Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the 24th German Savings Bank Day on April 25, 2013, in Dresden:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

27 April 2013 · 24th German Savings Bank Day · Dresden, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the 24th German Savings Bank Day in Dresden on April 25, 2013, speaking on banking regulation, savings banks' role, and European financial policy.
Main themes
Savings banks and regional banking, three-pillar banking structure, corporate lending and SME financing, trust and customer relationships, European banking regulation, financial crisis recovery, state banks restructuring, German banking diversity, medium-sized sector support, regional economic presence
Duration
~37 min
88th percentile
Words
4,409
88th percentile
Sentences
242
93rd percentile
Readability
54
75th percentile
Grade
10.1
21st percentile
Syntax
2.88
32nd percentile
Vocabulary
1.97
7th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 59%58%
  • Institutional 21%21%
  • Ceremonial 8%8%
  • Social 6%6%
  • Geopolitical 6%6%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

242 sentences in 55 paragraphs

Dear Mr. President, dear Georg Fahrenschon,

I can also say: dear Georg – he presented everything correctly; when we met exhausted after tough coalition negotiations, it happened –, dear Mr. Minister-President, dear Stanislaw Tillich, dear Madam Mayor, dear Helma Orosz, dear Mr. President of the European Parliament, dear Mr. Schulz, dear Mr. Papier,

I believe the Bishop is missing, but he will come,

ladies and gentlemen,

firstly,

I would like to thank you for the welcome, which also included the farewell. This is perhaps the greatest expression of trust one can show someone.

Secondly,

I would like to greet you on behalf of the German Association of Cities. The participants were slightly disturbed that you are meeting in parallel and were not quite sure what that means for the relationship between savings banks and cities. However, I believe it is nothing serious. It only shows congeniality, at least in choosing dates. This gives hope for further commonalities. The President of the Association of Cities – he was it yesterday; whether he still is at the moment, I do not know – Mr. Ude, did not miss the opportunity to speak after me to ensure that he can comment on what I have said. In this respect, this shows great trust, dear Georg Fahrenschon.

Ladies and gentlemen, I also greet all of you.

I am very pleased to be here. Because this conference of savings banks is also an important milestone in finding an answer to the question of how corporate lending and the savings of people in Germany will continue. Over 40 percent of all corporate loans in Germany are granted by savings banks and state banks. They account for almost a third of the deposits of domestic companies. 40 percent of private savings are held by savings banks and state banks.

What is the recipe for success? I believe one thing is of lasting and central importance, namely that there is a closeness and a relationship of trust with the customer. We have talked a lot about trust in recent years. We know that trust is something that must be treated very carefully and tenderly. Savings banks have built trust over many years through closeness to the customer. For that, I extend my heartfelt thanks to you.

The savings banks achieve this through a very broad regional presence. Through your closeness to the customer, you also maintain the flexibility to respond to changing demands. You know the various regions of our country. You know that the diversity of Germany is also a part of Germany's strength. The regional roots naturally lead to you knowing the conditions from your own experience. You can also represent this very well in your work. You offer advice, services, and financing – from start-ups to business successions. In 2012, the savings banks expanded their lending to businesses once again. We all know what this means for the medium-sized sector, the strong pillar of Germany. You are a reliable partner for the self-employed and medium-sized businesses. You have a significant share in ensuring that the medium-sized sector can continue to be a growth and innovation engine in Germany.

That is reason enough to once again say what you might also expect – Georg Fahrenschon already mentioned this at the beginning; I say it with full conviction –: It is right, and it has proven itself through all changes, that we have a three-pillar structure in our banking sector. The Federal Government stands by this and will make this clear in its further policies. This means – I consider it a very good thing that the President of the European Parliament is here – that the business model of the savings banks must also be taken into account at the European level. The Federal Government will advocate for this. In the diversity of Europe, we need diversity in the institutions as well. European regulations must take this into account.

Nevertheless, we know that the savings banks have come through the great international financial and economic crisis quite well. The state banks had a bit more trouble. But we do not want to talk much about that today. That has largely been placed on a good basis. I just want to say at this point that the adjustment process that the state banks had to undergo was, of course, tough, but it is also an example that such a thing can succeed. When we think of other European countries that are going through such a phase today, we can say as Germans: We have not always found everything easy either. In the adjustment process of the state banks, we saw how necessary it was for the various levels to work well together. It was important not to approach the model of the savings banks in such a way that we could no longer keep it alive. I believe many conclusions can be drawn from this.

But it was clear: We need a new regulatory framework for the entire financial world after the financial crisis. I also say: With the development of such a new regulatory framework, we are by no means at the end. It is proving difficult. It is one of the major topics where it is also true: We can only regulate certain things globally today if they are to be effectively regulated. This is also a good justification for Europe in daily work – I can say this from my own experience – because if we all were to appear individually in international forums and did not have the 500 million Europeans with a strong voice behind us, we would achieve nothing at all. But even so, it is already difficult enough in the G20.

This year, we will continue to work on the topic of bank regulation in St. Petersburg under the Russian G20 presidency. At the last G20 meeting, we filtered out the systemically relevant banks and established specific regulatory standards for them. Now it is about shadow banks; that is an even more complex topic. Because we must, of course, be careful – that we do not have a very strong regulation in the classic banking sector, resulting in many things shifting to the shadow banking sector, and then we will face difficulties elsewhere again.

We have achieved quite a bit in Europe. Think of the implementation of "Basel III." However, I also want to say: I will advocate internationally that not only Europe implements "Basel III." We have the situation that the Europeans are absolute pioneers here, but it is still unclear how the American Congress will respond to such regulations. – I have already spoken with the President of the European Central Bank that it cannot be like with "Basel II," where we have done everything fine and then have to experience that an international regulation is not implemented internationally. – We then have to consider whether we need to react. I want this regulation. We are preparing for it. But they are created for an international competitive field and not for us Europeans to incur competitive disadvantages.

We have not only strengthened the risk-adequate equity of banks, but we are also working on the implementation of remuneration rules for banks and insurers. The European Parliament has also played a very central role in this, not to the delight of all those affected. But that is still the right thing to do. In addition, we will make violations of risk management punishable in the future. We want that if an institution gets into trouble, in the future, the owners of banks can also lose their investment. I think that is very, very important.

Because we have said:

It must be such that firstly,

there can be no banks that are, by definition, so large that they can only be rescued by the taxpayer.

We have

secondly

said that

two

principles belong together: risk and liability must be seen together. It cannot be that one can take on as many risks as one likes and that the liability then falls to the community. This has proven to be a very great mistake.

Now it is a question of: How can we structure this correctly across Europe? Here, banking supervision and, in further development, a banking union is a central topic. I want to make it very clear to you: The Federal Government fully supports a common European banking supervision. I say in this circle – this may not be so central from your perspective, in this circle of savings banks; there are also gradations made here –: For the international credibility of the European banking system, it is essential that we have a trustworthy unified European supervisory mechanism.

We have thought long about: Who can be the responsible authority? For the euro area, we then said: We must give the European Central Bank a central function. However, we must be careful not to mix the monetary policy function and the supervisory responsibilities.

I believe that we have now found a reasonable solution within the framework of the existing treaties. We must not forget that in many European countries, including many euro member states, the central banks are already the supervisory authorities. So what seems difficult for us is common practice in other countries. But Germany has insisted that the responsibilities not be mixed.

We naturally need mechanisms that ensure that both deposit insurance is harmonized and that the resolution mechanisms in the European countries, at least in the euro countries, are effective. I also want to make it very clear: The Federal Government rejects a uniform European deposit insurance, at least for the foreseeable future. But we strongly advocate that we finally make progress with the harmonization of European deposit systems.

We also do not support mutual lending under the deposit insurance systems – we still have difficult negotiations with the European Parliament on this – because we believe that risk and liability belong together. As long as there is no institutionalization, which is also not foreseeable, it is not appropriate to have a common European deposit insurance. But there must be a national deposit insurance based on common standards. That is our negotiating position.

What happens when a systemically relevant bank gets into trouble? It is important that we have a resolution mechanism. By the way, we have taken the lead in Germany on this. Every bank must be able to be restructured and, if necessary, resolved in an emergency. For this, systemically relevant banks must develop plans together with the supervisory authorities. This is happening now in Germany. This is also happening in a very rigorous manner in the United States of America. Then we are much better prepared than before the great financial crisis. There is also a legislative proposal from the EU for this. This must be the core element of a common resolution mechanism. We already have practical experience in Germany.

We also had tough discussions with the savings banks about the bank levy. I believe we have found a solution that reasonably reflects the historical role of the savings banks. They were certainly not the cause of the financial crisis. Therefore, the levy does not weigh heavily on them. This, of course, means that the revenues from the bank levy in Germany are not such that one could already save huge financial institutions with it tomorrow. But we must not forget that the bank levy is really the very last link. Because we have the resolution mechanisms that come into play beforehand and give us much more legal certainty.

The German banking system has thus become more robust in recent years. This is also in the interest of the overall economy. We must now ensure that entire business areas in the real economy do not face major difficulties in obtaining credit. Therefore, I also ask the savings banks to ensure that we do not experience something like a credit crunch. I am thinking now as a North German particularly of ship financing, which is really in trouble because one is still busy dealing with the risks of the past. But overall, thanks to the savings banks, it has been possible in Germany to have reasonable financing for the German medium-sized sector instead of a credit crunch. For that, I extend my heartfelt thanks.

And because we have managed all of this – starting in the Grand Coalition, continued in the current Federal Government – quite reasonably, we have also been able to reach the pre-crisis level of gross domestic product as early as 2011. This is by no means the case in all European countries. We had one of the largest declines in gross domestic product in Germany at minus five percent. That we have ensured that this has not become dramatically noticeable – especially in the form of unemployment – is certainly a very wise decision.

It has been a test of the Social Market Economy in the best sense; and the Social Market Economy has truly proven itself – also regarding the relationship between employees and employers. Since then, I have also observed that some discussions about co-determination, about works councils, and many other things in Germany have become somewhat quieter, because we have seen, also in the European context, how much responsibility employees have taken on in such a crisis situation. When the German Trade Union Confederation travels with me to Spain, Portugal, or elsewhere and states what German trade unions, for example, are doing for vocational training and what responsibility they also take on, then that can be something that is indeed emulated in Europe. I think that is something very good.

Nevertheless, we have an exceptionally difficult situation. Nowadays, we are actually informed daily about various economic data. One can hardly keep up with which economic index has just risen or fallen. Therefore, it is worthwhile to look at the long-term trends. We see: Germany has had lower growth rates since 2012 – about half a percent in 2013; perhaps more next year. Regarding the credibility of such forecasts, one must be very cautious anyway, but we still have to make them.

What does that mean? Ultimately, it means: Germany will only do well in the medium and long term if all of Europe is doing well. We cannot decouple ourselves from that, because 60 percent of our exports flow into the European Union and 40 percent into the Eurozone. This means we have an inherent interest in the well-being of the entire Eurozone. The fact that you have interest rates that are so beautifully low – when it comes to government bonds, we are used to saying such things – also benefits public budgets. The Saxon Minister-President has few difficulties financing his state anyway. The federal government is certainly pleased about low interest rates, but we are now also seeing the downsides: the downside for insurers and the downside for customers who have deposits with savings banks. This means I fully support that we return to a harmonized interest rate level in Europe.

If you look at the interest rate development for government bonds before the introduction of the Euro, after the introduction of the Euro, and in the last three years, you see something very interesting. Before the introduction of the Euro, we had massive differences in interest rates for, let’s say, ten-year government bonds. After the introduction of the Euro, there were increasingly fewer interest rate differences for government bonds in the Euro area. This was also related to the fact that international investors were evidently mistakenly of the opinion that there was a community liability in Europe. Then, through the financing of stimulus programs during the international financial crisis, which originated in America, we essentially entered a stress test. During this stress test, investors suddenly asked: Can we actually treat all these countries equally? They then came to the conclusion that this is not possible. This led to a fragmentation of the interest rate level, as if we no longer had a Euro.

Now it is about shaping the foundation of the Euro area so that equal interest rates do not arise from misjudgment or a superficial community liability, but from a foundation of comparable economic structures and, of course, also from safeguarding mechanisms in connection with the question: What happens in the event of a crisis that cannot be foreseen? When you now see how the interest rates are converging again, that is also a success of politics, because we have a fiscal pact, because we have solidarity mechanisms like the European Stability Mechanism, the ESM. It is, of course, also a success that the European Central Bank has clearly committed to the Euro. However, we still need to work further on this task.

I once took a paper by Jacques Delors from the time before the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union. It clearly stated: It is not only about all member states of a currency area having the same deficit limit, as we have today in the Stability and Growth Pact, which we have also significantly strengthened, but it is also about having a common understanding of economic policy, of competitiveness, and of where we actually want to go. It cannot be that one country, two countries, three countries, or five countries are striving for the highest competitiveness while other countries consume a lot. I am not putting anyone on trial here; I am just saying that Jacques Delors said: There needs to be economic policy coordination; and with a common currency, not everyone can pursue completely different principles. This means we need more Europe. This does not automatically mean that one has to cede responsibilities to Europe. However, a sense of shared responsibility must arise.

Over the past five years, I have learned two words that I had never used before. The first was "real economy" when it came to the financial crisis. And the second was "austerity." Until then, it was called "budget consolidation," "sound economic management," or "not incurring debt." Now it is called "austerity," which already sounds like a foe is approaching us. I simply say: The situation we are in now did not arise from austerity; it arose from the fact that at some point we had to realize that Greece had a deficit of 15 percent, and everyone internationally said: We do not believe that this can be reduced.

This means we now need to find a way in which we have solid finances and at the same time as much growth as possible – a way in which we can return to solid economic development. What we are currently seeing in many European countries is also not bearable for Germany: Six million young people under 25 are unemployed in Europe. We urgently need to address this problem. That is why, alongside the growth program, we have also launched a special program to combat youth unemployment, which was also adopted last year together with French President François Hollande.

We talk a lot about growth in Europe, but we also need to ask ourselves: What do we mean by that? Only growth based on state financing will not make us more competitive in Europe. This means we are talking about the nature of growth and not about the question: Growth – yes or no? Therefore, it is also about research and innovation.

I also believe – I spoke with Herman Van Rompuy about this last night – that we in Germany, for example, have gained experiences in combating unemployment in the new federal states that we would like to contribute. We had huge unemployment numbers, especially among young people. We had a large range of instruments with which we addressed this. We know that ABM alone cannot solve such a problem, but, for example, state wage cost subsidies over certain periods help. It also helps to ask companies to give young people a chance. We really need to create a movement in Europe now that brings this issue to the forefront.

Even if we have bloated state apparatuses or state structures, we will have to go down the path of certain privatizations. This has proven to be correct in Germany and elsewhere. It is not about us pointing fingers at each other in Europe; it is about one thing: 90 percent of the growth in the world takes place outside of Europe; and if Europe does not succeed in exporting to the world outside of Europe, if we do not have sellable goods or services, then we will not grow sufficiently. That is the bitter truth. This means competitiveness is not a goal in itself, but competitiveness is a fundamental necessity for growth – that is my deep conviction. And that is why we should strive for it.

A lot has been done in this phase by many countries – Spain, Portugal, Greece, also Italy and others. We in Germany must not stand still either. Because, for example, regarding the internal market concerning services, we are also being asked very critical questions in Europe. I know that we want to maintain our social standards – we are fighting for that too. But the admonitions we receive in our country-specific recommendations from the Commission clearly indicate that some special regulations in Germany are being watched with a keen eye. Above all, we need a good internal market regarding all information technology. Because when there is a demand for labor in Europe, it is in the entire IT sector. We need business start-ups, as many start-ups as possible. For that, we need the right financing. We need many innovative ideas on how we can really create growth in Europe. However, this is not the place to dissect all of that. I just wanted to say: If we want to return to bearable interest rate levels, we must overcome this internal division of the Euro area.

The European Central Bank, dear Georg Fahrenschon, is of course in a very difficult situation. It would probably need to raise interest rates for Germany a bit at the moment, but it would also actually need to do more to ensure that liquidity is really made available for other countries again. And it is especially important to ensure that this liquidity reaches corporate financing. If we look at the fact that in Portugal, in Italy, even in South Tyrol, or in other places where comparable economic strength exists, corporate credit is two to three times more expensive than in Germany, then we see that many of the reform efforts in these countries are simply being consumed by the fact that financing for new investments for companies is not possible at all. This means, on the one hand, we need to bring down interest rates for government bonds; and only then will interest rates for corporate bonds also decrease.

Mario Draghi recently made it very clear to us: The higher a country's debt is, the more financial institutions invest in financing government bonds, the less money remains for corporate financing, and the more difficult corporate financing becomes. This means we get into a cycle. That is why it is better to reduce debt and not have too much debt, because otherwise financing growth becomes much more difficult.

We are keeping all of this in mind. We are working on it. But – think of the phase of the Hartz IV reforms in Germany – I also say: This cannot be achieved in a few months; it requires a longer lead time.

Germany has a constitutionally enshrined obligation to financial solidity with the debt brake. The states are working on it, and the federal government is too. We are pleased that we are already meeting the requirements of the debt brake for the federal government and want to establish a budget next year in which the structural new debt is already zero. We will continue to work in this direction and thus strengthen solidity.

So we are in a very decisive phase in Europe. I believe it is very, very important that we all see that Europe is indispensable for us. From my perspective, this is because we have something in Europe that makes us strong compared to the other 6.5 billion people in the world. We are at least 500 million people – about seven percent of the world's population – who, when things go well, have 25 percent of the economic output and who are estimated to have over 40 percent of the world's social spending. What makes us strong is our European social model; and we must maintain and further develop that in the 21st century; and we must ensure that our children and grandchildren also benefit from it.

There is a lot of criticism about Europe. If I had a moment more, Martin Schulz and I would, of course, discuss the details of the medium-term financial framework, the budget for 2013, and many important things, sometimes even argue about them. We spend nights on that. But one thing we do not do: we hardly ever argue about democracy. It is taken for granted that there are free elections. It is taken for granted that we have freedom of movement. It is taken for granted that we have freedom of the press. It is taken for granted that we have freedom of religion. These are things we rarely, if ever, have to discuss, let alone argue about. That 500 million people can bring these values into the world is not something you find very often when you look at the world.

That is to say, the fact that we passionately argue about certain issues sometimes makes us lose sight of what we passionately stand for together. That we can be here together today in Dresden, that there is no more Cold War, that there is no more Iron Curtain, that it is completely normal to be able to go to Poland, the Czech Republic, and elsewhere, that we still have to work on what concerns Belarus and Ukraine, but that we have hope that we can achieve that – this is worth so much that we can and must really get a grip on the other things as well.

A heartfelt thank you to the many members – this is truly an impressive gathering of the savings bank family – for working on exactly that. All the best – and to a good and sometimes constructively critical collaboration, dear Georg Fahrenschon.