minister advocated this on Saturday, and I did so on Sunday, in that we – this will also be reflected in the conclusions – ask the President of the Council to make proposals to us in December on how the culture of stability can be better anchored. This is not about a comprehensive reform of the Treaty of Lisbon – that would be too ambitious – nor is it about a further communitarization of large parts of economic and financial policy, but rather the next step is to create a way to take action against countries that repeatedly violate the Stability and Growth Pact and to really influence their violations of the Stability and Growth Pact.

Because – since there is murmuring here again – it is the case: It cannot be that common agreements in the Stability and Growth Pact are not adhered to – this has happened over 50 times. We now know that a non-compliance in one of the 17 member states – Greece is not the largest – can jeopardize the stability of the Euro as a whole. Therefore, violations of this culture of stability must be punished more severely, for example, through a right to sue at the European Court of Justice if a country persistently does not comply with the requirements.

I am very sure that the citizens of Germany, who rightly have many concerns, understand exactly this. They do not simply want more Europe, but they want more security for the culture of stability in Europe.

I believe that only when we create more Europe in this sense, when we further develop Europe, do we understand the political dimension of this crisis. Then we also understand that we must eliminate the structural weaknesses or deficiencies in the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union either now or not at all. If we eliminate them now, we will seize the opportunity of this crisis. Otherwise, we would fail.

I am well aware: An amendment to the treaty always carries risks. It is a laborious path. All 27 member states must agree. Nevertheless, it is the necessary and best way to prevent a division of the European Union into Euro and non-Euro states. If we fail to do this, then the necessity will arise for the Euro states to conclude binding contracts among themselves. I do not want that. I would not find it reasonable, because many countries still want to join the Euro. Therefore, one must be willing to take this path.

Since we are in such an existential crisis in Europe, I ask: Where is it written that a treaty amendment must always take a decade? Who in the world will consider us capable of action if we stand up and say: "According to the Lisbon Treaty, there can never be another amendment"? The whole world is changing, so Europe must also be ready for change.

Just as we managed to achieve a Two-plus-Four Treaty in six months in connection with German reunification, it should also be possible – the Euro should be worth that much to us – for us to jointly consider treaty amendments.

In light of the dimensions of combating the crisis, it should not be forgotten: It arose significantly due to too little regulation. Therefore, regulating the financial markets remains one of the major tasks that is far from completed.

That is why the European Council also addressed this again on Sunday and emphasized that important proposals for regulating derivatives, deposit insurance, and capital requirements for banks must now be adopted swiftly. In this context, I would like to emphasize once again that the Federal Government is committed to the introduction of a financial transaction tax, initially at the G20 summit in Cannes in the coming days. We are also grateful that the European Commission has put forward a proposal for this. The finance ministers will discuss this proposal at the beginning of November, and Germany will do everything to ensure that this proposal from the European Commission is a success.

However, it is also true that many questions require not only a national or European answer but global answers. The G20 is the appropriate forum for this. The G20 represents two-thirds of the world’s population and 80 percent of the world’s economic power. Therefore, the starting point of the G20 discussions was also a better global regulation of the financial markets.

One can say: We have achieved quite a bit. An important step will now be taken in Cannes: Systemically important banks will no longer be treated as they were during the crisis, where ultimately the taxpayer had to step in. "Too big to fail" no longer exists, and an international restructuring process for systemic banks will be agreed upon, as we have already proposed in Germany with the restructuring law for banks. It took a long time, but it is good that we can now decide this in Cannes.

At the same time, we will mandate that what applies to banks must also apply to "shadow banks," such as hedge funds; because they also pose a systemic risk to the financial markets. This mandate will be addressed next by the so-called Financial Stability Board.

In Europe, we have already regulated hedge funds. But globally, this has not yet been done to an adequate extent. Therefore, the issue of tax havens must also be back on the table; because we had initially set out as the G20 that every instrument, every place, and every actor would be subject to regulation. It is not enough for us to do this nationally or in Europe; it must happen globally. However, I also say: With individual measures in Germany, such as the ban on short selling, we have had good experiences; because now the whole issue is at least being discussed in Europe. Now we must push it forward globally.

What is also very important is: The G20 will only work if new decisions are not made every year. Last year in Toronto, we committed that all industrialized countries would halve their budget deficits by 2013. Germany will achieve this, but not all industrialized countries in the G20 will. I do not believe in making decisions every year based on the economic situation that fit at the time. Rather, I believe that the G20 has the obligation to stick to what has been decided on a long path and to counteract the causes of many of the difficulties. Debt exists not only in Europe, but also in other parts of the world, such as Japan or the United States of America. Therefore, I believe: It is not enough for us to just admonish each other; rather, it is primarily about us acting together.

Anyone who is out and about in the country these days and speaks with citizens, who follows the demonstrations in New York, Brussels, Frankfurt, or Berlin, knows how much the debt crisis moves people. I say: I have great understanding for that. The situation is very serious. Overcoming the crisis requires perseverance. We are all entering uncharted territory. I have outlined the causes of the crisis. They are complex. There will not be simple solutions, a single dramatic event. The issues will occupy us for years to come.

You have the documents today with details on maximizing the lending capacity of the EFSF, which can currently be presented to the best of our knowledge and belief. In the public debate about this maximization, there has been much talk of a greater default and liability risk that Germany may incur with the maximization of the EFSF. Whether that will be the case can ultimately not be conclusively assessed by anyone. But I explicitly say: We cannot rule it out. Therefore, it is right and good that we have anchored this in our resolution proposal.

I want to talk about this because we are at a point where we, who all bear political responsibility, must answer a simple political question. It is: How do we deal with risks in a situation like the one we have now? In other words: When do we consider risks to be acceptable? Can we consider the risk we are taking with the maximization of the EFSF to be acceptable or not? That is the concrete question today. If I consider the risk to be unacceptable, then I must not take it. But if I consider it acceptable after weighing all the arguments for and against, then I must take the risk. That is exactly what distinguishes political action and sets it apart from other actions.

Regarding the maximization of the EFSF, we can state:

First:

The German share remains at 211 billion euros.

Second:

Contracts will not be broken.

Third:

We are the economically strongest nation. But – I also say this – we are not the center of the world. The world is watching Europe and Germany. It is watching whether we are ready and able to take responsibility in the hour of Europe’s greatest crisis since the end of World War II.

Fourth:

The potential default and liability risk is countered by the economic gain that Germany, more than any other country, derives from the Euro.

Fifth:

My conclusion is therefore: The risk associated with the now intended maximization of the EFSF is acceptable. I even go a step further: It would not be acceptable and not responsible to not take the risk. After examining all possibilities, I do not have a better alternative, a more reasonable alternative.

Dear colleagues, I thank you for your previous support and critical accompaniment on our path to protect and strengthen the Euro. It is a personal concern of mine to find solutions for the benefit of our country in close coordination with the German Bundestag – with government and opposition factions.

I am convinced: With our comprehensive approach, as I have outlined, to address the acute crisis on the one hand and to make wise provisions for the future on the other hand, we will succeed in making the Economic and Monetary Union a stability union again. I tell our citizens: What is good for Europe is also good for Germany. This stands for half a century of peace and prosperity in Germany and in Europe.

Allow me, in light of the situation – not only the economic situation due to the debt crisis but also the political situation in individual states in Europe – to conclude with a personal word. No one should believe that another half-century of peace and prosperity in Europe is a given. It is not. Therefore, I say: If the Euro fails, Europe fails. That must not happen.

We have a historical obligation to defend and protect the unification project of Europe, which our ancestors set in motion over 50 years ago after centuries of hatred and bloodshed, with all the responsible means at our disposal. The consequences, if we fail to do so, are beyond anyone's foresight. It must not happen – that is my deep conviction – that it can later be said that the political generation that bore political responsibility in Europe in the second decade of the 21st century failed before history.

I find the political signal that the German Bundestag is sending today with a joint motion from CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen to the people in Germany, across Europe, and to the world all the more valuable. It conveys a message that goes far beyond the financial statements of the motion. It sends the message that Germany, across party lines, is committed to protecting the European unification project and stands together for this goal. I thank everyone who has contributed to this. You can be sure that I will carry this message with me to Brussels for the not easy negotiations today.