Government statement by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel to the European Council on October 18/19, 2012, in Brussels before the German Bundestag on October 18, 2012, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

18 October 2012 · European Council · Brussels, Belgium

Context
Merkel addressed the German Bundestag on October 18, 2012, ahead of the European Council summit in Brussels, outlining Germany's position on the eurozone crisis.
Main themes
Eurozone crisis, European Union Nobel Peace Prize, euro stability and reform, Greece economic situation, European integration, competitiveness and debt, EU structural reforms, banking crisis, European solidarity, euro area governance
Duration
~46 min
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Words
5,528
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Sentences
261
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Readability
51
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Grade
11.3
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Syntax
2.98
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Vocabulary
2.05
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Translated from German

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  • Economic 47%46%
  • Institutional 33%32%
  • Geopolitical 10%9%
  • Social 6%6%
  • Ceremonial 3%3%
  • Technological 1%1%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

261 sentences in 74 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen!

In the midst of the most severe crisis since the adoption of the Rome Treaties 55 years ago, in the midst of the greatest test that we Europeans have had to face since then, it is precisely at this time that one of the most significant awards in the world was presented to the European Union last Friday in the capital of a European country that is not itself a member of the European Union.

Little, I believe, makes the drama of the current situation in Europe so clear in one fell swoop as the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize 2012 to the European Union. Little compels us so much to be aware of the magnitude of the task facing our political generation as this decision in Oslo last Friday. I believe this is a wonderful decision, and that is because the Nobel Committee awarded the Peace Prize not in years of European triumphs and moments of happiness – for example, in 1990 after the fall of the Iron Curtain or in 2004 after the eastward expansion of the European Union – but now.

In times of crisis, this decision is far more than just an acknowledgment. It is much more than a reminder of the starting point of the idea of European unification after centuries of killing and dying on European battlefields. This decision is significant because it comes precisely now. For it is to be understood as a warning. Moreover, it is an incentive and a commitment, and indeed for all of us in Europe, to separate the important from the unimportant and to continually see the core of the test in which we are visibly situated.

This core of our test can be expressed in a simple sentence: The euro, for whose strength we are currently struggling with many instruments and measures, is far more than a currency; the euro symbolically stands for the economic, social, and political unification of Europe – with great impact far beyond Europe.

That is why overcoming the crisis in the euro area has determined the agenda of all G8 meetings, all G20 meetings, and almost all European Councils of heads of state and government for almost three years now. Since the beginning of 2010, we have had ten councils alone. Even today and tomorrow, at the eleventh European Council of heads of state and government, it will be no different.

It cannot be said often enough: The problems we are dealing with, the problems we are struggling with, did not arise overnight. Therefore, they cannot be solved overnight either. They are due to a lack of competitiveness, to the over-indebtedness of individual member states, as well as to foundational flaws of the euro.

We are venturing into uncharted territory in solving these problems. There has not been and there is not a solution, the one breakthrough that would have eliminated the crisis in one fell swoop. The summit today and tomorrow will not be the last one addressing the overcoming of the crisis in the euro area. More will follow; for strengthening the euro is a process of successive steps and measures. Some progress has already been made. In these three years of crisis, we have achieved far more than in many years before in Europe.

We can already clearly see the contours of a stability union. Many member states are undergoing tough reforms and adjustment programs to get a grip on their specific problems – these are state and foreign debt, banking crises, and loss of competitiveness.

This also applies to Greece. I was able to personally verify this during my visit to Athens last week. The Greek Prime Minister Samaras will provide us with an interim report on the status of his negotiations with the Troika at the Council.

There is no doubt: The situation in Greece is anything but simple. Many things are progressing too slowly. Measures that should have been implemented long ago are still in the works. The recession is much stronger than expected. Structural changes are often carried out at a snail's pace. The administration is inadequate in many areas, and fraud and corruption have still not been completely contained.

I can well understand why the vast majority of Greek citizens react with anger to the fact that wealthy Greeks do not want to contribute to solving the problems of their country. In light of this, it is absolutely humanly understandable why so many Greeks find it difficult to realize that the majority of the problems originated at home and therefore can only be solved at home.

But, dear colleagues, that is only one side of the coin. I also saw the other side of the coin during my visit. In Athens, in the Greek government, among many in the economy and society, I experience a serious will for change, the will to do their homework in order to lead the country to a better future and to remain a member of the euro area.

I would like to mention our colleague Hans-Joachim Fuchtel as an example, who, as the German representative for the German-Greek Assembly, along with many Greeks and many Germans, is making an tireless contribution to rebuilding the community from the ground up. That is the path we must of course pursue in parallel. I would therefore like to say thank you. In Greece, he is called – he told me – "Fuchtelos." I think that is a beautiful name for his work.

Because it is so – we know one side of the coin, and we know the other side of the coin – I cannot and will not preempt the report of the Troika here and today. But I repeat what I have already said elsewhere, during the visit of the Greek Prime Minister as well as during my visit to Athens: I wish for Greece to remain in the euro area. I wish for this not only because Greece is our friend and partner in the European Union as well as in NATO, but also because this is still, despite all difficulties, in the interest of Greece itself as well as of the euro zone and the European Union as a whole. That is the attitude with which I, with which the Federal Government, with which we should await the report of the Troika; we should not judge beforehand, but rather look at the results.

Greece must adhere to the agreed measures to which the country has committed itself. In my discussions with Prime Minister Samaras in Athens and again yesterday on the sidelines of the EPP summit in Bucharest, I felt the serious will to achieve this and thus to meet the obligations. As soon as the Troika report is available, decisions regarding the disbursement of the next tranche will have to be made here in the German Bundestag, nowhere else, and we will discuss that together.

At the Council, Spanish Prime Minister Rajoy will also inform us about the situation in his country. The report on the recapitalization of the banks – we have been following that – is now available. Whether and to what extent Spain needs further assistance from the ESM is solely – I have made this clear in all discussions with the Spanish Prime Minister – Spain's decision. The conditions for aid applications are clearly defined by the guidelines of the ESM; they have also been approved by the German Bundestag.

We know that the people in Spain, Greece, and the other affected member states are being asked to bear an extraordinary burden. The very tough reform measures naturally mean many cuts for many citizens in these countries. But we also see that there are results: In Ireland, in Portugal, in Spain, but also in Greece, labor costs have fallen significantly. This is an important factor for improving competitiveness. We also see this in all countries in industrial production, which is beginning to grow again in part. Deficits in current accounts are decreasing, as are deficits in budgets. One can say that these countries are moving in the right direction in many factors. But this path of reform is certainly far from over, and it must continue. That means we can say: A start has been made. We must not stop halfway. Because sustainable consolidation and growth are interdependent, both must be pursued equally.

At this point, I would like to say once again: Of course, we know that growth must emerge again. Of course, we know that growth is not an end in itself, but that it is about employment in these countries. Of course, we know that around 50 percent of young people in Spain, Greece, and also in other countries – that is a very high percentage – are currently unemployed. But we know from our own experience that only through labor market reforms, structural reforms, and sound budgets can employment be created again. That is not a mystery. Growth arises from entrepreneurial activity, entrepreneurial activity arises from the necessary flexibility, and we must create that again in Europe. That is the key.

That is why we have also developed the Pact for Growth and Employment in the European Union, parallel to all the programs that have been drawn up for the countries and to all the proposals made by the European Commission. That is why we have also agreed in this house, after long discussions, that this Pact for Growth and Employment, alongside the Fiscal Pact, is an important step in solving the problems of the European Union.

I also say: Despite all the differences we have here in this house: At the crucial points, we have always managed to come together. I would like to thank you for making that possible, and not because the differences are to be concealed – that is not the point at all – but because the great majority of this house fortunately sets aside such differences for the sake of Europe and says: What is good for Europe, we will do together.

The contours of a stability union are also becoming apparent because we now have permanent instruments for crisis management. More than two years ago, the Christian-Liberal coalition advocated the establishment of a permanent crisis management mechanism. We knew that the EFSF would expire in 2013, and therefore we advocated for such a permanent rescue umbrella in good time – because we knew that difficult legal questions needed to be clarified.

Now I can say: We have it today. It has been adopted. It is a permanent instrument for crisis management. I would like to think back two years. If we had asked back then: "Who in Europe is in favor of this?", one would have said: It is never going to happen.

Only because Germany has taken the lead in many areas are we today in Europe where we are, namely that we have, for example, a permanent crisis management instrument.

We have also said from the very beginning – and this is the measure of our actions – that solidarity on the one hand within the framework of the ESM goes hand in hand with conditions and requirements for the respective member states. Under this condition, we have always acted in solidarity and will continue to do so in the future.

However, of particular importance for a future stability union is undoubtedly the strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact. We have equipped it last year in such a way that imbalances in individual member states will no longer jeopardize the stability of the euro as a whole in the future. You know this – in quotation marks, expressed in a very people-friendly way – as the "Six-Pack."

But that is certainly not enough to create the necessary binding nature and thus also new credibility. It is always fundamentally about binding nature and credibility. For at its core, the European sovereign debt crisis is a crisis of trust, a crisis of trust in the euro.

That is why we have also adopted the Fiscal Treaty alongside the ESM. It requires each member state to introduce a debt brake, and the introduction of this debt brake can then be reviewed by the European Court of Justice. Ten member states have already ratified this Fiscal Treaty – just a few days ago, France as well – and I am therefore very optimistic that this Fiscal Treaty can come into force at the beginning of 2013. Furthermore, it will then be the case that only those who have ratified this Fiscal Treaty can receive assistance from the ESM. This shows the connection between these two measures.

So we have instruments for crisis management. We have reforms in the individual member states. We have strengthened the Stability and Growth Pact. But that does not mean that the construction flaws of the Economic and Monetary Union as a whole have been eliminated. We need more. Therefore, at the last Council in June, the presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the Eurogroup, and the European Central Bank presented proposals for the further development of the Economic and Monetary Union, and consultations have since taken place with the member states specifically on this.

An ambitious goal guides us: We want to decide – and that in December – how we want to further develop the monetary union. I say: This further development is indispensable, and it is a prerequisite for regaining trust and credibility in connection with the monetary union. I say: Only in this way can we overcome the crisis of confidence.

Today and tomorrow, at the European Council, it will not be about making concrete decisions, but it must be about setting the course for December, laying the groundwork for the decisions, asking the right questions, and distributing tasks on how we can solve these questions by December.

It is clear to me: The renewed economic and monetary union should be supported by four strong pillars:

firstly, by more common financial market policy,

secondly, by more common fiscal policy,

thirdly, by more common economic policy, and fourthly, by a strengthened democratic legitimacy and control.

On the first point: more common financial market policy. The global financial crisis has dramatically shown us that an inadequately regulated banking market can bring entire states to the brink of disaster. To prevent something like this in the future, strong financial market regulation is necessary both at home and in Europe as well as globally. We have already made progress step by step in Europe to find the necessary regulations. This is not the place for me to discuss it today. But it is extremely encouraging – this is a step forward compared to June – that finally eleven states have agreed to introduce the financial transaction tax, and that is good news; because many here in this house have fought for it.

However, for more common financial market policy, we also need a common banking supervision that is efficient and independent of national influences. The European Central Bank should play a central role in this. The European Commission presented us with a proposal for this banking supervision in September. It is now being discussed. We are committed to advancing the work on this basis swiftly. This is primarily also a task for the finance ministers. However, I say at this point: Quality must take precedence over speed; because if we end up with something that is not better than all the existing supervisory bodies, then we can save ourselves the work. We will insist on this in the discussions.

We have agreed that the Commission's proposals should be reviewed by the end of the year. The finance ministers are working, as I said, with great urgency. Then the European Parliament must deal with the draft. The President of the European Parliament has himself said: The European Parliament will not be able to make final decisions on this this year.

I tell you: There are a multitude of complicated legal questions. I do not make the topic more difficult than it is. Just ask countries that are not part of the Eurozone but have banks together with countries that are part of the Eurozone how the banking supervision should be regulated in terms of the ECB's accountability. Please ask how the monetary policy responsibility of the ECB is to be clearly separated from the supervisory responsibility. These questions must be well resolved. Germany will contribute with all its energy; that is not our problem. But the result must be such that credibility is improved and we do not end up in a worse position than today.

The establishment of an effective supervisory mechanism is then the prerequisite for a later decision on a direct bank recapitalization by the ESM. I want to make it very clear here: The mere completion of the legislative process for a banking supervision is not enough; rather, this banking supervision must be operational, it must be able to act effectively. Because here we are talking about the ESM one day recapitalizing banks in countries where we then have to intervene and for which we have to make decisions. That is the point. Therefore, this is a complicated but feasible task to which we are fully committed.

This brings us to the second pillar of a renewed economic and monetary union: that is more common fiscal policy. In strengthening budgetary discipline, we have made quite a good deal of progress recently with the Fiscal Compact. But we believe – I say this for the entire federal government – that we could go a step further here by granting the European level real intervention rights over national budgets where the agreed limits of the Stability and Growth Pact are not adhered to. I know: Many member states are still not showing the willingness to do this. But I also say: unfortunately.

However, this does not change the fact that we will continue to advocate for it. At the very moment we have such a mechanism that a budget could be declared invalid and this could also be reviewed by the European Court of Justice, we would be at the point where we would naturally need someone in the Commission who has the authority to do this. In this case, that would be the Commissioner for Economic Affairs. I am already surprised: As soon as someone makes a progressive proposal, gives an idea of how we can achieve more binding commitments, more credibility, the outcry comes immediately: That is not possible, Germany is isolated, we will never achieve this. That is not how we build a credible Europe. We should not dismiss all proposals immediately.

Instead of considering how we can achieve more binding commitments and more credibility, we are experiencing a permanent discussion about how we can achieve more common liability for state debts. The interim report of the four presidents also contains these elements again. I say: I consider this an economic dead end. Because we do not set the right incentives to develop in the right direction.

Now let us simply consider: Where would the democratic legitimacy lie if we were to decide on a common liability in Europe? The essential core of budgetary responsibility – this will remain so for a long time – is the budgets of the national states. As long as this is the case, for example, the French National Assembly would have to co-determine German state debt, just as the Bundestag would have to do so for French, Italian, or Spanish debt. This example already shows that it is practically impossible to first communalize liability in this area while still having national budgets. That will not work. That is not the structure we need. Therefore, we reject that.

However, we need – and this is the third pillar – more common economic policy. The former Commission President Jacques Delors already presented a report in 1989 when it came to the introduction of the economic and monetary union. In it, he stated very foresightedly – I quote –:

“A common currency requires a high degree of convergence in economic policies as well as in a number of other policy areas, especially in fiscal policy.”

The European sovereign debt crisis surrounding the Euro shows how insightful and correct Jacques Delors' analysis was.

The crisis shows us that misdevelopments in individual member states can indeed put the entire Euro in jeopardy. Therefore, we must now address the policy areas in which we need a high degree of convergence, in the spirit of Jacques Delors. We should identify these areas by December to then say: If we do not achieve more convergence here, we will have a problem in the future.

Where will stronger economic policy coordination be necessary? It will be particularly necessary where core areas of national sovereignty are affected: in labor market policy, in tax policy, that is, in many questions that are highly sensitive in national discussions. To believe that the only answer to this is to communalize all these policy areas now – that would be the classic logic of European integration – I believe leads us astray.

Of course, we can talk about minimum standards in taxes; we have been discussing this for ten, 15 years. I can only say: If we proceed in this way, we will not save the Euro, we will not improve the stability of our entire cooperation, but we will still be discussing with some countries for years and decades about how we should handle it.

Therefore, we propose a different path. We need solutions that create a meaningful balance between the necessary intervention rights of the European level to correct misconduct and violations of rules, and the right of self-determination and scope for action of the member states and their parliaments. We also need solutions that lead to binding and enforceable reform commitments of the member states without undermining national competencies, the principle of subsidiarity, or democratic procedures.

Therefore, we envision that the member states conclude binding reform agreements with the European level for this purpose, which then must be approved by the respective national parliaments. Then, so to speak, the democratic legitimacy is given that a nation-state commits to implementing certain things. To then give all member states the opportunity to really be able to implement these commitments to improve their competitiveness, I propose that we introduce a new element of solidarity, a fund from which, for a limited time and project-based, that is, not indefinitely, but entirely project-based, funds can be drawn. Because not all countries will be able to simultaneously achieve their budget consolidation and the necessary investments in future tasks.

I say: Yes, we need solidarity. But we need a form of solidarity that truly leads us to what we need, namely more competitiveness, more alignment of the competitiveness of the member states.

We have seen that unconditional financial payments, as they have occurred far too much with the structural funds and cohesion funds, have not only not helped but have also sometimes supported misdevelopments in the countries. We must draw the right lessons from this. Therefore, common liability is the wrong answer. Rather, we need a distinct solidarity.

I want to make it very clear that such a fund could, for example, be funded by the revenues from the financial transaction tax. This might even lead to more Euro member states introducing a financial transaction tax.

Regarding how the funds are spent, the Commission, together with the Council and the European Parliament, will, of course, oversee this based on the agreements made with the member states – that is quite clear – just as is the case with other payments in the European framework.

This should not be a closed shop – we did not do that with the Fiscal Compact either – but we explicitly say: All countries that may want to join the Euro tomorrow or the day after can participate in this fund if they are simultaneously willing to conclude binding agreements with the Commission regarding the improvement of their competitiveness.

Furthermore, the fourth point concerns the question of democratic legitimacy, which is of utmost importance. I have said several times that we need more cooperation in Europe to tackle this crisis, so more Europe rather than less. From my perspective, the path to a renewed economic and monetary union, a stability union that deserves that name, clearly leads in some areas to a strengthening of the role of the Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament, as well as the European Court of Justice.

This is also very important for the cohesion of the European Union; because of the 27 member states, 17 are in the Euro. The question keeps coming up: Do you want to exclude a part? Do you want a two-class society? I say: No, we do not want that. But if a part has specific problems in enhanced cooperation – and that is what the Euro is – then we cannot say: We will not solve these problems because not everyone is involved yet. – For this reason, there must be more democratic legitimacy and control, and this must go hand in hand with more integration.

Every decision – that is the principle – must be legitimized and controlled at the level at which it is made. This means that where the European level is strengthened, the European Parliament must also be strengthened. Where core national competencies are affected, democratic legitimacy can only come through the parliaments of the national states, meaning that we must decide there.

Now a word on the question: What happens when decisions need to be made at the European level that only affect the Eurozone? In many discussions with Members of the European Parliament, I have not heard: One should not consider whether perhaps only the parliamentarians from the Euro countries should vote. – There are a whole lot of interesting ideas about how to establish committees or conduct certain sessions to ensure that those who are not members of the Eurozone do not decide on matters that only concern the Eurozone. We need to discuss this. One cannot always say from the outset: That is not possible. That would create a two-class society. – This is not how Europe will move forward. We will face this discussion.

The goal of the European Council that begins today is to structure the further process in such a way that we can adopt a comprehensive package for the further development of the Economic and Monetary Union in December of this year, including a clear timeline. This applies to the Eurozone; but of course, as with the Fiscal Compact, everyone is invited. In the case of the Fiscal Compact, 25 member states are participating, although only 17 are in the Euro.

The sustainable stabilization and further development of the Economic and Monetary Union is the central political challenge of our time, and it is crucial for the future of the European Union as a whole. Therefore, I would like to sincerely thank everyone who contributes and makes proposals that move us forward: alongside Wolfgang Schäuble, especially Guido Westerwelle, who has been thinking about these issues with a number of foreign ministers.

You are grumbling, Mr. Gabriel, because you are not satisfied with all of this. I can only tell you: With the emphasis on what is not possible, and with the wrong methods of the past, we will not advance Europe. We only advance Europe by learning from the mistakes we made in the past. Only in this way can we move Europe forward.

Undoubtedly: The steps we must take now to achieve this goal will lead to a new quality in economic policy cooperation in the Eurozone and beyond. This new quality is, in our view, absolutely necessary. However – I want to address this openly here – it would be quite fatal – I can already sense this in some areas – if the fundamentally welcomed announcement by the European Central Bank to intervene in the secondary market without limits under clear conditions were to lead to a weakening of political efforts towards a stronger Economic and Monetary Union for exactly these reasons. That would be exactly the wrong response.

It must never be overlooked that in all the instruments we need to contain the crisis and that are available to us, it is not the crisis measures that will provide the solution in the end, but only a binding political architecture. Only in this way will we achieve a permanently stable Euro. This must be achieved through the renewal of the Economic and Monetary Union. Only then can we succeed in what has been our goal since the beginning of the crisis: Then Europe can emerge from the crisis stronger than it entered it, and then Europe will also be able to compete in the international arena in the future.

What is this European crisis of confidence really about? It is about building a stable, future-oriented architecture. But it is actually about the question of whether Europe can assert itself with its values and interests in the global competition of the 21st century; that also means whether Europe can maintain its prosperity, its standard of living, and its way of life.

This brings me back to the starting point of my considerations: to the overwhelming significance that the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union has for us in Europe. Yes, it is always also about never forgetting that the idea of European unification was a peace idea, the idea that the peoples of Europe would never again wage war against each other, which they have done for centuries, with incredible bloodshed and the sacrifice of many lives. But for today's youth, who know Europe only as a haven of peace and fortunately have never experienced a war, it is about whether we are able to prove that we can shape a good future based on what we have inherited. The good future is quite concrete: Can we create jobs for young people in Europe again? Can we ensure that prosperity is secured for the future? Can we ensure that people can rely on a good healthcare system and good retirement security? These are the things that distinguish Europe.

This year marks the 55th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome – I mentioned it at the beginning. When we celebrated the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome here in Berlin, we reflected on those early times. That was the year when Germany held the European presidency.

At the beginning of this presidency in 2007, I spoke in the European Parliament in Strasbourg. At that time, I already posed the question in my speech in the European Parliament in Strasbourg: How do regions around the world become successful? I referred to the American scholar Richard Florida, who says: Regions develop most successfully when three factors come together: technology, talent, and tolerance. – I believe that these three things define European strength: talent, technology, and tolerance. Because it is always the people who make scientific and technological progress possible.

It is the innovation on which Europe relies. Otherwise, we will not be able to maintain our prosperity. It is the economic and social progress and the social balance for which Europe stands like no other region on this earth. This is what we call the principle of the social market economy. It is the power of tolerance, the power of the rule of law, the ability to tolerate differing opinions and reconcile contradictions, and the will to enable freedom of the press and freedom of religion, in a word: "Democracy, freedom, and human rights," that have sustained Europe for more than six decades.

I am firmly convinced that tolerance enables us to make the best of Europe's unchanged diversity of languages and cultures, but with today’s shared values. Serving these values and goals and living them in everyday life, thus proving ourselves worthy of this sense of the prize of Alfred Nobel, is worth every effort and endeavor.

This will also be the spirit in which we will deliberate today and tomorrow in Brussels, where everyone beforehand says: The diversity is so great, Europe is divided, they will not make any progress. I tell you: We will make progress, and precisely in the sense I have described, because the values that unite us, values and goals with which Europe can also compete in the global competition of the 21st century, because we all, all heads of state and government of the European Union, all 27 member states, are committed to this spirit and because we truly share the common values.

We know that we live in freedom in Europe. We know that we have democracy in Europe. We know that one can also demonstrate in Europe when one visits another. But we also know: No one goes to prison for that unless they have become violent. That unites us; that is what we will work for. We want to be humane and successful, in peace and freedom.