Government statement by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel to the European Council on October 28/29, 2010, in Brussels and to the G20 Summit on November 11/12, 2010, in Seoul before the German Bundestag on ...

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

27 October 2010 · Government statement to the European Council (October 28/29, 2010, Brussels) and G20 Summit (November 11/12, 2010, Seoul), before the German Bundestag · German Bundestag, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the German Bundestag on October 27, 2010, ahead of the Brussels European Council and Seoul G20 Summit, outlining Germany's positions on eurozone stability and economic governance reform.
Main themes
Euro stability, European economic governance, Stability and Growth Pact reform, eurozone crisis management, German-French cooperation, EU budgetary rules, austerity and consolidation, German reunification anniversary, G20 summit preparation, sanctions mechanisms, future crisis prevention
Duration
~34 min
86th percentile
Words
4,104
86th percentile
Sentences
220
91st percentile
Readability
49
61st percentile
Grade
11.0
32nd percentile
Syntax
2.82
24th percentile
Vocabulary
2.11
28th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 58%55%
  • Institutional 19%18%
  • Geopolitical 13%13%
  • Ceremonial 5%5%
  • Environmental 3%3%
  • Social 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 5%

220 sentences in 60 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen!

Three and a half weeks ago, we celebrated the 20th anniversary of the reunification of Germany together. Together, we recalled the power of freedom that has made it possible for us to live in friendship with all our neighbors today. We are experiencing the happiest phase in German history. For this, we are infinitely grateful.

We will never forget that this happiness of our country is inseparable from the history of the European Union. With this awareness, our generation is making politics for our country and for Europe; for conversely, the European unification project is inconceivable without German participation. We should be aware of this not only on festive occasions and anniversaries but also in our political everyday life.

This means concretely: Our social and economic success is inextricably linked to European development. This makes it necessary for all member states to submit to common rules. For the misconduct of individuals can lead to upheavals for all; the crisis situation in Greece last spring and the Euro crisis have made this painfully clear to us. This crisis in Europe was existential. We have managed to get it under control, but that alone is not enough. Therefore, I say very clearly: My goal and the goal of the Federal Government as a whole is that the currency of Europe, the Euro, is permanently stable. This has determined my actions in the spring, and it determines our actions today.

In my government statement on May 19, I said here – I may repeat this:

"We must

achieve two things

: the management of the acute crisis situation on the one hand and the precaution for the future on the other."

Today we can state: We have made great progress in managing the current crisis, especially thanks to the ambitious reforms and austerity measures that Greece, but also other countries, have undertaken.

We insisted – as you will remember – on reforms and austerity measures against great resistance from this house as well as from Europe. Today, everyone knows that the government's course was the only right one.

At that time, I demanded: We need a culture of stability throughout Europe. Today I can state: Almost all EU countries have joined our vigorous consolidation course. This course was and is indispensable and must be continued under all circumstances; for still – that is the truth – it is not certain that Europe will really emerge from this crisis permanently strengthened. It is still not certain that we will actually make provisions for the future. Further decisive steps are still pending. We must take these steps, and not at some point in the future when Europe is once again in dire straits, but now. I am firmly determined to do so.

The European Council tomorrow and the day after is of utmost importance. We must draw the right lessons from the crisis, prevent new crises from arising, and establish the economic and monetary union on a stable foundation in the long term. Germany and France took joint leadership on the way to this goal last week. It is true: A German-French agreement is not everything in Europe. But it is also true: Without a German-French agreement, much will come to nothing. This applies in this case as well.

Therefore, it is of great importance that Germany and France agree on some crucial points:

firstly

that we want to tighten the stability rules in the monetary union in order to respond more quickly to irresponsible behavior by individual member states, and secondly that we want to make provisions now for possible future crisis situations in order to secure the stability of the Eurozone in the long term.

Regarding the

first

focus, namely the tightening of budgetary and economic policy monitoring in Europe to prevent future crisis situations as much as possible: We want to adopt the final report of the working group chaired by the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, at tomorrow's European Council. Germany pushed for the establishment of this group in March 2010; we did this together. Germany, through the excellent work of Finance Minister Schäuble, has shaped the discussions with important proposals, and Germany ensured that the agreement with France paved the way for a consensus in the group as a whole. I say very clearly: The result is impressive. It is already certain today: The Stability and Growth Pact will have significantly more bite to prevent a stability-threatening policy by individual Euro states.

I want to name three examples of this:

First:

Sanctions will be imposed earlier and faster in the future. They will come into effect much sooner than before, namely preventively, in cases of serious misdevelopments even before a member state violates the deficit limit of three percent. This does not exist today at all. This is completely new. The sanctions will be automated, both in the so-called preventive arm, which I just mentioned, and in the deficit procedure itself. This means that a sanction will occur unless the Council objects with a qualified majority. This will significantly reduce the political hurdles for sanctions. This is also what the European Commission understands by automatic sanctions.

Second:

From now on, the debt level will play a prominent role. Until now, member states only had to pay attention to the deficit limit of three percent. No one had to fear a procedure solely because of a debt level exceeding 60 percent. In the future, the rule will be: If a member state has a debt level over 60 percent, a deficit procedure will be initiated if the member state does not sufficiently reduce the debt level. This is a significant advancement; for the greatest dangers to the stability of the Eurozone come from exorbitantly high debt levels of some member states. A deficit below three percent is unfortunately no guarantee that the debt level will not completely spiral out of control in times of weak growth. This is exactly what is now being changed.

Thirdly,

we will – this is also an expression of the fact that we will work as an economic government in the Council in the future – no longer stand by when member states undermine their own competitiveness through misguided policies. There will be sanctions in the future – this is a completely new approach – because the crisis has shown: Massive structural problems can arise from misguided economic policy.

The finance ministers and the European Commission have reached a consensus on these measures in the Van Rompuy working group. With them, we are tightening the stability rules of the economic and monetary union. With them, we want to prevent new crises from arising at all. However, with them alone, we are still not at our goal; for even with the strictest stability rules, we cannot completely rule out that one day there will be an extreme crisis that threatens the stability of the Eurozone as a whole.

If that is the case, then we must face the facts. In this case, there can only be one consequence, which brings me to my second focus: We must make provisions today to manage future crisis situations. For this, we need – this is the conviction of the Federal Government and the coalition factions – a new, robust crisis management framework for emergencies. Only in this way can we secure the stability of the Eurozone in the long term.

This cannot be just any crisis management framework. A new word alone is of little help. Rather, the new crisis management framework must be legally unassailable, that is to say without ifs and buts, clear and straightforward: This will only succeed with a change to the European treaties. We need this change. We have already come so far that Germany and France agree on this. Many, if not almost all of you, would have considered this impossible just half a year ago.

But we have come this far. Germany and France are in agreement on this. With this, we have achieved a first major step. We must now, of course, follow this with a second step. This involves an agreement across Europe on the necessity of treaty changes. I have no illusions about this. Enforcing it will be difficult enough. However, that does not make it any less necessary, and I mean in the literal sense of the word "necessary."

Why? The answer is obvious. We must tackle this now because the current rescue umbrella, which arose from an unexpected emergency situation, is only provisional. It will expire in 2013. We wanted and decided it that way. A simple extension cannot and will not happen with Germany because the rescue umbrella is not suitable as a long-term instrument, because it sends false signals to markets and member states, and because it fosters a dangerous expectation. It fosters the expectation that Germany and other member states, and thus also the taxpayers of these countries, will somehow step in during a crisis and take on the risk of investors.

This was unavoidable for averting the acute crisis this year. However, it has little to do with real precautionary policy. Therefore, we must change this. The current rescue umbrella must not be the reference case for the future. Instead, we need a mechanism in which private creditors are also involved in a transparent, comprehensible process. This demand is not new. We already raised it together in this esteemed house in May. At that time, Germany was still largely alone in Europe with this. After the meeting in Deauville, France now also supports our concern.

Let me make one thing very clear at this point, so there are no misunderstandings: In the future, taking appropriate coordinated bilateral measures can only be an ultima ratio, that is to say a last resort, with which member states can secure financial stability in the Euro area as a whole. France and Germany are also calling for another measure, namely to be able to suspend the voting rights of the affected member state in the event of a serious violation of the fundamental principles of the economic and monetary union. This too would not be possible without a change to the treaties. I know that suspending voting rights meets with resistance from many of our European partners due to the associated change in competencies. I take this very seriously. But I add: Those who reject this must be able to convincingly demonstrate that they do not rely solely on the principle of hope in the event of a serious violation of the fundamental principles of the economic and monetary union, that is to say, that insight into improvement will somehow prevail. That would be grossly negligent; we would only be deceiving ourselves. Avoiding that should be our common goal.

To summarize: I will insist at the Council of European heads of state and government tomorrow and the day after that President Van Rompuy receives a precise mandate from the European Council, based on which he can develop proposals for the necessary, narrowly defined treaty changes and concrete options for a permanently robust crisis management framework in close coordination with the members of the European Council and present them to the European Council by March 2011 at the latest. I say unequivocally for the Federal Government and our country: For me, the approval of the report of the Van Rompuy working group and a precise mandate to Herman Van Rompuy are inseparable. They are a package.

We all know: The solution must be legally valid by summer 2013. This means that we are only prepared for managing future crises if that is the case. Therefore, I say: Although that may seem a long way off, there is not much time to implement all of this. You all know: I was the one who, during the German EU Council Presidency in 2007, together with then Foreign Minister Steinmeier, set the Lisbon Treaty in motion. Today, I am the one who, together with our Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, is firmly advocating that we do not shy away from the difficult path of treaty change, but rather pursue it boldly and resolutely.

The European heads of state and government must demonstrate to the citizens of Europe that they have drawn the right and necessary lessons from the crisis. Just because many fear the naturally arduous path of treaty change, that is by no means an argument against this path. I am convinced: Only by this means can we achieve unequivocal democratic legitimacy for a permanently established crisis management framework. That is the goal of the Federal Government.

I stand for Germany playing a leading role in securing the bright future of the European Union. We will not always receive immediate applause for this – we experienced that in the spring – but in the end, it is not about quick applause, but about winning a majority for our correct proposals, of which we are convinced of their importance for a good future for Europe. We are working on this, and for that, I ask for your support.

The European Council tomorrow and the day after will also address the upcoming G20 summit on November 11 and 12 of this year in Seoul. The establishment of a stable financial market architecture will be one of the central themes of the G20 summit. Here, I would like to repeat a sentence that I said in March 2009 in the midst of the spreading crisis in the run-up to the G20 summit in London:

"… Cooperation instead of isolation. That is the only way to return to growth and employment."

This sentence has lost none of its relevance. I consciously repeat it in light of terms such as currency war, devaluation race, and trade protectionism, which are unfortunately heard again and again in the current international discussion.

A debate using such terms is misguided. It is not only politically shortsighted; a debate with such terms also ignores the enormous successes achieved in combating the crisis. The key to this was an international economic cooperation that had never before been reached in such intensity and density. The only promising strategy for a definitive overcoming of the crisis, as well as for sustainable growth and more employment in the world, is the consistent continuation of this path.

The fact is: The G20 has developed into the most important global forum for economic policy issues in response to the financial market crisis. Without the resolute implementation of the measures jointly agreed upon there, the world economy would not have recovered so quickly from the sharpest economic downturn in peacetime in 80 years. Without the G20's insistence, it would not have been possible to establish such a comprehensive reform agenda for the international financial architecture as we have done, and to gradually work through it.

There is no doubt that we can already see today: Europe has made significant progress, for example in the supervision of hedge fund managers and private equity firms; regarding private equity firms, the Council achieved a breakthrough last week and cleared the way for a swift agreement with the European Parliament. Other examples include the strengthening of financial supervision in Europe, better control of rating agencies, and new remuneration rules that create incentives for risk-aware behavior. In this way, Europe has made a significant contribution to our common goal that all financial markets, all financial market participants, and all financial instruments are subject to appropriate supervision and regulation.

But that is not enough yet. Now it is about resolutely continuing the work on a stable new framework, both at the national, European, and international levels. Governments must not be forced in the future to fully bear the costs of ad-hoc rescue measures for the private losses of systemically relevant banks. Therefore, the ability of banks to absorb such losses themselves must be improved. For this, we need a strengthening of capital requirements for banks. To this end, the Basel Committee has decided on quantitatively and qualitatively higher capital standards – a very important step. We must also establish globally coordinated rules so that we can restructure or wind down systemically relevant financial institutions across borders in times of crisis, in a way that is gentle on the financial markets and with minimal burden on taxpayers.

Germany will advocate for progress on this important issue at the upcoming G20 meeting in Seoul. For Germany, the federal government has already initiated an important legislative project for the restructuring or winding down of banks. This draft law is currently under parliamentary discussion and serves as an international model.

The European Commission has announced legislative proposals for early 2011. I say this quite frankly: Regarding the participation of the financial sector in the costs of the crisis, the federal government could have envisioned more. We could have imagined a uniform solution across the G20. Unfortunately, no consensus has been reached on this. However, this does not change the fact that we remain committed to our goal. There must be no way around the financial sector contributing to the costs of the crisis. Therefore, the federal government continues to support the introduction of a financial transaction tax, at least at the European level if it cannot be implemented globally; that is how it is. You cannot ignore that there were no majorities for this at the G20.

A cornerstone of a new global financial architecture is a strong International Monetary Fund. We have therefore decided at previous G20 summits to strengthen the role of the IMF in crisis prevention and crisis management. The G20 finance ministers prepared the ground last weekend in Korea for us to achieve our reform goals in Seoul. The changed conditions in the world economy will be more strongly reflected in the IMF in the future than they are today. Dynamic emerging economies will be better represented through a higher quota share and more seats on the Executive Board. This success is particularly due to the Europeans, who have somewhat reduced their influence in favor of a fairer overall order in the IMF.

At this point, I would like to expressly thank Minister of Economics Rainer Brüderle for his excellent negotiation leadership in South Korea, when he represented Finance Minister Schäuble, whose presence here today I am particularly pleased about, as well as that of Mr. Steinmeier.

In addition to continuing the reforms in the financial markets, the global strengthening of growth forces will be the second focus of the discussions in Seoul. What can we do together for sustainable, strong, and balanced growth? First of all, we must understand that quantitative targets regarding the current account cannot be a solution. Current account balances are expressions of the competitiveness of economies and arise through market processes, and there should be no artificial intervention in these processes at this point.

To achieve strong, sustainable, and balanced growth, it is therefore necessary to address the structural causes underlying macroeconomic imbalances and to permanently reduce competitive disadvantages. When we look at Germany in this regard, it becomes clear that our country is fulfilling its international responsibility as a leading economic nation. We have implemented two stimulus packages totaling around 80 billion euros, and we have taken further measures to strengthen demand. With this, we have halted the downturn in Germany.

Moreover, due to our measures against the crisis, our exports have fallen significantly more during the crisis than imports. Germany has thus made a substantial contribution to stabilizing the world economy, and we will continue to do so.

In the meantime, we are overcoming the crisis faster than other countries. The current figures and data are impressive. With a growth rate of 3.4 percent this year and an expected 1.8 percent next year, Germany is one of the growth engines in Europe. I add: In terms of jobs, this is even more evident; because we can expect that we will soon have fewer than three million unemployed. This is a tremendous success in such a situation.

Investment activity has also noticeably increased again. We can now say: It was right to stop the crisis even at the cost of massive debt. This path – you will remember – is the one the federal government has taken. Since this has proven to be correct, it will also prove to be right that we now tackle the debt, and that precisely now, not earlier, but also not later. With a growth rate of over three percent this year, now is the right time to begin consolidation.

The time-limited measures under the stimulus packages will expire as planned at the end of the year. A growth- and employment-oriented budget consolidation has been initiated. This is exactly in line with what the heads of state and government of the G20 agreed upon last June in Toronto. The revitalization of international trade also plays a central role in the recovery of the world economy, and therefore we will do everything we can – I will also bring this up again in Seoul – to ensure that the Doha negotiations can finally be concluded with a reasonable result; because they could lead to a real growth impulse for free world trade.

Of course, we must conduct an international discussion about appropriate exchange rates between the world's most significant currencies in a factual and cooperative spirit. However, I say: The global recovery would be called into question if we were to accept increased distortions of exchange rates.

I am convinced that exchange rates should reflect the fundamental data of an economy in the medium term. A policy that aims at exchange rate distortions to strengthen competitiveness must be avoided. Because in a devaluation race, everyone ultimately loses. The terrible experiences following the Great Depression in the 1930s should serve as a strong reminder to all of us not to repeat the mistakes of that time. We have done many things right in this crisis; but if we were to repeat the mistakes of the past while on the way out of the crisis now, it would be very difficult and could really lead to completely wrong effects.

In this context, we should not forget that the future effectiveness of the G20 also depends on the ability to develop an agenda for the coming years and to transfer the cooperative approach, as it has become visible in combating the crisis, to other issues. Germany will decisively support France in its upcoming G20 presidency in this regard.

We also support the proposal of the Korean presidency to anchor development policy in the G20 agenda: on the one hand, because we as developed industrial countries recognize our humanitarian overall responsibility, but on the other hand, because the G20 is aware that the international community can only achieve its goals if there are sustainable advances in the developing countries themselves.

On the agenda of the European Council, five weeks before the start of the UN Climate Conference in Cancun, international climate protection will of course also be on the table. Even if it is likely not to be the focus of public attention here today – as well as in Brussels and Seoul – climate protection has lost none of its urgency. On the contrary, Germany is unequivocally committed to the goal of a new comprehensive climate agreement under the auspices of the United Nations.

It is unfortunately true: Cancun will not yet bring the decisive breakthrough and the comprehensive climate protection agreement. But it is also true: This conference, twelve months after Copenhagen, has the significance of demonstrating that important progress in building the international climate protection architecture and in implementing concrete climate protection measures is possible. In this sense, the European Union will strive for as comprehensive and ambitious a result as possible in Cancun. Germany will support this to the best of its ability.

The political priorities that the federal government pursues with regard to the European Council and the G20 process are ambitious. Implementing them requires our full commitment. No one can rule out setbacks. But if we move forward boldly, it has always brought progress for Europe. And it will be the same this time, where so many fear a change in the European treaties. But nothing has to remain as it is. This has always been the case, and changes for the better are always possible, even if the path is rocky and arduous. With this attitude, I will advocate in Brussels and Seoul for Europe and the G20 to set the right course. And thus we will make an important contribution to the future of our continent and the G20.