Government statement by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel on the situation in the financial markets before the German Bundestag on October 7, 2008, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

7 October 2008 · Government statement before the German Bundestag · German Bundestag, Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the German Bundestag on October 7, 2008, delivering a government statement on the international financial market crisis and Germany's emergency response measures.
Main themes
Global financial market crisis, crisis management, trust in financial markets, Hypo Real Estate rescue, European coordination, financial sector regulation, manager accountability, mortgage market collapse, liquidity provision, systemic risk, accounting rule reform, G8 European summit response
Duration
~20 min
66th percentile
Words
2,399
66th percentile
Sentences
140
78th percentile
Readability
48
58th percentile
Grade
10.8
30th percentile
Syntax
2.91
35th percentile
Vocabulary
2.11
28th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 69%69%
  • Institutional 17%17%
  • Ceremonial 9%9%
  • Geopolitical 3%3%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 0%

140 sentences in 52 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen!

The situation on the international financial markets is serious. It has never been like this before. It calls into question many things that were taken for granted. It confirms some of what is associated with greed, irresponsible speculation, and mismanagement in the financial sector.

Today is not the time to paint a bleak picture of the situation. But it is certainly not the time to sugarcoat it either. It is the time to achieve two things: on the one hand, to think, assess, and then decide very short-term, that is, to perform classic crisis management, as the federal government has done and is doing with the rescue plan for Hypo Real Estate, and to which we must always be ready to respond. On the other hand, it is the time to think, assess, and decide beyond the immediate day, that is, to develop a new system for the cooperation of all actors in the financial sector, to shape a future perspective and to act preventively.

Both, the classic crisis management from day to day as well as the development of a future perspective beyond the immediate day, are being carried out by the federal government. I would like to thank those in Parliament who have been helpful in this regard for their support and also for the spirit in which we have informed the factions so far.

What was at the beginning? In the United States, for years, irresponsible mortgage loans were granted to bank customers who had no prospect of normal repayment of the loan. All parties relied on constantly rising real estate prices and low interest rates. The risks from these loans were resold, repackaged, and spread worldwide, thus becoming the seed of the global financial market crisis. Traditional investment banks with illustrious names disappeared from the market in the United States from one day to the next. The American mortgage crisis has now become a global financial market crisis. Trust—the most important currency of the financial markets—has been lost. Banks distrust each other and hardly grant loans to one another. Given the particularly close interconnections of the actors in the financial sector, even solid institutions are now affected by the financial market crisis, and Germany is not exempt from this.

In this situation, it is crucial to quickly and decisively regain trust in the functionality of the financial markets.

Short-term measures are necessary for this. What are these short-term measures about?

First,

in Germany, it was about saving Hypo Real Estate in an acute emergency. Doing nothing would have caused not only unforeseeable damage to the mortgage bond market but also, in a much deeper way, to the economy. All experts told us that this would create a "systemic risk," as it is called in technical language. Therefore, private banks and especially the federal government provided a guarantee. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Budget Committee, which has accompanied this process very well. However, I want to point out that we have also emphasized in connection with this guarantee that a fee can be charged for it. This means that this institution does not simply receive money from the state for free.

So it was about covering the liquidity needs of HRE. When previously unknown liquidity needs arose again over the weekend, we had to begin renegotiations, which, however, could end in such a way that the guarantee framework given last week did not have to be exceeded. This was successful because the Bundesbank was very helpful in this regard.

We then insisted—again together with others—that the management of HRE be replaced.

This has happened today. We believe this is the necessary prerequisite for trust in this institution to be restored. We are counting on this succeeding.

I want to point out at this point: We discussed in the Cabinet today that there are indeed legal grounds in Germany to hold managers and supervisory boards liable. However, we note that these legal regulations are hardly used at all. I believe we should all look at how we can ensure that they are used better, or how we can change the laws so that they can be used. I also consider this absolutely necessary.

We have

secondly

held a meeting of the European members of the G8 group with the President of the ECB and Jean-Claude Juncker on Saturday as part of acute crisis management. We found agreement that the European Central Bank provides liquidity in sufficient amounts. This is extremely important in these times.

We agreed in Paris thirdly that the accounting rules should be aligned with those of the American standards. This is one of the most important measures for our banking institutions, especially in Germany.

At the moment, we do not have fair competition between the American sector and the European one. It will now be a matter of—because we are talking about days and not months—not proceeding through the normal legislative process—directive, European Parliament, national implementation—but finding a way for the European states to apply this quickly. I thank the Finance Minister for already beginning efforts in this regard.

Fourthly,

we know that we are operating in a European internal market. Of course, the question arises as to how national actions can be coordinated with European ones. I want to say which paths, in my view, are not suitable. The Irish way, which involves uncoordinatedly placing one's own banking institutions under a protective umbrella while excluding other international institutions that have also paid taxes in Ireland from this umbrella, is not suitable and would naturally cause competitive distortions that I consider unacceptable in the internal market.

From a German perspective, another unacceptable path is for 27 member states to create a protective umbrella and for everyone to contribute to a fund, only to then manage the corresponding crisis management in the respective member states with 27 states. I believe this is not conducive to the ability to act quickly. Therefore, we reject this path.

However, we certainly need a coherent, a joint approach. Therefore, it was an important message from the Ecofin Council that all member states commit to supporting financial institutions that can pose systemic risks if they get into trouble, both in their respective member states and beyond. We must be able to rely on this in Europe. That is why we did it with HRE, that is why France and Belgium did it with Dexia, that is why the Benelux countries did it with Fortis; I could also cite British examples. This is reliability in Europe that we urgently need.

Fifth:

In connection with the meeting in Paris, the Commission stated that it wants to fully and flexibly exploit the leeway in the state aid procedures— for example, when state banks receive support. I believe this is a very important signal in this context.

All these measures are not aimed at saving institutions for their own sake—therefore, there are no blank checks—or at protecting managers who have made mistakes. No, all these measures serve the functioning of our economy and, above all, the citizens in our country.

This also includes the statement made on Sunday by the Federal Minister of Finance and myself on behalf of the federal government that no saver needs to fear for their deposits. I want to reiterate: This statement stands.

It is about nothing more and nothing less than trust in our economic and social order. The social market economy—this is my firm conviction—is the best economic and social model there is.

Like every crisis, this crisis in the financial sector also offers an opportunity. It offers the chance for everyone within and outside Germany to recognize the international dimension of the social market economy, to learn to understand it, and to claim the right to shape it. We fought for this during our G8 presidency, specifically at the summit in Heiligendamm. At that time—this must be said in retrospect—it was in vain; now, however, even the last person recognizes how necessary it would have been back then to propose and implement measures. Therefore, the same proposals—of course, expanded—are part of the long-term strategy of the federal government for shaping the social market economy in its international dimension.

We know—therefore we cannot act only nationally—that coordinated European and international action is required for this. We have emphasized this repeatedly, for example, in the transparency initiative represented by the finance ministers and the heads of state and government.

In September, together with the French President, we established all European and international positions for solving the problems in a joint declaration of Germany and France, and then specified them in a meeting with the British Prime Minister and the Italian Prime Minister.

We have advocated for measures in the international arena. In doing so, we particularly refer to what has been developed by the finance ministers: the proposals that the Financial Stability Forum presented to the G7 finance ministers in April 2008, who were somewhat involved in the drafting. From this, the corresponding goals arise.

It is about improving liquidity management. It is about the treatment of off-balance-sheet risks; we have painfully experienced the consequences of this with IKB. It is about the valuation of illiquid assets. It is about transparency rules in the financial markets, and it is about dealing with ratings.

The G8 heads of state and government received and approved a progress report from the Forum in July 2008. However, I must say: Even in the summer, the enthusiasm for these rules—at least at the level of heads of state and government—was not as great as it should have been.

However, we can state that there have already been initial and significant progress in implementation. Numerous other proposals from the Forum are to be realized by the end of 2008. The Federal Minister of Finance will travel to America in the coming days and, of course, continue this discussion. The federal government will therefore be at the forefront of those demanding such regulations.

By the end of 2008, comparable work must be completed at the European level. This includes, in particular, the new regulation of rating agencies; because they have a significant share in the false ratings we are currently experiencing.

It is essential to ensure that the financial system itself sets the right incentives. We need financial markets and adequate mechanisms that consist not only of regulations but also of incentives. These incentives must be set in such a way that a one-sided focus of banks on short-term corporate strategies is prevented.

One cause of the crisis was that loans were granted that were not due for years. However, the bonus payments were already distributed after one year, without knowing whether there would even be a payment for this product after its trial period. This is unacceptable and must not be the case.

As a result, the long-term corporate success, and not the short-term strategy, should be the decisive criterion for the remuneration of managers.

I am confident that through the implementation of the Forum's recommendations, the proposals of the European Union, and the establishment of the right incentive structures, the foundation will be laid so that a comparable crisis cannot arise in the future. This means that we will have an architecture in which such mistakes are prohibited.

In this situation, we must critically question whether the banking supervision has fulfilled its tasks.

We need forward-looking supervision that recognizes developing misdevelopments in a timely manner and then also acts. For this, structures must be reviewed and improved if necessary.

This applies to the national level, but of course also to the European and international levels.

Therefore, the federal government will consider—regarding the national level—whether the interplay between BaFin and the Bundesbank can be made even more efficient. It must also be ensured that the internal decision-making structures allow for quick reactions. We should not make hasty decisions at this point, but we should work consistently on this issue.

This crisis offers the opportunity to better understand that on the one hand, freedom and on the other hand, order are not opposites, but that they belong together in the social market economy. We want the humane social market economy. This is a market economy that serves people and the individual.

There is truly nothing to sugarcoat. The situation offers no reason for that. The long-term effects of the financial market crisis are still not foreseeable today. This also applies to the effects on our growth and our country. We are an export-oriented economy. We must deal with rising energy and food prices.

However, I also say in this difficult hour: Germany is strong.

Germany has positioned itself very well in recent years. Many have contributed to this. Germany is equipped for global competition. I am firmly convinced that this will help us to master the consequences of the financial market crisis, even if it will not be easy.

The reform course of the federal government was and is essential for this, and it is paying off. This includes budget consolidation, the reduction of labor additional costs, responses to the demographic changes in our society – I would like to remind you of the pension at 67 – and consistent investments in education and innovation. I believe that the results of the coalition committee meeting last week are further evidence of this.

I explicitly state: Especially in this situation, we will continue on this path consistently. It would be the worst possible signal to deviate from the course now. The goal is to restore trust, to strengthen trust; for trust is the currency in which we are paid. I believe that each of us – we in this house, but above all the actors in the country – can contribute to restoring trust.

The federal government is determined to pursue this path calmly and thoughtfully, but with all resolve.

Let me conclude with one thing: In these days of crisis, there are many who are working to the limit of their capacity. I would like to once again express my gratitude to all those at the end of this government statement.

Whether it is in banking supervision, in the ministries, or partly also in the private banks – we need actors who are committed to our country. It is good that they exist. That is why I am also optimistic that we can continue on this path.